157. Moral Virtues Distinguished by Objects of Passions

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Question: Are Moral Virtues Distinguished by Objects of Passions? #

• The objection claims moral virtues are not distinguished by objects of passions, just as justice covers both buying and selling different things
• The fundamental question concerns whether diversity in passions requires diversity in moral virtues

Key Distinction: How Passions Differ from Operations #

• Operations concerning the same virtue (e.g., justice) do not vary by objects—buying a house or horse are both acts of justice
• Passions (desires, fears, pleasures) are NOT opposed to reason in the same uniform way
• Sexual desire and thirst are opposed to reason differently, requiring experience to understand ethics
• More and less do not diversify species, yet diverse delightables sometimes seem to differ only in degree

The Role of Reason in Distinguishing Virtue #

• Virtue perfection depends on reason; passion perfection depends on desire
• Virtues are diversified according to their order to reason
• Passions are diversified according to their order to the desiring power
• The same object can cause diverse species of passions but diverse species of virtue based on its relation to reason

Objects and Their Relations to Reason #

• Objects of passions, compared diversely to the sense-desiring power, cause passions differing in species
• The same objects, compared to reason, cause diverse species of virtue
• Nothing prevents some difference of objects to cause diversity of passions without causing diversity of virtue (one virtue ordering many passions)
• Conversely, some difference of objects can cause diversity of passion without diversity of virtue

Diversity of Powers Determines Diversity of Virtues #

• Diversity of objects regarding diversity of powers always diversifies species of virtue
• Example: something good absolutely vs. something good with difficulty
• Reason rules lower parts and extends to exterior things, so objects grasped through sense, imagination, or reason have diverse relations to reason
• Objects pertaining to soul, body, or exterior things have diverse relations to reason

The Classification of Goods and Corresponding Virtues #

Goods of Touch (Most Vehement)

• Apprehended by sense; pertaining to human consistency in individual or species
• Examples: food, venereal matters
• Pertain to temperance
• Pleasures of other senses (hearing, sight) not vehement, so no virtue established about them

Goods Grasped by Interior Power (Not Sense)

• Money and honor not apprehended by sense but by interior power
• Money: ordered to good of body
  • Taken absolutely (object of concupiscence/pleasure/love) → liberality
  • Taken with difficulty (object of hope) → magnificence
• Honor: consists in apprehension of soul
  • Taken absolutely (object of love) → philotimía (love of honor)
  • Taken with difficulty (object of hope) → megalopsychía (magnanimity/great-souledness)

Goods Relating One to Another

• In serious matters: manifest oneself through words and deeds as agreeable → friendliness (φιλία)
• In serious matters: show oneself as one truly is → truth (veracity)
• In play/jocular matters: another virtue called eutrapelia (good turning/wit)

Why Good is Stronger Than Bad in Moving Us #

• Bad does not act except by virtue of good (Dionysius, Divine Names IV)
• Bad does not make difficulty to reason requiring virtue unless very excelling
• Therefore seems one virtue for anger, one for audacity/fortitude
• Good brings difficulty to reason and virtue even if not excelling in that passion
• Therefore concerning concupiscences, diverse moral virtues are laid down

The Ten Moral Virtues #

According to Aristotle: fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, philotimía, mildness, friendliness, truthfulness, eutrapelia

With justice added: eleven cardinal and principal virtues

Distinguished by:

• Diverse matters
• Diverse passions
• Diverse objects

Key Arguments #

Objection 1: Unity of Virtue Despite Multiple Objects #

Argument: Just as justice covers diverse objects (buying houses, selling horses), moral virtues about passions should not be diversified by objects

Thomas’s Reply:

• Objects of same operation have same relation to reason
• Objects of same passion do NOT all have same relation to reason (sexual desire ≠ thirst in their opposition to reason)
• Operations are not repugnant to reason as passions are

Objection 2: More and Less Don’t Diversify Species #

Argument: Diverse delectable things differ only in more and less, not species; therefore all pleasurable things belong to one virtue

Thomas’s Reply:

• More and less do not diversify species except on account of diverse relation to reason
• This is the crucial principle: numerical difference becomes specific difference when reason relates differently to the objects

Objection 3: Good Objects Should Have Diverse Virtues Like Bad Objects #

Argument: About desires of good things there are diverse virtues (temperance for pleasures of touch, eutrapelia for pleasures of play); so about fears of bad things there should be diverse virtues

Thomas’s Reply:

• Good moves us more strongly than bad
• Bad acts only by virtue of good
• Bad thus requires virtue only when excelling, so appears one virtue per genus of passion (one for anger, one for audacity)
• Good brings difficulty to reason even when not excelling, so diverse moral virtues are established

Important Definitions #

Virtues Distinguished #

• Temperance: Moderates pleasures of touch (food, venereal matters)
• Liberality: About good of money taken absolutely
• Magnificence: About great sums; money with difficulty
• Philotimía: Love of honor (Greek: φιλό-τιμα)
• Megalopsychía/Magnanimity: Great-souledness; honor with difficulty (Greek: μεγαλο-ψυχία)
• Friendliness: Makes oneself agreeable through suitable words and deeds (also called affability)
• Truthfulness: Shows oneself as one truly is, opposed to deception (ψεῦδος/falsehood)
• Eutrapelia: Good turning; wit; levity in play matters (Greek: εὖ-τραπελία)
• Mildness: Moderates anger

Key Principle #

Relation to Reason: Objects have diverse relations to reason based on:

• Whether grasped by sense, imagination, or reason itself
• Whether pertaining to soul, body, or exterior things
• Whether pertaining to good of man in himself or in regard to other things

Examples & Illustrations #

The Jealous Cat #

Berquist uses example of jealous cat perking up at mention of steak to illustrate how experience shows us that desires work differently—the cat’s desire for food vs. a human’s sexual desire operate through different mechanisms and require different restraints.

Shakespeare’s Iago #

Iago represents deception/falsity—presents himself as friend to Othello when actually considering Othello’s harm. This illustrates the vice opposed to truthfulness.

Mozart and Musical Keys #

Mozart in Jupiter Symphony (36th, in C major) represents magnanimity/great-souledness. Different keys represent different emotions and passions, showing how artistic form follows the natural distinctions between objects and their relations to reason.

The Importance of Division Numbers #

Berquist digresses on the scholastic principle of dividing by two or three (rarely four, never more). He notes:

• The Gospel of Matthew divides into three parts (coming into world, proceeding in world, passing out)
• Augustine and Thomas divide Psalms into three (Psalm 50 = penance/beginning; Psalm 100 = good deeds/progress; Psalm 150 = rest in God/completion)
• Our Father divides into three (ascent to God, seven petitions subdivided into 2+2+3)
• Sonata form has three parts (exposition, development, recapitulation)
• Mozart’s concertos always three movements
• Three seems the minimum for completeness (Aristotle: Sophocles introduced third actor)

Notable Quotes #

“Sexual desire and the desire to drink are not opposed to reason in the same way. You’ve got to see that from experience. That’s what Stiles said, you’ve got to experience to understand ethics.”

“Virtue is operative of something good, so it also impedes something bad.”

“The good, more strongly, is stronger to move us than the bad. Because the bad does not act except by virtue of the good.” (Dionysius, Divine Names IV)

“More and less do not diversify species except on account of diverse relation to reason.”

“The perfection of virtue depends upon reason. Reason, right? And the perfection of passion depends upon desire.”

Questions Addressed #

Q: Why don’t all pleasurable things belong to one virtue if they differ only in degree? #

A: Because they differ in degree precisely through diverse relations to reason. More and less only fail to diversify species when the relation to reason remains the same. Different objects (food vs. sexual matter) have fundamentally different relations to reason despite being equally pleasant.

Q: If justice covers many diverse objects, why don’t temperance and other moral virtues? #

A: Justice concerns operations, which all maintain uniform relation to reason (all buying and selling are acts of rendering what is due). Passions, however, have diverse relations to reason depending on their object, subject, and how they impede reason.

Q: Why is there one virtue for anger but many for pleasure-seeking? #

A: Because bad/difficult passions (anger, fear) require virtue only when excelling/extreme, making one genus of virtue per passion sufficient. Good/pleasant passions bring difficulty to reason even when moderate, requiring distinct virtues for different types of goods.

Connections and Context #

This lecture continues the treatment of moral virtues and their distinction, building on previous discussions of virtue as a habit and virtue distinguished by objects and subjects. It prepares for the detailed treatment of individual cardinal virtues and their related virtues that will follow. The analysis of how reason relates differently to diverse objects becomes foundational for understanding why the cardinal virtues are four rather than more or fewer.