201. Passion, Sin, and the Problem of Moral Culpability

Summary

This lecture explores how passion (emotional inclination of the sense appetite) functions as a cause of sin within Thomistic moral theology. Berquist examines the three concupiscences (of the flesh, of the eyes, and pride of life) as sources of disordered desire, then addresses the critical question of whether passion can excuse from sin entirely, partially diminish sin, or conversely aggravate it. The lecture emphasizes Thomas’s distinction between antecedent passion (which diminishes voluntariness and thus sin) and consequent passion (which demonstrates the intensity of will and may increase culpability), connecting this to scriptural texts and concrete moral examples.

Listen to Lecture

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Three Concupiscences and Their Objects #

Thomas identifies three primary sources of sin, each corresponding to a disordered desire:

Concupiscence of the Flesh (ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός): Disordered desire for natural goods perceived through touch—food, drink, reproduction
Concupiscence of the Eyes (ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν): Disordered desire for things pleasing to sight alone (not involving bodily pleasure)—wealth, beautiful objects, fine clothing, cars, appearance
Pride of Life (ἀλαζονεία τῆς ζωῆς): Disordered desire for excellence and honor—political office, distinction, acclaim

All passions causing sin reduce to these three categories, with the first two belonging to the concupiscible appetite and the third to the irascible appetite.

Passion and Voluntariness: The Central Problem #

The core question: Does passion excuse from sin, aggravate sin, or something more complex?

The Paradox:

Objection 1: Passion causes the involuntary; therefore it wholly excuses from sin
Objection 2: Passion impedes reason; therefore it diminishes culpability
Objection 3: A good passion increases merit; therefore a bad passion should increase sin
Scripture (Romans 7:5): “The passions of sin operate in our members with the fruit of death” (suggesting passion makes sin grave)

Thomas’s Resolution: Passion must be understood in two ways:

Antecedent Passion (passion preceding the act of will):
- Draws or inclines reason and will toward the disordered act
- Diminishes voluntariness because the act flows more from passion than from reason’s own judgment
- Therefore diminishes sin by reducing the per se cause (voluntary choice)
- Example: A man provoked to anger strikes harder in the moment
Consequent Passion (passion following upon the will’s decision):
- Does NOT excuse from sin
- Actually demonstrates and points to the intensity of the will’s commitment to the sinful act
- Example: If someone sins with greater libido/concupiscence, this shows the strength of their willing, not their excuse
- Functions as a sign, not a cause

The Distinction: Berquist emphasizes Thomas’s use of “look before and after” (from Shakespeare, cited as important for philosophical thinking)—one must distinguish the temporal order of passion relative to the will’s act.

When Passion Causes Involuntariness #

Passion can only wholly excuse from sin if it totally removes the use of reason. This occurs in two cases:

Natural Causes: Sickness or natural affection so great it wholly intercepts reason’s use—the act becomes entirely involuntary
Voluntary Causes (which do not excuse): When the will voluntarily brought about the passion from its beginning (e.g., drunkenness where one freely chose to drink)

In most cases, passion diminishes but does not eliminate reason’s use. Reason remains able to:

Divert attention to other thoughts
Impede passion’s effect by refusing consent
Exercise deliberation about how to act

Passion and Mortal Sin #

Objections to passion producing mortal sin:

Mortal sin requires turning away from the ultimate end (God), which pertains to reason deliberating
How can passion, which impedes reason, produce such grave sin?

Thomas’s Answer:

Mortal sin, as an aversion from God, requires reason’s deliberation. However:

Sudden motions caused by passion alone are not mortal sin
But when someone proceeds from passion to deliberate consent (not suddenly), reason retains its power
Reason can then exclude or impede the passion—if it fails to do so, the resulting sin is mortal
Example: David seeing Bathsheba (sudden motion), but then deliberating to bring her, then planning Uriah’s murder—each step involves reason’s choice and is thus grave

Conclusion: Many homicides and adulteries committed through passion are mortal sins precisely because reason had opportunity to deliberate and choose otherwise.

The Nature of Venial Sin #

Berquist addresses the meaning of “venial” sin:

Three senses of “venial”:

From its cause: A sin has reason for forgiveness because some diminishing cause (infirmity, ignorance) reduces its gravity
From its event: Any sin becomes venial through penance
From its genus: Sins that are venial in kind (like idle words) are distinguished from mortal sin by their matter

Sin from infirmity and ignorance can be venial because these causes diminish the per se voluntary character of the act.

Key Arguments #

Argument Structure: Per Se vs. Per Accidens Causation #

Berquist stresses the fundamental distinction between:

Per se cause (per se): Direct cause proportionate to the effect (e.g., fire’s heat melting wax)
Per accidens cause (per accidens): Accidental cause not proportionate to the effect (e.g., fire’s coldness if the house burns down and becomes cold)

In moral causation:

The per se cause of sin is the voluntary act of the will (conversion + aversion from God)
Passion is a per accidens cause: It impels toward the act but is not the will’s own act
Therefore: Passion does not increase sin’s per se cause; rather, an increase in antecedent passion diminishes the per se cause (voluntariness)
If passion is consequent (a sign of will’s intensity), it may demonstrate greater culpability, but this is because the per se cause (the will) is stronger, not because passion itself is stronger

The Principle of Reason’s Sovereignty #

Core principle: “The members are not applied to work except by the consent of reason.”

Therefore:

Even in passion, reason retains the power to consent or refuse
Passion without reason’s consent cannot produce sin
If reason consents while able to refuse, the sin is imputable to reason
If reason is truly unable to refuse (total loss of use), sin is excused

Middle case: When passion greatly diminishes but does not eliminate reason’s use, reason is able to exclude passion—if it fails, this failure is imputable.

Important Definitions #

Concupiscence (Concupiscentia) #

Disordered desire directed toward sensible goods that conflict with reason or God’s law. The three forms (flesh, eyes, pride) represent the principal ways appetite disorders sin.

Passion (Passio) #

An emotion or motion of the sense appetite (concupiscible or irascible) that may incline the will toward disordered acts. Passion is distinguished by its temporal relation to the will’s choice (antecedent or consequent).

Involuntary (Involuntarium) #

An act not subject to the will’s control. Passion produces involuntariness only when it wholly removes reason’s use; partial diminishment of reason still leaves the act subject to will’s governance and therefore voluntary (though less so).

Venial Sin (Peccatum Veniale) #

Sin that does not turn one away from God as the ultimate end and thus does not destroy sanctifying grace. A sin can be venial from its cause (if infirmity or ignorance diminish voluntariness), from its event (if forgiven), or from its genus (if its matter is light).

Examples & Illustrations #

Contemporary Marketing and Concupiscence #

Berquist discusses car advertisements as paradigmatic examples of concupiscence of the eyes:

A beautiful woman drives a new car: “the new beauty in town”
The viewer is meant to desire both the car and the status associated with it
Neighbors become jealous: the pride of life is activated
None of this aims at bodily pleasure (touching) but purely at appearance and status

The biblical example illustrates the progression from antecedent passion to mortal sin:

David sees Bathsheba bathing (sudden motion, passion)
He sends someone to bring her (deliberation begins)
He lies with her (voluntary act with opportunity to deliberate)
He plans to murder Uriah (clearly deliberate consent)

While the initial seeing might be excused as sudden, the progression shows reason’s increasing involvement, making the later acts mortal sin.

Sobriety and Responsibility: The Case of the Drunk Man #

If a man voluntarily becomes drunk and then commits a sin in his drunkenness:

The drunkenness itself was voluntary
Therefore, the sin in drunkenness is imputed to him through the voluntary cause (choosing to get drunk)
The fact that he did not know the wine’s power when he drank it does not excuse, because he chose to drink
Example: Old Testament figure (Noah) who “did not know the power of the wine”

Personal Anecdote: Academic Competition and Ardor #

Berquist recounts a friendship formed with Warren Murray in biology class:

Murray knew science and asked good questions
Berquist felt competitive desire (ardor of the irascible appetite seeking a difficult good)
The desire to surpass Murray in exams drove study but reflected the passion of rivalry
This illustrates how passion can move one toward action without (necessarily) being sinful

Questions Addressed #

Question 1: Does Passion Wholly Excuse from Sin? #

Objections:

Passion causes involuntariness; involuntariness wholly excuses
Particular ignorance caused by passion (e.g., not thinking of God’s law) wholly excuses
Infirmity of soul parallels bodily infirmity, which excuses; so passion should excuse

Answer:

Only if passion wholly removes the use of reason does it wholly excuse
Partial diminishment of reason does not excuse because reason remains able to repel passion
Particular ignorance caused by passion is excused only regarding that act, not generally
The distinction: something is involuntary either when the will directly intends an involuntary outcome, or when the will chooses the cause while not intending the effect (“indirect voluntariness”)

Example: Drunkenness may be involuntary in its effects, but if one voluntarily got drunk, one is responsible indirectly for what happens.

Question 2: Can Sin from Passion Be Mortal? #