47. God Is Man: Predication and the Incarnation

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Core Question #

• Whether the statement “God is a man” can be truly and properly asserted
• Not merely whether Christ is both God and man, but whether we can correctly predicate one nature of the other
• Central to understanding how to speak rightly about the incarnation

Initial Objections #

The objection from remote matter (materia remota):

• An affirmative statement about things maximally distant in nature is false
• Just as “man is a stone” is false because man and stone are far apart
• Divine and human natures are even more distant than man and stone
• Therefore, “God is a man” should be false

The objection from the Trinity:

• The three divine persons share more in common than human and divine natures
• Yet we never say “the Father is the Son” despite their greater commonality
• Therefore, we should not say “God is a man”

The objection from Athanasius:

• “Just as the soul and the body are one man, so God and man are one Christ”
• But we do not say “the soul is the body”
• Therefore, we should not say “God is a man”

The Solution Through Concrete and Abstract Terms #

The crucial distinction:

• Abstract terms signify the nature itself (divinity, humanity, soul, body)
• Concrete terms signify the nature as existing in an individual (God, man, animated, corporeal)
• The name “God” signifies divinity in the concrete—that is, as the divine person possesses it
• The name “man” signifies humanity in the concrete—that is, as a human individual possesses it

How predication works:

• One cannot predicate abstract terms of each other: divinity is not humanity; the soul is not the body
• One can predicate concrete terms of each other when they share the same supposita (underlying individual substance)
• The concrete term stands for (supposit for) the individual who possesses the nature, not the nature itself

Suppositum and Hypostasis #

• Suppositum (placed under): the individual substance that underlies a nature
• Hypostasis: equivalent term, more commonly used in theological contexts
• The divine person of the Son is the suppositum of both divine and human natures
• Because both natures inhere in the same suppositum, the concrete names can be predicated of each other

The Nature of Beatitude (Connection to Article 10) #

• Perfect beatitude: the soul’s intellectual and volitional union with God plus the body’s glorification
• Primary component: the soul’s enjoyment of God (seeing God face to face)
• Secondary component: the body’s glorification (gifts of impassibility, subtlety, agility, clarity)
• Christ possessed the primary component fully but lacked the secondary component until after the resurrection

Key Arguments #

Against the Remote Matter Objection #

• Remote matter applies when two forms cannot coexist in a single individual substance
• But divine and human natures, though maximally distinct, do coexist in the person of Christ through the incarnation
• Therefore, the statement is not in remote matter but in natural matter (materia naturalis)
• The predication is proper and essential (per se), not accidental (per accidens), because it concerns the supposita itself, not merely an accidental form

Against the Trinity Objection #

• In the Trinity, the three divine persons are distinct in supposita but one in nature
• They are not said of each other because they are distinct as supposita
• In the incarnation, the natures are distinct but the supposita are one
• This is the opposite relationship, so the comparison fails

Against the Athanasius Objection #

• Soul and body, when signified in the abstract, cannot be predicated of each other
• But in the concrete (animated, corporeal), they can be: what is animated is corporeal, and vice versa
• Similarly, divinity and humanity in the abstract cannot be predicated of each other
• But in the concrete (God, man), they can be, because both are predicated of the same supposita (the divine person)

Important Definitions #

Suppositum/Hypostasis #

• The individual substance in which natures inhere
• Plural: supposita/hypostases
• Distinguished from nature: the same suppositum can underlie multiple distinct natures
• Concrete terms stand for supposita, not for natures themselves

Materia (Matter in Predication) #

• Remote matter (materia remota): predication where subject and predicate are maximally distant in their forms
• Contingent matter (materia contingens): predication where forms can coexist but contingently do (e.g., “the white one is just”)
• Natural matter (materia naturalis): predication where forms naturally or necessarily coexist (e.g., “the white one is colored”)
• The present case (God is a man) is natural matter because the incarnation brings the natures together necessarily in one supposita

Concrete vs. Abstract #

• Concrete: a word that signifies a nature as existing in an individual (homo [man], deus [God], animatum [animated], carneum [fleshy])
• Abstract: a word that signifies the nature itself (humanitas [humanity], divinitas [divinity], anima [soul], caro [flesh])
• Concrete terms can be converted into different supposita while maintaining their meaning
• Abstract terms cannot be predicated of other abstract terms when they represent distinct natures

Propositio #

• Originally: the premise of a syllogism, or a statement placed before one in logical discourse
• By custom, came to mean any statement or proposition in general
• Latin root: pro- (for) + ponere (to place), thus “something placed before”

Examples & Illustrations #

The Family Analogy #

• “Dwayne Berquist is the son of a man”

  • Here “a man” stands for (supposits for) my father, not universal man
  • Though “man” is a universal term, it stands for a particular individual in this context
  • The suppositum is what “a man” stands for, not the universal nature

• “I am the father of a woman”

  • “A woman” stands for a particular daughter, say Maria
  • Again, the concrete term stands for the individual who has the nature

The Geometer and Health Analogy #

• “This healthy one is a geometer”
  • Predication works because one supposita (the healthy individual) is also a geometer
  • But we cannot say “health is geometry” (abstract predication)
  • Similarly, one can say “God is man” but not “divinity is humanity”

The Learner and Knower (From Article 10) #

• A man can simultaneously be a knower (regarding theorems he has mastered) and a learner (regarding theorems he is studying)
• This shows that contradictory relations are possible when directed toward different objects
• Similarly, Christ can be comprehensor and viator in relation to different aspects of beatitude

Questions Addressed #

Article 1, Question 1: Is the Statement “God Is a Man” True? #

The Problem:

• The statement seems to violate the principle that affirmative statements about maximally distant things are false
• Divine and human natures appear to be maximally distant

The Solution:

• The statement is true when understood correctly through concrete predication
• Both natures inhere in the same supposita (the divine person of the Son)
• Predication concerns the supposita, not the natures themselves (in the concrete, not the abstract)
• The natures remain truly distinct, but the person remains truly one

Why Not Say the Same of the Trinity? #

• The Trinity involves distinct supposita in a common nature
• The incarnation involves distinct natures in a common supposita
• Therefore, the logical relationships differ entirely

Why Not Say the Same of Soul and Body? #

• Soul and body signified abstractly are predicated of nothing
• But signified concretely (animated, corporeal), they can be predicated of the same thing
• The same resolution applies to God and man

Notable Quotes #

“This proposition, God is a man, is conceded by all Christians.” — Thomas Aquinas (Berquist’s translation)

“A name signifying a common nature in the concrete is able to stand for any one of those contained in that common nature.” — Thomas Aquinas (on suppositional predication)

“The three divine persons come together in the nature, but they are distinguished in the supposita. Therefore, they are not said of each other. But in the mystery of the Incarnation, the natures are distinct, but because they come together in the supposita, they are said of each other in the concrete.” — Thomas Aquinas (distinguishing the two mysteries)

“You can’t be learning the very theorem that you know. But you can know some theorems and be learning other ones.” — Duane Berquist (clarifying the resolution of Article 10)

Pedagogical Notes from Berquist #

The Sophistical Problem #

• The sophist wants to make you appear to contradict yourself
• By carefully distinguishing concrete from abstract predication, we avoid the appearance of contradiction
• Logic helps us speak correctly about mysteries we cannot fully comprehend

The Importance of Precision in Language #

• Berquist emphasizes throughout the lecture that we must be careful about what we say of what
• Many heresies (Manichaeanism, Nestorianism, etc.) arise from imprecision in predication
• Getting the logic right protects the faith

Connection to Liberal Arts #

• The study of logic (pars tertia of the Organon) directly illuminates theological mysteries
• Thomas uses logical principles not as mere formalism but as tools for truth-seeking
• The metaphysical insight (unity in supposita, distinction in natures) confirms rather than contradicts logical principles