134. Intellectual Habits and the Possible Intellect

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Question: Can the Intellect Have Habits? #

• Central objection: The intellect is form without matter, therefore pure act, and habits require something in potency
• If the intellect is purely actual like God, it cannot possess habits
• Habits exist as a middle state between potency and act, requiring a subject in potency

The Problem of Intellect’s Immateriality #

• The understanding is not an act or form of the body (as established in De Anima III)
• Therefore, the understanding should not be subject to habits, which are seen as bodily dispositions
• Common operations of man belong to the soul-body conjunction, so habits should be in the conjunction, not the intellect alone
• Yet Aristotle distinguishes intellectual virtues (wisdom, science, understanding) as belonging to reason itself, not sensory powers

Thomas’s Resolution #

• The possible intellect (intellectus possibilis) is in potency with respect to all intelligible things
• This is analogous to prime matter being in potency to all sensible forms
• Therefore, the possible intellect can be perfected by intellectual habits
• A habit is not the disposition of object to power, but of power to object
• Intellectual habits reside principally in the possible intellect itself, not in the phantasms or sensory powers (which are common to body and soul)
• The phantasm stands to the possible intellect as object, not as subject of the habit

First Act vs. Second Act #

• When someone learns a theorem (e.g., Pythagorean theorem), they possess it as first act—habitually, capable of operation
• The actual consideration or demonstration of the theorem is second act
• Even when not actively thinking about it, the habit remains in the intellect, subject to the will
• The possible intellect is reduced to act through intelligible species (intelligible forms)

Memory and Habit Distinguished #

• Intellectual memory is the habitual retention of intelligible forms whereby one understands
• This differs from sensory memory, which is tied to singular images and depends on sense powers
• Intellectual memory is accessed through will and reason, not dependent on time or sensory presentation

Key Arguments #

Against Intellectual Habits (Objections) #

1. Form-without-matter argument: The intellect is form without matter; only composed things (form + matter) have potency and act together; therefore only composed things can have habits
2. Disposition argument: A habit is a disposition by which someone is well or badly disposed; good or bad disposition to understanding comes from bodily disposition; therefore habits are not in the separated intellect
3. Reason and the senses: Sense powers are not rational per essentiam but only by partaking; therefore, knowing habits cannot be in them; but the intellect must have something in potency to receive habits; contradiction

Thomas’s Counterarguments #

1. The potency of the possible intellect: Just as prime matter exists in potency to sensible forms without being pure potency, the possible intellect exists in potency to intelligible forms. Different kinds of subjects can have different kinds of potency (material vs. intellectual)
2. Habit belongs to the power of the operation: If an operation belongs to a power, then the habit perfecting that operation belongs to that same power. Understanding is the proper operation of the intellect; therefore, the habit of science belongs to the intellect itself
3. The possible intellect is the true subject: It belongs to the possible intellect to be in potency to many things; this is the defining characteristic of a subject of habit; therefore, the possible intellect is supremely the subject of habit
4. Phantasms are objects, not subjects: The phantasm or image stands to the possible intellect as object (compared to the intellect as a potency receiving it), not as subject. Therefore, the habit is not principally in the phantasm (which is common to soul and body) but in the intellect itself

Important Definitions #

Habit (habitus) #

• A quality existing as a middle state between pure potency and perfect act (first act)
• Disposition of a power to its operation, not disposition of an object to a power
• Enables operation when the agent wills it, distinguishing it from what is always in act
• Requires a subject in potency to many things

Possible Intellect (intellectus possibilis) #

• The intellect in potency with respect to all intelligible things
• Analogous to prime matter in the order of sensible things
• The proper subject of intellectual habits
• Distinguished from the agent intellect (intellectus agens), which actualizes intelligible species

Intelligible Species (intelligible forms) #

• The forms by which the possible intellect understands
• Received from phantasms through the action of the agent intellect
• What the possible intellect becomes actualized through

Potency (potentia) #

• Capacity to receive a form or to perform an act
• Material potency: potency of matter to receive form
• Intellectual potency: potency of the intellect to receive intelligible forms
• Different kinds of potency in different kinds of subjects

First Act vs. Second Act (actus primus / actus secundus) #

• First act: possession of a form, power, or habit (e.g., having learned the Pythagorean theorem)
• Second act: exercise of that form or power (e.g., actually demonstrating the theorem)
• The intellect in learning passes from potency to first act; in considering, from first act to second act

Phantasm (phantasma) #

• The image or representation received through the senses
• Stands to the intellect as object, not as subject of intellectual habits
• Necessary for human intellectual knowledge but not the subject in which intellecutal habits reside

Examples & Illustrations #

The Farmer’s Mule #

Berquist recounts how a farmer’s mule was struck by lightning in a field. For the rest of its life, whenever the mule returned to that field, it would deliberately avoid that spot. This illustrates memory and habit formation even in non-rational animals—the mule “remembered” and habitually avoided what caused pain.

The Pythagorean Theorem #

Used as a primary example of intellectual habit. Even when not actively thinking about it, one who has learned the theorem possesses the habit. The learner can, at will, go to the board and demonstrate it. This demonstration is the second act; the habitual knowledge beforehand is the first act.

Learning vs. Considering #

Berquist explains: when learning from another (discovering by oneself), one moves from pure potency to first act. When then considering the learned material, one moves from first act to second act. The habit of science exists as first act—the stable possession of knowledge that enables but does not require continuous exercise.

Medicine and Memory #

Berquist shares a personal anecdote about taking two pills in the morning and later wondering: “Did I take two or did I take one?” He used the external memory aid of an open tea box to determine what day it was (“It’s Wednesday”). This illustrates the difference between sensory/empirical memory (dependent on images and circumstances) and intellectual memory (which operates through reason and is not dependent on external cues).

Geometry and the Order of Proceeding #

Berquist contrasts different orders of proceeding. Geometry proceeds from simple to complex, from equal to unequal. Euclid defines equilateral before isosceles before scalene triangles; he defines square before rhombus and rectangle. The Pythagorean theorem (Proposition 47) comes before theorems about obtuse and acute angles (Book II, Props. 12-13), which depend on the Pythagorean theorem for their proofs. Even number is defined before odd number because it is divided into two equal parts. This ordering reflects the natural movement of the intellect from what is better known to us toward what is better known in itself.

Questions Addressed #

Q: Can the intellect, being immaterial form, be the subject of habits? #

A: Yes. Though the intellect is immaterial and act-like, it is not pure act. The possible intellect exists in potency with respect to all intelligible things. Just as prime matter stands in potency to all sensible forms, the possible intellect stands in potency to all intelligible forms. Therefore, nothing prevents the possible intellect from having a habit, which is a middle state between potency and perfect act.

Q: If understanding comes from soul-body operations, shouldn’t habits be in the conjunction rather than the intellect alone? #

A: A habit is not the disposition of the object to the power, but of the power to its operation. Understanding itself, as an operation, is not common to soul and body except through the phantasm (the image). The phantasm is compared to the possible intellect as object. Therefore, the habit is principally in the intellect itself, not in the phantasm or sensory powers, though sensory preparation is necessary for human intellection.

Q: How is intellectual memory different from sensory memory? #

A: If by memory one means the habitual retention of intelligible forms whereby one understands, this is similar to (or the same as) the intellectual habit. However, there is also sensory memory, which is an interior sense power tied to singular images. Intellectual memory is subject to the will and reason; sensory memory depends on time and sensory presentation. One can intellectually recall a definition “on demand,” whereas sensory memory requires appropriate temporal or sensory triggers.

Q: Why are axioms like “the whole is greater than the part” situated before theorems about unequal magnitudes? #

A: This follows from the natural order of the intellect’s movement. The equal comes before the unequal in human understanding. Therefore, Euclid establishes axioms about equality and the Pythagorean theorem (about equal or related magnitudes) before proving theorems that depend on understanding inequality. The order of proceeding in knowledge must follow what is naturally prior in understanding.

Philosophical Principles Discussed #

Essential vs. Accidental (Per Se vs. Per Accidens) #

Berquist emphasizes the distinction between what belongs to something essentially and what belongs to it by participation or accident. A power has a property per se; a thing has it per accidens if it has it through another. For example: sugar is sweet per se; lemonade is sweet per accidens (through the sugar). This principle helps clarify why sense powers are not rational essentially, though rational acts can use sensory powers.

The Axiom of Prior Knowledge #

What is better known in itself may not be better known to us. The order of learning must accommodate what is naturally prior in understanding (better known to itself) while proceeding from what is clearer to us. Geometry exemplifies this with its ordered progression from axioms through simple figures to complex theorems.

Different Kinds of Potency #

Berquist and Aquinas emphasize that potency is not univocal. Material potency (potency of matter to form) differs from intellectual potency (potency of intellect to intelligible forms). Recognizing different kinds of potency allows us to avoid reducing everything to material composition and enables understanding how immaterial things like the intellect can have habits.

Contextual Connections #

To Aristotle #

• De Anima I-III: On the nature of the intellect and its immateriality
• Metaphysics IX: On act and potency in universal sense
• Nicomachean Ethics VI: On intellectual virtues (wisdom, science, understanding, prudence)
• Physics I: On form and matter as act and potency

To Thomas’s Treatment #

• Continues the systematic examination of what can be a subject of habits
• Prepares for discussion of habits in the will (Article 5) and in angels (Article 6)
• Grounds the existence of intellectual virtues that will be discussed later

To Medieval Philosophical Tradition #

• Engages implicitly with Averroist interpretations of the intellect’s unity
• References the distinction between possible and agent intellect from Aristotle through Islamic and Christian Aristotelians