Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 13: Logic, Words, and the Ordering of Thought

Transcript
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Let's forget the word trivial, right? Because everybody would know the trivia. But it's not trivial, in our sense of the word, right? So the seven liberal arts, he says, among other sciences, are called arts as well as sciences, because they not only have knowledge, but some work that is immediately of reason itself, as to construct syllogisms, to make a syllogism or to make a definition or make a statement, right? Logic is about that. And to form speech, to form sentences like in grammar, and then to number and measure, like in arithmetic and geometry, and to form melodies, music, right? And to compute the course of the stars, right? He's touching upon the four parts of the quadrivium, which go back to the great Pythagoras. To form speech, of course, you take that to mean rhetoric, too. Quartic is about giving speeches. But other sciences either do not have any work, but knowledge only is divine and natural science. Or they have a bodily work as medicine, chemistry, and others of this kind. Whence they cannot be called liberal arts, because acts of this kind belong to man by that part which is not free, namely the bodily part. So notice, in those two short texts there, Thomas is pointing out that logic, like the other liberal arts, right, is in a way an art because it makes something, although it's a more mental making than making wood or glass or paper or something like that, right? And that these are, in a way, tools, right? That reason needs for these acts, right? Now, the next two little passages here, and the first one is more complete for our purposes here. Thomas says, Just as in exterior acts, one can consider working in the work, the making of a chair and the chair, the making of a house, the building of a house and the house, right? So also in the works of reason, one can consider the act itself a reason, which is to understand either what a thing is, or understand the truth or the false, right? Or reasoning, right? Or something constituted by an act of this kind, which in looking reason, first is definition, which corresponds to understanding what a thing is, statement, which corresponds to understanding the true or the false, right? Composition or division, right? And third, syllogism or general argument, which corresponds to what? Reasoning, right? So you could say that logic is about, right? Three acts of reason, right? But it's about three acts of reason, not so much as its subject, as its inner purpose. Its inner purpose is to perfect these three acts, right? To direct and order these three acts, okay? But its subject more is the, what, three tools, right? Definition and statement and syllogism, mainly. Argument. Which perfect those three acts, which make them possible, or at least make them more perfect, right? Let's direct them, right? Okay? Now, if you go back to the text here in the premium of Nicomarcan Ethics, when Thomas is dividing order in comparison to reason, let's look at the order in comparison to reason that logic is going to be concerned with. And Thomas says, there is also an order which reason by considering makes in its own act, as when it orders its thoughts to each other, and the signs of thoughts, right in the middle of the page here, and the signs of thoughts, which are signifying vocal sounds. I think there's a very key passage there in Thomas, because I think he's bringing out something that is very subtle. Well, let me stop and expand on this a bit. I think this is kind of a key to seeing. If you ask the fundamental question, how do we order our thinking? I used to broaden our thinking there to include all these acts. How do we order our thinking? Yeah, yeah. So I'm going to take another step there, right? I would say first we order our thinking by ordering our... Let me make this a little more explicit. How do we order our thinking about things? Okay? More explicit. I'm going to answer the question by ordering our thoughts about things. We pointed out before that thinking and a thought are not the same thing exactly. Just as imagining and an image are not the same thing, right? But they're very closely tied, right? When we imagine something, we form an image of it, right? When we think about something, we form a thought about it. Okay? And the image in a way is a likeness of something. A thought of a likeness of something. So if we could order our thoughts, our thinking would be what? Ordered, right? Just like if we order our images, our imagining would be. In a way, when you memorize something, you have the steps there, right? You're ordering your what? Images, right? Okay? And that's why we go back to the beginning, you know, to follow it in order. You try to remember something, huh? Sometimes I, you know, get lost in the middle of a passage, I can't remember. I go back to the beginning and say it at the beginning, right? And then I remember it, right? It's in the proper order. But notice something about this. Can you see, hear, smell, taste, or touch thinking? Can you even imagine thinking? Can you see, hear, smell, taste a thought? Can you even imagine a thought? So, for an animal with reason, whose natural road is from the senses into reason, how can you get at these things that it can't sense or imagine? It needs something sensible, right? Okay? And that comes to the third thing, you know, the vocal sounds, huh? Okay? But ask the informal question first. First, how do we order our thoughts about things, huh? About things about things. Well, it's by ordering the words that signify things, or the words that signify things and thoughts. In words, the original words are not the written words, but the vocal sounds, as he says, right? Okay? So you can say that logic, in a way, is about using words, right? Insofar as they signify things and thoughts, right? To order our thoughts, and consequently our what? Thinking. That's very subtle, right? But I think that's all implied in what Thomas says here. There is also an order which reason, this is now in the framing to the Comachian Ethics, there is also an order which reason like, considering makes it its own act and its own thinking right as when it orders its thoughts to each other and the signs of thoughts which are signifying vocal sounds okay but that's putting up that second part there right okay one time the apostles asked our lord teach us how to pray john taught his disciples how to pray right and what did christ do in prayer yeah yeah he taught them what give him some words to use to pray right and notice those words are not the inward prayer are they but in order to teach us how to pray he has to use the what outward sensible sounds right then so you teach a little child to pray right you teach him the our father and say and hail mary right and they will say these words right not fully comprehending them right but they're gradually ordering their what desires and their requests to god right as they say these words again and again and understand the words better right okay i think in the 18th psalm is it right he says let the words of my mouth the thought of my heart find favor before you it's interesting how it proceeds right you have to in a sense learn the words but then your thoughts have to pull along with those words you know the king in hamlet you know he falls down he starts to pray right after the the scene there where he reenacted the murder right and he can't bring some to repent right he's down there saying words right to god but then he says words without thoughts near to heaven go you know hamlet is by almost going to kill him right but then he's not going to kill me he's praying because that's too nice to wake up to go right he's got to wait till he's drinking and drunk or something you know and uh some activity there's no relish of heaven in it all right so you have to really revenge right this is kind of you know christian in a way but um after heaven goes by then the king rises up right and realizes that he's not really what the interim is not conformed to the words right so he says words about thoughts near to heaven go right well the same way in thinking about right now the words right just as physical sounds wouldn't do anything right but insofar as these words signify things and thoughts right we can use those words to order our thoughts about things in consequence they are thinking about things now some people you know are kind of shocked by that and when you examine the definitions say a definition of the definition of statement or the definition of syllogism the first word the definition of all those things is in greek logos right okay now the greek word logos can mean word i mean the spoken word later on the written word logos can also mean speech right now later on logos can mean the thought right when aristotle uses logos as the genus in the definition of definition of definition or a statement or syllogism is using it in the sense of thought or in the sense of of words word or words which is yeah if you look at the commentary if you look at the prayer hermeneas aristotle makes it crystal clear that he's using logos there to mean the vocal sound as thomas says thomas is very concrete there right so it's kind of a shock to people when they you tell them that logic is about vocal sounds it seems to be putting logic lower than it should be right they want to say logic is about thoughts well in a sense it is right it's about thinking right but the point is um you can't order your thinking without ordering your thoughts and we need a sensible tool right to order our thoughts and the sensible tool we use to order our thoughts is words insofar as they signify things through thoughts right it's only insofar as words signify things through thoughts thoughts that they can be used to order thoughts about things in consequent here i think so what's up front is the sensible what tool which is either a word or a speech right or just say a logic of name or a speech that's kind of a shock but make another comparison i think sometimes uh seven sacraments right very important huh what's the genus of the seven sacraments sign yeah the sign is something what sensible right thomas always goes back to augustine's definition of sign is that which you know strikes the senses and brings to mind something else right now if you say that the seven sacraments is seven sensible signs that seems to to lower the dignity of the sacraments right you know instead of saying that the seven sacraments are seven graces no he's saying there's seven signs right but there are seven signs instituted by christ to give grace and so on right you know but that's the genus is signed and and god is what condescending to an animal with reason right it has to be led from the sensible to what is above the sensible right okay okay you see the idea um you know sometimes in these contemporary catechisms you know we're going to call catechisms but they'll want to you know speak of the sacraments as an encounter with christ right was that really the genus of the sacrament yeah you do encounter christ the sacraments and and that's why they're so important right but the sacrament itself is not in an encounter with christ it's a sensible sign through which you're going to encounter christ to the power of christ right see the idea so you know sometimes i find people are kind of shocked right i said had you know you know someone here to discuss with people about this right there still makes it crystal clear that very human is that logos is so in a way the two fundamental definitions of logic are the definition of name and the definition of speech okay and the definition of name and of speech and logic are the same in most of their parts but one part is different in each okay so a name is first of all a sound and a speech is first of all a sound it's a sound and i'll say sound produced not by my fingers wrapping on the desk right but it's a sound produced by the vocal cords right now the little boy he starts to say professors always clear your throat when i clear my throat do i intend to signify something by that sound that i think so i can speak more clearly but the name or the speech is a vocal sound that what signifies right i mentioned already the uh definition of sign right to gustin right and i translate the definition as two parts that which strikes the senses and brings to mind something other than itself now the fourth part of the definition sound is the first part right vocal is the second part signifying is the third part now the fourth by the definition now the fourth by the definition we say sometimes it signifies by custom or by agreement, as opposed to by nature. Now, what are you separating the name of the speech from when you add by custom or by agreement? Things like moaning or sighing. There are certain vocal sounds that signify by nature, like a groan, right? So if you kick somebody in the stomach, they're groan, right? And you can recognize that groan around, right? Someone attacks you in the dark, you scream or something, right? Or the baby's cry, right? The baby's cry signifies something. Kind of funny, you know. Someone gave me a little book on dads, you know. And one of the items there was kind of funny, huh? The new father, right? His first time, the father. He's leaving the hospital, you know, with his wife and the new baby, right? He's very concerned about doing the right thing. So he says to the nurse, you know, now, wouldn't you wake the little fellow? I realize that he's going to be taking over their life for a while, you know. But notice, huh? It's by nature that the, what, the baby signifies, right? That need, right, for food, and maybe need to have the diaper changed, and so on. By crying, you say, okay. That's when you first, you know when you first see the baby, you start to look before and after? I noticed when the baby would cry on the night, the first thing we'd do is, what, change the diaper, right? Then the baby would get fed, right? Oh. Okay? And the baby would cry through the whole change of the diaper until they got their food, right? But after a while, once they went on the changing table, they stopped crying. Oh, man. Like they knew that it was going to be followed. Yeah, looking before and after, it was going to be followed by food, and it's all their needs, right? So they don't need to keep crying anymore, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, 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yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah In a statement, in syllogism, or argument in general, definition is always a what? Speech, yes. A statement is always what? Speech, right? It has parts that signify by themselves. So when I get the definition of square as an equilateral and right-angle quadrilateral, well, quadrilateral means something, right? Equilateral means something, and right-angle means something. And the meaning of the whole definition depends upon the meaning of those parts, right? When we define reason as the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, well, before had a lot of meaning, right? Looking has meaning right by itself, right? Discourse, large, each has a meaning by itself. Ability does, right? So a definition is never just one name. It's always a combination of two or more names. A statement, now, is a speech, right? Man runs. Man is an animal, right? Man means something by itself. Runs means something by itself, right? Okay? Man is an animal. Man means something by itself. Animal is an animal. Man is not a stone. Man means something. Stone means something. By itself, right? And the meaning of the whole depends upon the meaning of the parts. Parts, right? Nay, for its story, an argument is going to be composed of two or more statements, right? Usually two statements. So it's going to be, what? Speech, right? So we could say that logic, in terms of its end, it's about three acts of reason, right? But as a subject, it's about mainly the three speeches that perfect those three acts. Definition, which perfects understanding what a thing is. Statement, makes possible understanding the true or the false. And syllogism, or some other kind of argument, makes possible reasoning, right? Okay? But when we examine these speeches, we'll see the names that they're put together from, right? And so we studied the names even before the definition, right? Before the statement. So the subjects of logic are the tools. Yeah. Okay. Okay. And chiefly, definition, statement, and syllogism, take the name. Sorry. It's perfect. And you call name and speech two fundamental definitions? Definition, well, I mean, two fundamental things we talk about, right? Yeah. Okay. So the work of Porphyry is sometimes called the Book of the Five Names. And the categories is called the Book of the Ten Names. Actually, in the Greek they'll say, you know, the five vocal sounds and the ten vocal sounds. Okay? So we're going to be studying, then, three main speeches, if we define this now. So let's look at this last text from Aristotle here, which is a bit of a breakdown here. This idea of the third actor in page six now. He says, all teaching and all learning by reason come to be from preexistent knowledge. Well, this ties in at what we saw about the word discourse, right? We define discourse in the definition of reason as coming to know, right? The unknown through the known, right? Aristotle is now looking at this in regard to reasoning in particular. This is clear to those looking at all. For the mathematical forms of reasoned out knowledge come about in this way in each of the other arts. And he takes the mathematical forms of reasoned out knowledge, geometry and arithmetic, as the most clear examples of what? Demonstration, right? Okay. That's why you could use that phrase there, QED all the time, right? But notice how in the beginning of Euclid, you can kind of see the three acts of reason. Because he begins with definitions, right? And then he gives certain statements that are obvious from the definitions, like the postulates and the axioms, huh? And then he starts to what? Demonstrate, right? And so he demonstrates through the postulates the first theorem, right? He uses the first theorem to demonstrate the second theorem, and so on, right? And in each of these, you're going from the known to the what? Unknown, right? See? So he takes the parallels, he shows that when a straight line falls upon parallels, it makes what? Equals what? Equal these two, or if you need for this one. Then later on, he's reasoning, I'm going to change the demonstration a little bit here. If you wanted to show that the triangle has its interior angles equal to right angles, you could use this and draw a straight line through there, parallel to the base. Then by this previous theorem, you'd know that these two were, what, equal, as relative angles, and these two here would be equal. So these two equal to those two, and that's the third one, so you add up to the right angles. Okay. So having to know, right, in a very rigorous way, right, something you didn't know, what you didn't know, right? Okay. How do you know these two angles are equal, right? We know already that when a straight line makes a straight line, it makes either two right angles, or angles equal to two right angles. So A plus X must equal two right angles, right? This is a straight line meeting a straight line, and B plus X must also be equal to two right angles, minus equal to the same, or equal to each other, that's one of the axioms, right? Definitely equal to each other, and then equal to subtract from equal is another axiom, it's also equal, right? So you're reasoning to these angles being equal from this previous theorem, that was a straight line to a straight line, it makes two right angles, or angles equal to two right angles, and the quantities, what, equal to the same or equal to each other, and equal to subtract from equals, it's also equal, right? Okay, so it's clear that, he says in the mathematical forms of science at least, right, that you're knowing, or you know something, you're knowing something else, right? But in a very rigorous way that we call demonstration, right? Now, when Plato talks about this kind of knowledge that's produced by demonstration, which in Greek is called episteme, right? He does so in the dialogue called the Theotetus, where Socrates talks with a mathematician about demonstration. Now, there's usually a connection between the guy that Socrates talks to, and what he talks about. So he talks about courage with Lachez, Lachez, who's an old, what, general, presumably would know something about courage, right? He talks to Euthyphro about piety, because Euthyphro is prosecuting his own father for impiety, right? So he should know something about piety. But he talks to Theotetus, the mathematician, about what? Demonstration, right? Okay? So Aristotle's touching upon that first kind of reasoning that we talk about in the prior and posterior analytics, right? Which is most easily seen in mathematics, huh? Okay? And then he goes to the Socratic conversations, which are mainly dialectical. And likewise, in the conversations, sometimes Socrates reasons by syllogisms, and then those by induction. For both teach through what was known before. These taking from what is understood, and that's something universal in the syllogism, and those, the ones by induction, showing the universal through the singular, that is clear. Can't you say that conversation, sir? Yeah, the word dialogue means Plato. The word dialogue is a big word for conversation, right? Okay. So, sometimes Socrates argues by a syllogism, right? He says, Sybius has argued that the soul is the harmony of the body, right? Socrates says, well, the soul resists the body, sometimes. He says, well, the soul is the harmony of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of always follow the body, the soul resists the body, but the harmony of the body does not resist the body. So if the soul resists the body, but the harmony of the body wouldn't resist the body, then the soul is not what? This is a syllogism, right? And the syllogism is defined as a speech in which some statements lay down, another follows necessarily because of those laid down, okay? So if you lay down these two, then it follows necessarily that the soul is not the harmony of the body. So sometimes Socrates syllogizes, and he doesn't really state the definition fully, but he will say this follows necessarily from that, right? So he has the general idea. But then Socrates wants to reason for the proposition that changes between conquers, right? The first way we show this is by deduction. We say, what is it that dries out? What is it that's moistened? Yeah, you can't moisten the ocean. You moisten something that is dry. What is it that's hard? What is it that's soft? What is it that becomes healthy? Sick. And who becomes sick? So he's showing, in many particulars, right, something that he wants to say generally. The change is between opposites, right? Okay? So that's the other kind of argument called induction, right? And that's an argument from many particulars, right, to the general. Okay? But here he's starting from something more general, seen by the syllogism. Where is that from? This is from the fatal. Actually, it's three syllogisms there that he destroys the position of objection to simians, which is based upon suggestion, but not proof that the soul is the harmony of the body. He's shown before that there's a harmony of the soul, but there's not a harmony of harmony. Therefore, the other harmony depends upon the other harmony in some, because maybe some of the premises are only, what, probable, right? Okay? But Socrates is given a probable argument that the soul existed before the body, but the harmony of the body doesn't exist before the body. Therefore, the soul is not the harmony of the body. But maybe that statement is not even true, that the soul exists before the body. But it's probable, well, you know, Socrates is given an argument for it, right? So he syllogizes from that, but the conclusion is not necessarily true, because maybe one of the premises is not necessarily true, right? So Socrates will reason either by syllogisms or by inductions. The reason why you do this in dialectic is that you're concerned with knowing something about the universal. And one way of knowing something about the universal is by an induction from the many particulars, right? The other is by syllogism. Now, in the same way, speakers persuade. Now he's thinking of rhetoric, right? The art of persuasion. For they do so either through examples, which is induction, and not simply induction, but it has a resemblance to induction, or through enthymemes, which is, in a way, like a syllogism. And what way is example like an induction? Well, example here doesn't mean a singular use to illustrate something. That's another meaning example. But here example means an argument from one singular to another singular of the same kind, okay? So a friend comes to town, he wants to eat in a good restaurant in Boston, right? Years ago. So my wife and I had a wonderful meal at Joseph's restaurant. So let's go to Joseph's, okay? I'm reasoning from the wonderful meal my wife and I had at Joseph's to what? The meal that he and I could have going to Joseph's, huh? So you buy a particular car and it lasts a long time, so you buy another one of that same thing. Is it going to necessarily be good? No. No. No. Is the meal going to necessarily be good? No. No. No. No. My wife and I went on Saturday night and my friend and I went on Monday night and probably not the same show. But the more the two are alike, the more you can reason from one to the other, right, huh? MacArthur was defending the Inchon landing, you know, that chiefs of staff were opposed to it and so on. And he compared what he was going to do to what Wolf's landing in Quebec, huh? You know, he thought Wolf could land where he did, right? But Wolf had stayed very closely and he could climb up a bigger place, right? And surprise the French. And that led to the taking of the French in the war, right? So, now notice an example is a little bit like induction because in a sense I'm taking the last meal, the meal I had it, it shows us, right? As kind of what? Representative of meals it shows us, right? It's a very perfect induction. I had one or two meals there maybe, right? You see? So that's something of the induction but not as the strength of the induction which is from many. So the scientist often bases himself upon an induction but he's cut open hundreds or thousands of frogs, right? And they all have three chambered hearts or whatever they have, right? I've eaten maybe this restaurant two or three times, you know? Or you know, only once. And what's an enthymeme, huh? An enthymeme is an argument from what? Likelihood or from science, huh? Boys will be boys, huh? Any exceptions to that? Yeah, sometimes you read the newspaper about a boy who did what you expect a man to do, right? So, likelihood falls short of the true universality of the syllogism, right? See, if I had a syllogism like this, huh? We say, no odd number even. Every three odd was an odd number. But it followed necessarily that no three is what? Even, yeah. Notice that complete universality here. Universal negative, right? No odd number is either. And for knowing what an odd number is an even number, I can see that, right? Okay? But now if I say, boys will be boys, he's only a boy, therefore he's going to act like a boy, right? Does he have the same nerve? No, because sometimes a boy, you know, like a Dutch boy put his finger there and save the type, right? Sometimes a boy does something, right? Protecting the mother when the father's away or something like that, right? We mean about this in the paper, right? It's difficult in human affairs, you see, to take propositions that are true universally, right? In case you shouldn't do this, right? So there's some exceptions. So in the end to me, what proceeds from likelihood, but likelihood lacks the true universality of syllogism. So Aristotle says it's the syllogism in a qualified sense, right? It's like the syllogism, right? But it has a kind of universality, but not complete universality. Or he argues in the end to me, from signs, huh? Now the most common sign that you have in rhetoric is a sign that's more universal than signified, huh? So if a man comes staggering out of a bar, what would you conclude? A sign that he's drunk, right? But does everybody who staggers drunk say sometimes they have a physical defect, right? Sometimes... They are what? Just tired, right? You know? So we go down to the side of the wall, they go down to bed, right? You see? And your eyes being bloodshot, you know? That sign you've been drinking? No? One time the state trooper stopped me, I was driving, I was driving about five miles over the speed limit, it's coming down from Quebec, and it's like an eight, nine hour drive, it's coming straight through, you know? It's nighttime, you know, the lights in your face. So he stopped me, he's giving me no warning and so on. Then he went away and looked back at me, you know, my eyes, and he says, you were drinking? And I said, no, I drove down from Quebec today, he said, well, go to Dunkin' Donuts over here, get yourself some coffee, you know? But the point is, you see, you must stop people who are going a little bit over the speed of it, or a lot, right? And he recognized certain signs that I had been drinking, right? But my eyes were, what, something else, right? Yeah. So, I remember one time I had a student come to class, he had gotten along, shaky hair, you know, and so on. And so he comes to the day one day in class, and his hair is all cut real close, and so on. And I said, I said, get your hair cut. He says, yeah. I told him what happened, right? He got in some kind of an accident, and he was defending himself, and he came down to the courthouse to go to one of the offices, and the cops saw him and said, you're in the drug charge tube over there. Uh-oh. And so he said, I'm not going to go up here in court looking like a druggy. He said, I mean, the point is, these, you know, we all recognize signs of certain things, right? I was staying downtown in a street corner one time in Worcester, and I watched the cop there, you know, kind of follow somebody on that thing. I said, what am I saying? I look closely and see a little bullish or something, you know? Oh. Like a gun or something, right? The way you pick those things up, huh? One of my wife's friends is married to a top policeman here in the city, detective. You know, he could pick out a prostitute, you know, two or three blocks down, you know, just by the way that they walk, you know, see? But you can't always, these signs are not, what, universal, right? So, an anthony was an argument from likelihood or from signs, but there are certain, what, exceptions, right? So it doesn't have the rigor of the syllogism, which requires true universal, you know, in the major premise. Now, we'll be coming back to these forms of argument, huh? I just thought it's different in that old text of Aristotle there. Let me take up argument, huh? But notice, the emphasis in that text of Aristotle was on argument, right? Reasoning. Now, in the text from the metaphysics, he's talking about the same thing, but he points out that this is true about, what, definition, right? Okay? It happens to the one learning geometry to foreknow, but he knows nothing before it that which there is reasoned out knowledge, and about which he's going to learn, but that through which he's going to learn, right? Contrary to Socrates there in the beginning. For all learning is through the foreknown, either all, as Thomas explains, universal, or some the particular. Both that by demonstration and that by definition. Now, I might mention apropos of this, huh? That when Albert the Great divides logic, he divides it not into three, but into what? Two. The art of defining and the art of reasoning. And the art of defining is about the simple unknown, he says, right? And how you've come to know it. And the art of reasoning about the complex unknown. Okay? But then, in consideration of the statement, he makes it part of the argument, right? Why Thomas divides it into three. But if you go back to the dialogue called the Mino, it corresponds to Albert the Great's division. Because the Mino has three parts, huh? And the first part is about defining. The third part is about reasoning. The middle part is about what's common to the two. Common to know what you know about. So, in a way, Albert is closer to Plato's division there, right? When Thomas was looking at the works of Aristotle, it was called the Pogna of Logic and he sees they fall into these three, right? I'm sorry, I didn't follow how the Mino in the division of three fits with Albert's division of three? Well, the Mino has two parts, or three parts, huh? Right. And the first part begins with Mino's question. Can virtue be taught, right? It's required in some other way. And Sarkety says, I don't know. Furthermore, I don't even know what virtue is. And so they get into a discussion of what virtue is. Sarkety says, no, that's anybody who knows what virtue is. And Mino says, I know. So they have a conversation, huh? And Mino has a hard time defining virtue. It doesn't really succeed, right? So that first part is a kind of introduction to the difficulty of defining it. Right. Okay. Now, in the third part, Mino comes back and he wants to know whether virtue can be taught still, even though it isn't what virtue is exactly. And Sarkety says, well, we could discuss better whether virtue can be taught if we define virtue. But since you're not willing to do that, I'll try to talk about whether virtue can be taught by going to look at both sides. And he argues for and against, dialectically. Now, that third part was a introduction to reasoning. And Sarkety distinguishes between knowing, the sense of being certain, and opinion, right? Yeah. Even a true opinion, right? So he's making the distinction in a way between demonstration and dialectic, right? And so on. But the middle part of the dialogue begins with Socrates wants Mino to go with him and explain, or try to find out, rather, what virtue is, right? And Mino says, well, how can you investigate what you don't know? Yeah. You don't know what you're looking for. Yeah. So I'm going to go looking for it. Yeah. So, and Sarkety tries to reply to that, right? I don't think it's in trouble replying to it, huh? So, how can you direct yourself to what you don't know? A reason, okay. Because, if I tell you, how do you get there? If I go into the, you know, gas station station, I say, how do you get there? Where are you trying to get to go, buddy, right? I can't tell you how to get there. That doesn't know where you're going. Yeah. So, how can you direct yourself to what you don't know? That's really the problem of the middle part of the dialogue. But both in defining and in reasoning, you are directing yourself to what you don't know. And how is that possible, right? So, the middle part is really about what's common to defining reasoning. And even to counter-encompassion, right? How can we direct ourselves to what we don't know? We don't know it. You see, logic is about, you know, using what you do know, right? To come to know what you don't know, right? But how you know what to use, you don't know what you're trying to get to. And Aristotle, you know, alludes to the Amino there in the beginning of the Posturalytics, if you read it, huh? But Socrates gets into a difficulty. Amino's objection is based upon, you know, a sophisticated kind of argument, which I'll take up later on. And Socrates commits the very same kind of mistake that he tries to answer Amino. So Plato has artfully, right, separated a introduction to the art of defining and the art of reasoning by discussion of what's common to the two. So if you know Albert the Great's division of logic into defining and reasoning, right? And Osterly used to use Osterly's logic book years ago. But the name of the book was Logic, and the subtitle was The Art of Defining and Reasoning. So it's following Albert the Great's division, right? But that goes back to Plato there in the near Socrates in the Vedo, right? But Thomas, when he divides Aristotle's works, he divides them into what? Three, right? And I think there's something to be learned from both divisions, right? But in order to keep it into two, Albert has to put the art about statements with the logic of reasoning, right? And he doesn't see the one, two, three there as well as Thomas does. But it's not impossible to divide, what? The same thing into two and three, right? Like we were mentioning about the creed, right? Yeah. The Nicene Creed and the Apostles' Creed divides all the articles of faith into three. But the Athanasian Creed... And the creed of the Fourth Lateran Council divides all the Articles of Faith into two. The Nicene Creed divides it according to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. And they group all the, you know, articles around either the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit, right? But the Athanasian Creed, so-called, and the creed of the Fourth Lateran Council, they divide it according to the Humanity and the Divinity of Christ. And they group them all, six Articles of Humanity, six Articles with the Divinity in them. And both divisions make sense, but the Nicene Creed emphasizes the Trinity, right? When Peter makes his profession of faith, he's following the other divisions, isn't he? The Christ, the Son, the living God, has a complete profession of faith. And that's why the Church is built upon that. The First Lateran divides the, what, the plot into the beginning they don't in. He divides it also into tying the knot and untying the knot. Both divisions make sense, though. Sometimes I divide the family into the parents and the children. Both divisions make sense, though. Both divisions make sense, though. Both divisions make sense, though. Both divisions make sense, though. Both divisions make sense, though. Both divisions make sense, though. Both divisions make sense, though. Both divisions make sense, though. Both divisions make sense, though.