Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 11: Error, Wisdom, and the Four Senses of Before

Transcript
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Planaste, right? Planai. Oh, yeah. Well, the Greek word, planai, something like this, is the same root as er, right? It means, it comes with the word to wander. Oh, okay. And we get the word planet from that, right? Okay. Because the planets seem to wander around the sky, right? Okay? So, he says, Christ says, you wander because you know the scriptures, so you don't know the power of God. You know, they'll be like the angels that won't be married, and they'll be getting married there, so. Stupid question. But there, you see, that's a very important word then, right? Planai, see. But it's exactly the same methodologically, you know, in Greek, as the word er. Now, if you go back to Shakespeare's Greek comedy, the comedy of eras, right? You see some of that meaning of the word eras, too. That's one there, right? Okay. But I see that that suggests the necessity of seeing an order before and after a road to follow, right, in order to avoid eras. And then that'll go up in Thomas's, you know, or even those three words. Now, the other word is, you've got a different origin, and that's the word mistake. There's a kind of two main words in English, eras and mistake. But mistake is the idea, I think, of, you know, you're missing, you're going to take something, right? Oh. What's the cause of that, huh? Mistaking. What's the cause of a mistake? Put on judgment. Yeah, yeah. Okay, so you don't grasp. You don't grasp. That is. If I take, I want to take the truth, and I take the falsehood instead, or I take this rather than that, what's the cause of that? Well, what is suggested by that? You know, why did I mistake? You missed. Yeah, you missed, yeah. Shakespeare has, uses the word aim in Shakespeare, the word aim often has a sense of to guess, right? Probably. And when you aim at something, you don't always hit it, you sometimes miss it, right? Yeah. Okay, so you're guessing, you know, you sometimes hit, and sometimes you don't, right? Okay. Well, why should I mistake and take? Because you thought it was the right one. Yeah. What was the cause of my deception, I see? Your appearance? Yeah, yeah. A bad aim? Yeah. And this is very important. You know, Plato and Aristotle talk about how likeness is the cause of deception, right? Oh. And you wouldn't be deceived if the false is not like the true, right? And the bad is in some way resembled with the good, right? Okay. And you don't see the difference, right? So, these two words suggest a couple of different things. That an error or a mistake is the result of a disordered movement of reason. And if it proceeds from ignorance of the road to follow, right? Of the order in which you should proceed. But the word of mistake suggests that likeness is the cause of deception, right? Mm-hmm. Now, what faculty of man is named from likeness, huh? Yeah. Yeah. And so, what the name causes is the deception is what is called false imagination, right? Well, it's tied up with the idea of likeness, huh? And, uh, there's a passage there and was it, uh, one of the English poets there where he says that the imagination delights in the likeness of things and reason in their, what? Differences, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But in looking before and after you're, you have to be able to distinguish things, right? To differentiate them, right? So, imagination is common likeness of things but doesn't see the, what? Difference, right? And reason is perfected more by seeing the difference. And reason is helped also by seeing likeness, huh? Look at the fourth tool of the dialysis. The third tool is different from the fourth tool of likeness, right? And, uh, you know, he puts the tool of difference for the tool of likeness, right? Because to see the likeness without seeing the difference is apt to be, what? He's wanting to mistake, right? Let me give you another little thing here now. Sometimes I say, using the word wise now, not in the full sense, right? It's not scary or if you know anything. One man is wiser than another because because I don't know I don't know I don't know I don't know I don't know I don't know that the other man does not see. Now, am I saying the same thing twice there, or is there no difference? One man is wise in another, he's superior to knowing, I don't mean wise in another, because he sees what is before or after what the other man sees, or because he sees it before and after that the other man does not see. You said before that you can see a distinction without seeing the before and after. So, he might see what is before, but he might not see the before and after. Yeah, yeah. Let me exemplify the two. It's a very simple example. The first philosopher, Therese, said that water is the beginning of all things. So, he saw nothing before water, right? Okay. Now, if Lavoisier discovered that before water is, what, hydrogen, then Lavoisier seems to be wiser, right? The one man saw nothing before water, huh? The other guy saw that, oh, it's something before that, right? Okay. Or take another example, right? Sometimes you want to do something, but you don't see the consequence that we're going to do. Or maybe we see, you know, the consequence that we're going to do, but not the consequence of the consequence. And the more prudent man, right? He can see the, what, consequent reaction, right? And therefore, he's, what, wiser, right, in this matter, huh? Okay. I mentioned how, when I was in graduate school there, the logic professor came in, and he had that text from Thomas's commentary on metaphysics. And he was distinguishing between, what, the private road, the special way of proceeding in each science, and the common road, right? And common road is before the private road, huh? We didn't see anything before that, right? And Monsignor Dion came in and distinguished the three, right? So, the one man didn't see any road before the road of logic, right? Common road. And the other man saw the natural road, right? Before that, right? So he seems wiser, right, huh? Okay. Now, what's the difference between that and the second part now, huh? Let's take a simple example from English fiction here. John Dryden, who became a poet laureate of England, right? He describes how, as a young man, there were more plays of Beaumont and Fletcher performed than plays by Shakespeare. Now, I don't think you've already ever seen a play by Beaumont and Fletcher. I don't remember reading them. I read a few of their plays in the books, but I've never seen them on the stage of you. But there were more plays of Beaumont and Fletcher performed than Shakespeare, right? Especially Fletcher. So he saw the plays of Fletcher, and he saw the plays of Shakespeare, right? And as these years went by, he began to realize, hey, Shakespeare is much better, right? He began to realize, as he said, that Fletcher was just a limb of Shakespeare. An arm or a leg, right, huh? Okay. So notice, when he was seeing Fletcher and Shakespeare in the early part of his life, right, he had seen both, right? He heard both, right? But he didn't see right away that the plays of Shakespeare were better than the plays of what? Yeah. Yeah. You see? You see the difference between that and Thaddeus, who sees nothing before, right? It's not that, that, um... It's like if someone had, had, uh... Had some knowledge of water, and had some knowledge of hydrogen, he didn't realize that water was, what, H2O, right? Okay. He sees what's before water, but he doesn't see it as before water. Right? Do you see that? Okay. Suppose I was here with one of my sons, and, uh... You see us as two different individuals. You don't realize that I came before him as... Right? You know? I could know two individuals without knowing which one is, what? Older, for example, right, huh? And I always talk to so-and-so, you know, you get me talking, you know? Some people look their age, some people look younger than their age, right? And so on. And I always talk to so-and-so was older, and so on, and so on, and then all of a sudden you find out, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. See? So it's not like you were ignorant of who was before and who was after, but you're ignorant of their, what? Of their order, right? So you have somebody who can tell the difference between wine and beer, but doesn't know wine is better than beer. Right? Or someone who can recognize Mozart and Haydn, but doesn't know Mozart is better than Haydn, right? See? Okay? So sometimes one man sees what is before or after the other man sees, right? And so in that case, he's going to maybe eventually see that before and after the other man doesn't see, right? But sometimes somebody sees both, but doesn't see that one comes before the other, right? In one of those senses. But I look at you people here, I'm maybe not altogether sure, you know? Are you before him in time, or, you know? So I'm not altogether sure about that, right? Right? See, in most couples that I know, the man is older than the woman, right? But I know a few marriages where the woman is a year or so older than the man, right? She'll be that way by the way they say sometimes. I know some marriages of the sort, right? But I can certainly know a couple and distinguish the husband and the wife, right? Without seeing which one is older, right? Especially when, you know, doesn't look their age, right? So let's say the wife is older than the husband. She's before him, right? I see what is before, but I don't know that it is before, right? In time, right? Okay, let's go on to a real example. What about the wine and the beer? You see what I mean? See the difference, right? But in a sense, I write the statement through Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? So the reason is the ability for a large discourse looking before and after, right? So if one man succeeds in seeing something before, after what the other man sees, if there are quarks before protons, I don't know. But the man who sees the quarks might be, you know, wise in a sense, right? You could distinguish between maybe the ocean and the moon, right? Without knowing if it's true that the moon causes the tides or something, right? So it's not simply repeating it. It looks like that at first, right? It can seem like the very senses of his words, right? A man might know the very senses of the world. word to see, right, but not see that the word, meaning the act of the eye, comes first, and then to imagine it comes second, right, and then to understand, right, you know. When I ask these in class sometimes, I'll say, you know, what it means with the word to see, and the only means they'll usually talk about is what, you know, to see the eye, and then they'll put the second one to understand, right, but because those means are so far apart, easy to see, they're different, right, but they would sometimes, you know, speak of seeing up in the sense of imagination, right, but they haven't ordered the meanings yet, right, you see. So I think when a man sees that the first meaning you have to see is the act of the eye, the second is to imagine, and the third is to understand, right, then he sees it before and after, among meanings that someone else might not see, right. Nowadays you hear people talking all the time about establishing your priorities as kind of a, you know, fashionable word now, but prior is what the Latin word for what? Before. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So what does it mean to establish your priorities, what does it mean? To all the things according to the importance. Okay. But is it only that, you see? No, some things are unimportant but they need to be done anyway. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So in one sense it means the better things, right, huh? But sometimes you have to do the more necessary things first, right? I say to students, for example, which is better, to breathe or to philosophize? That's one of my favorite questions. I know they're going to say to breathe, right? Okay. And I say, now why do you say to breathe is better than to philosophize? Yeah, yeah. I say, well, that's the reason you're giving there, right? You're saying you can't do anything else in life if you're not breathing, right? That shows that breathing is before philosophizing in what sense of before? Second. Second sense, right? Which is you, this can be without that and vice versa, right? You can breathe without philosophizing, but you cannot philosophize without breathing. That shows that breathing is before philosophizing. In being, it doesn't end is what's better, right? That's what I was saying. And then we show later on that the end is what's better, right? And, uh, is breathing your purpose in life? No, you can only do it for so long. But you breathe so you can do other things, right? Like eat or something, right? So that it's not the best thing in life, right? It's confusing the second and the fourth sentence, right? Aristotle says, um, is the opposite of the worst the best? No one's saying the corruption of the best is the worst? Well, I'd say, uh, which is worse, to kill a man or kill a dog? Yeah. And that, therefore, you could argue that a man must be better than a what? Dog, right? Okay. And what's the exception to that? That's generally true, right? Which is worse, to be mistaken about who won the game or to be mistaken about God? Yeah. So, therefore, knowledge of God must be better than knowledge of who won the ballgame, right? Okay. There's any exception to the rule that the better is the opposite of the worse. Wait, did I say it again? Yeah. Is it that the opposite of the worst, right, is best, right? Or the opposite of the worse is better? Is there an exception to that? Would you be worse for me now, to stop philosophizing or to stop breathing? Yeah, yeah. But that's because breathing is before philosophizing in the second sense, right? Right? So, if, um, A is before B in the second sense of before, right? Then the loss of A is worse than the loss of, what? B. Even though B is better than A. So, if I stop breathing, I'll stop philosophizing. And everything else I do, right? See? When we get breathing, it's not better than philosophizing, huh? I breathe for the sake of philosophizing and doing other things, right? Which are more my end or goal or purpose in life, right? When I was a little kid, I used to ask him, do you eat to live or live to eat, right? And there were some questions about the ways that people live, right? Whether to live or live to eat, right? But even those days, no one, you know, asked you, do you, you know, breathe to live or do you live to breathe? It's pretty clear that you breathe to live, right? And, uh, so, when A is before B in the second sense, right? It is necessarily true, then, that what? The loss of A will be worse than the loss of B, right? But A will not be better than, what? B, huh? Do you see that? That's why you get very careful with the second and the fourth sense, right? You notice where the student is arguing, right? He's arguing, I give him the choice, right? I say, question, is it better to breathe or to philosophize? And I know they're going to answer to breathe, right? Okay? But then you ask them to defend that answer, right? Why is breathing better than philosophizing? Well, if you're not breathing, you don't be philosophizing or anything else, right? So they're arguing that because to stop breathing, right? He's going to be worse than stop philosophizing. Therefore, breathing must be better than philosophizing, right? Now, if there was not that before and after of the second sense, then you could argue, you know, that the loss of this is worse, right? Therefore, it must, this must be better. I'll give you another example here, where it's controversial, the student, I say, which is better, to live or to live well? But notice, to live is before living well in the second sense, isn't it? You can live without living well, but you can't live well without living, right? Which is worse, to not live well or to not live? Yeah, yeah. There's life, there's hope, as they say. See? So to stop living, to die, is worse than to not live well. But living well is better and ever less than just living, right? In the sense of the end. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So that's the exception to the rule, that the opposite of the worse is better, right? Aristotle says about wisdom, right? He says, every other knowledge is more necessary than wisdom. Right. But none is better. So he sees the distinction there between the necessary and the better, right? That's what this hinges on, right? Yeah, yeah. I say, when I say to the students, you know, I say, which is better, to breathe or philosophize than to say to breathe, right? And then I ask them for their reason. And I point out to them that their reason shows that breathing is before philosophizing in the second sense of before. Not in the fourth sense. See? But you can say in the defense that if two things don't have them, they're before and after in the second sense, right? Then the one whose loss is worse is what? Better. Give a theological example here, right? Which is better, charity or faith? Yeah, okay. Which is worse, the loss of charity or the loss of faith? The loss of charity. See, if you lose faith, you can't have hope or charity. See, so the loss of faith is worse, right, see, than the loss of charity. But charity is better than faith, right? There's an order among them, right? The same way with hope there. Hope is in between. Hope is better than faith, but faith is more necessary. And the loss of faith would involve the loss of hope and charity. So you see, you can't argue from the fact that the loss of faith is worse to faith being better. That's instinct, you know. So what was the original, you were phrasing a question originally? Well, the students, I asked them, which is better, to breathe or to philosophize, right? Yeah. Even before you started giving examples, you were just giving a simple... Then we would plug in these different examples, like breathing a philosophy. It's the worst, the opposite of the... It's the worst, necessary, opposite of the best. That was the thing. How to plug these in, I'm trying to plug them in. It's why I said, you know, would you rather, if you had to choose, would you rather be blind or deaf? You know, either one. But if you had to either be blind or deaf, would you choose? No, I'd be deaf. Deaf, yeah, see. So if to be deaf is not as bad as to be blind, then seeing is better than what? Hearing. Yeah, see. But notice, there's no order of the second kind between seeing and hearing. It's not that you can see without hearing, but not vice versa. No, there's no order of that sort between the two, right? So if the loss of hearing is not as bad as the loss of sight, then sight must be better than hearing, right? I'm still thinking, is the worst the opposite of the best? So the worst is not always the opposite of the best. Well, I'm saying that if there's not an order of the second kind, right, then the opposite of the worst is best, huh? The opposite of the worst is better, right? You see? An aristocracy distinguishes the three kinds of government there, you know, the good and the bad. And you have monarchy, oligarchy, excuse me, monarchy, aristocracy, republic, and then the bad ones, democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. Tyranny is the worst, monarchy is the best. Democracy is the least bad, and republic is the least good. So this is kind of a common rule, right? Which is worse? We call it the virtues and the vices, right? Some vices are worse than others. And then the virtues they're opposed to then must have what? Yeah. Which is worse, let's say, injustice or stinginess. Stinginess. Yeah. So therefore, justice must be a greater virtue than liberality or generosity, huh? I mean, that's a good rule, huh? Yeah, yeah. But the exception, you know, and it's a very important exception, is that though when this is before that in being, right, then the loss of it is going to be worse, right, even though it is not better than the other. Yeah. But you can't even think about these things as well without knowing those senses of before, right? The first thing I do is accuse students of equivocation, right, because they're arguing that breathing is before in the second sense, right? I say, which is better? I say, a pile of bricks or a brick wall? Why do you pay more for a brick wall or a brick house than a pile of bricks? Is it worth more? Huh? Right? As in the case, it's... Yeah, yeah. You're going to pay more for a brick patio than a pile of bricks, right? Yeah. You know? So brick... And the bricks are for the sake of the brick patio or for the sake of the brick wall, right? So the end is always better than when it's for the sake of it, huh? Okay? But you can have bricks without a brick wall. You can't have a brick wall without bricks. Right? So let's be safe that thing, sir. The opposite is the worst... The opposite of the worst is better. That's the stated rule, but the exception is in sense number two. Yeah, where you have that order, yeah. This is before that giving. Yeah. Then the loss of this worse. You find this strange thing, Thomas, you know, where infidelity is in a sense the worst of sins, right? You say, why not, you know, despair or, you know, vice opposed to charity and so on, huh? You say, well, you lose faith, you lose hope and charity, right? You say, you know? An exception to the exception. Our Lord said it would be better for him if he wasn't born. He said it would be better for him not to live than to live. It's the eternal misery. So that's the opposite of being, well, eternal misery. I'll have to think about that a little bit more, you know? Yeah. Yeah, sure. You know, it's something like Judas, though, you know. You know, Judas... He despaired, right, you know? Judas of forgiveness, right? He despaired, right? See, why Peter, you know, didn't do obviously as awful a thing as he did, right? He didn't despair of being, what? Forgiven, right, for his denial of Christ, right? So isn't despair worse than hatred of God, right? In some sense, huh? Some of that sort, right? Pride, you know? You're going to cut off, right? You know? Regarding the things that you can... Yeah. I wanted to, first of all, emailing you at your email address would be pointless. Yeah, it's probably the best way to translate it into English. Premium, paving the way, right? And Timaeus gives a premium to his discourse on the universe in the dialogue called the Timaeus. And almost every work of Aristotle's has a premium to it. But Thomas, when he writes a commentary on Aristotle's works, will not only explain Aristotle's premium, but he'll give a premium himself. Well, like we had the premium here to the Nicomachean Ethics. Now, usually Thomas' premium stands back a little bit further from the work than Aristotle's does. He's kind of situating it in the whole of our knowledge or in a wider perspective. Now, there are only two works of Aristotle's in logic that Thomas wrote a commentary on. And one is the Peri Hermeneus, which he didn't complete his commentary on. and Cajetan completed it. And then he wrote a commentary on the posterior analytics. So the first of these two premiums is taken from the beginning of his commentary on the Peri Hermeneus, and the second one from the beginning of his commentary on the posterior analytics. The second one is much broader and deeper than the first one. So, let's look at the beginning here of the major premium. He says, As Aristotle says in the beginning of the metaphysics, the human race lives by art and reasonings. And we saw that in the premium to the wisdom. In which the philosopher, now, Thomas very often refers to Aristotle as the philosopher. And that's, say, what? Antonio Messiah, right? Okay. He often refers to St. Paul as the apostle. Peter and Paul are called the apostle by Antonio Messiah. Okay. So you'll see sometimes he uses the word Aristotle, or that name Aristotle, sometimes philosopher. So he says, In which the philosopher seems to touch upon a certain property of man, by which he differs from the other animals. For other animals are led by some natural instinct to their acts. Man, however, is directed by the judgment of reason in his acts. And hence it is that diverse arts serve to perfect human acts easily and orderly. Now he gives a kind of common notion of art. As Monsieur Dion would point out, the word art in Latin and the word technique in Greek, they first refer to these practical arts. These mechanical arts that transform matter in some way. Like the art of carpentry that made this table. Or the art of metalworking that made this chair. And the art of the glassblower or whoever made this glass. Okay. But Thomas here is taking art in a broader sense, huh? And this is, what's this broad sense of art that he takes here? Ordering of reason by which the acts, the term it ends, there's only... Yeah, yeah. Okay. And this sense, this broad sense of the word art, is going to apply even to logic, right? Okay. So when I was coming up here, I was using the art of driving an automobile. And the reason has figured out how to use your hands and your eyes and your feet to drive an automobile, right? Okay. And I can do it in an orderly way now. And easily, right? In fact, sometimes I'm hardly aware of the fact that I do it from here to there because I'm thinking of something else, but I do it, you know, almost habitually now. Okay. Now, in the second paragraph, he makes a very interesting distinction, though. He says, In all the other arts, reason is directing the acts of some other part of man than reason. Like, in my example there, the hands and the feet, right? And in a sense, the carpenter and the plumber and the metal worker and so on. They know how to use their hands and sometimes their feet, too, huh? To make things, right? And their eyes and so on. What's unique about logic is that reason is going to be directing not the acts of the hand or the feet or some other part of man, but the acts of reason itself. Okay? And how is that possible? Well, it's possible because reason can not only think about the hand, and how to use it to play the piano, wherever it might be, but reason can also think about, what? Thinking. Okay? In some way, knows its own act, huh? It comes back upon itself, huh? Okay? And that's why the famous words of the seven wise men of Greece, the Nothi Sautan, know thyself, huh? They could be applied to reason in particular. Because reason is the only part of man that can know itself. Well, the hand doesn't know what a hand is. The hand doesn't ask what a hand is and how a hand differs from a foot. But reason asks not only what a hand is, but what reason itself is. And you'll see that reflected in certain interesting things in logic that you talk about, for example, definition in logic. Not only can you define, say, square like you do in geometry or define man as we did earlier, but reason can even define definition. There's a definition of definition. And there are statements, we'll see, about statements. And there is reasoning about what? Reasoning, right? And that reflects the idea that reason can come back upon itself, huh? Okay? So that's what he points out in the second paragraph. Reason, however, is not only able to direct our lesser parts, but also directs its own act. For this is a property of the understanding part, that it reflects upon itself, which means it comes back upon itself. For the understanding understands itself, and likewise reason is able to reason about its own act. If, therefore, from this, that reason reasons about the act of the hand, there has been found the art of building, let's say, or of metalworking, through which man is able to perform acts of these kinds easily and orderly, for the same reason, some art is necessary which directs the act of reason itself, by which man can proceed in the very act of reason, orderly, easily, and without air. And notice he's been using the words orderly and easily, right? And now he adds the words without air, right? Okay? Now if you think back upon the art of carpentry, or the art of plumbing, or the art of cooking, right? The person who possesses this art, they go about doing something in an orderly way, don't they? And they can do it much more easily than we can, right? And they avoid the mistakes that the neophyte, the beginner, makes all the time, huh? Okay? So if something goes wrong with the plumbing, right, you can try to fix it yourself, but you don't know exactly what to do first, or what to do second. You try this, you try that, right? And you have, you know, difficulty, right? And you make certain mistakes, you know, that have to be rectified, huh? You see? Sometimes do a little carpeting down in the basement there, you know, and my brother-in-law, who was a professional carpentry, says, what'd you do that for, Dwayne? You know, you stood on this, done that, see? And it's kind of interesting to see the way that the carpenter, the plumber, he, right away, he comes in, he does things in a, what, one, two, three way, in the same way to cook, right? Cook does things in an orderly way, and with ease, and without air, right? And perhaps the order there is interesting, orderly first, huh? Because you see, you know what, through first, second, third, it becomes kind of, what? Easy, right, huh? And then you also tend to avoid errors, because you're proceeding in an orderly way. Okay? And so he says, this art that's going to direct the acts of reason is called logic, an art which is named from reason itself, huh? Logos, right? Okay? And he says, it's named from reason in a special way. Every art is something of reason, that reason is figured out, right? But what's peculiar to this art is that it's also about reason, or about the acts of reason. And therefore he calls it the, what? Art of arts, huh? Because it directs reason in its own act, and all of the other arts, the hands or the feet or the eyes, are being directed by, what? By reason, right? But here reason is directing itself. Therefore, it has a right to be called the art of arts, right? It directs the director, you might say. All the rest. And here you see likeness of logic to what? To wisdom, right? Okay, the art of arts. Okay, now in the fourth paragraph here, next to the bottom there, paragraph, is going to now divide logic, right? Okay, and you'll find out that most arts or sciences, most holes in fact, are divided usually into two or, what, three parts. We'll talk about that rule of two or three, but you saw it in theology a lot, right? Geometry, for example, is divided into two parts. Geometry as a whole, plain geometry and what? Solid geometry, right? So the first six books you could there are plain geometry to get the solid geometry later on. Even those first six books, you wouldn't divide them into six books. You divide them into the rectilineal books, the first two books, the circular books, the third and fourth book, and proportional books, five and six, okay? They tend to fall into two or three. When you get into natural philosophy, the basic division there is into two parts, a general consideration of change, and then the particular consideration of change. And the particular consideration of change is divided into three parts, change of place, change of quality, and growth. And that's the origin of physics, chemistry, and biology, originally. Although most people have forgotten the original reason for it, because they get kind of confused now about it, but let's back to that. Theology is divided into how many parts? Yeah. Consider God in himself, right? Then God is the, what, maker, right? And the Lord. And then God is the end of the provident one, right? So you consider God in himself, God is the beginning of other things, and God is the end of all things. Like in, what was it, Psalm 18? Now, know that the Lord is God, he made us, his we are, his people of the flock, he tends. That's the three parts. Know the three parts of theology. They're being said or told in that Psalm, right? Can we repeat that? Yeah. Know that the Lord is God, and he made us, his we are, his people of the flock, he tends. You consider God in himself, God is a maker, and God in his providence. Well, no, in natural philosophy, you divide it into two. Consideration of change in general, then in particular, but the division in particular is into three. Change of place, change of quality, and change of quantity in the sense of growth. Yeah. Growth. Okay? And say that's the basis of the division we still use in high school and college into physics, chemistry, and biology. Because physics was originally a study of change in place, chemistry of quality and substance, and then biology, the study of things that grow. Okay? But that tradition, that division became customary, and people forgot the reason for it. Okay? And so, really something like atomic physics belongs with chemistry, not with mechanics. So if you look at Heisenberg's division, the gift for lectures, he puts atomic physics with chemistry, right? Okay? But the original basis of that was the place, the kinds of change. Okay? Now, Thomas divides Aristotle's logical works, and therefore logic itself, into what? Three parts, right? According to three acts of reason, that come in a certain order, and you could say more precisely that these are three acts of looking reason, okay? And the first act is going to be presupposed to the second, and the second to the third, huh? Now, you can name these acts in various ways. I like to name the first act as understanding what a thing is. So understanding what a triangle is, right? Understanding what a man is, right? Understanding what reason is, understanding what a dog is, right? Understanding what a stone is. This is the first act of reason. And the second act I call understanding the true or the false. And this involves putting together in an affirmative statement, or separating in a negative statement, the things you've understood by the first act. So if I understand in some way what a man is, what a man is, what a man is, what a man is, and understand in some way what a man is.