146. Prudence, Moral Virtue, and the Irascible and Concupiscible Powers

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Prudence and Right Reason About Things to Be Done #

• Prudence (φρόνησις/prudentia) is right reason about things to be done
• Requires rectitude of the will toward the ends/objectives (finis)
• Distinguished from speculative knowledge: must know the end not merely speculatively but be inclined to it concretely through the will
• Depends heavily on experience and on the rectification of the will regarding appetite

The Rectitude of Will as Foundation for Prudence #

• Just as natural light of the agent intellect (lumen intellectus agentis) underlies speculative knowledge with self-evident principles (e.g., “the whole is more than a part”)
• Rectitude of the will underlies prudence
• Example: Without temperance regarding food and drink, one cannot judge when one has had enough; without justice toward others, one cannot reason rightly about what to do toward them
• Prudence cannot exist without moral virtue; one may have worldly wisdom but not true prudence without moral virtue
• This creates a subtle relationship: reason orders things, yet the rectitude of will must precede prudence

The Irascible and Concupiscible as Subject of Virtue #

• Question: Can the irascible (θυμός/irascibilis) and concupiscible (ἐπιθυμία/concupiscibilis) appetites be subjects of human virtue?
• These powers are common to humans and beasts
• Objection: Since virtue is proper to man and these powers are shared with animals, they cannot be subjects of human virtue
• Objection: Since moral virtue cannot dwell in flesh/bodily organs, and appetite uses bodily organs, appetite cannot be subject of virtue
• Objection: The chief act of moral virtue is choice (προαίρεσις/electio), which belongs to reason, not appetite
• Objection: Body is ruled by soul despotically (like master-slave), so all good is referred to soul; therefore virtue cannot be in appetitive powers

Thomas’s Resolution: Participation in Reason #

• The irascible and concupiscible can be considered in two ways:
  1. In themselves (secundum se): as parts of the sensitive appetitive power—in this way they cannot be subject of virtue
  2. As they participate in reason (per participationem rationis): insofar as they are apt to obey reason—in this way they are subjects of human virtue
• Moral virtue is a habitual conformity of these powers to reason (conformitas habitualis harum potentiarum ad rationem)
• The irascible and concupiscible do not obey reason “blindly” (caeca oboedientia) as the body obeys the soul
• Aristotle’s distinction: reason should rule the emotions like a father rules a son (not despotically like master-slave), because emotions have something to say about their operations and can offer resistance

The Role of Choice in Moral Virtue #

• Choice involves two elements: (1) intention of the end (pertaining to moral virtue), (2) deliberation about means (pertaining to prudence)
• For right intention of the end to occur, the irascible and concupiscible must be well-disposed
• Therefore moral virtues regarding the passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers
• Example: temperance is the habituation to moderate desire for food and drink; courage is the habituation of the irascible to face dangers appropriately

Distinction Between Despotic and Political Rule #

• Body obeys soul “blindly” without contradiction in matters apt to be moved by soul → soul rules body despotically (despotice)
• Therefore no virtue in body itself, only in soul
• Irascible and concupiscible do not obey reason blindly → they have a certain resistance and deliberative capacity
• Therefore they require habituation to conform to reason; this habituation is moral virtue
• Comparison to taming wild horses: the horse initially resists but through repeated discipline becomes obedient; similarly emotions initially resist reason but through habituation become conformable to it

Interior Sensory Powers (Apprehensive Powers) and Virtue #

• Question: Can the interior sensitive apprehensive powers (imagination, cogitative power, memory) be subjects of virtue?
• These powers include: imaginative power (imaginativa), cogitative power (vis cogitativa), and memory (memoria)
• Objection: These powers obey reason (e.g., when doing geometry, the imagination pictures the figures); therefore they can be subjects of virtue
• Objection: Just as the will is aided or impeded through the sense appetite, so reason is aided or impeded through imaginative and sensory powers
• Objection: Prudence includes memory as one of its parts (according to Cicero); therefore virtue can exist in the memorative power
• Objection: All virtues are either intellectual or moral; but if sensory apprehensive powers can be well-disposed, this would require a third class of virtue

Thomas’s Resolution: Habits But Not Virtues #

• Interior apprehensive powers can have habits acquired through custom (consuetudo)
• Custom works like second nature (in modum naturae); habit is nothing other than “that which is customary” (constitudinalis)
• Cicero: virtue is “a habit in the manner of nature” (in modum naturae) in agreement with reason
• However, these habits are not virtues per se but are annexed to intellectual habits
• Virtue must be a perfect habit by which it happens that one does good (virtus est habitus perfectus per quem non fit nisi bonum)
• The interior sensory powers do not complete the act of knowing; they are preparatory (praeparatoria)
• Knowledge of truth is completed in the understanding or reason itself, not in the sensory apprehensive powers
• Therefore: virtues by which truth is known belong to the understanding/reason itself

The Distinction Between Moving and Moved Powers #

• Sense appetite is moved by the will; therefore it completes the act and can be subject of virtue
• Sensory apprehensive powers are moving principles for reason (images move the understanding) but do not complete the act of understanding
• Analogy: Images relate to the understanding as colors relate to sight (from Aristotle, De Anima III)
• Because sensory apprehension does not complete the act, these powers cannot be proper subjects of virtue
• Memory is included in prudence not as a subject part but as one of the things required for foresight; memory is necessary for prudence but prudence is not in memory

Key Arguments #

For Moral Virtue in Irascible and Concupiscible #

• Aristotle explicitly assigns courage to the irascible and temperance to the concupiscible (Ethics III)
• These powers can partake of reason through obedience
• Moral acts require right intention of the end, which depends on good disposition of these appetitive powers
• Experience and habituation show these powers can be trained like animals (horses) to conform to reason

Against Moral Virtue in Irascible and Concupiscible #

• These powers are common to animals; virtue should be proper to man
• They use bodily organs; virtue should be only in the soul
• The chief act of moral virtue (choice) belongs to reason, not appetite
• The body is ruled despotically by the soul, so all good should be referred to soul alone

For Virtues in Interior Apprehensive Powers #

• These powers obey reason when reason commands them (e.g., imagination in geometry)
• Reason is aided or impeded by these powers, just as will is aided or impeded by sense appetite
• Memory is part of prudence; therefore virtue should exist in memory
• Custom produces habits in these powers that function like second nature

Against Virtues in Interior Apprehensive Powers #

• All virtues are classified as either intellectual or moral; no third category exists
• These powers do not complete the act of knowing; they are preparatory
• The completion of knowledge occurs in the understanding/reason, not in sensory apprehension
• Habits in these powers are annexed to intellectual virtues, not virtues per se

Important Definitions #

Prudence (Prudentia/Φρόνησις) #

• Right reason about things to be done (recta ratio agibilium)
• Distinguished from art (ars) and from speculative sciences
• Requires both intellectual grasp of means and rectitude of will regarding ends

The Irascible Appetite (Irascibilis) #

• Greek: θυμός (thymos) in Plato and Aristotle
• The power of spirited/aggressive appetition
• Concerns response to difficulties, dangers, and honor
• Subject of courage (fortitudo) when properly habituated to reason

The Concupiscible Appetite (Concupiscibilis) #

• Greek: ἐπιθυμία (epithymia) in Plato and Aristotle
• The power of desire for pleasant things
• Concerns food, drink, sexual pleasure, and comfort
• Subject of temperance (temperantia) when properly habituated to reason

Habituation (Constitudinalis) #

• Habit acquired through custom (consuetudo)
• Functions like second nature
• Distinguished from innate nature or immediate obedience

Despotic Rule (Despotice) #

• Rule as master over slave (like soul ruling body)
• Immediate, unresisting obedience without deliberation
• Contrasted with political rule

Political Rule (Politice) #

• Rule as father over son or statesman over citizens
• Allows for resistance, deliberation, and partial autonomy
• The proper way reason should rule the emotions

Conformity to Reason (Conformitas … ad Rationem) #

• Habituation of appetite to follow dictates of reason
• Constitutes moral virtue in appetitive powers
• Does not eliminate appetitive resistance but habituates to overcome it

Examples & Illustrations #

The Damaged Car Incident #

• A Frenchman intentionally throws a stone that damages Berquist’s new car
• Berquist initially feels anger (passion of irascible appetite)
• Through reason, he moderates the anger: “I’m a philosopher, what do I care?”
• Illustration of how emotions naturally arise but can be trained to follow reason
• The emotion itself is not eliminated but is ordered by reason

Teaching a Child about Virtue #

• When teaching commandments to young children, explaining “adultery” as “stealing someone’s mother or father”
• Appropriate for a child’s understanding while remaining essentially true
• Shows how reason directs the will toward what is fitting in particular circumstances

Taming Wild Horses #

• Reference to Washington Irving’s Tour of the West: wild horses initially resist and try to throw off the rider
• Must persist repeatedly in disciplining the horse
• Eventually the horse becomes obedient through habituation
• Analogy: emotions are like the wild horse; reason is the rider; virtue is the habituation of obedience
• Emotions will naturally resist at first (unlike the body which obeys soul immediately)

Determining Appropriate Food and Drink #

• Eating moderately is temperance; eating excessively is intemperance
• Circumstances determine what is appropriate: before surgery (none), after operation (perhaps one cocktail), before bed (perhaps none), before driving (perhaps none)
• Prudence (not mere appetite) determines what and how much in each situation
• Even festive meals (Thanksgiving) can permit more eating because of the special occasion
• Example from Scripture: Nehemiah speaks of sweet wines and rejoicing on feast days

The Doctor’s Coffee #

• A doctor having coffee before surgery
• Illustrates how same action (drinking coffee) can be appropriate in one circumstance but not in another
• If the coffee steadies the hand, it is appropriate; if it makes hands shake, it is inappropriate

Geometrical Imagination #

• When doing geometry, must imagine/picture the figures
• Cannot fully understand solid figures without visualization
• Imagination provides necessary preparation for understanding
• Yet the completion of knowledge is in the understanding itself, not the imagination
• New 19th-century edition of Euclid uses colored diagrams instead of letters for improved visual memory

Good-Natured Colleagues #

• Coworkers who constantly joke and insult each other in good nature
• Shows how irascible appetite can be expressed in proportionate ways when habituated correctly
• Different from genuine hostility

Accidental Bumping in the Hallway #

• Someone bumps into you accidentally in the hallway → small irritation
• Contrasted with deliberate knocking everyone down (high school behavior) → would justify stronger anger
• Contrasted with using one’s children as target practice → would justify significant anger
• Shows how reason judges appropriate level of anger to circumstance

Ice Cream at a Friend’s House #

• Friend offers ice cream; the friend picks a “salad bowl” worth because he’s underweight
• Even though ice cream is pleasant, friend moderates through reason because he wants to eat appropriately
• Temperance (not mere appetite) determines the amount

Questions Addressed #

Can the Irascible and Concupiscible Be Subjects of Human Virtue? #

Objections:

1. They are common to animals; virtue should be proper to man
2. They use bodily organs; virtue should only be in the soul
3. Choice (the chief act of moral virtue) belongs to reason, not appetite
4. Body is ruled despotically by soul; therefore virtue should only be in soul

Resolution:

• These powers can be subjects of virtue insofar as they participate in reason through obedience
• They are apt to obey reason, unlike the body which obeys despotically
• Moral virtue is the habitual conformity of these powers to reason
• Because they have a deliberative capacity (not blind obedience), they require habituation to conform to reason
• This habituation is what constitutes moral virtue in these powers

Can Interior Sensory Apprehensive Powers (Imagination, Cogitation, Memory) Be Subjects of Virtue? #

Objections:

1. They obey reason (imagination helps in geometry)
2. Reason is aided or impeded through them
3. Memory is part of prudence
4. Custom produces habits in them like second nature

Resolution:

• These powers can have habits (acquired through custom) but not virtues per se
• These habits are annexed to intellectual virtues but are not virtues in themselves
• Virtue must be a perfect habit that perfects the power to complete its act well
• These sensory powers do not complete the act of knowing; they prepare for it
• The completion of knowing occurs in the understanding/reason
• Memory is required for prudence but prudence exists in reason, not in memory