16. Multiple Divine Persons and Natures in the Incarnation
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Main Topics #
Article 6: Could Multiple Divine Persons Assume One Human Nature? #
The Central Question
- Whether two or three divine persons could together assume a single human nature
- This reverses the pattern of the Incarnation: normally one person assumes one nature
- Parallels the Trinity inversely: three persons in one divine nature
Arguments Against This Possibility
- If three persons assumed one human nature, they would either be one man or many men
- Cannot be many men (one nature does not multiply supposita)
- Cannot be one man (because “this man” demonstrates one person, destroying distinction of divine persons)
- Assumption is terminated at unity of person; three persons cannot be one person
- The communicatio idiomatum (exchange of properties) would create problems:
- What is proper to the Father (generating the Son from eternity) would be predicated of the man
- What is proper to the man would be predicated of all three persons
- This is unfitting and impossible
Arguments For This Possibility
- If three divine persons can subsist in one divine nature, why not in one human nature?
- The divine nature serves as precedent: three supposita in one nature
- This would mirror the Trinity structure in reverse
Thomas’s Resolution
- Yes, it is possible by divine power that three persons assume one human nature
- They would be said to be “one man” on account of unity of nature, not unity of person
- Just as they are “one God” by unity of divine nature, not by being one person
- This is analogous to how many men can be “one people” without being one person
- However, the distinction of persons would be preserved
- The human nature would have unity with the singular persons by assumption, not creating a composite unity
- One could not conclude from “three persons are one man” that they are one simpliciter
Article 7: Could One Divine Person Assume Two Human Natures? #
The Central Question
- Whether one divine person (specifically the Son) could assume two human natures
- This would result in “one person having two human natures”
Arguments Against This Possibility
- If a divine person assumed two human natures, there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species
- This seems to imply contradiction, since natures of one species are multiplied only by distinction of supposita
- But we are considering a divine person, which is infinite
- It could not be said that the incarnate person is “one man” (lacks one human nature) or “many men” (only one suppositum)
- The two human natures could not be totally united to each other (would require fusion of body and soul)
- Yet the divine nature must be united to the whole of each assumed nature
- This creates an impossible situation
Arguments For This Possibility
- Whatever power the Father has, the Son has
- The Incarnation of the Son does not diminish the Father’s power to assume another nature
- Therefore, the Son could assume another human nature besides the one he assumed
Thomas’s Resolution
- Yes, it is possible that one divine person assume two human natures
- The key is that divine power is infinite and cannot be limited by created things
- A divine person cannot be so “comprehended” or “surrounded” by one created nature that another cannot be assumed
- Whether considering the divine person:
- According to its power (which is the beginning of union): infinite, not limited
- According to its personality (which is the terminus of union): infinite, cannot be “exhausted” by one nature
- Therefore, no created nature can limit a divine person’s capacity to assume other natures
- The divine person could assume three, four, or more human natures if such a thing were possible
Crucial Distinction: Nature vs. Person
- The created nature is perfected through its form, which is multiplied according to division of matter
- But in the Incarnation, the union of form and matter (soul and body) does not constitute a new suppositum
- Matter is the source of individuation in created things
- Since the divine person is not bound by this principle, two human natures could be assumed without creating two supposita
- The plurality is on the side of nature (matter), not on the side of person
Implications for Language About the Incarnation
- If two human natures were assumed: it would be proper to say there are “two men” (on account of two individual natures)
- Yet not two supposita (the divine person is one)
- Names should be used according to how they signify among us
- A name imposed from some form takes plural form only on account of plurality of supposita
- The human nature functions somewhat like a “garment” (though not entirely)
- Therefore, if divine person assumed two human natures, could say “one man having two human natures” (by unity of person)
- But one could not argue from “one man having two natures” to a completely different kind of unity
Addressing the Problem of Union Between Two Human Natures
- Divine and human natures are not in the same order relative to the divine person
- Divine nature is one with the person from eternity
- Human nature is compared to the person as subsequently assumed
- For union to occur: divine nature must be united to the whole of the assumed nature (all its parts)
- But if two human natures were assumed, they would have a uniform relation to the divine person
- Neither one would assume the other
- Therefore, one need not be totally united to all the parts of the other
- The divine nature penetrates both; they need not penetrate each other
Key Arguments #
Why Matter and Supposita Matter #
- In created beings: matter is the principle of individuation and multiplication of forms
- Each distinct supposita has a distinct instance of the form
- In Incarnation: union of soul and body does not create a new supposita (different from divine person)
- Therefore: plurality of nature (by matter) ≠ plurality of person (supposita)
The Fallacy of Accident (Fallacia Accidentis) #
- When applied to Christological discourse: “God is unbegotten” (true of Father) does not entail “Son is unbegotten”
- Though we say Son is God, “unbegotten” does not apply to Son
- Why? Because “God” stands for the divine nature when we say God is unbegotten
- In statement about Son, “God” might stand for the Father specifically
- The fallacy occurs when one term shifts its supposition (what it stands for) mid-argument
- Example: “Divine nature is the power of breathing the Holy Spirit, divine nature is in the Holy Spirit, therefore the Holy Spirit has the power of breathing the Holy Spirit”
- False: power of breathing is divine nature insofar as it is in Father and Son (distinct from Holy Spirit)
- Accidental to the divine nature insofar as it is in the Holy Spirit
Infinite Power and Infinite Personality #
- Aquinas emphasizes that divine person possesses infinity on both counts:
- Infinite power (can assume any nature)
- Infinite personality (cannot be “comprehended” or “exhausted” by any created nature)
- No created thing can limit or bound the divine person
- Therefore, there is no inherent reason one divine person could not assume multiple human natures
Important Definitions #
Suppositum (pl. supposita) - The underlying subject or individual being; the principle of individuation. In created things, matter provides distinction of supposita. In the Incarnation, the divine person serves as the suppositum for both divine and human natures.
Hypostasis - The Greek term for suppositum; the individual subsistent entity or person.
Nature - The essential characteristics of a thing; what makes it what it is. Distinguished from person/suppositum.
Communicatio Idiomatum - The “exchange of properties” or “communication of idioms”: what belongs to one nature can be predicated of the person subsisting in that nature, using the name of the nature being signified (e.g., “God died” or “this man is God”).
Supposition - What a term stands for in a given context. Critical for avoiding the fallacy of accident.
Simpliciter - Simply, absolutely, in itself; fundamental being.
Secundum quid - In a qualified sense, with qualification; not absolute.
Examples & Illustrations #
The Trinity as Precedent #
- Three divine persons subsist in one divine nature
- Berquist suggests: why not three persons in one human nature?
- Answer: Because human nature cannot sustain such a union the way divine nature can
- The Trinity sets a pattern but does not logically force the same pattern in Incarnation
Three Persons, One Will #
- Berquist reflects on how difficult it is to imagine three persons with one will
- Even friends typically have some disagreement of will
- Yet Trinity and (potentially) three-person incarnation would require this unity
- Shows the mystery exceeds natural human understanding
The Fallacy of Accident in Action #
- “The sick becomes healthy”
- Not sickness that becomes healthy; rather the body becomes healthy
- Being sick is accidental to the body; health is the perfection
- Applied to Trinity: “Father is unbegotten, therefore Son is unbegotten”
- Only if “is” stands for Father, not Son
- Fallacy when middle term shifts what it stands for
Teaching and Learning #
- A teacher learns the subject better by teaching it
- But does it belong to teacher as such to learn what he teaches?
- No: insofar as he is teaching, he knows the subject; insofar as he learns, he doesn’t know it yet
- Learning is accidental to the act of teaching, not essential
Making (Poiesis) vs. Acting (Praxis) #
- Marx suggests man perfects himself through making/production
- Aristotle responds: making perfects the thing made, not the maker
- Objection: “But you change yourself by making”
- Reply: Yes, but accidentally—not through the act of making as such
- A carpenter improves his skill, but this is accidental to carpentry itself
- Essential to human perfection: contemplation, virtue, acts of will and intellect
Walking and Philosophy #
- Aristotle’s Peripatetics walked while philosophizing
- Is walking a form of thinking?
- No: thinking is accidental to walking
- One can walk without thinking; one can think without walking
- Similarly, smoking a pipe is accidental to philosophizing (though it may aid concentration)
Questions Addressed #
1. Could Multiple Divine Persons Assume One Human Nature? #
Question: Is it possible for two or three divine persons to assume a single human nature together?
Answer: Yes, by divine power, it is possible, though it did not occur. They would be “one man” by virtue of the unity of the assumed nature, not by being one person. The three persons would remain distinct. The human nature would be united to the singular persons (persons taken individually) by assumption, not creating a composite unity of persons.
2. Could One Divine Person Assume Two Human Natures? #
Question: Is it possible for one divine person (such as the Son) to assume two human natures simultaneously?
Answer: Yes, divine power and divine personality are both infinite and cannot be limited by created things. No created nature can “comprehend” or exhaust a divine person. Therefore, the divine person retains infinite capacity to assume additional natures. The plurality of natures would exist on the side of nature (distinguished by matter), not on the side of person/suppositum.
3. How Do We Speak About Two Natures in One Person? #
Question: If one person assumed two human natures, would we say “one man” or “two men”?
Answer: Thomas prefers “one man having two human natures” because:
- Names are imposed based on how things are among us
- In our experience, one man has one nature; many men have many natures
- But since both natures would subsist in the one divine suppositum, proper speech would recognize the unity of person
- However, we must be careful not to assume this creates a unified human person (which would be heretical)
- The unity is on the side of person (suppositum), not on the side of nature
4. How Do We Avoid the Fallacy of Accident in Speaking About the Trinity and Incarnation? #
Question: When we say “God is unbegotten” and “the Son is God,” can we conclude “the Son is unbegotten”?
Answer: No, this commits the fallacy of accident. The term “God” shifts its supposition:
- In “God is unbegotten,” God stands for the divine nature as it is in the Father
- In “the Son is God,” God stands for the divine nature itself (common to all three)
- When predicated of the Son, “unbegotten” does not apply because the Son is begotten
- Similarly, “power of breathing the Holy Spirit” belongs to the divine nature insofar as it is in Father and Son (distinct from the Holy Spirit)
- Not to the divine nature insofar as it subsists in the Holy Spirit alone
- Careful attention to supposition avoids heretical conclusions
Notable Quotes #
“In the mystery of the Trinity, you have three persons in one nature, and then in the mystery of the Incarnation, you have one person in two natures, right? And now we’re kind of saying, well, could… two of these persons, or even three of these persons, have one human nature together?”
“You know what you can do. You know what it’s lower.”
“Just as one divine nature in many persons does not suffer for there to be many gods, so one human nature in many persons would not undergo many men.”
“But the foresaid position being made about the person of the Father could be said, those things which pertain to human nature, right? And those things which pertain to divine nature, right? And likewise about the person of the Son, the Holy Spirit. But not what pertains to the person of the Father, by reason of his own proper person, could be attributed to the person of the Son, the Holy Spirit, on account of the distinction of the persons, which would remain, right?”
“For something uncreated cannot be surrounded by, comprehended by, a created.”
“Whether we consider the divine person according to its power, which is the beginning of the union, right? Or according to his personality, which is a term of the union, right? It is necessary to say that the divine person, apart from the human nature, which is assumed, is able to assume a another human nature, another number, right? So that both his power is infinite and his personality is infinite.”
“The human nature… has itself in the manner of a garment. Although this is, this likeness is not should be taken in regard to all things.”
“It would seem strange to have two persons that try to assume one and the same one man. It seems to me it would be either one or three, not two.”
“The nature assumed, to some extent… Has itself in the manner of a garment.”
“If one proceeds further and says, man is ungenerated, the Son is man, therefore the Son is ungenerated, there would be the fallacy of the figure of diction, which is in the six fallacies in speech.”
“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was toward God… You can’t be toward yourself, right? So therefore, the Word is not God… It makes sense with Heideic, right? The Word was God.”
“Does the Holy Spirit have the power of breathing the Holy Spirit? The power of breathing the Holy Spirit is the divine nature. The divine nature is in the Holy Spirit. Therefore…”
“That’s the fallacy of the accident, isn’t it?”
Additional Philosophical Considerations #
The Role of Power vs. Fittingness #
- Berquist distinguishes between what God can do and what is fitting
- An earlier part of the Summa discusses whether God did become incarnate (treated from Scripture)
- Then whether God could become incarnate (treating objections from misuse of philosophy)
- Then whether it is fitting that God became incarnate (discussing suitability)
- These are separate logical questions but often intertwined in Thomas’s treatment
Matter as Principle of Individuation #
- In material substances: form is what makes something what it is; matter is what makes it this thing
- Multiple supposita of the same species are distinguished by matter
- But in Incarnation: matter distinguishes two human natures without distinguishing two divine persons
- The divine person serves as suppositum for both
- This is why “plurality on the side of nature” does not entail “plurality on the side of person”
The Penetration Question #
- If one divine person assumed two human natures:
- Divine nature would be united to the whole of each assumed nature (all parts)
- But the two human natures would not necessarily be totally united to each other
- One would not “penetrate” the other as the divine penetrates both
- No fusion or confusion of the human natures required
- This preserves the integrity of each nature while allowing unity in the divine person