152. The Division of Human Virtue: Intellectual and Moral

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Fundamental Division of Human Virtue #

• Human virtue divides exhaustively into two categories: intellectual virtue and moral virtue
• This division is based on the two principal movers of human action:
  • The understanding/reason (intellectus/ratio)
  • The appetitive power (vis appetitiva): both will and sense appetites (irascible and concupiscible)
• Every human virtue must necessarily perfect one of these two principles
• This is a universal affirmative statement: every human virtue without exception falls into one of these two categories

Prudence (Phronesis/Foresight) as the Bridge Virtue #

• The Problem: Prudence appears to be something “in between” intellectual and moral virtue
  • It is numbered among intellectual virtues in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book 6
  • Yet it is also counted among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral
• The Solution: A crucial distinction between essence and matter
  • According to its essence (secundum essentiam): prudence is an intellectual virtue, perfecting practical reason
  • According to its matter (secundum materiam): it concerns things to be done and works with the moral virtues
  • Prudence is “right reason about things to be done” (recta ratio agibilium)
• This distinction exemplifies how the fundamental division remains complete and unbroken

Continence and Perseverance: Apparent Virtues #

• The Problem: Continence (self-control/containment) and perseverance do not seem to be intellectual or moral virtues
  • The continent person struggles against excessive passions but does not have them ordered
  • The persevering person experiences sadness or sorrow but persists despite it
  • Neither fits neatly into the categories of virtue
• The Response: These are not true virtues but something less than virtue
  • In true moral virtue, the appetitive power is perfected so that right action flows naturally
  • In continence, disordered passions remain; the person must struggle against them
  • For a virtue to be perfect, both the rational part AND the appetitive part must be perfected
  • Like a blind horse running at full speed: natural inclination without proper direction is dangerous
• Aristotle discusses these in Book 7 of the Ethics as things that fall below human virtues
• Continence comes short of virtue because it lacks the right desire of the end, which is necessary for perfect practical reasoning about the beginning of actions

Faith, Hope, and Charity as Supra-Human Virtues #

• The Problem: These theological virtues are neither intellectual nor moral by the given definitions
• The Response: They are supra-human virtues (virtutes supra-humanae)
  • They perfect man insofar as he is made a sharer in divine grace and the divine nature
  • The division of human virtue into intellectual and moral is complete for virtues perfecting human nature as such
  • These exceed the natural order and thus fall outside the classification

Key Arguments #

Argument Establishing the Sufficiency of the Two-Fold Division #

Premise 1: The beginning of human acts consists of only two things:

• The intellect/reason (understood as both speculative and practical)
• The appetitive power (both rational and sensory appetites)

Premise 2: Every human virtue must necessarily perfect one of these two beginnings of action

Conclusion: Therefore, every human virtue is exhaustively divided into intellectual virtue (perfecting reason) or moral virtue (perfecting appetite), with no third category

Clarity of the Division: This is a universal affirmative—every human virtue without exception falls into one of these two categories

Why Prudence is Essential to Moral Virtue #

Premise 1: Moral virtue is a habit involving choice (ἕξις μετὰ προαιρέσεως), determining the mean in passions and actions

Premise 2: For choice to be good, two conditions must be met:

1. A suitable intention of the end — provided by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive power to good according to reason
2. Right execution of the means toward the end — this cannot be achieved except through prudence

Premise 3: Prudence involves three essential acts:

• Eubulia (εὐβουλία): taking counsel well
• Gnome or Synesis (σύνεσις): judging well about particular matters
• Command (imperium): commanding rightly

Premise 4: Prudence presupposes natural understanding (intellectus naturalis), which grasps the natural law and universal principles of action both theoretical and practical

Conclusion: Moral virtue cannot exist without prudence, nor consequently without natural understanding; however, it can exist without wisdom (σοφία), science (scientia), and art (ars)

Why Moral Virtue Cannot Exist Without Prudence #

Key Insight: The right desire of the end is a starting point for deliberation

The Problem with Natural Inclination Alone:

• A natural inclination to good (e.g., being naturally mild or temperate) is merely a beginning of virtue
• Without prudence, even strong natural inclination is dangerous
• The person must be able to judge correctly about what is truly good in particular circumstances
• This judgment cannot be made if the appetitive power is not well-disposed (has not the right intention of the end)

Example: Like a blind horse running at full speed—the faster it runs, the more dangerous it becomes without sight (reason) to guide it

Response to the Objection from Natural Inclination #

Objection: Some people are naturally mild or temperate without vigorous use of reason; yet they seem virtuous

Response:

• Natural inclination toward good is distinct from moral virtue
• The use of reason in the virtuous person need not be vigorous regarding all matters, but must be vigorous regarding the things done by virtue
• Even those appearing “simple” (in the sense of lacking worldly astuteness) must possess prudence according to their capacity
• Christ’s command (Matthew 10:16) clarifies: “Be prudent as serpents, and simple as doves”
• Natural understanding (as a basic kind of knowledge) is required to be virtuous

Important Definitions #

Moral Virtue (Virtus Moralis) #

• A habit perfecting the appetitive power (will and sense appetites)
• Inclines one to act in agreement with reason
• Establishes a mean (μεσότης) among passions and actions
• Requires: proper intention of the end + prudence to determine right means
• Necessarily involves choice

Intellectual Virtue (Virtus Intellectualis) #

• A habit perfecting reason (understood as either speculative or practical)
• Makes reason function well in understanding or deliberating about action
• The five intellectual virtues: understanding (intellectus), science (scientia), wisdom (σοφία), prudence (φρόνησις), and art (ars)

Prudence/Foresight (Φρόνησις/Prudentia) #

• Right reason concerning things to be done (recta ratio agibilium)
• By essence: an intellectual virtue
• By matter: directs the moral virtues in particular circumstances
• Three constitutive acts: taking counsel well, judging well, commanding well
• Essentially requires knowledge of both universal principles and particular circumstances

Continence (Ἐγκράτεια/Continentia) #

• Self-control or restraint against disordered passions
• The person understands what should be done but must struggle against contrary passions
• Falls short of virtue because: the appetitive power remains imperfect (passions remain disordered)
• Not true virtue but something less

The Mean (Μεσότης) #

• The proper measure in passions and actions determined by virtue
• Not a mathematical mean but a mean relative to us, determined by right reason
• Established by prudence in each particular circumstance
• Example: anger should be neither absent nor excessive but proportionate to the offense

Natural Understanding (Intellectus Naturalis) #

• The natural grasp of first principles, both speculative and practical
• Grasps the natural law and universal principles of action
• A foundational intellectual virtue that moral virtue presupposes
• Distinguished from prudence, science, wisdom, and art

Examples & Illustrations #

The Continent Person Struggling Against Passion #

• A person with excessive urge to sensual pleasure who struggles against it
• He knows he should not pursue it but “has to jump into the bush,” in Berquist’s vivid expression
• He lacks the mean that virtue possesses
• He is not virtuous because his appetitive power is not well-disposed; he lacks the right desire of the end

The Blind Running Horse #

• A metaphor for natural inclination without prudence
• The stronger the horse runs without sight, the more dangerous
• Similarly, strong natural inclination to good without reason’s guidance becomes increasingly problematic
• Prudence must guide natural inclination to make it true virtue

Shakespeare and the Mean #

• Reference to “richest in Venice”—character noting it is “no mean happiness to be constituted in the mean”
• Illustrates Shakespeare’s understanding of the virtue of maintaining the mean
• Pun on the word “mean” shows sophistication in understanding Aristotelian ethics

The Patient Clerk #

• A postal clerk observed to be remarkably patient with complaints
• When complimented on his patience, he admitted he had a quirk: he had a quarter permanently in his back pocket
• Suggests that even apparent patience may lack full virtue if the disposition is not authentic

Simplicity and Wisdom (Matthew 10:16) #

• “Be prudent as serpents, and simple as doves”
• Shows that simplicity (in the sense of purity of intention, not foolishness) is compatible with prudence
• One need not be intellectually acute to possess prudence in moral matters
• Demonstrates that the use of reason must be vigorous in the matters pertaining to virtue, not necessarily in all worldly affairs

Natural Temperance Without Virtue #

• Some people are naturally mild or temperate by nature
• They do not eat or drink to excess naturally
• Yet without prudence, this natural inclination alone does not constitute true moral virtue
• True virtue requires the judgment of reason about what is truly good in particular circumstances

Notable Quotes #

“Every human virtue without exception is either one of those two [intellectual or moral]” — Thomas Aquinas (on the exhaustiveness of the division)

“Prudence, secondum essentiam suam [according to its very nature], is a virtue of reason. But according to the matter, it comes together with the moral virtues.” — Thomas Aquinas (on how the division accommodates prudence)

“For it is right reason about things to be done” — Thomas Aquinas (definition of prudence)

“The inclination of moral virtue is with choice” — Thomas Aquinas (key distinguishing factor from natural inclination)

“Just as a blind horse running at full speed impinges itself more strongly, the faster it runs; so natural inclination, without right reason, is more dangerous the stronger it is” — Thomas Aquinas (illustrating why natural inclination alone is insufficient)

“That the other virtues, unless the things they desire, they do, what? In a prudent way, right? Are in no way able to be, what? Virtues.” — Gregory the Great (on the necessity of prudence for all moral virtue)

“Continence from pleasures and perseverance from sadness are not virtues but something less than a virtue” — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book 7 (as cited by Thomas)

Questions Addressed #

Primary Question: Is Human Virtue Sufficiently Divided into Intellectual and Moral? #

Answer: Yes, with proper understanding of key distinctions.

Objection 1 — Prudence as an In-Between Virtue:

• Objection: Prudence is listed with intellectual virtues (Book 6 of Ethics) but counted among cardinal/moral virtues; thus the division is insufficient
• Resolution: Prudence is intellectual by essence (it perfects practical reason) but moral by matter (it concerns things to be done). The distinction between essence and matter shows how the two-fold division remains complete

Objection 2 — Continence and Perseverance:

• Objection: These are neither intellectual nor moral virtues, falling into a third category
• Resolution: They are not virtues at all but states falling short of virtue. They lack the perfection required of virtue because the appetitive power is not perfected; the person must struggle against disordered passions rather than having them ordered by habit

Objection 3 — Faith, Hope, and Charity:

• Objection: These theological virtues are neither intellectual nor moral
• Resolution: They are supra-human virtues, perfecting man insofar as he shares in divine grace and nature. The division of human virtue is complete for natural virtues perfecting human nature

Secondary Question: Can Moral Virtue Exist Without Intellectual Virtue? #

Answer: Moral virtue cannot exist without prudence and natural understanding, but can exist without wisdom, science, and art.

Why Prudence is Necessary:

• Moral virtue requires not only the right desire of the end but also right judgment about the means
• Without prudence, even natural inclination to good cannot constitute true virtue
• Prudence provides the three necessary acts: counseling well, judging well, commanding well

Why Natural Understanding is Necessary:

• Prudence presupposes natural understanding of principles
• The natural law and universal principles of action must be grasped
• Without this foundation, prudence cannot function

Why Wisdom, Science, and Art are Not Necessary:

• These perfect the speculative intellect or deal with artificial things
• Moral virtue can exist without mastery of theoretical knowledge or technical skills
• A person can be truly virtuous without being intellectually cultivated in these domains

Tertiary Question: What Distinguishes Continence from Virtue? #

Answer: Continence lacks the perfection of virtue because:

• The appetitive power is not perfected; passions remain disordered
• The person must struggle against contrary inclinations
• True virtue inclines the whole person to right action; continence involves internal conflict
• The person lacks the right desire of the end, which is necessary for perfect practical reasoning