156. Distinction of Moral Virtues by Operations and Passions

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Padre Pio as Model of Human Suffering #

Berquist opens with an extended biography passage on Padre Pio illustrating that saints suffer humanly, not stoically. Padre Pio:

• Genuinely felt pain and distress (“I feel completely shattered”)
• But maintained submission to God’s will alongside his tears
• Distinguished from Stoic heroism, which attempted to make feelings die
• Exemplifies that virtue does not require insensitivity or denial of human weakness
• Remained faithful to his daily program (choir, altar, confessional) despite physical deterioration

Operations vs. Passions in Moral Virtue #

Thomas distinguishes two ways to consider operations and passions in relation to virtue:

As Effects: Every moral virtue produces both good operations and pleasant or sad feelings

As Matter: This is where the distinction lies—some virtues have operations as their proper matter, others have passions

Virtues About Operations (Primarily Justice) #

• Good and bad in these operations is determined “according to themselves,” regardless of how one is affected
• Example: Paying debts is just whether done happily or sadly
• Justice concerns the aspect of debt or commensuration to another
• The commensuration must be correct in the operation itself

Virtues About Passions (Temperance, Fortitude, etc.) #

• Good and bad here is determined according to the disposition of the one operating
• The interior affections (passions) must be properly ordered
• Examples: temperance about pleasures and sadnesses, fortitude about fears and boldness

The Multiplicity of Justice and Its Unity #

Objection: If operations are so diverse, how can there be one virtue of justice?

Thomas’s Response:

• All virtues about operations share a common formal object: the notion of debt (ὀφείλημα/debitum)
• Debt is not univocal but varies in character:
  • Debt to a superior (e.g., obedience to parents, to God)
  • Debt to an equal (commutative relationships)
  • Debt to an inferior
• These diverse debts are distinguished special virtues: religion (debt to God), piety (debt to parents), gratitude (debt to benefactors)
• Justice properly speaking concerns the perfect notion of debt restored according to equivalence
• Justice in the amplified sense (amplificato nomine) extends to any rendering of what is owed

Legal Justice and the Command of Justice #

A sophisticated distinction regarding the common good:

• Justice ordering to the common good (legal justice) differs from justice ordering to private good
• Yet this difference is not one of diverse species but only of reason (ratione)
• Just as a virtue acting in its own domain differs from the same virtue acting under the command of another virtue, they differ only in reason, not in substance
• Example given: Charity commands all acts of other virtues toward the common good

Diversity of Virtues in the Passions #

Objection: If all passions have one beginning (love) and one end (pleasure or sadness), shouldn’t there be only one virtue about them?

Thomas’s Response:

• Passions belong to diverse powers: some to the irascible appetite, others to the concupiscible
• A virtue in the irascible appetite cannot be the same as a virtue in the concupiscible
• Not all diversity of passions requires diversity of virtues

Contrary Passions and Single Virtue #

For passions that are contrary to each other (e.g., fear and boldness; pleasure and sadness):

• There is necessarily one and the same virtue
• Reason: Moral virtue consists in a mean between contraries; the mean is instituted according to the same reason
• Example: If I want wine too much, I’m too pleased; if there’s no wine, I’m too sad. Both are failures of the same virtue (temperance) ordered to the same rational principle
• This reflects the principle that knowledge of opposites is one knowledge

Ordered Passions of the Concupiscible #

Passions that follow in order from one another (love → desire → pleasure):

• Pertain to the same virtue
• Their emotions follow according to a certain order, being ordered to the same end: achieving the good or fleeing the bad
• All three—love, desire, pleasure—are unified under temperance

Diverse Virtues in the Irascible #

The irascible passions are not ordered in the same way:

• Fear and boldness: Ordered to great danger → Fortitude
• Hope and despair: Ordered to difficult good → Magnanimity
• Anger: Ordered to overcoming something contrary that harms oneself → Mildness (gentleness)
• These diverse orderings require diverse virtues

The Question of Being True to Oneself #

Berquist explores a Shakespearean and philosophical problem: When one’s passion conflicts with one’s rational choice, which is “really oneself”?

The Aristotelian Principle: “Reason more than anything else is man” (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10)

Implications:

• One is being true to oneself when true to reason, not to emotion against reason
• A man who chooses to join Alcoholics Anonymous and resists temptation to drink is being true to himself (his rational choice), not when he gives in to bodily desire
• A married man tempted to commit adultery is not being true to himself if he yields, because marriage is a choice (rational commitment), not merely a feeling
• The premeditated murder is more serious than the crime of passion because it is more truly “you”—the deliberate choice reveals the person more than sudden passion

Application to Virtue and Vice:

• Crime of passion reflects the person less than premeditated crime
• A written rejection of friendship is more serious than angry words spoken in the moment
• Hamlet’s claim that his angry outburst “is not me” reflects this: his rational self is more truly him than his angry passion

Key Arguments #

Argument 1: Operations and Passions Both Have Effects of Virtue #

Objection: Moral virtues should not be distinguished by some being about operations and others about passions, because every virtue has effects in both. Aristotle says virtue operates well regarding both pleasures and sadnesses.

Thomas’s Response:

• Passions and operations can be considered in two ways: (1) as effects of virtue, or (2) as the matter about which virtue operates
• As effects, every virtue produces good operations and proper passions
• As matter, some virtues have operations as their proper object, others have passions
• The distinction concerns the primary matter, not the effects

Argument 2: All Justice Should Be One Virtue #

Objection: All virtues about operations should be one because they all concern the rendering of what is owed (the notion of justice).

Thomas’s Response:

• Justice is one special virtue in its proper sense (rendering what is owed according to equivalence)
• But justice in the amplified sense extends to all rendering of debt
• The debt takes different special forms (to superiors, equals, inferiors) creating distinct virtues: religion, piety, gratitude
• These share the common formal object of debt but differ in their special reasons

Argument 3: All Passions Should Have One Virtue #

Objection: Love is the beginning of all passions and pleasure (or sadness) is the end; therefore there should be one virtue about all passions.

Thomas’s Response:

• Passions belong to different powers (irascible and concupiscible)
• Virtues in different powers cannot be the same
• The diversity of passions is relevant for virtue only when they are not ordered to the same end by the same reason

Argument 4: Ordered Passions Need Not Require Diversity #

Objection: Love, desire, and pleasure are three different species of passion, yet temperance is one virtue about all of them. Therefore, diversity of passions does not necessitate diversity of virtues.

Thomas’s Response:

• These three passions follow in order: love gives rise to desire (when the object is absent), and desire culminates in pleasure (when the object is obtained)
• They are ordered to the same end and follow according to a certain order
• Therefore they pertain to one virtue, not diverse virtues
• Contrast: fear and boldness, though contrary, are also unified under one virtue because they concern the same matter (danger)

Important Definitions #

Operation (operatio): An act or deed done, distinguished from passion as the activity of the agent

Passion (passio): A motion or affection of the sensitive appetite in response to sensible good or evil (e.g., fear, desire, pleasure, sadness, anger)

Commensuration (commensuratio): The proper proportion or relation between things; in justice, the equivalence between what is given and what is owed

Debt (debitum): What is owed; the formal object of justice. Takes different forms:

• Debt to God → Religion
• Debt to parents or country → Piety
• Debt to benefactors → Gratitude (Thanks)
• Debt to equals → Justice proper

Amplificato nomine: “In amplified sense” or “in the extended meaning” of a term; used when a virtue name extends beyond its strict definition

Irascible appetite (appetitus irascibilis): The faculty of the sensitive appetite concerned with difficult goods and opposing evils; seat of passions like fear, boldness, hope, despair, anger

Concupiscible appetite (appetitus concupiscibilis): The faculty of the sensitive appetite concerned with pleasant and unpleasant sensibles; seat of passions like love, desire, pleasure, sadness, hatred, aversion

Examples & Illustrations #

Padre Pio’s Suffering #

• Found weeping alone in his cell but quickly composed himself to joke with his spiritual director
• Said during trials: “I felt very bad. But then the Lord sustained me, and so I adapted myself to my new surroundings”
• Preferred to be brought to the confessional in a wheelchair rather than stop hearing confessions
• Illustrates that virtue consists in submission to God’s will while genuinely feeling human suffering

Socratic Dialogues and Debt #

• Euthyphro: Discusses piety toward parents, country, and God—illustrating different kinds of debt
• Crito: Socrates refuses to escape prison despite unjust conviction, claiming he owes debt to Athens and its laws—illustrating piety toward country
• Comparison: Ethan Hale’s supposed saying, “I wish I had but one life to give my country,” shows how one can be perpetually in debt to one’s country

Shakespeare’s Characters #

• Proteus (Two Gentlemen of Verona): Torn between loyalty to friend Valentine and love for Sylvia; says he cannot be true to himself without being false to his friend—illustrates conflict between passion and rational commitment
• Coriolanus: Struggles with his natural anger; told he must be false to himself to control it; responds that virtue would require him to act against his nature—problematic conclusion that Berquist critiques
• Hamlet: When he insults Ophelia in anger, he later claims “that’s not me”—reflecting that his rational self is truer to him than his angry passion
• King Lear: Illustrates that a father (Lear) has greater debt from his daughters than a brother would have—showing gradation of natural debts

Practical Examples from Discussion #

• Paying Debts: Whether one pays happily or sadly, one is just if the payment is equal to what is owed
• Eating and Drinking: The same virtue (temperance) moderates both excessive desire for food and excessive sadness when food is unavailable
• Alcoholism vs. Gluttony: A man might consume much beer while eating little—suggesting different difficulties attach to different sensible goods, potentially requiring distinction of virtues (later to be explored)
• Visceral Response to Crime: The premeditated crime is worse than crime of passion because it reveals the person’s true will more fully
• Marriage and Adultery: A husband who vowed to take his wife as his spouse has made a rational choice; yielding to temptation violates his commitment, not merely his feeling

The Vicks VapoRub Tangent #

Berquist mentions applying Vicks VapoRub to the soles of feet at night—illustrating how even small details of practice can become embedded in transmitted knowledge

Questions Addressed #

Question 1: How Can Operations and Passions Both Be Fruits of Virtue Yet Distinguished? #

Problem: If virtue produces both good operations and proper passions, how can some virtues be distinguished as primarily about operations and others about passions?

Answer: Operations and passions are related to virtue in two ways: (1) as effects of virtue (both can be effects), and (2) as the matter about which virtue operates (some virtues properly concern operations, others concern passions). The distinction is in the matter, not the effects.

Question 2: Why Is Justice One Virtue Despite Diverse Operations? #

Problem: If justice concerns such diverse operations (buying, selling, commutations, distributions), shouldn’t there be diverse virtues for diverse operations?

Answer: All operations about which justice is concerned share the common formal object of debt (debitum). They are distinguished according to diverse special reasons (debt to superior, equal, inferior), creating distinct virtues while maintaining the unity of the genus justice. Justice proper concerns equivalence; others (religion, piety, gratitude) are distinct special virtues.

Question 3: Why Should Contrary Passions Fall Under One Virtue? #

Problem: If fear and boldness are contrary passions, and pleasure and sadness are contrary, shouldn’t opposite passions require opposite virtues?

Answer: Contrary passions about the same matter are moderated by the same virtue because virtue consists in the mean, and the mean between contraries is determined by the same reason. Fear excessive and boldness excessive are both deviations from the same virtue (fortitude); just as cooking a steak too much and too little are failures of the same culinary principle.

Question 4: Must Ordered Passions Be Unified Under One Virtue? #

Problem: If love, desire, and pleasure are three different species of passion, why should they all fall under one virtue (temperance)?

Answer: These passions are unified because they follow in order toward the same end. Love of the good naturally gives rise to desire when it is absent, which culminates in pleasure when obtained. Since they are ordered to one another toward a single end, they are all moderated by one virtue.

Question 5: Which Debts Are More Serious—to Father or to Brother? #

Problem: Is the sin of killing one’s father worse than killing one’s brother?

Answer (Implicit from Berquist’s discussion): One has a greater debt to one’s father than to one’s brother because one receives life itself from the father. Therefore, the violation of filial debt is more serious. This is illustrated by the comparison in King Lear, where the violation of paternal authority exceeds the violation of fraternal relationship.

Question 6: When Passion Conflicts with Rational Choice, Which Represents One’s True Self? #

Problem: When an adulterer yields to passion against his marriage vow, or an alcoholic yields to craving against his chosen commitment, which represents his true self—the passion or the choice?

Answer: The rational choice is more truly oneself because reason is what most essentially distinguishes humans. Therefore, the alcoholic being true to his rational choice to abstain is more truly being himself than when he yields to bodily desire. Similarly, the married man is being false to himself (his rational commitment) when he commits adultery, even if it accords with his current passion.