Lecture 190

190. The Gravity of Sins: Causes and Circumstances

Summary
This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of what makes sins more or less grave, focusing on two central questions: whether the gravity of sin is determined by its causes, and whether circumstances aggravate sin. Berquist explores the distinction between intrinsic causes (the will’s inclination to sin) and extrinsic causes (ignorance, infirmity, violence), and demonstrates how circumstances can either change the species of sin or multiply its defects within the same species.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

  • Gravity of Sins According to Causes: Whether the magnitude of a sin’s cause determines the gravity of the sin itself
  • Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Causes: The will’s own inclination to sin versus external factors that impede free choice
  • Voluntary vs. Involuntary: How ignorance, infirmity, and other extrinsic factors diminish the voluntary character of an act
  • Circumstances and Species Change: Whether a circumstance can transfer a sin from one genus to another
  • Circumstances and Defect Multiplication: Whether a circumstance can aggravate a sin within the same species
  • Deformity and Circumstance: How a circumstance can increase deformity arising from another circumstance
  • The Nature of Accident vs. Species: The relationship between accidental features of an act and its essential moral character

Key Arguments #

On Gravity According to Causes #

Objections:

  • The greater the cause of sin, the more strongly one is moved to sinning and the more difficult it is to resist; but sin is diminished when it is more difficult to resist, so greater causes diminish sin
  • Concupiscence is a general cause of sin; when greater concupiscence overcomes a man, there is less sin
  • Just as defect of reason causes sin, and greater defect of reason means less sin (the ignorant are excused), so greater causes of sin diminish sin

Thomas’s Resolution:

  • Distinguish between two kinds of causes: per se (intrinsic) causes and per accidens (extrinsic/remote) causes
  • Intrinsic cause: The will’s own inclination to sin; the greater this inclination, the graver the sin
  • Extrinsic causes: Ignorance, infirmity, violence—these do NOT belong to the nature of the will itself, but rather impede its free motion
  • Extrinsic causes diminish the voluntary character of the act, and thus diminish sin
  • Concupiscence (understood as an emotion/passion) preceding reason’s judgment diminishes sin; but concupiscence that follows reason’s judgment indicates a greater inclination of the will and aggravates sin
  • Defect of reason (ignorance) diminishes sin because it diminishes the voluntary; but this does not mean the cause of sin diminishes it—rather, what diminishes the voluntary diminishes culpability

On Circumstances #

Three Ways Circumstances Aggravate Sin:

  1. Change of Species: A circumstance carries a sin into another genus/species

    • Example: Fornication (approaching one not one’s own) becomes adultery when the woman is another’s wife—this adds the element of injustice (usurping another’s property)
    • The circumstance here adds a new ratio of evil, not merely multiplying the existing one
  2. Multiplication of Defects: A circumstance multiplies violations of reason within the same species

    • Example: A man who gives when he ought not to and to whom he ought not to give sins more gravely than one who merely gives to the wrong person
    • The circumstance does not change the species but multiplies the ways reason is violated
    • Analogy: A sickness is more grave when more parts of the body are infected
  3. Increase of Deformity: A circumstance increases the deformity arising from another circumstance

    • Example: Taking much from a poor person is worse than taking little from a rich person
    • The circumstance “much” itself is not intrinsically bad, but it increases the deformity of the act of theft when combined with the poverty of the victim
    • This shows a greater disorder in the will’s inclination, not merely external harm

Objections and Responses:

  • Objection: Since circumstance is an accident, it cannot affect the species of sin (which is determined by substance/form)

    • Response: While circumstance is indeed accidental to the act itself, it can transfer the act into a different genus of sin by adding a new element that gives a new ratio of evil (e.g., adding injustice to fornication)
  • Objection: Either the circumstance is bad (in which case it constitutes a separate sin) or it is not bad (in which case it cannot increase evil)

    • Response: A circumstance can be bad and yet not constitute a separate species of sin; it can aggravate the existing sin by adding a new ratio of wickedness within the same species or by multiplying defects
  • Objection: The malice of sin comes from aversion from God, but circumstances follow sin on the side of conversion; therefore circumstances do not increase malice

    • Response: Reason must order the act not only as to its object but as to all its circumstances; aversion from the rule of reason (which concerns all circumstances) constitutes the formal evil of the act

Important Definitions #

  • Intrinsic (Per Se) Cause: The will’s own inclination toward sinning; belongs to the nature of the voluntary act itself
  • Extrinsic (Per Accidens) Cause: A remote moving cause such as ignorance, infirmity, violence, or threats; does not belong to the nature of the will but impedes its free motion
  • Circumstance: An accident of the act that may or may not determine its species but can aggravate it
  • Voluntary: The extent to which an act proceeds from the will; diminished by ignorance, infirmity, or violence
  • Conversion: The turning toward some desirable good in sin (as opposed to aversion, the turning away from God)
  • Aversion from the Rule of Reason: The formal evil of sin; consists in departing from the order of reason in any circumstance

Examples & Illustrations #

  • The Excused Person: One who acts under duress or in ignorance may say, “That wasn’t me,” meaning the emotional passion or ignorance, not the rational will, drove the act—showing that extrinsic causes do diminish culpability

  • Adultery vs. Fornication: A man who approaches a woman not his own commits fornication; but if the woman is another’s wife, it becomes adultery by the addition of the circumstance of marital status—the sin changes genus to include injustice

  • Filicide (Patricide/Matricide): Killing one’s father or mother is worse than killing a stranger, not necessarily because of a change of species, but because of the many circumstances of ingratitude and violation of duties owed to those who generated and nourished you

  • Theft of Different Amounts: Stealing much from a poor person is worse than stealing little from a rich person, even though the amount stolen itself is not intrinsically bad; the circumstance “much” shows greater disorder in the will’s inclination and violates reason more severely

  • Drinking at the Wrong Time: Drinking alcohol before operating on a patient or before flying a bombing mission is unreasonable; the same amount drunk after such duties are completed, or in celebration (e.g., Thanksgiving), may be reasonable—showing how the circumstance of time determines the conformity or non-conformity to reason

  • Public Atonement Story: A thief sees an elephant on the road and tells his brother; when the brother laughs at him, the thief says he would rather believe his brothers than disbelieve them, showing the role of trust and reason in judgment

Questions Addressed #

  1. Does a greater cause of sin make the sin more grave? No, if the cause is extrinsic (ignorance, infirmity, violence); yes, if it is intrinsic (the will’s own inclination)

  2. How does concupiscence affect the gravity of sin? If it is a mere emotion/passion preceding reason’s judgment, it diminishes sin by lessening the voluntary; if it follows reason’s judgment and shows the will’s strong inclination, it aggravates sin

  3. Can a circumstance change the kind of sin? Yes; when it adds a new ratio of evil that belongs to a different genus (e.g., injustice added to fornication makes it adultery)

  4. Can a circumstance aggravate sin without changing its species? Yes; by multiplying violations of reason within the same species, or by increasing deformity arising from other circumstances

  5. Why must reason order all circumstances, not just the object? Because the fullness of the will’s ordering requires conformity to reason in every aspect; aversion from the rule of reason in any circumstance constitutes a defect in the act

  6. How do ignorance and infirmity affect culpability? They diminish the voluntary character of the act and thus reduce (but do not eliminate) culpability, because they lessen the extent to which the will freely inclines to sin