Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 19: Reasoning, Definition, and the Categories of Being

Transcript
================================================================================

So, this here is not really in practice a, what, alternative because of our knowing things in an outward way, and knowing things always in a confused way before distinctively. So, these are the only three possibilities, right? So, it's more difficult to see how these exhaust the possibilities than the property and accident, right? Because they're not even, right? Either think of the nature or not think of the nature, right? If it follows upon the nature or doesn't follow upon the nature, it's got to be one or the other, right? Your definition of reasoning, again, do you say coming to know or guess? Coming to know or guess a statement. A statement, yeah. Through other statements, right? By calculating, adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing. It's coming to know or guess a number, two other numbers, right? And you say, why do I say guess, right? Well, sometimes when we add, subtract, multiply, or divide numbers, even if we add, subtract, multiply, or divide correctly, we're not always sure of the numbers we're adding, right? So, when somebody, you know, starts to talk to you, how much is going to, you know, grab a party or something, right? How much is it going to cost, right? Well, how many people are going to be there? Well, about 25, right? You know, I'm not sure about the number, right? And how many beers would a person print? Well, I think about, you know, four beers a person, okay? Now, four times 25 is 100, so it's 100 beers, right? Am I sure about that number? I don't know. But I'm not sure there'll be 25, there might be more. Which, I'm not sure that they're probably going to be four beers. They might drink more, right? You see what I mean? You see? And the same thing can happen with reasoning, right? Sometimes you're not sure of the statements from which you reason, right? In which case, if they're only probable, it's a guess, right? But other times, even if you're sure about the statements which you reason, the conclusion doesn't follow necessarily. It's not a syllogism. So, if I'm sure I had a lousy meal at Restaurant X last week, I might reason from that that I shouldn't go out there this week, right? And if I'm sure that I had a lousy meal, the question was lousy, I can't, it doesn't follow necessarily that it was lousy last week, but I have to be lousy this week, right? So, it's not a syllogism, right? So, I'm reasoning from last week to this week, but it doesn't follow necessarily, right? But you can reason necessarily from only probable opinions, right? Just like you can add, subtract, multiply very rigorously, numbers you're not sure about. Can I just, the genus then is coming to know or guess, or is that actually not true? No, no. This is not reasoning, this is defining, right? But it resembles reasoning, right? And what defining and reasoning have in common is that there are ways of coming to know what you don't know through what you do know, right? I'm thinking, though, if coming to know or guess a statement through other statements is the definition of reasoning, then in this definition there should be genus, no? And I was wondering what the genus is. Coming to know. Coming to know or guess, yeah. That's what I was... As long as I just say coming to know, period, you know, but then using knowing in a kind of looser way, right? Yeah. You don't know. Yeah. Albert de Guia, as I mentioned before, that's the way he divides logic, right? Into the art of the simple unknown, right? The art of defining. And the art of the complex known, the art of reasoning. And that's in a way anticipated by Plato and the Mino, where he talks about, you know, the art of defining first, when you're trying to define what virtue is, right? And then in the third part, where you're trying to reason whether virtue can be taught or not, right? And then the middle part of the dialogue touches upon what's common to the two, huh? How can you investigate what you don't know, right? How can you come to know what you don't know, right? Okay. Okay. Now, going back, huh, to where we left off last time, huh? If you take, now, species in the sense of what? The name of a particular kind of thing on the genus. We pointed out that the same name can be both a what? Yeah. And that shows that, in a way, the distinction there is not an absolute distinction, but a what? Yeah. Okay. And every science has these relative distinctions, right? So in mathematics, you have double and what? Half, for example, right? In biology, you have father and son, or mother and daughter, right? Okay. And the same person or the same thing can be both, but in relation to different things, right? Okay. And the same thing can be a cause and a what? Effect, but not of the same thing, right? And in particular, we talk about the same thing can be a mover, mover, and what? Moved, right? So if I line up my books here, you know, usually in class, you know, I have a series of erasers and I'll add them up, right? But the Pope speaks there, right? Is that a mover or a moved? Yeah. It's moved by this, and it's moving this over here, right? So it's a moved mover, right? It's moving something else through being moved itself, right? So the same thing can be a cause and effect. It can be a mover and a moved, right? Okay. Now, as you know, reason looks before and after, right? And the cause is before the effect in the fifth or crowning sense, right? So when I look, you know, does every cause have a cause before it, right? Or do you eventually come to a, what, first cause, right? Or is every effect also a cause? Have you come to an effect that is not, right? You're looking before and after the crowning sense there before, aren't you? And it's in the second book of wisdom that Aristotle speaks universally of this, but in particular he talks about this in natural philosophy and ethics and so on, that there's a first cause, a cause that is not an effect, right? But it's very important to look before and after in the sense of the crowning sense of before, right? Now, when you talk about the genus and the species, is there a before and after there? Which is before? The genus. Yeah. The genus is before the species, huh? Okay. Now, what sense of before is the genus before the species? Third sense. The third sense, yeah. In the discourse of reason, right? Okay. And notice how that, in a way, resembles the second sense, right? Second sense was in being, right? And you could say it seemed to resemble that because animal, it seems, can be without dog. You can't have an animal without a dog, but you can't have a dog without a, what? Animal, right? But in the discourse of reason, animal comes before a dog, right? And you see it naturally. You know, if you ask a student out of the blue class, what's a dog? Come on, tell me. Well, if it's an animal, it's what he'll usually start with, by saying, right? What's a sign? You know? It's a poem. Okay? You see? You know, they'll naturally begin with the genus before the species, right? So, we're going to look before and after in the, what? Third sense of before, right? Okay? In ethics, you know, we look at the goods of the soul and the goods of the body and outside goods, and we ask which are, what? Better, right? And the reason that the inside goods are better than the outside goods. And among the inside goods, that the goods of the soul are better than the goods of the body, right? And then, in the ethics, we go through the goods of the soul, and we say that some are better than others, right? So we're looking before and after in the, what, fourth sense of before, right? The Greeks wondered whether time, what, every time you had a time before it, or whether there's a beginning of time, right? Aristotle says he didn't know. And he gives, in the topics there, he's talking about probable reasoning. He gives as an example there something that we long to know, whether the universe is eternal or not, right? Whether it had a beginning in time, huh? And Thomas, you know, in the Middle Ages, he considers arguments that people gave down through history for or against the eternity of the world, and he says none of them are, what, conclusive, right? None of them are certain, huh? And we know only by faith, right? At least, you know, it's up to his time anyway, right? That would show this, right? People wonder with the Big Bang and that sort of stuff, you know, whether, you know, time's in the beginning, right? Right, you know, okay? But we know it more by faith than by reason, right? But notice, reason is asking that, right? The time, you know, today and yesterday, right? And tomorrow. Are those absolute distinctions? Because today can be yesterday and tomorrow, you know, it could be today and so on. But does every day have yesterday, right? Or is there a first day? And does every day have a tomorrow or a someday? Well, we know in terms of our life that there's a first day, right? You know, we've got grandchildren, first day for them, right? And it's a last day for us, right? But it's time as a whole, it's because of the beginning or end. But we find out in Genesis that it did have a beginning, right? It wasn't always. And in the Apocalypse, it speaks of the end of time. Have you seen in the Apocalypse? Time will come to an end. So there you're looking before and after in the first sense of before, which is after time, right? See how important it shapes which definition it is, right? How it fits. So we ask now, does every genus have a genus before it, right? Or another way of saying that, is every genus a species of something before it? And is every species a what? A genus of something after it, right? Or do you come to something that is a species only, right? And not a genus. Or do you come to something that is a genus and not a what? A species, right? Okay. Now, are there, in other words, lowest species and highest, what? A highest genus or a gen or a r, right? Of course, we gave a definition of lowest species, didn't we? Okay. And are there lowest species that we know? And it's easiest to see this in the case of what? The mathematical examples, right? But there doesn't seem to be different kinds of square, right? There are different kinds of quadrilateral, but not different kinds of square, right? Instead of thinking of the shape, right? Okay? Or different kinds of what? Circle, right? Or different kinds of seven, right? There are seven men and seven dogs in seven chairs, but that's man and dog in a chair. It's kind of accidental to what seven is, right? Seven seems to be a lowest species, right? Now, natural science is not as clear, right? Is dog or cat a lowest species? Or the different kinds of dogs and cats, right? You know, a lot of times the biologist tries to take as kind of a rule of thumb, you know, reproduction together, right? As a science, we come to a lowest species, right, huh? But it's not as clear, obviously, as math, right? So we ask, is man, huh? We're very familiar with this animal called man, huh? Is man a lowest species, huh? In other words, is the division in white men and black men and little men and so on, is this kind of an accidental thing, huh? Like if you're dividing circles into red, white, and blue circles or something, right? But they would not be making species a circle, right, huh? Well, in order to have species under a genus, those species have to have, what, differences, right? And those differences have to determine what's intrinsic to the genus, huh? And so if you take a simple mathematical example, when we divide triangle into equilateralis, sauces, and scalene, we're determining something intrinsic to the very definition of triangle, which would be something like a plain figure contained by three straight lines. And those two straight lines can be all equal or just two of them or none of them, right? But red, white, and blue aren't three ways of being free-sided, are they? They're purely accidental, right? So when you get down to man, if man is an animal with reason, as we were defining him before, huh? In Shakespeare. If there were species of men, in the strict sense, right, it would have to be different kinds of what? Reason, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, does the white man, the yellow man, really have a different kind of reason, right? I don't think you'd want to say that, would you? Interesting to see Heisenberg's talks after the war, of course. Because during the war, of course, you had the Nazis talking about the master race and all these sort of things, you know. And Heisenberg was talking to the young students now, of course. His background is there, right? He was talking about his days as a student in Copenhagen under Niels Bohr, right? Where men came from all over the world to study under Bohr, and they were different, what, nationalities and so on, right? Mm-hmm. And then finally had, what, the Japanese and so on, making real contributions to physics, right? Not just learning physics in the Westerners, but, you know, developing new things, right? And then you realize there was nothing really, what? Different. Yeah, yeah, there's no really different reason that we have, right? And Heidegger says philosophy speaks Greek. Well, that's kind of a compliment to the Greeks, right? Mm-hmm. Sure, even here, the scientist says science is a Greek way of looking at things. Oh, right. But it's because the Greeks, you know, made great contributions to philosophy and to science and so on. But several S is not really, what, by definition, Greek, right? Philosophy is not in Greek or in English, you know. Even though you might see one language is a little more suitable for philosophy, maybe than another one, huh? Mm-hmm. Um, some grammars, you know, they study grammar, you know, I mean, some of them have more figures, more parts of speech, they're more explicit, the language, right? Mm-hmm. And Latin is not, it doesn't have all the parts of speech. It doesn't have the article. And you see that in medieval Latin, they're trying to stick in an article. Mm-hmm. You see L-Y or something, right? Mm-hmm. I actually think that's where l'eau d'eau in French came from. Like, it's a diddle. It's a diddle. It's a diddle. It's a diddle. Didn't they put Winnie and Pooh there? Oh, Winnie and Elie Pooh. Yeah, yeah, yeah. We have to kind of find some way of doing this, right? You see that problem there in the translation we're mentioning there, the Our Father, right? In the seventh petition, and deliver us from evil, right? But the Greek says, the evil one, right? Oh, it's got the article there, right? Well, of course, in Latin, deliver us a malo, right? There's no article there, right? So you tend to take it as we translate it, right? To deliver us from evil. But really, the Greek says more, but deliver us from the, what? Evil one, right? It actually has, and it can go either way. Because the same form is neuter and masculine. Okay, okay. So, in that in Greek, too, yeah, it's interesting. So the article, but then you go through some other languages, and maybe you don't even have the verb to be, you know? They tell me, you know, that the verb to be came last, you know? You know, the evolution of language, if you wish. So it's kind of hard, you know, to express yourself as clearly, right? In some languages. But nevertheless, I wouldn't say, you know, that philosophy is, by definition, Greek. And if it's not in Greek, it's not. Well, now it's in Quebec, there, you know, there's to be kind of a joke, because sometimes French Canadians want to send their students out to Quebec to study, and especially for the sake of theology and religion, right? The word French is not going to get correct again. You know, French is the oldest, you know, dominant church and stuff like that, right? The word French is not going to get correct again. The word French is not going to get correct again. The word French is not going to get correct again. The word French is not going to get correct again. The word French is not going to get correct again. So, so notice, so if man is an animal with reason, you have to have different kinds of reason to have, what, species of man, right? Although someone says, with men and women, maybe there is some prima facie evidence. Even there, you know, I don't go quite that far. So, man might be an example, then, of a lowest species, right? When you get to the virtues, right? A lot of times you speak of the cardinal virtues. Now, is temperance a lowest species? You said it's a different way of being temperate, say, food and drink. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I think moderation in food, moderation in drink, moderation in sex, these are maybe three different, what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I think to some extent experience might tell you that, right? And by the ways, something can be said of individual substances. Now, in the text that we have of Aristotle, in the categories and also in the topics, right, he distinguishes these into ten right away. But Thomas, in his commentary on the physics, where the question of categories comes up, in his commentary on the fifth book of metaphysics, where Aristotle would get in first to these ten, Thomas divides into two and three, right, as a way of arriving at, what, ten, right? In other words, he follows a rule of two or three that we'll talk about later on. And I had some students at my house last night there, and we're looking at the sixth book of wisdom, right? Sixth book of after-natural philosophy, the sixth book of metaphysics. And Aristotle, in the second reading there, he recalls four senses of being that he had talked about in the fifth book of the metaphysics, right? He just recalls the four of them, right? So he had four rather than two or three, right? Now, you go back, though, to the what? The fifth book, where he originally does this, right? And he divides into two. And then he subdivides one of them into three, okay? Now, sometimes, as Thomas says, you know, about Aristotle, you know, brevitate students, you know, seeking brevity, which is a soul of wisdom, right? And he may, you know, run together, you know, a division with a subdivision, right? But in order to understand it, you have to, what, make explicit, right? So here, he, what, divides into two, subdivides one into three, ends up with four, right? But in the next book, he just numerates the four, right? Okay? Now, we had an example of that, something like that, in Thomas, right? When Thomas was dividing order in comparison to reason, he divided it right away into four, remember that? If he examined the order, it really is based upon what? There's the order not made by reason, and the order made by reason, right? And then he subdivides the order made by reason, by that in which it is made, right? The order made by reason in its own acts, which we're concerned with for this. Study of logic, right? The order made by reason in the acts of the will, that's where we're concerned with an ethics, right? And then the order made by reason in exterior matter, and that followed to the art of carpentry and the art of metalwork and so on, right? Okay? So, how does he get four orders? Not really by one division, does he? By division into two. Made by reason, not made by reason. That's two, right? And then made by reason in its own acts, in the acts of the will. It makes it a matter. But, Rabbi Tate Sudens, he says about Aristotle, right? He what? It gives the result of a division and a subdivision in one thing, right? But the one who explained this, you'd have to take it apart, right? And say, hey, the last three orders he talks about are all orders made by reason. The first order he talks about is not made by reason. That's the fundamental distinction, isn't it? And it's very illuminating, right? And Aristotle, obviously, has a difference. That's why he put the order not made by reason first, because an actual order is more basic than the order made by reason, huh? It comes before. You've got to be orderly in talking about order, right? Sure. Do you see that? So, sometimes, you'll find that Aristotle or Thomas somewhere would make it more explicit, the divisions, right? Other times, you just have a text where, you know, we have to, what, go looking at ourselves, right? And take it apart, right? Okay. I just mentioned it, because I happened to be doing this last night, and we're looking at the sixth book, and we've done some things in the fifth book. And, as I say, in the sixth book, when he comes back to the various senses of being, he speaks of four groups of meanings of being, right? Right away. He could eliminate two of them as not the main concern of the wise man, who he's going to be concerned with. But you go back, that's obviously based upon the previous book, right? Go back to the previous book, he divides into two, and then the second he sub-divides into three, right? But you don't always have that, maybe, what's come down to us in Aristotle, right? So, what you find in the text of the categories, he divides it into ten, right? Right away. And then the similar text in the topics, he has the same ten, exactly the same order. Those are the two main texts, right? But it's right away into ten. Right away, but Thomas, knowing, you know, all of Aristotle, he knows the, what, various divisions, right? They have, right? Okay. So, you see, he does this in two places. One is in the third book of the physics, where he's talking about undergoing emotion, and he has to explain the document, the categories, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? We don't have any commentary by Thomas on the categories of our style, so we have to kind of pull things out, right? Just like, you know, there's no commentary in the Asagobia by Thomas, but you can pull that thing out, and then assume I kind of can't do that, right? Little bits, you know, so I go around, you know. If I find something, you know, that's relevant, I said, I'll pick it up. So, he says, if you have an individual substance, like a man, let's say, or a horse, like a champion, right, something can be said of man, of Socrates, let's say, or a champion, by reason of what they are, right? By reason of what it is. So, I can say, for example, of Socrates, that he is a man, right? What is Socrates? A man, right? What is champion? A horse, right? What is Moppet? We get this beast at home. Moppet is a cat, right? Okay. They have her mother, Tabitha. And these are all being said of individual substances, like Socrates, or champion, or Moppet, by reason of what they are, right? And Aristotle, in the categories, he calls this highest genus substance, right? But in the topics, he calls it what it is. So, you're obviously thinking of individual substances, huh? I can say more generally, of what, champion, and of Socrates, that they're animals, right? And more generally, that they're, what, living bodies, right? Which is common to them in the plants, right? And more generally, body, right? But most generally, what, substance, huh? Of course, in the beginning, the philosophers tend to identify body and substance, because that's the only substance they know, right? But later on, they realize that they're not. So, this gives rise to the category of substance. Now, other things can be said of Socrates, or champion, or Moppet. Not by reason of what they are, but by reason of something existing in them that is not what they are, right? Not by reason of something in them, in addition to what they are, right? But eventually, the council is going to eventually divide this into three, right? They first divide it into two. But before we get involved in that, let's just exemplify some things. So we might say that Socrates is what? Great example. We might say Socrates is wise, so they didn't deny it. We might say Socrates is healthy. There could be also at the table drunk in the symposium, right? Socrates walks up and takes his morning, you know, bop and his usual day, right? The sir used to tell me that the conic in the old days, he days without sleep, right? I was thinking. I'd yell, shot, come on, thanks. The old sir has told you that our staff would sit there, you know, with a metal basin and a ball, you know, and he starts to all sleep, you know, drop and bang. I'm sure he didn't do that, you know, but it's interesting the way these stories begin, right? The legend about Aristotle's death is that he died by chronic indigestion, brought up overwork. But they didn't even know what the guy's died of, right? I mean, you know, they don't know what Mozart died of for sure, you know? The Aristotle, or the great, you didn't know what he died of either. The reason there's something in them, right? Other than what they are, right? So we might say that they're healthy, or they're sick, or they're beautiful, or they're ugly, or they're big, or they're little, right? The third thing is, by reason of something outside of them, huh? Some divided in them. Now, one good example of something said of me, or reason of something outside of me. That's not what I am, right? And it doesn't really exist in me, right? What's outside of me, huh? One obvious example is that I am, what? Clothed, right? My clothing is not what I am, and it's not in me, like my health is in me, right? And yet, I am said to be clothed, right? For reason of something outside of me, right? Now, Thomas will not subdivide the first one, right? I'm expecting to subdivide the first one. But he's going to see a reason for subdividing the second here, and a reason for subdividing the third, right? Okay? And he's going to get eventually three under the second, the three highest genera. And under the third, he's going to get six. But those six are not as important as these three. And the first substance is the most important of all, right? The rest of us doesn't spend much time on the last six, but he does on the first four, right? He has his fundamental division down. I've got to subdivide the second one here, right? I was a freshman in college, I was in this classroom that had black people all around the room, right? And I had a math teacher, right? And he would start to fill up equations and induction. He'd go all the way around with a little bit. Maybe the thing, he'd be fun, right? He'd be teaching, you know, fun. He'd help the whole board. He would have raised a kid, you know, and just go on and off. He'd come to the gym. Nice guy. He used to go to class and he'd have a cigar, you know? I just, you know, don't come down with a cigar, you wouldn't even dare, you know? And he had kind of stiff legs. He'd have been a paratrooper or something, you know, or, you know, so you'd hear his legs look like he'd do a paratrooper. He's a really tough guy, you know? Technically, it's kind of like he was a modern mathematician. I can define it in the way I want to, you know? I think my brother Mark has got to argue with him about this. Yeah. Thomas says that something in his second way, Alan, something that he said to me by reason of something in me, either absolutely, he says, or towards another. Okay? So let's put up what we're dividing and subdividing. Said of individual substances, right? By reason of something in them, either absolutely, and absolutely means in itself, not towards another, right? Or, towards, now the Greek here, the Greek for towards another is pros, ti, pros, ti, pros, ti, right? Toward, you say, towards something. Now, in Latin, they translate this very literally, they'll translate it as ad, ad, ad, ad, ad, ad, ad, ad, ad, ad, ad, ad, ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad ad He's a subsisting relation, so. But if you know Aristotle's chapter on relation, you know this word, posti, and then you look at the Greek at the beginning of John's Gospel right away that picks out, right? The distinction between the father and the son is a relative distinction, albeit as much different than this kind of relation, right? Something in God's maximus, right? But something of the character of relation is found there. And that's very important for understanding the Trinity. But I just mentioned that, you know, to point out how important it is the words of the very words that Aristotle uses and how Latin, you know, when they say that, I'll be with. But they don't pronounce it, you know, and the word was toward God, but they say I think in English we usually pronounce it as with, right? The word was God, right? With it not really. This is very important in the beginning. I'm surprised that I haven't seen that together in Thomas anyway or in the West another they see very clearly that distinction is of this kind, right? I haven't seen the comment on the actual Greek word there, do you? It happens to anybody. I don't see it. I'm surprised when I see this thing, you know. It just jumps out at me, you know. Because it's jumped into me when you're studying this thing, you know. What a bad word this was in some sense, right? And how our established words are much better than OST. So I had that very much in mind and then pathophilization is where you have a lot of other people, right? And then you say we have a child's gospel. We have a great father's maybe. Maybe, yeah. Yeah. If you run across something, I mean, I know everybody, obviously. I've read everybody. And you know, we kind of invested in in Thomas' environment, especially his development. Okay, now, absolutely, huh? Thomas divides that into two, huh? One, you know, it's connected with the fact that these things are what? Material things, right? He ties it up with matter and form, huh? With matter, he ties up quantity. So the question here, let me get the concrete thing first. The Greek will say how much, how many, his rise to quantity and form, how, huh? His rise to add it early and fall. So quantity is something that things, material substances have because they are material, right? Yet, their size, but they are not the same thing, right? And even in daily speech, we kind of see that, right? A man, his size. To be a man and to be five foot ten, are they the same thing? If you're bigger than another man, are you more a man for that reason? You're more in some sense. Your size, you're bigger, huh? But you're not more a man, huh? Now, the Pythagoreans, and to some extent the Platonists, they confuse quantity with, what? Substance, right? And you have that same mistake repeated in Descartes in modern times, huh? Where they identify quantity, extension, right? With material substance, huh? The very substance of these things. And when I argue against Descartes, I say kind of playfully, well, you know Descartes never grew up. Because if your quantity was your substance, then when your quantity changed, you no longer have the same substance, right? So you never grew up. And to grow up, it means what? One of the same substance has a different, what, size, right? As you go through your years and grow, right? And I made a theological application of that. Now, this confusion and the error between quantity and substance contradicts the, what, the Eucharist, right? Because in the Eucharist, we have, as the Church says, a transubstantiation, right? The substance of the bread is turned into the substance, right? Of Christ's body, right? And the substance of the wine is turned into the blood of Christ's body. But the accidents, as you say, right? The quantity of the bread remains, right? The quantity of the wine remains. And the qualities remain, right? The sense qualities are the most quantity, right? But if you identify the quantity with the substance of these things, well, then, the substance remains, right? You need your inherency now, right? So, for us, you know, a sign of the greater truthfulness of Aristotle's philosophy over, say, Dick Carter's is that Aristotle's philosophy is compatible with the faith, right? But Dick Carter's here looks kind of like it. But notice, that's not the reason why Aristotle's philosophy is useful, right? It's just reversed, right? It's because it's true that it's useful in theology, and it's not true because it's useful in theology. Go back to the question there in the, usually for it, right? The pious of what the gods approve of. And Socrates says, well, is it pious because the gods approve of it, or do they approve of it because it's pious, right? And I sometimes ask students that question about the commandments, right? I say, it's a commandment to honor your father and mother. It's a commandment to not kill, right? And I say, is it good to honor your father and mother because it's a commandment to do so? Or is there a commandment to do so because it is good? Did God give us that commandment so it would be good to honor your father and mother? Or did he give us that commandment so we would do what in fact is? You know, murdering your neighbor become bad because God made a commandment against it? Or do you make a commandment against it because it is a bad thing to do? The whole understanding of the commandments depends upon the answer to that question, right? And even, you know, even students today they seem right away that it's not bad because of the commandment against it but because it is bad and so it's a terrible thing he's made a commandment against it, right? Okay? Now there could be a commandment of another kind, right? You stay in your room until I turn you in the mouth. It's not in itself, you know, or you drive on the right side of the street, right? And it's not bad to drive on the left side of the street to make a commandment to, you know, it's arbitrary in that sense, right? But you should decide one or the other and be consistent, right? And so, what's important to see here is that Peristalt's philosophy is not true because it's useful with theology or because it's compatible with theology but it's compatible with theology or useful because it is true. And Descartes' philosophy is not false because it's incompatible with theology. It contradicts theology or the faith but it contradicts it because it's false. The false contradicts the true, right? The true doesn't contradict the true but the false contradicts it. We'll see, I've got to get into what statements there are and what have contradictions, right? So notice what Thomas does. He divides into two absolutely or towards something, right? And then he subdivides the first into two, right? So he ends up with three and so now we've got four all together, right? Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, right? And he has a whole chapter to work each in those four, right? But he's very brief at the last six. At the last six. Now you can see that absolutely and towards something that's a, you know, division very clearly by opposites, right? Because absolutely there means what in itself opposed to towards another. This here is no hard to see but you'll see it better when we study matter and form and mutual philosophy and all material and so. And notice the word how here, right? See, just the word how. By the definition of difference, we said, it signifies how it is, what it is, right? If you're talking about a difference up in substance, that would be substance, right? Here you're talking about some accidental malty and post-insistential malty. What is that in Greek? How does it express that? Poyas. It says in Greek and Latin, there's a more connection there between the concrete way and the abstract way. In English, you have to say howness. Poyas and polytas. Poyas and poyotes. Now, the last group, something can be said individual substances by reason something outside of them. Now, this is going to be eventually divided into six, but Thomas, again, arrives at the six by dividing into two or three, right? I never see Thomas take the rule of two or three, but he seems to always... You know, I mean, for the most part, and it's always plain when you get to the rule of two or three. It's two only for the most part. Sometimes we immediately divide into more than three, right? But usually, if you divide into more than three, you're either divided and subdivided and giving the results of several divisions, right? Or you're crisscrossing two divisions, right? If I divide human beings into good men, bad men, good women, bad women, clearly I'm crisscrossing good and bad, male and female, right? So it doesn't stand that you have to go back to two divisions of two, right? Or sometimes they say, order is compared to reason four ways! But he analyzes it, and he has what? I do the three, right? But sometimes he just puts it together, right? I think it's in the Parahumeneus commentary, where Aristotle sometimes, he'll define one thing, and then the next thing maybe has the same parts in its definition except for the last part, just give you the last part, seeking liberty. It's like if I was, you know, to define, now genus is a name said with one meaning of many things other than kind signifying what it is, huh? What the difference signifies how it is what it is. I haven't given you the definition explicitly of difference, right? I've just given you the last part, huh? I think Aristotle does it, was it? No, he might do it, you know? So, right, repeat yourself, right? That's less of why you repeat. Now, Thomas usually divides this into two, right? He divides one of them against the other five. One of them is peculiar to man. So, common man and other things, huh? And then private to man, huh? That's a bit of an orthification to say private to man. But it doesn't belong to anything else except if it comes into the use of man. Now, in Greek, this is called exesam. Imagine they translate hobby to us, right? Sometimes, I take the liberty of English to say outfitting. Okay? This may not be the best way to translate it. But it gives the idea there, right? An outfit, huh? An outfit is something that fits you outside of you, right? Okay. Why does man have this, huh? Why does man have this, huh? He needs it. It's not natural. It's not an adult. Yeah. Man was not given by nature everything he needs. Why was that so, right? The other animals have the tools they need for doing what they do. That's a part of that, right? So, the animal has its what? Claws. It needs claws, right? It's got its sweat horns and it needs to butt other animals around, right? Okay. Or it's got its wings and it needs to fly away, right? Mothers. It's got its stinger, you know. They're there, you know, just all red. It's too weird. I thought something like that. All red. Okay. So, they have these, you know, tools, you know, for building into you and all that, right? Why can't man have, by nature, the tools he needs? Well, I've been digging in the ground, so I needed a shovel this week, yeah? And then there's these roots down there, so I needed an axe to whack away, right? And then I'm leveling out the dirt, so I needed a rake, yeah? Okay. And then when I go in the house, I need a knife and a fork and a spoon, right? A screwdriver, you know, because it's fixing up the fans and so on. It's getting so hot, right? And then I need a key to my house and so on and my office, right? I guess I need a computer now. Oh, no. And I need a car, right? And so on. Steering wheel and so on. There's a kind of infinity of things that man is able to do, right? And there's no end to the tools that he might require, right? This building's on fire, we need that fire extinguisher over there, right? Right, huh? Okay. So, he needs a pen, obviously, right? But can you imagine what would it be if I had the hammer and the saw and the axe and the knife and the fork and the spoon and all these other tools, right? You're sorry, guy. Yeah, yeah. So instead, man, nature's given man a hand, right? Or by a confession of the tools, right? Hand what? Use them, right? So the hand is sometimes said to be the tool of tools, right? But the hand corresponds to what? To reason, right? There's something unlimited about reason, right? When we look in natural philosophy at the fragment, the great fragment DK12 there of Anaxagros and the mind, the first thing he says about it is it's unlimited, right? There's something infinite about the mind. You see that from the inner self to the universal that contains an infinity of things. But in the biological books, Aristotle says that Anaxagros said that man is the most intelligent of animals because he has a, what, hand instead of a hoof or a claw, right? Aristotle says well, no, it's just the inverse of what he says. Because he's the most intelligent of animals, he has a hand. This is the tool of what? Reason in a way, right? Okay? It's interesting that first act of reason is called simple grasping even by all the name. But the hand enables you to what? Make and pick up and use an infinity of different what? Tools, yeah. Okay? In the same way man is not given by nature what? The clothing he needs, right? Now, the cat seemed to be shedding some of her neighbor's dog there. They had, you know, she's getting all tangled up in you. I said, well, it's good for her, you know, to be. Cuts of her fur, right? It's cooler, right? Some people take a brush and they go in the water and they brush the cat and the cats don't like that go out, you know? Usually they don't like water, but, you know, some cats used to that, you know, cooling and out living, you know? You feel like pampering these cats, right? I know what was about the market and we went to one of these cat shows just to, you know, like the cat where they hit cats around, you know? It's kind of crazy those cat shows, you know? People lay down, you know, they're taking care of these cats, you know, all these fancy things and all more than most people take care of their children. So, not only does man not have maybe the fur that he needs in the winter and so on, right? But also the fact that man doesn't want to always wear the same thing, right? People give up this human quality to wear the same thing every day. In fact, men tend to do that, right? And they have the same pants, the same shirt. My wife says, you've had the same shirt and pants.