203. Sin from Malice and Its Relation to Habit

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Sin from Malice (Peccatum ex Malitia) #

• Definition: A sin committed through deliberate choice of a temporal good over a spiritual good, not merely from ignorance or passion
• The paradox: How can the will choose evil when evil is not desirable in itself?
• Resolution: Evil is chosen not as evil but as a means to obtain some temporal good (pleasure, wealth, honor) loved more than spiritual good
• Example given: One who chooses to be elected by abandoning pro-life position; one who chooses pleasure over chastity

The Distinction: Having vs. Acting from a Habit #

• Central distinction: Not everyone who has a vicious habit sins from malice; but whoever acts from a vicious habit necessarily sins from malice
• Why the distinction matters: To use a habit is subject to the will of the one having it—one can choose not to use even a vicious habit
• Example: A Christian who doubts the faith is not necessarily using the habit of faith; the habit remains available but unused

Habit as Second Nature #

• Aristotle’s principle: “Habit is a second nature” (from Ethics)
• How habit corrupts: Through repeated acts, custom becomes nature; the will becomes inclined toward evil as if it were a good
• Permanence: Unlike passion, which quickly passes, habit is stable and settled; therefore sin from habit is more grave
• Result: What is “suitable” according to a vicious habit appears lovable to the sinner, since “to each one that is choosable is what he is inclined to by his own habit”

The Stages of Decline to Malice #

• Gradual not sudden: Following Origen, one does not suddenly sin from malice but “little by little” through custom
• Lazarus symbolism: Different stages of resurrection in Scripture (Lazarus buried four days, son of widow, sleeping girl) correspond to different depths of spiritual death from habitual sin
• The four-day burial: Represents one who has “died and is habituated in all his sin”

Malice Without Habit: Desperation and Presumption #

• Two exceptions to habit presupposing malice: One can sin from malice through desperation (loss of hope) or presumption (false confidence in forgiveness)
• Desperation: When one loses hope of salvation and sins knowingly, believing oneself already damned
• Presumption: When one assumes God will forgive any sin and therefore sins without restraint
• Both involve removal of preventing factors: Hope and fear (of damnation) normally restrain the will from malice
• Importance of balance: Fear without hope becomes despair; hope without fear becomes presumption—both lead to malice

The Nature of the Will and Its Inclination #

• Natural inclination to good: From the nature of its power, the will is inclined to the good of reason, not to evil
• Every sin is against nature: Because it opposes the natural inclination of the will toward good
• What must corrupt the will: Either a passion (temporary impulse) or a habit (stable disposition), or defect of reason (ignorance)
• Malice proper to the will: When the will itself, from itself, is moved to evil—this requires something that has corrupted the will’s natural bent

Key Arguments #

Argument Against Immediate Sin from Malice #

• Premise 1: Man’s nature inclines him to good, not evil
• Premise 2: For the will to choose evil, something must come upon the power to corrupt it
• Premise 3: This corruption is either passion or habit
• Premise 4: Sin from passion is not sin from malice (it is from infirmity)
• Conclusion: Therefore, sin from malice presupposes either a habit or something habitually-like that corrupts the will

Argument That Acting from Habit Necessitates Malice #

• Premise 1: To each one having a habit, that which is suitable to his habit is per se lovable
• Premise 2: What is suitable to a vicious habit excludes spiritual good
• Premise 3: Therefore a man chooses spiritual evil in order to obtain the good suitable to his habit
• Conclusion: This is to sin from malice; therefore whoever sins from habit necessarily sins from malice

Counter-argument: Malice Does Not Require Habit #

• Objection: Aristotle says sin from malice is from choice only to those having a habit; therefore malice requires habit
• Resolution: This confuses “having” a habit with “acting from” a habit. The will can choose evil through desperation or presumption (removal of restraining factors) without necessarily having a vicious habit
• Key distinction: Not all disposition toward evil is a habit; some is temporary defect of reason or loss of hope/fear

Important Definitions #

Malitia (Malice): A defect of the will whereby one knowingly chooses a temporal good over a spiritual good, selecting evil not as evil but as a means to obtain what is loved more

Habitus (Habit): A stable disposition of the soul that becomes “second nature” through repeated acts; inclines one toward its characteristic acts

Secundum quid vs. Simplicitare: Venial sins are evil secundum quid (in a qualified way), not simplicitare (absolutely). Their habits too are evil only in a qualified way, unlike mortal sins

Passion (Passio): A temporary movement of the sense appetite that can incline the will but does not establish a stable disposition

Connatural/Connaturalis: Made natural or suited to nature; what is accomplished “connatually” according to habit appears natural and fitting

Examples & Illustrations #

The Wine Drinker’s Progression #

• Initial stage: Novice drinkers prefer white wine; they lack the refined palate
• Habitual stage: With repeated tasting, one acquires taste for red wine’s complexity
• Moral application: Shows how habit shapes preference and makes the disordered appear desirable

The Arm Amputation During Civil War #

• Illustration of choosing lesser good for greater: Men knowingly underwent amputation of limbs to conserve their lives, which they loved more
• Application to sin: Just as one can choose bodily harm for bodily preservation, one can choose spiritual harm for temporal pleasure

Don Giovanni (Mozart) #

• Habitual seducer: Don Giovanni’s constant pursuit of women reflects a stable vicious habit, not momentary passion
• Rejoicing in sin: Unlike the incontinent man (who sins from passion and regrets), Don Giovanni rejoices in his actions
• Final moment: When the ghost appears at the feast, he cannot repent; his habits have become his nature
• Theological significance: “Where your tree falls, there it lies” (Ecclesiastes)—at death one is stuck with one’s habits; Don Giovanni falls where his habit inclines him

The Spanish Civil War Martyr #

• Power of witness: A girl in a white dress stands before Communist attackers; when shot, her blood flowing through the white dress shocks them
• Reason not wholly corrupted: Even with corrupted reason, something in the perpetrators’ nature responds to the image of innocent suffering
• Illustration: Shows that even those with vicious habits retain some capacity to be moved by what is truly good

The Quebec Restaurant (Petite Steak) #

• Habitual choice: Berquist orders the same meal every visit
• Habit recognized: The waitress knows his order so well she calls it to the kitchen before he orders
• Second nature: Habit becomes automatic; choice becomes nearly reflexive
• Application: Illustrates how habits shape the will’s movement toward their characteristic objects

The Cheddar Box Telephone Anecdote #

• Idle words and venial sin: Reference to someone’s phone number being nearly identical to the Cheddar Box restaurant
• Venial vs. mortal sin: Illustrates the difference between small, habitual failures (idle words from habit) and grave sins from malice

Desperation and Presumption in Sin #

• Desperation: One loses hope of salvation and deliberately sins, knowing one is damned anyway
• Presumption: One assumes God will forgive and sins deliberately without restraint
• Both remove restraint: They remove the fear of damnation or hope of salvation that would normally prevent the will from turning to evil

Notable Quotes #

“Habit is a second nature” - Aristotle (via Thomas Aquinas)

“To each one having a habit, that which is fitting to his habit is per se lovable” - Thomas Aquinas (on why habitual sin seems good to the sinner)

“Where your tree falls, there it lies” - Ecclesiastes (cited on the permanence of habits at death)

“It is not suddenly that someone is empty or fails, but little by little through parts he must decline” - Origen (on gradual descent into habitual malice)

“Those who sin from habit after the sin is committed sorrow” - Thomas Aquinas (on the difference between passion and habit)

“To act as the unjust one acts is not only to do something unjust from malice, but also without any great refusal of reason or opposition of reason, which is not except in one who has the habit” - Thomas Aquinas

Questions Addressed #

Does Everyone Who Sins from Habit Sin from Malice? #

• Initial objection: Light sins from habit (like idle words) seem not to be from malice since they are not grave
• Resolution: Venial sins are evil secundum quid (in a qualified way), not absolutely; their habits too are only qualified evils
• Distinction: One must distinguish between sin having a habit and sin from a habit. Having a vicious habit does not require acting from it; the will can choose not to use it
• Key finding: Not everyone having a vicious habit sins from malice; but whoever acts from a vicious habit necessarily sins from malice

How Do Acts from Habit Differ from Acts Generating Habit? #

• Aristotle’s principle: Acts proceeding from habit are like acts generating the habit, but differ as perfect differs from imperfect
• Before the habit: Acts require difficulty, hesitation, conscious effort
• After acquiring the habit: Acts proceed with ease, ability, naturalness
• Application to sin: Sin from passion lacks the stable choice characteristic of sin from malice; sin from habit displays permanent, settled choice toward evil

Does Sin from Malice Necessarily Presuppose Habit? #

• Initial argument: Aristotle says sin from malice is only to those having a habit; therefore malice requires habit
• Counterargument: One can sin from malice through desperation (loss of hope) or presumption (false confidence) without a habit
• Resolution: Malice presupposes some corrupt disposition, but this need not always be a habit. However, it typically is a habit, since malice requires stable orientation of the will toward evil
• Two ways the will moves to evil: (1) through a corrupt disposition (habit or natural inclination) making evil suitable to it, or (2) through removal of restraining factors (hope/fear) that would prevent the choice

What is the Difference Between Desperation and Presumption? #

• Desperation: Removal of hope; one loses belief in God’s mercy and salvation
• Presumption: Removal of fear; one falsely trusts in God’s forgiveness regardless of one’s sins
• Both as malice: Both represent a will that has become disordered in its orientation toward God as ultimate end
• Need for balance: Fear without hope becomes despair; hope without fear becomes presumption—both are dangers requiring both virtues together