155. Moral Virtue, Passion, and the Distinction of Virtues

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Moral Virtue and Passion #

• Virtue as Habit, Not Passion: Moral virtue is a stable disposition (habit), not a motion of the appetite (passion)
• Moderation vs. Elimination: Virtue moderates and orders passions according to reason rather than eliminating them entirely
• Disordered vs. Moderated Passions:
  • Disordered passions overcome reason and lead to sin
  • Moderated passions follow reason’s command and aid virtue
• Passion Defined: Motions of the sense-desiring power (concupiscible and irascible appetites)

Can Virtue Exist Without Passion? #

• Some virtues (those about operations, like justice) can exist without passions
• Virtues about passions (temperance, courage) necessarily involve passions as their matter
• The perfection of virtue does not require the elimination of passion but proper ordering of it
• God and angels are without passion because they lack sensitive appetite; humans necessarily have passions

The Overflow of Joy #

• When the will experiences joy in virtuous action, this joy can overflow into the sensitive appetite
• Example: St. Teresa of Avila dancing and singing from spiritual joy
• The more perfect the virtue, the more moderated passions may flow from it through this overflow
• The apostles’ joy at meeting the risen Christ overflowed into bodily expression

Why Moral Virtues Are Distinct #

• Not One Virtue: There cannot be only one moral virtue because moral virtues exist in diverse powers of the soul (will, irascible appetite, concupiscible appetite)
• Formal Unity with Material Diversity: All virtues share the formal reason of conformity to reason, but differ materially according to their objects and the powers they perfect
• Analogy to Creation: Just as the sun produces diverse species of animals according to the diverse proportions of matter, reason produces diverse virtues according to diverse proportions of the appetitive powers
• Different Objects: The desirable good has diverse formal reasons according to its diverse relations to reason

Virtues About Passions vs. Operations #

• Temperance and Courage: Concern the moderation of passions (pleasure/sadness and fear/boldness respectively)
• Justice: Concerns operations ordered to another rather than internal affections
• Why the Distinction: Justice’s good is determined by commensuration to another; virtues about passions are determined by the agent’s internal ordering of appetite

The Issue of Diverse Passions and Diverse Virtues #

• Contrary Passions Under One Virtue: Fear and boldness are moderated by the same virtue (courage) because they follow from the same reason
• Passions to the Same Object: Love, desire, and pleasure regarding food and drink fall under one virtue (temperance)
• Virtue Not Equidistant from Extremes: Cowardice is closer to courage than foolhardiness; intemperance is less virtuous than puritanism in temperance

Key Arguments #

Against One Moral Virtue #

Argument from Multiple Powers: If moral virtue is a habit in the desiring part of the soul, and this part contains multiple distinct powers (will, irascible appetite, concupiscible appetite), then there cannot be only one moral virtue since one habit cannot exist in multiple diverse powers. Conclusion: There must be at least three distinct moral virtues.

Argument from Formal Reasons of Objects: The formal reason of good that moral virtue pursues is one (conformity to reason), yet this formal reason is received diversely according to the diverse relations of different appetitive powers to reason. Just as the same agent (the sun) produces diverse species according to diverse proportions of matter, reason produces diverse virtues according to diverse proportions of appetitive powers.

The Objection That All Virtues Are One #

Single Directing Virtue: There is one intellectual virtue (prudence/foresight) directing all moral acts, so there should be only one moral virtue inclining all moral acts. Thomas’s Response: This confuses the formal with the material dimension. While reason provides unified direction, the diverse appetitive powers receive this direction differently, creating diverse virtues.

Socratic Argument from Unity of Opposite: In Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates argues that since foolishness is the opposite of both wisdom and temperance, wisdom and temperance must be the same. Berquist’s Note: This contains insight (similarity between wisdom and modesty) but fails to account for the diversity of appetitive powers.

Why Passions Are Compatible with Virtue #

Against Stoic Apatheia: If passions are natural to human beings (since we have sensitive appetite), eliminating them entirely would be contrary to human nature. Virtue perfects human nature as it is, not by transforming it into something else. Scripture supports this: Christ experienced fear and sadness yet remained perfectly virtuous.

Aristotle on Tragic Emotions: Tragedy moves us to pity and fear, which dispose people to help others and understand human nature better. These emotions are not vicious but civilizing. The temperate person feels pity when others suffer; the person without pity seems inhuman, not virtuous.

Important Definitions #

Passiones (Passions) #

• Motions of the sensitive appetite in response to sensible good or evil
• Include: love, hate, desire, aversion, hope, despair, fear, boldness, anger
• Distinguished from affections of the will (affectiones), which are not properly called passions

Moral Virtue (Virtus Moralis) #

• A habit of the appetitive part perfecting it by ordering it to the good of reason
• Consists in a mean between extremes, determined by reason
• Cannot exist without some relation to reason, either as its subject or as its directive principle

Disordered vs. Moderated Passions #

• Disordered (Passiones Inordinatae): Passions that overcome reason or precede and overcome reason’s judgment
• Moderated (Passiones Ordinatae): Passions that follow reason’s command and serve virtue

Virtues About Passions (Virtutes circa Passiones) #

• Temperance (Temperantia): moderates concupiscible passions, particularly pleasure and sadness
• Courage (Fortitudo): moderates irascible passions, particularly fear and boldness
• These virtues cannot exist without passions as their matter

Virtues About Operations (Virtutes circa Operationes) #

• Justice (Iustitia): concerned with operations ordered to another
• Can exist without passions since operations are not passions
• Can be accompanied by passions through overflow of joy from the will

Examples & Illustrations #

From Scripture and Theology #

• Christ’s Passions: “My soul is sad, even unto death” demonstrates sadness is compatible with perfect virtue
• Saints Knowing Earthly Affairs: Thomas makes clear that saints in heaven know what happens on earth and may pray for us
• Communion of Saints: Saints may pray for us; we pray for souls in purgatory; there is mutual intercession
• The Assumption of Mary: Mary’s body had to be assumed into heaven so that Mary (the person, not just her soul) could be in heaven, since the person is the composite of soul and body
• Mary as Mediatrix: Mary as mediatrix of all grace; her immaculate conception pertains to her dignity as a person
• The Hail Mary Structure: First part from Scripture (angel and Elizabeth); second part from Church tradition; parallels the structure of the Pater Noster
• Demonic Affliction to Marian Titles: In the famous exorcism case (basis for The Exorcist), the demon was greatly afflicted by “Holy Mary, Mother of God,” particularly the title “Mother of God”

From Literature #

• Shakespeare’s Tragedies: Tragedy moves us to pity and fear; this emotional response disposes people to virtue and has a civilizing effect
• Ellen Fawcett on Shakespeare’s Women: The 19th-century actress wrote appreciatively of Shakespeare’s female characters, noting we have “infinite debt” to Shakespeare for representing what is most noble in women
• Fictional Female Characters: Book (apparently by Fawcett or contemporary) on Madonna representations in European art
• Hamlet: German critics call it a “tragedy of thought”; contrasted with love tragedies like Romeo and Juliet and Othello
• King Lear and Macbeth: Northern European tragedies set in ancient England and Scotland respectively
• Romeo and Juliet and Othello: Southern Italian (love) tragedies; Othello noted as “the most tragic” of Shakespeare’s tragedies
• Two Gentlemen of Verona: Proteus cannot be true to himself without being false to his friend and fiancée
• Coriolanus: Difficulty of controlling anger; character says he must be false to himself if he controls his anger
• Macbeth: “Modest wisdom plucks me from over credulous haste” - exemplifies tempering boldness with wisdom
• The Merchant of Venice: The casket scene - suitor told “If you had been wise as bold”

From Personal Anecdotes #

• Father Stanley’s Counsel: A priest Berquist admired told his mother never to stop praying for his father because we don’t know when souls leave purgatory
• The Georgetown Connection: Writer of The Exorcist was Georgetown graduate; placed story in Washington D.C., but actual case was in St. Louis involving a boy

Notable Quotes #

“Never stop praying for him because we don’t know when anybody gets out of purgatory.” - Father Stanley, on intercession for the deceased

“If you had been wise as bold.” - Shakespeare, illustrating the need to temper boldness with wisdom

“Modest wisdom plucks me from over credulous haste.” - Shakespeare (Macbeth), on virtue moderating passion

“We have an infinite debt to Shakespeare for representing what is most really pleasing in a woman.” - Ellen Fawcett, on Shakespeare’s female characters

“The demons are loose.” - Connection made between The Exorcist and the spiritual state of contemporary institutions

Questions Addressed #

Question 59 (Main Topic): Can Moral Virtue Exist With Passion? #

Answer: Yes. Virtues do not eliminate passions but moderate them. Disordered passions (those overcoming reason) are incompatible with virtue. Moderated passions that follow reason’s command are not only compatible with virtue but aid it. For virtues about passions (temperance, courage), passions are their necessary matter. For virtues about operations (justice), passions may follow through overflow of joy from the will.

Question 60, Article 1: Is There Only One Moral Virtue? #

Answer: No. Although all moral virtues share the formal reason of conformity to reason, they are distinguished according to the diverse ways different appetitive powers relate to reason. Since moral virtue exists in multiple distinct powers of the soul (will, irascible appetite, concupiscible appetite), there must be multiple moral virtues.

Question 60, Article 2: Are Virtues About Operations Distinguished from Those About Passions? #

Answer: Yes. Some virtues (like justice) concern operations ordered to another. Others (like temperance and courage) concern passions. The distinction is material, not formal.

Question 60, Article 3 (Implied): Is There Only One Virtue About Operations? #

Answer: Although all virtues about operations share conformity to reason as their formal reason, they differ in their specific objects and the notion of debt they address.

Question 60, Article 4 (Implied): Are There Diverse Virtues for Diverse Passions? #

Answer: Not necessarily one virtue per passion. Contrary passions (fear and boldness) fall under one virtue (courage). Passions ordered to the same object (love, desire, pleasure regarding food) fall under one virtue (temperance). But passions to different objects or in fundamentally different ways require different virtues.

Philosophical Method and Distinctions #

Univocal vs. Equivocal Causation #

• Univocal agents produce effects of the same species (a man begets a man)
• Equivocal agents produce effects of diverse species according to the diverse proportions of matter receiving the form
• Application: Reason is an equivocal cause producing diverse virtues according to diverse proportions of appetitive powers

Mozart vs. Baroque Composers #

• Baroque composers write pieces transposable to any instruments
• Mozart adapts each piece to the specific nature of an instrument
• Analogy: Reason adapts its direction to the specific nature of each appetitive power

Shakespeare’s Geographical Adaptation #

• Northern European tragedies (Hamlet, King Lear, Macbeth) vs. Southern Italian love tragedies (Romeo and Juliet, Othello)
• Point: Shakespeare adapts his tragic form to the matter, just as reason produces diverse virtues adapted to diverse appetitive powers