14. The Grace of Union and Divine Assumption
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
Whether the Incarnation Was Merited (Question 2, Article 11) #
The Problem:
- Objection argues that ancient fathers merited eternal life, which required the Incarnation as necessary means; therefore fathers merited the Incarnation
- The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to bear the Lord through the Incarnation
Thomas’s Solution:
- Christ himself could not merit the Incarnation (he could not act before possessing human nature)
- No other human could merit it ex condigno (as proportionate reward)
- The grace of union transcends even the beatific vision (union of blessed mind to God)
- Merit properly orders to beatific vision as reward; Incarnation exceeds this
- Grace is the beginning of merit; Incarnation is beginning of grace itself—it cannot itself fall under merit
- The Incarnation reformed the whole of human nature, not individual merit
- However, the fathers and Virgin Mary merited it ex congruo (fittingly)
- They merited it through desiring and asking for it
- God fittingly hears those who obey him
- The Blessed Virgin merited the purity and sanctity suitable to be Mother of God, not that God become flesh
Key Insight: Grace precedes merit; Incarnation precedes grace. Therefore Incarnation cannot fall under merit.
Whether the Grace of Union is Natural to Christ (Question 2, Article 12) #
The Problem:
- Objection: Union made in person, not nature; grace divided against nature; grace not natural according to either divine or human nature
Two Meanings of ‘Natural’:
- From essential principles of the thing - e.g., fire naturally moves upward
- Possessed from birth - e.g., children born with original sin (natura as nativity)
Thomas’s Answer:
- Grace of union is NOT natural in sense (1): not caused by principles of human nature
- Grace of union IS natural in sense (2): Christ had it from conception; joined to divine person from birth
- Also natural because caused by divine nature’s power
- Therefore: Christ is “naturally holy” from birth, though not from human nature’s intrinsic principles
Resolution of Objections:
- The union was caused by divine nature’s power and belongs to Christ from nativity
- Not said to be grace and natural by the same reason: grace insofar as not from merit; natural insofar as from divine nature’s power and from birth
- The grace of union is not natural according to human nature (so does not belong to all men) but was natural to Christ on account of what was unique in his nativity—conceived from Holy Spirit
Whether Assumption Belongs to Divine Person (Question 3, Article 1-2) #
The Problem:
- Objection: Divine person is infinitely perfect; nothing can be added to it; assumption seems to add something; therefore unsuitable for divine person to assume
- Moreover: To assume communicates dignity to what is assumed; but person is incommunicable; therefore unsuitable
- Also: Person constituted by nature; effect cannot act on cause; therefore unsuitable for person to assume nature
Thomas’s Analysis of ‘Assumption’: The word “assumption” (assumptio—to take to oneself) implies two things:
- The act/beginning: The taking itself—this belongs to the person as the one who acts
- The term/end: The one to whom something is taken—this is the person
Since person is both beginning and end of the act of assumption, it most properly belongs to the person to assume.
Resolution:
- No addition to God’s perfection: Divine person is infinite; nothing can be added to God’s perfection. What is added is subsistence (divine subsistence) given to human nature, not to God. Human nature is perfected, not God
- Person’s incommunicability: Person is incommunicable insofar as it cannot be predicated of many things. But many things can be said of the person (e.g., this man is both geometer and white). Unique to divine person (on account of infinity): two complete natures can subsist in it—not accidentally (like quantity in a man) but substantially
- Person vs. nature constitution: Human nature does not constitute divine person simply, but only secundum quid (in a qualified sense)—insofar as it is denominated by such a nature. The divine person has being simply from eternity; from human nature only that it be a man
Key Philosophical Distinctions #
Simply (simpliciter) vs. Not Simply (secundum quid) #
This fundamental distinction runs throughout the analysis:
- Being simply: Substantial being from intrinsic principles
- Being in some way: Qualified or accidental being, being in ability/potency
- Application to Christ: Son of God is man (secundum quid) but son of God simply (simpliciter); has being simply from eternity, only being man from Incarnation
- The same distinction applies to knowledge: wise man knows all things in some way (secundum quid), not simply
Important Definitions #
- Assumptio (Assumption): To take to oneself; implies both the act of taking (beginning) and the term to which taken (end/person)
- Grace of union: The union itself of human nature to divine person—not a habit but immediate union to divine person
- Natural (in Christology): Either from essential principles OR from birth/nativity; grace of union is natural in the second sense
- Secundum quid: In a qualified way, not absolutely or without qualification
- Ex condigno: As proportionate reward (strictly merited)
- Ex congruo: As fitting or suitable (fittingly granted)
Examples & Illustrations #
On Merit and Grace:
- Thomas’s prayer: asking for grace to be given, then rewarding that grace given to him
- Old Testament structure: Law (Father) in OT; Grace and Truth (Christ) in NT
- Vatican II’s organization of Scripture reflects this: Gospels (origin of grace), Paul’s epistles (nature of grace), Acts and Apocalypse (effects/growth of Church)
On Perfection and Addition:
- Einstein on Mozart: perfectly written—cannot improve; perfection is imperfectible
- Emperor and Mozart: “Too many notes”; Mozart: “Just as many as I need”
- Cyril’s comparison: Not like marriage where each spouse completes the other; here only human nature is perfected by assumption
On Natural Knowledge:
- Student asked if she knows Berquist’s brother Mark: She doesn’t know him simply, but knowing what “brother” and “man” are, she knows him in some way
- Doubling the square: Slave boy doesn’t know it simply at first, but can know it through things he already knows
- All things are “something,” so wise man knowing being knows all things in some way
On Moral Action:
- Annoyance example: Killing someone who annoys you is in some way good (removes annoyance) but not good simply
- Standing between promotion: Eliminating obstacle is in some way good but not good simply
- Abortion: Something simply bad (killing) but in some way good (escape from difficult situation, continuation of life/studies)
Questions Addressed #
Was the Incarnation merited?
- Not ex condigno: it transcends even beatific vision and precedes grace itself
- Yes ex congruo: the fathers and Virgin Mary merited it fittingly through desire and obedience
Is grace of union natural to Christ?
- No in sense of being from human nature’s principles
- Yes in sense of being possessed from birth/nativity and caused by divine nature
Does assumption belong to person or nature?
- Properly to person (both as beginning/agent and as term/end of assumption)
- The divine nature acts in the assumption, but by reason of the person
Notable Quotes #
“Grace is the beginning of merit. Whence, much less, does the incarnation come under merit, because it’s the beginning of grace.” — Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist)
“We do not understand the mode of union being according to an addition… not God, but man is perfected.” — Cyril (Council of Ephesus), cited by Thomas
“In Christ, the Son of God, does not have in human nature that he be simply, since he was a being from eternity. But only that he be a man.” — Thomas Aquinas
“The wise man knows all things in some way… but knowing being, you know all things.” — Berquist, reflecting on Aristotle’s wisdom
“Perfect is that to which no addition can be made.” — Aquinas (Compendium of Theology), cited by Berquist