148. Art and Prudence as Intellectual Virtues

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Art (Ars) as an Intellectual Virtue #

Definition: Right reason about things to be made (recta ratio factibilium)

Key Characteristics:

• Makes only the ability for good work, not the use of that ability
• Does not require rectification of appetite; a good cook can be a glutton and still cook excellently
• The good of art is in the thing made (the artifact), not in the artist
• Making (facere) is an act passing into exterior matter; perfection is in the artifact, not the agent
• Concerned with contingent things that can be otherwise
• Distinguished from speculative virtues by its concern with making external products

Why Art Is Not a Complete Virtue:

• Augustine’s principle: no one badly uses virtue, but someone can use art badly (e.g., a doctor performing abortion)
• This apparent contradiction resolves when we recognize art only makes ability, not use
• A bad use of art is “against art” rather than “according to art”
• The rectitude of will (moral virtue) is required for good use, but not part of the notion of art itself

Prudence (Prudentia) as Distinct from Art #

Definition: Right reason about things to be done (recta ratio agibilium)

Key Distinctions from Art:

• Makes both the ability AND the use of that ability for good action
• Requires rectification of appetite through moral virtue
• Doing (agere) is an act remaining in the agent; perfection is in the doer
• Concerns human acts that constitute the entirety of living well
• Essential for living virtuously, not merely for producing good artifacts

Why Prudence Requires Moral Virtue:

• The ends of human action are the starting points (analogous to principles in demonstration)
• One must be well-disposed toward the right end through moral virtue
• Without wanting to eat moderately, one cannot find the right amount to eat
• Without wanting to be just, one cannot determine fair prices or proper treatment
• Prudence presupposes the rectitude of the will and appetites

The Distinction Between Making and Doing #

Making (Facere):

• An act passing over (actus transiens) into exterior matter
• The perfection is in the thing made, not the maker
• Examples: building, cutting, crafting
• Not affected by whether the maker loves or hates the product

Doing (Agere):

• An act remaining in the one acting (actus immanens)
• The perfection is in the agent performing it
• Examples: seeing, willing, acting virtuously
• Constitutes the flourishing of the agent

Why Prudence Is Distinguished Before Moral Virtues #

Thomas proceeds from less unlike to more unlike:

• Art is unlike speculative virtues but shares the feature of being about what can be otherwise
• Prudence is more unlike speculative virtues (concerns human acts, requires moral virtue)
• Therefore prudence is treated after art but with the moral virtues

Key Arguments #

Against Art Being a Virtue (Augustine’s Objection) #

Objection: Augustine says no one badly uses virtue, but someone can use art badly (e.g., a doctor performing abortion).

Response:

• This reflects the two senses of virtue
• Art only makes the ability for good work, not the use of that ability
• The rectitude of will (moral virtue) is required for good use but is not part of art itself
• A bad use of art is contrary to art, just as lying is contrary to science even though the person knows truth
• Through justice, which rectifies the will, the artist is inclined to do faithful work

Against Prudence Being Identical to Art #

Objection: Both art and prudence are right reason about things that can be otherwise; both involve taking counsel (as in military strategy).

Response:

• The distinction lies in the formal notion of virtue
• Art makes only ability; prudence makes both ability and use
• Art concerns making (external products); prudence concerns doing (human acts)
• Art does not require rectified appetite; prudence essentially requires it
• Prudence takes counsel about the whole of human life and its ultimate end; art takes counsel only about private ends of particular arts
• A military leader may have the art of strategy but lack prudence if he does not order it to the common good

Important Definitions #

Facere (Making): An act passing into exterior matter whose perfection is in the thing made, not the agent

Agere (Doing): An act remaining in the agent whose perfection is in the agent performing it

Ars (Art): Right reason about things to be made, making only the ability for good work

Prudentia (Prudence/Foresight): Right reason about things to be done, making both ability and use through rectified appetite

Rectitudo Appetitus (Rectitude of Appetite): Right desire for the proper end, required for prudence but not for art

Examples & Illustrations #

Art Not Requiring Moral Virtue #

• A cook can be a glutton and still make excellent food
• A bartender can dislike cocktails but make them perfectly with right proportions (Manhattan at 2:1 ratio)
• A woodworker can hate walnut but make beautiful walnut furniture
• A doctor uses medicine well even if he hates his patients
• An artist can knowingly make mistakes (as Mozart does in the Musical Joke) and still perform them well artistically

Prudence Requiring Right Appetite #

• A woman shopping knows the prices of individual items but must add them to know if she has enough money
• Without temperance (wanting to eat moderately), one cannot determine what constitutes a moderate amount
• Without justice, one cannot determine fair prices in dealings
• Without wanting to treat one’s wife rightly, one cannot find the proper way to do so

Economic Examples #

• A desk sold for $99 at a Chinese import: one could not even get the material in America for that price, yet it includes profit
• People are often uninformed about policies they support (Affordable Care Act vs. “Obamacare” confusion)
• Candidates and voters often disagree on fundamental issues without realizing it

Mathematical Analogy #

• Length and width of a table can be known without knowing the area
• Multiplication is required to move from knowing the parts to knowing the composite
• Similarly, principles can be understood without seeing conclusions that follow from them

Political Examples #

• MacArthur in Japan after WWII showed both military and political prudence
• Military leadership requires art and counsel about war, but true prudence requires counsel about the whole of life and common good
• A governor’s aide noted that people often don’t know what candidates stand for

Questions Addressed #

Is Art an Intellectual Virtue? #

Answer: Yes, but in a limited sense. Art makes the ability for good work and is properly about necessary conformity to right reason in making. However, it does not make one use that ability well, which requires moral virtue. This is why art falls short of the complete notion of virtue, which must perfect both ability and use.

How Does Art Relate to Speculative Virtues? #

Answer: Art is more unlike speculative virtues than to practical virtues because:

• It concerns contingent things (like prudence), not necessary things
• But it shares with speculative virtues the feature of not requiring rectified appetite
• The good of art, like science, is in conformity to what is true about the making
• Therefore Thomas treats it before prudence to proceed from less unlike to more unlike

Why Doesn’t Someone Who Knows Art Always Produce Good Works? #

Answer: Because the rectitude of the will is required for good use. The artist must be well-disposed through moral virtue (especially justice) to actually produce faithful work. Without this, he may know how to make something well but refuse to do so.

Is Prudence Different from Art? #

Answer: Yes, fundamentally. Prudence differs from art in:

• Object: prudence concerns human acts (doing); art concerns external products (making)
• Perfection: prudence requires rectified appetite; art does not
• Nature of virtue: prudence makes both ability and use; art makes only ability
• Scope: prudence orders all human acts to the ultimate end of living well; art orders only particular productions
• Necessity: prudence is necessary for living well; art is necessary only for particular crafts

Notable Quotes #

“The good of art is in the thing made, not in the artist. Making is an act passing into exterior matter; it is a perfection of the thing made, not the maker.”

“Art makes only the faculty for a good work. It does not regard appetite. But prudence not only makes for the ability of a good work, but also for the use of this. For it regards the appetite, not because it’s in the appetitive power, but as presupposing the rectitude of the appetite.”

“To make and to do differ: making (facere) is an act passing over into exterior matter, just as to build and to cut. But to do is an act remaining in the one acting, as to see or to will.”

“The color is visible insofar as it partakes of light. So you see the shape and the color at the same time, but light is the reason of seeing the color.”

“Just as science always has itself to the good, so in a sense art always does, in fact according to art. But in this, nevertheless, it falls short from the perfect or complete notion of virtue, because it does not make the use good.”

“Three indicates that you distinguish between the material object and the formal object. The material object is what is known; the formal object is the way it is known.”

“For foresight is required that man be well disposed about the ends, which happens through right desire, the rectified appetite. And therefore, for prudence is required moral virtue, through which the appetite becomes rectified.”

“Prudence is bene conciliativa, taking counsel well about those things which pertain to the whole life of man, and therefore to the last end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel about those things which pertain to the private ends of those arts.”

“By the wise man who distinguishes the senses of the whole, right, he can defend and judge better the truth of the axioms and everybody can know, you know, could be misled.”

“The material object of the intellect and will is one, but the formal object is different. God knows other things under knowing and loving himself. That’s the formal object of his intellect and will.”

“Philosophy is the helmsman of life. That’s what Phi Beta Kappa means—the helmsman of life.”