55. Christ's Will: Unity and Distinction in the Incarnation

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of Multiple Wills in Christ #

• Whether Christ possessed one will or two natural wills
• The relationship between divine and human wills in the incarnate Word
• The distinction between will (voluntas) as a power versus will as an act
• How the human will can will something other than the divine will absolutely considered, yet conform to it rationally

The Three-fold Division of Will in Christ #

1. Voluntas sensualitatis (sensual appetite): The sensitive appetite that naturally recoils from pain and death
2. Voluntas naturalis (natural will): The will considered as nature, naturally desiring good things like life and health
3. Voluntas rationalis (rational will): The will as exercised through reason, capable of choosing means to ends through deliberation

The Distinction: Will as Power vs. Will as Act #

• As power (potentia): There is only one human will-power in Christ
• As act (actus): There are two species of acts—the will toward ends absolutely (simplex voluntas) and the will toward means to those ends (voluntas ut ratio)
• Both acts belong to one rational will-power through this distinciton of reason

Christ’s Free Judgment (Librium Arbitrium) #

• Christ possessed free judgment because his reason could judge various goods to be chosen
• Free judgment presupposes counsel and judgment but not doubt
• Christ’s will was determined to the good (he could not sin), yet this does not negate free judgment
• The ability to judge “this or that good” is essential to choice

Key Arguments #

The Unity of Will-Power Despite Diversity of Acts #

• Premise 1: The will as a power is ordered to the good as its object
• Premise 2: Both the natural will and rational will have the same object (the good) knowable by reason
• Premise 3: Acts ordered to one common notion of object do not diversify the power
• Conclusion: Though there are two acts of will in Christ, there is only one will-power

Why Christ’s Human Will Could Will Otherwise Than the Divine Will #

• Christ’s natural will and sensual appetite could will something other than the divine will absolutely (e.g., avoiding suffering)
• Yet his rational will conformed to the divine will through deliberation and choice
• This is not contrariety because:
  • The natural will did not impede the rational will
  • The rational will was not retarded by lower appetites
  • All wills operated according to their proper nature without conflict

The Role of Divine Dispensation #

• God permitted Christ’s human nature to act according to its proper operations
• Christ’s flesh could hunger, thirst, fear, and experience sadness
• This attest to Christ’s true humanity and the genuine assumption of human nature
• Yet these natural motions never contradicted his rational will or divine will

Important Definitions #

Voluntas per participationem (Will by Participation) #

• The sensual appetite is called “will” not essentially but by participation in reason
• Just as Aristotle says the sensitive part of the soul is “reasonable by participation”
• The emotions can obey reason and be trained to habituate to obey reason

Philesis vs. Boulesis #

• Philesis: The natural will, the simple will (simplex voluntas) ordered to the end as such
• Boulesis: The rational will (voluntas ut ratio), the will resulting from counsel, ordered to means
• Both were present in Christ, though unified in one will-power

Gnome and Pro-aeresis (Choice) #

• Gnome: A position or mind; sometimes used as a synonym for the will itself
• Pro-aeresis: Choice, which differs from will because it concerns means rather than ends
• In God and in Christ in his comprehension, there is gnome without doubt, though choice presupposes counsel

Examples & Illustrations #

The Physician and the Bitter Medicine #

• A man’s sensuality refuses burning (pain) from cautery
• But his rational will chooses burning for the sake of health
• This is not contrariety because the rational will commands the sensual appetite
• Similarly, Christ’s sensual appetite refused suffering, but his rational will chose it for salvation

The King and the Relative of the Thief #

• The king wills the thief’s execution for the public good
• A relative wills the thief not be executed for private love
• This is not contrariety because they are ordered to different ends
• The relative’s will does not impede the king’s will

The Educated Man’s Evening Reading #

• Berquist exemplifies his own free judgment: he could choose to read Shakespeare, or Thomas on the Gospel of John, or Thomas on the soul, or the Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia
• All are good, yet reason can judge different goods to be chosen in different circumstances
• He could find reasons for relaxation (virtue of eutrapelia) over rigorous study
• This shows how free judgment operates even when determined to the good

The Horse and Unfamiliar Rider #

• A horse Berquist knew recognized him but would not obey him after many years of his sister riding it
• The horse knows who the authority is and senses the rider’s nervousness through muscle tone
• Shows how creatures sense the confidence and authority of their master
• Illustrates obedience and the hierarchy of will

The Grandchildren and the Green Apple #

• Berquist gave his grandchildren portions of a green apple
• He willed them to feel free to eat from it
• They willed to eat from it
• No contrariety: their will participated in his will

Notable Quotes #

“Not my will, but yours be done” (Christ in Gethsemane, Luke 22:42, quoted through Augustine against Maximinus)

• Shows Christ’s human will willing something other than the divine will absolutely considered
• Yet his rational will conforms to the divine will

“He will eat butter and honey, that he may know to refuse the evil and choose the good” (Isaiah 7:15)

• The objection argues this shows Christ’s capacity for choice between good and evil
• Resolved by noting Christ’s will was determined to the good, yet possessed free judgment regarding which good to choose

“Chosen us in himself before the constitution of the world” (Ephesians 1:4, cited by Berquist)

• God chose us freely, not by necessity
• God could have made a different universe without us
• Shows that choice does not require doubt; God’s choice was without doubt but truly free

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Does Christ have one will or two? #

• Answer: Two natural wills (divine and human), but one personal will as power. The distinction is between will as power (one) and will as act (two types: simple will and will as reason).

Q2: How can Christ’s human will will something other than the divine will? #

• Answer: The human will considered as nature (voluntas naturalis) can will something absolutely (avoiding suffering), while the rational will wills it for the sake of the divine will (salvation). This is not contrariety because the rational will commands the natural will and is not impeded by it.

Q3: Did Christ have free will or free judgment? #

• Answer: Yes, Christ possessed free judgment (librium arbitrium) because his reason could judge various goods to be chosen. Though his will was determined to the good and he could not sin, this does not negate the ability of reason to judge “this or that” good.

Q4: What about the distinction between understanding (intellectus) and reason (ratio)? #

• Answer: These are not diverse powers but diverse ways of operating the same power. Understanding (intellectus) grasps what is known naturally (like axioms), while reason (ratio) discovers what is not known through discourse. Both apply to the will: the natural will is like reason as nature, the rational will is like reason as reason.