Lecture 291

291. Grace as Quality and the Five Predicables

Summary
This lecture examines whether grace is a quality in Aristotle’s ten categories and applies the five predicables (genus, difference, species, property, accident) from Porphyry’s Isagoge to understand grace’s metaphysical status. Berquist explores how grace, though more noble than human nature, must be understood as an accidental form rather than a substantial one, and how it relates to the soul’s powers through the analogy of properties flowing from essence.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Three Senses of Grace (Equivocation by Reason) #

  • First sense: Grace as favor or good will (e.g., “in the good graces of the king”)
  • Second sense: Grace as a gift given gratis (not owed as payment)
  • Third sense: Grace as gratitude or recompense for a benefit received freely (“gracias”)
  • These three senses are ordered by reason: the first causes the second (gift given), the second causes the third (gratitude)
  • This is equivocation by reason (not by chance) because there is an order among the meanings

Grace in God vs. in Creatures #

  • In creatures: the good in the thing causes our love for it
  • In God: God’s love causes the good in creatures (reversed order)
  • God’s love is eternal and unchanging; it does not suddenly decide to love
  • God loves all creatures with common love (secundum quid) by giving them being
  • God loves rational creatures with special love (simpliciter) by drawing them to share divine goodness (“I call you no longer servants, but friends”)

Is Grace a Quality? #

First Objection (Equivocation on “Act”) #

  • Objection: Quality acts upon its subject, but grace justifies the soul, so grace cannot be quality
  • Response: This commits equivocation on the word “act” (ἀκτός/actus)
  • Quality acts not as efficient cause but as formal cause: whiteness makes something white; justice makes someone just
  • Just as the form (second cause of being) makes something what it is, so grace as form acts upon the soul
  • Maker/maker applies to all four causes by extension, though primarily to efficient cause

Second Objection (Nobility) #

  • Objection: Substance is more noble than quality; grace is more noble than human nature; therefore grace should be substance, not quality
  • Response: Grace is accidental, not substantial
    • Every substance is either the nature of a thing or part of its nature
    • Grace is above human nature and cannot be the very substance of the soul
    • What is substantially in God comes accidentally to the soul (participatory mode)
    • The soul imperfectly partakes (imperfecte participat) of divine goodness; this participation is grace
  • Grace is more noble than human nature as an expression/participation of divine goodness, not as regards God’s mode of being (“I AM WHO AM”)

Third Objection (Incorruptibility) #

  • Objection: No quality remains after ceasing to be in its subject; but grace remains, so grace is not quality
  • Response: According to Boethius and Aristotle, “the being of an accident is to be in another”
    • Strictly speaking, nothing is in itself
    • Accidents do not properly come to be or be corrupted; rather, they are said to come to be or be corrupted according as their subject begins or ceases to be in act according to that accident
    • Grace is said to be created (new creature, Galatians) because men are created according to grace—that is, constituted in new being not from their merits
    • “Created in Christ Jesus, in good works” (Ephesians)

Grace Within Aristotle’s Ten Categories #

  • Grace is not a quantity (how much) but a quality (how/what kind)
  • Grace is not in the fourth species of quality (form and figure) because it does not pertain to the body
  • Grace is not in the third species (sensible qualities like heat/cold) because it is principally in the mind
  • Grace is not in the second species (natural power/lack of power)
  • Grace must be in the first species of quality: habit or disposition (ἕξις/habitus)
  • Note: Grace is compared to habit by likeness but is not identical to it

Aristotle’s Five Predicables (Book of Five Names) #

The Five Predicables are what are said of things:

  1. Genus (γένος): what is said of many things, signifying what they are in common (e.g., “rectilineal plane figure” for triangle)
  2. Species (εἶδος): the more particular specification of what a thing is (e.g., “triangle”)
  3. Difference (διαφορά): how the species differs from others under the same genus (e.g., “three-sided” for triangle)
  4. Property (ἴδιον): something outside the nature of the thing but following upon it (e.g., “interior angles equal to two right angles” for triangle)
  5. Accident (συμβεβηκός): something outside the nature with no connection to it (e.g., “green” for triangle)

Key Distinction:

  • Property and accident both exist outside what a thing is, but:
    • Property follows upon the nature (proprium sequitur naturam)
    • Accident has no necessary connection to the nature

Application to Soul and Its Powers:

  • Species to Property = Soul to its powers
  • The more noble the soul, the more powers it has:
    • Plants: vegetative powers (nutrition, growth, reproduction)
    • Animals: add sensation and emotion
    • Humans: add intellectual powers
  • Similarly, grace relates to virtues as the soul’s essence relates to its powers (implied development)

Key Arguments #

Against Grace Being Substance #

  • Grace cannot be substantial because it is above human nature
  • What is substantially in God comes accidentally to creatures through participation
  • The soul imperfectly participates in divine goodness; perfect participation would make it identical, which is impossible for creatures

On Equivocation and the Word “Act” #

  • Aristotle’s Categories distinguish act primarily as motion (ἀκτός), later extended to form
  • Motion is more known than form; hence words like “action” and “activity” primarily suggest motion
  • This explains why even substantial causes (form) come to be described through the language of making/moving
  • Modern philosophy tends to emphasize motion (Hegel, Marx, Heraclitus), perhaps because motion is most evident to sense

On Divine Providence and Sweetness #

  • God disposes all things suaviter (sweetly) because He moves creatures toward what accords with their nature and powers
  • Example: A cat naturally pounces on moving things; God gives the creature inclinations matching its powers
  • Similarly, grace gives the soul inclinations toward supernatural acts so they are performed sweetly and promptly

Important Definitions #

  • Accidental form (forma accidentalis): A quality existing in a subject but not essential to what that subject is; contrasted with substantial form
  • Substantial form (forma substantialis): The form that makes a thing what it is (e.g., soul as form of body)
  • Habitus (ἕξις): A habit or stable disposition; the first species of quality in Aristotle’s Categories
  • Imperfecte participat: Imperfectly partakes; indicates partial sharing in something that belongs more perfectly to another
  • Simpliciter vs. Secundum quid: Simply/absolutely vs. in a certain respect; God loves rational creatures simpliciter (absolutely) but other things secundum quid
  • Suaviter: Sweetly; God’s mode of disposing creatures to act according to their nature and inclination
  • Forma (as efficient/formal cause): Distinguished from motion; form makes a thing what it is rather than moving it to action
  • Arkhē (ἀρχή - Beginning vs. αἰτία - Cause): Beginning is more general than cause; point is beginning of line but not cause of line
  • Genus, Differentia, Species, Proprium, Accidens: The five predicables

Examples & Illustrations #

The Five Dollar Bill #

  • Berquist uses a five dollar bill as a concrete example to illustrate the five predicables (genus, difference, species, property, accident) from Porphyry’s Isagoge
  • This makes the abstract logical framework tangible for understanding how predicables apply to grace

Opening the Church Door #

  • Opening the door for someone behind him and saying “be my guest”—gratis—illustrates the second sense of grace as a gift given freely
  • Their response “thank you” illustrates the third sense of grace as gratitude
  • Shows the ordering: free gift → gratitude

The Squirrels and Natural Inclination #

  • Squirrels running around a tree, wrapping it and jumping with adeptness—illustrates how creatures act according to their nature with ease and promptness
  • This exemplifies how God disposes all things sweetly: creatures naturally incline toward their proper actions

The Kitten and the Striated Belt #

  • A rescued kitten played with a belt until shown a striated belt, then responded with cat-like hunting instinct, jumping and pouncing unnaturally for a kitten
  • Illustrates instinctual natural inclination (the snake is a natural enemy of cats)
  • Shows that powers follow from nature and are exercised according to the creature’s capacities

The Carpenter’s Wooden Chairs at Assumption #

  • A craftsman who couldn’t afford to send his children to Assumption but made beautiful wooden chairs for the school
  • The carpenter gave wood a form (formal causality) that lasts indefinitely
  • Illustrates the maker/form-giver as cause of act-as-form, distinct from motion

Natural and Unnatural Motion #

  • A body falling from a window goes down naturally (due to matter); helium rises naturally (due to matter)
  • Walking up church steps can be natural (form/reason) or unnatural (matter)
  • Man’s large discourse (rational reflection—looking before and after) is natural to his form, not matter

Questions Addressed #

Is grace a quality? #

  • Answer: Yes, grace is a quality in the first species of Aristotle’s categories (habit or disposition), though not identical to habit but having a likeness to it
  • It is accidental, not substantial
  • It acts formally (giving form to the soul) not efficiently

How can grace be an accident if it is more noble than nature? #

  • Answer: Grace is more noble than human nature as a participation in divine goodness, but participation is necessarily accidental to the participated
  • What is substantially in God comes accidentally to creatures
  • The soul imperfectly partakes of divine goodness; if it participated perfectly, it would be identical, which is impossible for creatures

What is the relation between the five predicables and understanding grace? #

  • Answer: The predicables help classify how grace relates to the soul and its powers
  • Grace is to the powers (virtues) as the soul’s essence is to the soul’s natural powers
  • Grace functions as a principle (ἀρχή) from which supernatural operations flow through virtues

Why does Porphyry write about the five predicables? #

  • Answer: To introduce logic and make it useful not only for understanding categories but also for division, definition, and demonstration
  • The Isagoge serves as introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, addressing questions about genus, species, difference, etc.
  • This logical framework is necessary for theology as well as philosophy