48. Predication in the Incarnation: God is Man, Man is God

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of True Predication in the Incarnation #

• Whether “God is a man” can be truly and properly predicated (not merely figuratively)
• Whether “man is God” can be truly and properly predicated
• The apparent contradiction these statements seem to contain
• How both can be true simultaneously despite the maximum distance between divine and human natures

Concrete vs. Abstract Predication #

• Concrete names (God, man, Christ) stand for the hypostasis (individual substance/person) and can receive predication from either nature
• Abstract names (divinity, humanity, deity) signify the nature itself as “that by which” something is what it is
• Example: When I say “I am the son of a man,” the concrete name “man” stands for my father (a particular person), not universal man
• The divine nature cannot be predicated of the human nature in the abstract, but can be in the concrete
• Grammar and logic differ: grammar sees only a noun with modifier; logic distinguishes between accidents and essential differences (equilateral vs. green triangle)

The Hypostasis (Suppositum) as Unifying Principle #

• The same hypostasis (individual substance/person) subsists in both divine and human natures in Christ
• This unity explains how properties can be transferred between natures through predication of the person
• Berquist’s geometric illustration: two lines meeting at the same endpoint (the divine person/suppositum)
  • One line represents divine nature, one represents human nature
  • The endpoint represents the divine person
  • The lines are not each other, but share the same endpoint
  • This shows how two distinct natures can be united in one person without confusion

The Communication of Idioms (Idiomata) #

• Properties proper to one nature can be predicated of the person who has both natures
• “God died,” “God suffered” - true predications because the person (God) has human nature
• “Man is eternal,” “man is omnipotent” - true because the person (man/Christ) has divine nature
• But: divine nature cannot be predicated of human nature in the abstract, and vice versa
• The person of the Son of God is the suppositum of both natures

The Question of ‘Homo Dominicus’ (Lordly Man) #

• Augustine initially used this term to describe Christ
• However, Augustine later retracted this usage in his Retractions, questioning whether it was properly said
• The problem: “Dominicus” is a denominative term (derived from “Dominus,” Lord), implying the person is not essentially Lord but only participates in lordship
• More accurate to say “He is Lord” (using the absolute name) rather than “Lordly man” (using the denominative adjective)
• This relates to whether human nature can participate in divine properties

Key Arguments #

For “God is a man” (Thomas’s Position) #

• From Logic: The concrete name “God” stands for the person of the Son, who also has human nature; therefore it is true to say “God is a man”
• From Scripture: Philippians 2:6-7 - “He who was in the form of God, emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, made in the likeness of men”
• From Union: Since both natures are united in one hypostasis, what is true of the person is true when expressed using either nature’s name
• Resolution of ‘Remote Matter’ objection: While divine and human natures are very distant, they are not “remote” in predication because they are united in one hypostasis, unlike man and stone

Against “God is a man” (Objections Discussed) #

• Trinity Objection: If man is God, and God is Father or Trinity, then man is Father or Trinity (syllogistic problem)
  • Response: The name “God” stands for different persons in different statements (when we say “man is God,” God stands for the Son; when we say “God is the Father,” God stands for the Father). Therefore the rule of logic is not violated because the middle term is not being used univocally
  • This is a fallacy of accident or equivocation based on supposita, not based on meaning of the word

Against “man is God” (Objections Discussed) #

• Incommunicability: The name “God” is incommunicable; the Book of Wisdom reprehends idolaters for placing the name God on wood and stones
  • Response: Idolaters wrongly attributed “God” to stones according to their own nature, thinking something divine was in them. We attribute it to man according to the eternal person (suppositum), not according to human nature. The union is the basis, not any supposed divinity in human nature itself
• Recency Objection: Psalm 80 says “there shall not be in you a recent God,” but man is recent; therefore man cannot be God
  • Response: Although human nature in Christ is recent (new), the suppositum (person) is eternal. Since “God” is said of man by reason of the person, not the nature, it is not false to say “God is man” despite the recency of human nature

On ‘Homo Dominicus’ #

• For: Just as God is said to be “humanated” (made human), why not say man is “lordified” (made lordly)? Just as “divine” is said denominatively from “God,” so “lordly” is said denominatively from “Lord”
  • Response: These are not parallel cases. “Divine” can be said of Christ because the person truly is divine in nature. But “lordly” as a denominative adjective implies the person is not essentially Lord but only participates in lordship. The proper statement is “He is Lord” (using the essential name), not “Lordly man” (using the denominative adjective)

Important Definitions #

Hypostasis (Suppositum) #

• The individual substance or person; that which “stands under” (sub-positum) the natures
• More general than “person” (which requires rational nature)
• In Christ: the principle of unity allowing two distinct natures to exist in one being
• The subject of predication when we say “God is man” or “man is God”

Concrete vs. Abstract Signification #

• Concrete: Signifies as “that which has” the nature (e.g., “God,” “man,” “Christ”)
• Abstract: Signifies as “that by which” something is what it is (e.g., “divinity,” “humanity,” “deity”)
• Concrete names can receive predication from either nature; abstract names cannot

Supposita/Suppositing #

• The act by which a name “stands for” a particular reality in a proposition
• Example: In “I am the son of a man,” the word “man” supposes for (stands for) my father specifically, not man-in-general
• In “man is God,” “man” supposes for the person of the Son; in “God is the Father,” “God” supposes for the person of the Father
• Two different supposita mean the rule of logic allowing predication is not violated

Idiomata (Idioms/Properties) #

• Properties or characteristics proper to one nature
• The “communication of idioms” is the theological principle allowing properties of one nature to be predicated of the person who has both natures

Denominative (Denominativus) #

• A term derived from another term and implying participation or attribution of a quality
• Example: “lordly” (dominicus) is denominative from “Lord” (dominus)
• Implies the person is not essentially what the denominative says, but participates in it
• Contrasts with essential attribution

Examples & Illustrations #

Geometric Illustration of Hypostatic Union #

• Two lines meeting at the same endpoint
• Left line represents divine nature, right line represents human nature
• The endpoint represents the divine person (suppositum/hypostasis)
• The lines are not each other, but share the same endpoint
• “Notice one line is not the other line, right? But they have the same, what, end point, right?”
• Shows how two distinct natures can be united in one person while remaining distinct from each other

Predication Examples #

• “I am the son of a man” - “man” stands for the father (particular person), not universal man
• “I am the father of a woman” - “woman” stands for the daughter
• “This man is God” - “man” stands for the person of the Son (who has divine nature)
• “God died” - “God” stands for the person who has human nature
• “Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God” - Peter’s profession of faith using concrete name
• “Jesus… is the Christ, the Son of God” - John’s same profession of faith, using Jesus as subject

The Priest Father Example #

• “You are a man, a man is my father, therefore you are my father”
• Without the priest qualifier: this is a fallacy of the accident because “man” supposes for different people (you vs. my father)
• With the priest qualifier: now the conclusion is true because the suppositum is the same
• Shows how understanding supposita is crucial for valid reasoning

Concrete vs. Abstract in Virtues #

• “The man is courage” - incorrect (abstract name)
• “The man is courageous” - correct (concrete name from the abstract)
• “The man is temperance” - incorrect (abstract)
• “The man is temperate” - correct (concrete)

Questions Addressed #

Article 1: Is “God is a man” true? #

• Answer: Yes, truly and properly, not merely figuratively or figuratively
• Reason: The concrete name “God” stands for the person of the Son, who has human nature
• Key Point: Not true of the divine nature itself, but of the person who possesses both natures
• Scripture Support: Philippians 2:6-7 on the emptying (kenosis) of the Word

Article 2: Is “man is God” true? #

• Answer: Yes, truly and properly
• Reason: The concrete name “man” stands for the person of the Son, who has divine nature
• Key Point: Not true of human nature itself, but of the person who possesses both natures
• Distinction from Idolatry: Unlike idolaters who thought divinity was in the nature of wood and stone, we affirm divinity only in the person (suppositum) united to human nature

Article 3: Can Christ be called “Homo Dominicus” (Lordly Man)? #

• Answer: No, not properly; better to say “He is Lord”
• Reason: “Lordly” (dominicus) is a denominative term derived from “Lord” (dominus), which implies the person is not essentially Lord but only participates in lordship
• Augustine’s Retraction: Augustine himself retracted this usage in his Retractions, questioning whether it was properly said
• Alternative Phrasing: “He is Lord” uses the essential name and avoids the false implication of mere participation
• Scriptural Example: When Thomas sees the risen Christ’s wounds, he says “My Lord and my God” - using absolute names, not denominatives

Notable Quotes #

“The ruler must be distinct or separated from the ruled” - Anaxagoras, as discussed by Berquist regarding the necessity of Mind being separate from matter to govern it

“God became man so that man might become God” - Augustine (with the clarification that this uses “God” in two different senses: essentially in the first part, participatively in the second)

“Death lies on her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field” - Shakespeare, from Romeo and Juliet, cited by Berquist as an example of perfectly expressed sentiment that cannot be surpassed

“It is impossible to say it better than Thomas” - Berquist’s observation on Thomas Aquinas’s clarity and precision

Logical Fallacies Discussed #

Fallacy of Equivocation (Fallacia Aequivocationis) #

• A term has different meanings in different premises of an argument
• Example from Feuerbach: “The human mind is infinite, the infinite is God, therefore the human mind is God”
• Different meanings of “infinite” (temporal vs. quantitative) make this a fallacy

Fallacy of the Accident (Fallacia Accidentis) #

• Occurs when a term supposes for different things in different premises
• Example: “You are a man, a man is my father, therefore you are my father”
• The word “man” does not have a different meaning, but supposes for different people
• Resolution of apparent syllogistic problems in the Incarnation uses this distinction: the name “God” has the same meaning but supposes for different persons

The Distinction Between Meaning and Supposita #

• “You can’t conclude you are my father, right? Unless he’s a priest” - Berquist’s humorous example
• Shows the importance of understanding that a word can have the same meaning but different supposita
• Modern philosophy often misses these distinctions, making it vulnerable to logical errors
• Knowledge of fallacies helps one avoid them; ignorance makes one prey to them