Lecture 49

49. Predication in the Incarnation: Divine and Human Natures

Summary
This lecture examines how predicative statements about Christ’s divine and human natures can be properly true despite their metaphysical distinctness. Berquist explores the distinction between concrete names (God, man) and abstract names (divinity, humanity), the concept of hypostatic union as grounding unified predication, and the asymmetry between what can be said of divine versus human nature. The discussion addresses how Thomas Aquinas resolves apparent contradictions in patristic formulations, particularly Augustine’s retraction of ‘Homo Dominicus’ and the theological implications of statements like ‘God suffered’ or ‘man is God.’

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

  • Concrete vs. Abstract Names in Predication: The fundamental distinction between names that signify as “having” a nature (concrete: God, man) versus names that signify the nature itself (abstract: divinity, humanity). This distinction resolves apparent contradictions in Christological statements.

  • Hypostatic Union and Supposition Theory: How one person (hypostasis/suppositum) with two distinct natures enables unified predication. The same subject can have attributes predicated of it according to different natures, without those natures being identical.

  • Augustine’s Retraction of ‘Homo Dominicus’: Augustine withdrew the phrase ‘Homo Dominicus’ (Lordly Man) because it employs a denominative adjective incorrectly. Christ IS Lord essentially, not denominatively; proper speech requires calling Him Lord, not lordly.

  • Participatory vs. Essential Attribution: Human nature can participate in divine attributes (e.g., Christ’s knowledge of future events), but the divine nature cannot participate in human limitations. This asymmetry is crucial for proper Christological speech.

  • Nestorian vs. Catholic Solutions: The Nestorian heresy attempted to divide predicates between natures (divine predicates only of the Word, human predicates only of the man). The Catholic position maintains that the same suppositum bears both, allowing proper predication across natures.

Key Arguments #

On Whether Things of Human Nature Can Be Said of God #

  • Objection: Divine nature is immutable, eternal, uncreated; human nature is mutable, temporal, created. Opposites cannot be said of the same thing.

  • Thomas’s Response: Opposites can be said of the same thing according to diverse respects (secundum diversa). Christ is immutable according to divine nature, movable according to human nature. This resolves the apparent contradiction.

  • Application to Defects: If human defects (suffering, death) were attributed to God according to divine nature, it would be blasphemy. But attributed according to human nature, it is fitting for salvation. The Council of Ephesus affirms: “God does not think that something is an injury that is an occasion for the salvation of men.”

On Whether Things of Human Nature Can Be Said of Divine Nature #

  • Key Distinction: Although God and divine nature are really identical, they signify differently. ‘God’ signifies as that which has divine nature; ‘divinity’ signifies as the nature itself (as that by which God is God).

  • The Abstract/Concrete Divide:

    • We can say: “The Son of God suffered” (concrete name, referring to person/suppositum)
    • We cannot say: “The divine nature suffered” (abstract name, referring to nature itself)
  • Reason: What is proper to human nature cannot properly be said of the divine nature as such, because the divine nature is the very principle by which God is God. It cannot be that human properties constitute the divine nature.

  • Participatory Exception: Things of divine nature can be said of human nature participatively (e.g., Christ’s wisdom, power), not essentially. The divine nature in reverse cannot participate in anything—it is purely actual and perfect.

On the Phrase ‘God Was Made Man’ #

  • Objection: Becoming involves coming to be, which is impossible for the eternal God.

  • Thomas’s Solution (via geometric analogy): One eternal point (divine person) exists always. When a second line (human nature) is drawn to that point, the point does not come to be anew as an endpoint—it begins to be the endpoint of the new line. Similarly, God does not begin to be; rather, human nature comes to be united to the already-existing divine person.

  • The Change: Change occurs in human nature being assumed, not in the divine nature assuming it.

On Denominative Adjectives #

  • Definition: A denominative adjective (e.g., ’lordly’ from ’lord’) signifies participation in or possession of the quality named, not essential identity with it.

  • Application: ‘Homo dominicus’ (lordly man) incorrectly suggests Christ participates in lordship as an accident or quality. The truth is Christ is Lord essentially.

  • Proper Speech: We correctly say His flesh is “the Lord’s flesh” (possessive construction) rather than “lordly flesh” (denominative).

Important Definitions #

  • Suppositum (suppositio): The individual substance or person that is the subject of predication. In Christ, one suppositum underlies both divine and human natures, enabling unified predication despite the distinctness of the natures.

  • Concrete Name: A term that signifies as having or possessing a nature (e.g., ‘God’ signifies as that which has divine nature, ‘man’ as that which has human nature).

  • Abstract Name: A term that signifies the nature or quality itself, apart from any supposit (e.g., ‘divinity’ signifies the divine nature as the principle of being God; ‘humanity’ signifies human nature itself).

  • Denominative Adjective (nomen denominativum): An adjective formed from a noun, implying participation in or possession of the quality rather than essential identity (e.g., ’lordly’ from ’lord’).

  • Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις): The individual substance or person; in Greek used for hypostasis specifically. Distinguished from ousia (nature). In Christ: one hypostasis, two natures (ὑποστάσεις divine and human unified in the person).

  • Idiomata (ἴδιωμα): Properties or characteristics proper or particular to something (from ἴδιος, “one’s own”). Used in patristic theology for the distinctive properties of each nature in Christ.

  • Incarnation (incarnatio): In this context, understood as the assumption of human nature by the divine person, not as a transformation of the divine nature into flesh, but as a genuine union of both natures in one person.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Two-Line Geometric Analogy #

Thomas uses a geometric illustration to explain how God can assume human nature without change:

  • First line (eternal): Represents divine nature, existing always with its endpoint (the divine person/suppositum)
  • Second line (temporal): Represents human nature, drawn to that same endpoint in time
  • Result: One endpoint/person (suppositum) with two distinct lines (natures). The endpoint does not begin to be; rather, it begins to be the endpoint of the new line.
  • Application: God does not begin to be when human nature is assumed; rather, the eternal person becomes the suppose of human nature.

Augustine’s Example on Virtue #

When Christ washed the apostles’ feet, He was exemplifying humility, described as “a very important virtue.” Berquist notes that a person without Augustine’s or Thomas’s humility would be untrustworthy—the example shows how Christ teaches virtue by action.

The Problem of Attribution #

  • We can say: “God died” or “God suffered” (speaking of the person according to human nature)
  • We cannot say: “Divinity died” or “The divine nature is mutable”
  • We can say: “The Lord’s flesh suffered” (possessive)
  • We cannot properly say: “The lordly man suffered” (which would suggest Christ possesses lordship as an accident)

Questions Addressed #

  1. Can things proper to human nature be said of God?

    • Yes, when said of the suppositum (person) according to the human nature he assumed. Example: “God suffered.”
  2. Can things proper to divine nature be said of human nature?

    • Only participatively, not essentially. Human nature in Christ participates in divine knowledge and power, but does not essentially possess what belongs essentially to divinity. Human nature cannot partake of what is proper to divinity alone (e.g., immutability, being uncreated).
  3. Why did Augustine retract ‘Homo Dominicus’?

    • Because it employs a denominative adjective incorrectly. Christ is not “lordly” (participating in lordship); He is Lord essentially. Proper speech avoids the denominative form.
  4. How should we understand ‘God was made man’?

    • Not as God beginning to be (which is impossible), but as human nature coming to be united to the eternal divine person. The change is in the assumption of human nature, not in God.
  5. What is the key difference between Nestorian and Catholic predication?

    • Nestorians divided predicates: human properties only of “the man,” divine properties only of “the Word,” maintaining two persons. Catholics hold that because one suppositum has both natures, the same person can have both human and divine predicates said of Him according to the respective natures.
  6. Why can the divine nature not participate in human attributes?

    • Because the divine nature is purely actual and perfect. Participation implies receiving something in a limited way; but God can receive nothing. What is proper to human nature cannot constitute or perfect the divine nature.

Scholastic Framework #

The lecture demonstrates Thomas Aquinas’s deployment of medieval logic (specifically supposition theory and the distinction between concrete and abstract names) to resolve Christological paradoxes. This prevents both heretical denials (Nestorius) and imprecise speech (Augustine’s initial formulation). The method shows how careful attention to how terms signify, not merely what they mean, prevents theological confusion.