Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 7: Natural Beginnings of Philosophy and Following What Is Common

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So am I sitting or standing? Now, how did you separate the true from the false there? I am sitting is true, you would say, and I am not sitting is false. We don't know that yet. Only because if we go to that, you could be standing. We don't know how to tell you. Oh, okay, okay. But no, he's going back to his senses to separate the true from the false, right? Okay. Okay. That's the beginning, right? Okay. And when we're talking about those so-called evil spots in geometry, right, where all the right angles have to be equal, right, we went back to the axioms, right? The whole is more than the part, right? Something cannot be both greater than and equal to. It doesn't both be and not be equal, right? Both be greater than and not greater than. So you go back to some beginning, and ultimately to the natural beginning. So if you don't come into philosophy from the natural beginning, you're unable to what? To judge, right? You're unable to separate the true from the false from the beginning. Okay? Now, the next group of reasons emphasize the fact that these are the natural beginnings, right? The emphasis here is upon nature, right? And following nature, right? The emphasis, was there a special emphasis on the first four? On the beginning. Beginning, yeah. The importance of the beginning, right, huh? And these are the very first beginnings, right? So you have four reasons there. Now, I gave a whole talk with him out there at Thomas Christ College on the royal fragment of Heraclitus, right? But in the royal fragment there, Heraclitus says that wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accord with nature. You think you're there too, huh? So, I hope that we're all afraid of this part of here. Wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accord with nature. Giving ear there too, huh? The idea that nature is, what? Wiser than we are, right, huh? And that's why Aristotle often says that human art imitates nature, huh? Nature is something of the divine art in things, huh? Put into things, right? So, listening to nature in a way, you're listening to God, right? You're learning from the works of God, huh? And only a fool would think he's wiser than nature. Even the greatest scientist, right, you know? Being wiser than we are, huh? So if you don't come into philosophy from its natural beginning, you're not listening to nature, right? Right? You're not fouled to nature, right? That's a very important reason, huh? Now, think of another thing here, huh? Nature is before what is not by nature, right? It's before being in time, right? Furthermore, we acquire what is not natural to what is natural. It's pretty obvious in our experience that nature is before artificial things in time, right? There are natural things before artificial things. They could be without these artificial things, right? But the second proposition there, we acquire what is not natural to what is natural. Well, take the ballpoint pin in your hand, or take the hammer or the saw, or any of these artificial tools we have, right? How do we acquire those? Well, basically, through our hands, right? And our reason, too, right? But our hands and our reason are something we have by, what? Nature, right? And, you know, it began with a man just taking a rock, maybe using it like a hammer or using it like a... Yeah, yeah. And then gradually perfecting the tools, right? But all of them through the use of his, what? Hands, huh? So we acquire what is not natural through what is natural, right? So you have to acquire the rest of philosophy through what is natural, right? And I was pointing out there, even the postulates are acquired by, what? In some ways through the axioms, huh? Okay? And all of our knowledge in some ways is acquired by following the natural, what? Road, right, huh? And all the philosophizing comes out of wonder and the desire to live well and so on, huh? First out in the book about the poetic art, huh? He points out some interesting things about man and imitation. And he says that man is by nature the most imitative of all the animals. There's no animal that imitates as much as man does, huh? Notice how we imitate, you know, either that for the grandchildren. You know, when children imitate the cat and the sound the cat makes. I have a very good meow, by the way. I mean, it's very convincing, right? And people who don't know me make me fool of looking at the cat. And you have the bird sound, the dog sound, and all the other sounds, huh? You know, the old farm animals. And he also points out that, you know, we actually delight in imitations, right? But also that at first we learn by imitation, huh? But emphasize the idea that man is by nature the most imitative of animals. So how do we acquire our native language? By imitating our mother and our father and uncles and older brothers and, right? Teachers, right? Take things like custom, right? And fashion, these are not natural things, right? Things are by custom, by fashion. But how does custom and fashion arise? Yeah, yeah. Both custom and fashion arise because man is an imitative animal, right? The cat doesn't entail us in these things, right? So all these things that are not natural, they presuppose the natural and they're acquired through the natural. So that's another reason why we have to come in from what is natural into philosophy. Okay? Take one other thing, huh? We should come in to philosophy from the more known to us, right? Okay? The natural to come in. In what is more known. What is naturally known is what? More known, right? What is most known? You're most sure about the things we naturally know, right? Now, you might have seen it there. You might have seen it there. I told Pastor Peter from Thomas there, from the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. He speaks of the order of things among themselves, and then the order of them to their end. And he sees a certain order among those two orders, which is more fundamental. The order of many things to their end, or the order among themselves, which is more fundamental. To the end. Yeah, yeah. You take an example of a chair, right? You might have a seat and legs and a back and so on, right? There's an order among these, right? But all of these parts are ordered to one end, which is sitting. Okay? And the reason why, let's say, the back of the chair comes in to the seat at the angle it does, is because of what? A sitting, right? I mean, why doesn't it come in at an acute angle? You know, we have more back problems than I do, right? Okay? And even why does it come in maybe at a slightly obtuse angle, right? Rather than a right angle. Well, you can see, yeah? There's a little more to pose in a chair, right? It's a little bit obtuse, right? There's too much obtuse, I mean, you tend to fall asleep, you know, because there's parking lodges, you know, or something like that. But, so the order of them among themselves is an account of what? The order of all of them to their end, huh? Same way in a basketball team or even in an army, right, huh? The order of the parts to each other is an account of the order of the basketball team to winning the game, right? Or the order of the army to victory over the enemy, right? Okay? So the order to the end is what's most important. All the other orders depend upon that, right? Now, the end of philosophy is by what? By nature. So, say the end of philosophy is by nature. Now, when I say by nature, I don't mean that nature is enough to get to the end, because you have to, what, use your reason, right? And think out all these things, right? Okay? But what is the end, in fact, right, is determined by nature. We saw that especially when we say that wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? Because wonder is the beginning of philosophy, the end of philosophy had to be, what? A knowledge of first cause, right? In other words, there's a connection between philosophy beginning and this natural desire to know the cause, and the end of philosophy being a knowledge of the first cause. And that's why Plato, or Socrates, in that reading we had from the theotators, right? He says, in a way to make you wonder and think, right? It wasn't a bad genealogy, but Hesiod said, right? When he said that Iris was the offspring of wonder, and Iris, what's the meaning of that that we saw? Iris is the rainbow, and the rainbow connects heaven and earth like a messenger. Yeah. Iris is both of those, huh? Iris is both the messenger of the gods, right? And therefore, you know, it's man with God, right? Because that's what he does, like an angel, right? And Iris is also the rainbow personified, which joins heaven and earth, in the place of God and man, right? I mean, even in the Old Testament, you bring up the symbol, right? The view of man and God, that's the nation there, right? So he's saying that there was an advantage of genealogy to say that wonder unites man with God, right? But how does wonder unite man with God? It makes us look for the cause, right? If the cause has a cause, to the cause of the cause, right? And so on, until you get to the first cause, and the first cause turns out to be God. Therefore, wonder unites us ultimately with God on the side of our reasoning, right? So, or again, from the natural road, right? The natural road, as we say, goes from the effect towards the cause, as we saw. So the natural road is moving in the direction of wisdom. We saw that, too, when we saw that you went from sensing to memory to experience to art or science, you're moving in the direction of wisdom. So you see that the end here of philosophy is something that is by nature, and that the natural desire there, wonder especially, the natural road, are both going in the direction of the first cause. Yeah? So why do we have conflict in philosophy? Because we don't start from the natural beginnings, that's why. In fact, I'll come to that reason, you know. And Heraclitus talks about that a lot, okay? I'll come back to that. So, the end of philosophy is by nature, and the order of things to their end is the reason for all the other order in them. So if you don't start from the natural beginnings of philosophy, you don't know what the end of philosophy is. And that's the basis for all of the order in philosophy. So the whole thing is cast into what? Chaos, right? Because you weren't wise enough to begin from the natural beginnings, you know? Okay? Now, Heraclitus, huh? He has a marvelous fragrance here. I'll get you to copy that. But the natural is what is common, right? And Heraclitus has some marvelous fragrance there, dealing with this. The first one is this. He says, we should not act and speak like those asleep. Now, when I quote this fragment, Heraclitus, we should not act and speak like those asleep. Most people say, yeah, that seems to make sense, right? We're not exactly sure of all that it means, though, right? You know, we often say just don't wake up, you know? Okay? We should not act and speak like those asleep, right? Now, there's an obvious sense here that the man who is asleep is cut off from his senses, right? And if he's following anything, it's not his senses, but his imagination, right? So he's kind of cut off from the real world, right? But Heraclitus goes on in another fragment to bring out something else. He says, for the waking, he says, there's one world, and it's common, right? But when men fall asleep, each enters into his own, what? Private world, right? His own dreams, right? Okay? So he's saying something else, right? That those who follow what is private are like those who are, what? Asleep, right? See, we're all awake now, let's say, at this table here, right? We all know we're around this table, right? Okay? But if we all fell asleep, we might dream we're in chapel, or we're at home, or whatever, right? You know? And these many private views that we have in our dreams, right? Could all be false, right? Now, let's just get into it with truth and falsity, huh? Because two plus two is four. There's one true answer, right? But how many false answers to them, right? Then Heraclitus goes on. He says, therefore, we ought to follow what is common, right? But the many live as if they had a wisdom of their own, a private wisdom, huh? Now, if you stop and think about this, this is the only way for the human mind, really, to go forward, is to follow what is common, huh? Now, let me show that, you know, inductively here, how this is. Sometimes we go forward in our knowledge with the teacher and the students, right? Okay? And sometimes we go forward more like equal. when you're discussing something, right? Okay. Now, is it possible for the teacher to lead the students forward without following the common? What the teacher does, he's a good teacher, is he takes things that the student already knows, right? And he helps the student to put those things together and see something new that he hadn't seen before. Okay. And of course, you know, Socrates in the famous dialogue Domino, when he does this with the slave boy, and Socrates says afterwards, the slave boy knew it all along. And actually the slave boy didn't know how to double a square, in fact he was mistaken, right? But the way double a square comes out of the slave boy's answers. Okay? But now if the teacher doesn't know those same things, can he lead the student? See? So there's no way that the teacher can fully, you know, lead the student forward in his knowledge, and not just say, believe me, because I'm the teacher. The only way he can do so is by helping the student to use what the student knows already, right? To see something that maybe the teacher sees and the student doesn't yet see, right? But the teacher obviously has to know those very things that he's going to, what, lead the student from, right? They have to be common to him and the what? Student. Okay? And so he should go through, say, geometry, right? You come to a new theorem, and Euclid knows that new theorem. You don't. But he leads you to see that new theorem through things that you've learned already, right? You know already. Like the axioms and the postulates and the definitions and the theorems you've done already, right? But he helps you to put together what you know already to see the new theorem. Okay? Just like I was putting things together to help you see that the director had to bisect the circle, right? Okay? You see that? So there's no way the teacher can really lead the student forward in knowing, not just in believing, right? Without, on the basis of what is common to the student and the teacher. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. He wasn't saying what was common to him. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So the teacher, right, do things that both he and the student sees, right? He leads the student to see something the student at first didn't see, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Because he hasn't maybe brought these things together and see what falls from them. Okay? Now, the other way of proceeding is where two people are more or less equal, right? And it's not clear that one knows like the teacher knows and the student doesn't know, right? Okay? And we're trying to put our two heads together in order to go further, right? Okay? Now, when we think about it, neither one of us really, you know, fully knows what we're talking about, right? We're kind of, you know, two are better, two heads are better than one, we're putting our two together. We're going to be guessing and so on, right? And there's going to be some, what, disagreement, right? Okay? Now, I can say, you know, well, you're mistaken because I'm right. Mm-hmm. And you can return the compliment and say, no, you're mistaken because I'm right. But is this going to bring us forward? No. The only way we can really go forward is for us to find something, right, that we both know and agree about, right, from which we can, what, separate my opinion or your opinion as one as being true and one as being false, right? See? In other words, I can't, if I say you're mistaken on the basis of what is private to my thinking, right, and you say that I'm mistaken on the basis of what is private you're thinking, in no way can we go forward in our thinking anyway, okay? But if we can come back to something that we both have in common, right, and use that to decide where we disagree, right, then we can go forward, right? Now, you'll see in the first book of Aristotle's physics, right, that when he disagrees at one point with Plato, right, he goes back to a common understanding that he and Plato share, and from that he reasons, right, that in this place where we disagree, he's right and Plato's wrong, right? Okay? But that's the only way to, what, go forward in, okay, so whether you're going forward as a teacher tries to lead the students forward, right, or you're going forward in the discussion more between equals, right, in both cases you must base yourself on the common, right? Okay? Now, it's best if there's something actually common to the two of you, right? Okay? And in the conversation between Socrates and the slave boy, right, the slave boy is at first mistaken as to how to double a square. He thinks you double the, what, side, right? And actually, if you double the sides, you get a square four times as big. And Socrates knows the truth, that you take the diagonal, right? But both in showing the slave boy that he's mistaken in his first thinking, right, and later on in bringing the slave boy to see that the diagonal would be the side of a square twice as big, right, in both, Socrates proceeds from the answers of the slave boy, from things that the slave boy does, in fact, know. Which Socrates also knows. The only way of going forward, right? See, unless he's going to demand your belief, you know, kind of blind belief. Okay? So in that case, that from which Socrates can show the slave boy that he's mistaken, Socrates is right, is actually common to him the slave boy, right? And in general, this is true in philosophy, at least at the beginning, right? You start from what is actually common, that's the only way you go forward. Now when you get into what we call experimental science, which is not as certain, there you can't proceed from something that is actually common, because even experiments are never common even to scientists. Okay? Okay? But they try to follow Hercules so far as possible, right? And Schrodinger, for example, the author of the Schrodinger equation in modern physics, right? But the man who perfected the mathematics of wave mechanics, famous physicist. But he says, The first and indispensable condition we demand of an experiment is that it be repeatable with the same results. If an experiment cannot be repeated with the same results, we don't consider that experiment worthy of scientific consideration. So if Professor Berkwist in his lab, you know, conducts an experiment, and he announces to the world the results of it, right? But no one can duplicate that experiment and get the same results as Berkwist, we're not giving you what? Yeah. Yeah. And the fact that the experiment can be repeated with the same results, right, is a sign that is able to be common, right? Which is the best we can do in science, huh? So when Louis de Broglie, you know, proposed the idea of wave mechanics, huh, and this is so unusual and contrary to the customary ideas that they are making a joke out of it, right? I mean, here's a Frenchman, they're calling it the Comédie Francaise, you know, the French national comedy. But fortunately, Einstein at the time had great prestige, and he said, just a minute now, there might be something that Louis says, right? Mm-hmm. And so they conducted an experiment where Louis' theory predicted what would take place, right? Mm-hmm. And the experiments were performed and they built all full laboratories in New York, right? Mm-hmm. But notice, if two scientists disagree, and I have one hypothesis, and you have another hypothesis, and I say, well, you're wrong, because my hypothesis is correct. And you return the compliment and say, well, you're wrong. The only way to go forward is for you and I, you know, to find an experiment we can both perform or both observe, right? Mm-hmm. An experiment in which my hypothesis would predict something differently than your hypothesis, right? Mm-hmm. And then we can decide, right? See? So whether you're in philosophy or in science, the only way to go forward is to follow what is common. Okay? Now, nothing is more common than the, what, natural, right? The customary or the fashionable or the chance event or the even choice, right? They're very different, right, huh? So if you're going to follow what is common, you've got to follow what is natural. That's the only way to go forward. In other words, you're going to have a private philosophy, an idiotic. You know, the Greek word private, huh, is idios. Forget the word idiot. An idiot lives in his own world, right? His own private world, right? Which is not the true world, right? Yeah. up with a private philosophy. So those philosophers who do not follow what is common, right, who do not follow what is natural, they're like men who are asleep, each who are imagining his own, what, starting point. So you go to, say, you know, the modern philosophers in a general way, and you read each modern philosophy, you might get the impression that philosophy could begin anywhere, and go anywhere, and end up anywhere, right? In other words, you can't say anything about it. It's nothing, right? So this is another reason, right? Could you repeat the quote of Heraclitus, especially the second part? Yeah, well, I've got it in here. These are their quotes right here, and then I've got the Greek down below there, you know? We should not act and speak like those asleep. For the waking there is one world, and it is common. But when men sleep, each one turns aside into a private world. Therefore we ought to follow what is common. Although reason is common to all, the many live as if having a private wisdom. And he goes on to say, those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all. And that makes a very interesting comparison. As much as the city is strong in its law, so just as life together in the city is impossible without a common law, right? So the life of the mind, whether it be between teacher and student, or between equals in conversation, is impossible without some common basis, some common understanding. But notice he goes on. As much as the city is strong in its law, and even more so. For all human laws, meaning the laws of the city, are fed by one divine law, the natural law, which governs as far as it wishes, and is more than sufficient for all, right? So the divine law and the natural law, like don't murder, right? Don't kill innocent life, and so on. That feeds the law about, you know, the speed limit in the city, right? On the highway, right? It feeds the law about actually your gun off, right? And every time you invent something, you know, it ends life, right? It ends life, right? It gives birth to other laws, right? So eventually you go back to the natural, right? Okay. So this is another reason, right? We ought to follow what is common, that's the only way we can move forward. That's because men don't understand that and follow the common, that you have more disagreement, right? Then it's what? Inevitable, right? There's always going to be some disagreement, right? But as you come back, you can only resolve the disagreement by going back to the common, right? And it's by departing from the common that you start to get something private, right? Can you follow imagination, huh? Just give one more here, huh? In coming into philosophy from its natural beginnings, you're introduced into a consideration of everything that is necessary to be a good philosopher. What do I mean by that? Well, when you talk about these natural desires, right? You see that the disposition of a man's will, right? A good disposition of his will and even of his emotions is necessary for philosophy, right? And are there other dispositions of will or emotion that are necessary besides wonder and desire to live well? And one of them, of course, is the love of wisdom. The love of wisdom is not the same thing as one idea of a talk one time, which is the difference between those two, okay? Or humility, right? Is humility necessary in the philosopher? The great philosopher there in Pentacles, right? He says, you know, men don't live very long and they seem a part of life, but they both boast in having seen the whole. Boasting is one of the species of pride there that Gregory talks about. And this is part of where the disagreement among men come, right? That it's natural for man to see a part of the truth before he sees the whole, right? But out of pride, he boasts that he's seen the whole. And you can see that in the thinkers, right? I mean, like the 19th century, take an example of that. Long comes a man named Karl Marx. He says, everything can be explained by the epilogue point of production. Society can be explained by the epilogue point of production. Society can be explained by the epilogue point of production. Society can be explained by the epilogue point of production. Society can be explained by the epilogue point of production. Society can be explained by the epilogue point of production. You know? There's nothing to be explained by that, right? Well, undoubtedly there's some things that are explained by the economic mode of production, some things are explained by sexual drive and so on, right? But maybe having seen a part of the truth, they boast that they see the what? The whole, see? So maybe humility is necessary in the philosopher, right? In the great dialogue of the Fatal, Socrates shows that they're discussing with the souls immortal or not, right? It's a very difficult discussion, right? What you see is that it's not enough to want to know whether the soul is immortal. You can easily get discouraged in the investigation and even despair of finding the truth, right? And so you need this hope of finding the truth, right? You need this perseverance in the face of difficulty, that strength of will, right? To persist, right? But Socrates often, and there he talks about it a little bit too, but more in other dialogues, that you need this fear, though, of being mistaken. The fear of making a mistake, right? My greatest teacher there at Monsuniyan said to me, his principal passion is fear. I mentioned at the time when I was doing my doctoral thesis under him, you know, really, it was all I needed to write the thesis by myself. And when he made it, I could see right away, it was good. It fell into place. Who have any evidence, he says? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But, you know, with Monsuniyan, if he was at a new idea, you know, his first reaction was to reject it, you know, and you'd really have to… But, I mean, it was very good because, you know, it was so rigorous there, you know? And when I was first starting out, I think Monsuniyan would have been a bad man for me. Yeah. I would have been, you know, terrified almost. To move forward, right? But, you know, my teacher, you know, would encourage you to read things, you know? And so on, right? And so sometimes… So, I mean, there's all kinds of dispositions of the will, in addition to these natural wonders, wonder, who desire to live well, right? It's necessary that hope of perseverance, right? It's necessary that fear of mistake, right? The love of wisdom is necessary. Humility is very necessary, right? Pride is the chief cause of deception in the part of the will, right? And so, in looking at these natural beginnings, among which are the, what, natural desires, right? You're introduced to thinking about the fact that, what are the dispositions of will and emotion necessary to be a philosopher? Mildness, right? People get into discussion, they often get angry at each other, they don't seem like, oh, anger, you know, I don't think you're being fair, you know, or something like that. And anger often gets in the way, it's represented in the dialogue, right? People get angry, and they kind of cloud their vision, right? And sometimes, you know, you get angry, and the next day you calm down, you see the other guys, boy, get up! And you come back or something, you know? But I mean, there's all kinds of dispositions of the will and emotion that are necessary for the philosopher, right? And in beginning with the natural desires, you're being introduced, right? To the dispositions of will that are necessary to be a philosopher, right? And I go into a class, you know, I mean, how many students in there really have that wonder? That's, you know, our civilization intends to kill wonder, right? If you study the customs of the modern world, they're opposed to wonder, really. As de Tocqueville says, the great customs are opposed to wonder. They're opposed to pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Heisenberg says modern science is opposed to wonder. I've never talked about the customs, I'll show you that. But so you say, gee whips. But even if I have a student who has this wonder, you know, maybe he gets, what, discouraged, right? By the disagreement among philosophers, right? Or gets discouraged by the difficulty of all the things he has to go through and so on, right? Now likewise, when you talk about the natural road, right? And you say, well, are there other roads besides the natural road that you need to know, right? And that introduces you to the whole question of these three roads I talked about, right? There's a natural road in our knowledge, and then there's the road of reason as reason, the road from reasonable guesses to reasoned out of knowledge, the common road of reasoned out of knowledge. And each reasoned out of knowledge has, to some extent, its own road, right? So we're being introduced to the roads that are necessary, right, to be a good philosopher, by considering this natural beginning that is a road, right? You see that? Okay? And likewise, when you talk about the natural beginning in the sense of the statements known to themselves by all men, these axioms, right? Are there other statements known to themselves that are beginnings too? And it's a famous, you know, the distinction between the statements known to themselves by all men, and the statements known to themselves by those who are wise in some science. I'll give an example of what I mean. Now, is a perfect number a composite number? What would you say? Is a perfect number a composite number? Obviously it is. But you have to know what a perfect number is, right? A perfect number in arithmetic is a number that is equal to the sum of everything that measures it. So the first perfect number is what? Six, right? Six is measured by one, by two, and by three, but not by four or five. And one plus two plus three equals six, right? Four is not a perfect number. It's measured by one and by two, not by three. And one plus two don't add up to four, right? So, if you know what a perfect number is, it's going to have to be measured by some other number besides one, right? Because one's obviously going to add up to it. Okay? So it's got to be a composite number, obviously, right? And a number that's measured by some other number, not just by one. Okay? But you see, I'm a man learned, a little bit learned, right? In arithmetic, right? See, most students don't know what a perfect number is, right? But if you know what a perfect number is, then it's obvious that a perfect number is a, what? A composite number, yeah. You see that? Okay. So, what Poetis actually says, it's per se known, right? Per se notum, sapientibus, right? But meaning, not sapientibus necessarily in the full sense of being wise, but per se known, known to itself, right? By those who are learned in some science, right? You see what I mean? You see? But everybody knows what a whole and a part is. You can't live without, you know, you can't eat or drink without experiencing a whole and part, right? But you can go through life without learning about what a perfect number is. So that every perfect number is a composite number is known to itself by the wise, right? Or by the learned in geometry or arithmetic. But the whole is more than a part is known to itself by all men. See? So, in studying those axioms, those statements known to themselves by all men, you are led, you're being led into the general consideration of what statements known to themselves. Because they are the foundation of all reason and knowledge. And are there other statements known to themselves besides those naturally known? Are there other roads in our knowledge besides the natural world, right? Are there other dispositions of will and emotions necessary to be a good philosopher besides those, what, natural desires of wonder and the desire to live well? You had a question? Anybody ask? No. I just use an observation I was thinking of in terms of, you know, applying this to theology and just seeing all the problems we've had in the beginning of the church, all the sex and the breakups and everything because people have chosen to go up with their private understanding or their biased perspective on their understanding of God and God's Reclamation. I used to think of the built-in census for today, you know, the sense of the people, the common sense that God gives to the church. It's a protection even against even the greatest guidelines that could still go off base if they're not touched on them. Sure. So you see that analogy, you know. Yeah. The word heretic comes in the word chosen, right? You know, the heretic, you know, he chooses what he's going to believe, right? Yes. Rather than following the common faith in them. Mm-hmm. But there's always a, you know...