Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 23: Equivocal Names by Reason: Division and Carrying Over

Transcript
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Now, don't confuse the idea of a name being equivocal with a name being said equivocally of many things. It's possible that if the name is equivocal, you might say it of many things having only one meaning in mind. Take the word bat. The word bat is equivocal by chance. It can mean the piece of wood used in baseball, right? Or it can mean the flying mouse, right? But if I said the word bat of three baseball bats, it would be said, what, univocally, right? It's being said of the three baseball bats with one meaning in mind, right? So even though the word does in fact have many meanings, right? In saying it of these three baseball bats, it's being said univocally, right? But if I say it of the baseball bat and the flying mouse, it's being said according to different meanings it has. So we're going to talk about name equivocal by reason. A name that has many meanings, but there's some, what, reason for it having these many meanings, huh? There's a connection among the meanings, huh? Okay? I don't think there's any one text in Thomas Aquinas, or in Aristotle, where they lay it out. As the universe says, I'm going to try to lay it out now. So what I'm saying is kind of my thinking about this, the putting together, you know, scattered text, right, huh? Okay? You often see, you know, how Aristotle and Thomas, they don't make all the distinctions that we made about something. They often make the distinctions that are relevant to what they're going to do here and now, right? Okay? But sometimes you find some place where they lay out the whole thing in a very universal way, right? But sometimes you don't. Okay? Just like I was mentioning before when you talked about the distinction of the roads in our knowledge, right? I think I've seen Diana who brought that together, right, huh? Which is not to say that Aristotle and Thomas can see it, but you just want to have one text, right, when you lay it out, huh? So, to the best of my knowledge now, huh? I think a name becomes equivocal by reason in two ways. And both of these ways are going to subdivide, huh? Okay? And let's take the simplest case just where you have a name set of two things, equivocally by reason, right? Okay? To simplify the example, son. Now, one way, which is, as we'll see, less equivocal than the other, is, we'll just take the example of two things, sometimes a name that is set of two things is kept by one of them as its own name, and the other gets a new name. So, what's that what I'm doing here? A name becomes equivocal by reason in two ways, huh? One is by being kept as its own name by one of two things of which it is set, huh? While the other gets a new name as its own, huh? Sometimes a name that is set of two things, right, is kept by one of these as its own name, and then the other one gets its, what, a new name as its own name, huh? There's two ways this happens, huh? Before I go into those, I want to divide as a considerate. The other way a name becomes equivocal by reason is by being carried over from one thing to another. By being carried over from one thing to another. Sometimes a name has been placed upon one thing, and then we see a reason to carry it over in place in something else, changing, you know, somehow the meaning, but having some connection with which the meaning is. Now, the first, it seems to me, takes place in two ways, huh? Sometimes, huh? Sometimes a common name is all that one of the two things has, while the other has something special about it, something that makes it stand out, right, or it has something noteworthy in addition to what the common name sets on it. And so it gets the new, what, name, huh? Now, take the most familiar example of that, huh? How many fingers do I have here in this hand? So, fingers said of all five, right, huh? Now you might say, I have, what, four fingers and a thumb, right? Thumb gets the new name, right? Now, why does the thumb get the new name, and why do the other four keep the name finger? Is there something special about this finger that helped me to pick up this class, huh? I guess they call it in biology the opposable thumb, right? You speak of the thumb sticks out sometimes, right? You want to get a ride, use the thumb, right? There's something special about this finger, right? So the other four keep the name finger, right? At least in daily speech they do, right? And this finger gets a new name, right? Okay. Now this is very close to Univakon. So in one sense, a finger is, a thumb is a finger. In another sense, it is what? But not, huh? Take an example from us. Sometimes we say that man is an animal, right? And the beast, they're both animals, right? But sometimes we say that man is not an animal, right? So in some situations, to say you're an animal is no insult, right? That was doing a minute ago in logic, saying you're an animal, right? Man is an animal. But in other circumstances, if I call you an animal, that would be insulting to you at least, right? So, animal is said of man and beast, but sometimes animal is kept by the beast as its own name, right? And man is given a new name, man, right? Okay. Because man is something noteworthy, that separates it from the beast, namely reason, right? Okay. So, though animal in general is significantly of man and the beast, right? Sometimes we oppose man and the animals, right? So my mother would object when I was little, if I called man an animal, right? She'd say, well, he's not just an animal, mom. Well, okay, you know? She didn't like the idea of calling man an animal, right? But you're thinking of animal then, to me, really, what? Beast, right? So there's some equivocation there, isn't there? Because in one sense, man... He's not an animal, he's not just an animal, but in some other sins, in the broader sins, he is an animal, right? Okay? So, this is one way this takes place then, huh? And, you know, Monsignor, when I talked to him about this, you know, he would hesitate to even want to call this analogous, you see, because it's so close to inevitable, right? Okay? But, I ran across a text one time, and Thomas, where he's saying, the objection was saying, you don't distinguish the genus against the species, you would distinguish between square and quadrilateral, right? It's a different thing. But sometimes you do, if in terms of the meaning, right? So, it seems there's some distinction, however, a little, right, in meaning between animal as said of man, and animal as opposed to man, right? So, it's kept, in this case, by the one that adds nothing noteworthy, let's say, to the common meaning, right? And the one that adds something noteworthy, or it stands out, gets a new, what? Name, right? And the one that adds something that stands out, gets a new name, huh? Now, we have an example of that in categories. When Aristotle talks about disposition and habit, right, sometimes he'll say that habit is a disposition. Other times he'll distinguish between habit and disposition. Well, habit is a, what, firm disposition, right? A disposition not easily lost. So, a habit adds to the idea of disposition, in general, that it's something quasi-permanent, right? Something stable, right? So, habit gets a new name, and a disposition that is easily lost keeps the common name, what? Disposition. What we call mood often, right? You know how mood changes very often during the day, right? For better or for worse. You see, well, mood is like a disposition, right? But it's easily lost, easily changed, right? Or you're being a just man, or unjust man, or, you know, courageous man, or a coward, right? This is more permanent, right? And easily lost, right? So, you can divide disposition into disposition and habit. Obviously, disposition has a different meaning somewhat, when it's said of disposition and habit, and when it's supposed to have it, huh? If you go to a nursery to buy a plant, right, huh? They're thinking of something kind of small, right, huh? And they might distinguish the trees from the, what? The plants, right? So, that's in daily speech. It's not invented by us philosophers, right? But in some sense, you'd say a tree is a plant, right? But at other times, you might distinguish the plant with a tree, right? So, if you say, I want to buy a plant, they're not thinking of a tree, probably, when you're walking in there and say that, right? So, plant can be divided into plant and a tree, right? A little bit animal into animal and man. You see that? And, you know, you find this kind of commonplace in the parishes, you know. They're talking about sex and so on. You've got to teach young men to look at the woman not as a thing, but as a person, right? So, they distinguish between a thing and a person, right, huh? Amples, they treat you like a person, not a thing, right? But is a person in some sense a thing? If they weren't a thing in some sense, it'd be nothing, right? But very commonly, we distinguish thing and person, don't we? So, thing is divided into thing and person. In one sense, person is a thing. In another sense, person is divided into thing. But again, the person adds something of great dignity compared to a common notion of things, right? Reason and will, so. Okay? Can you read what you read up there? Yeah. It's kept by the one that... It's kept by the one that adds nothing noteworthy, right? Okay. To the common meaning, yeah. And the one that adds something that is noteworthy or that stands out would get the, what, new name, maybe. Sometimes, you know, you'll find, the authors will say that the Iliad of Homer is a poem, right? And I forget how many lines they add, quite a few lines, right? But sometimes, you would distinguish a poem from a, what, epic, right? And then the poem is something, what, kind of small and short, right? You know? By the epic, you know? So, you're going to find this again and again in daily speech and being used everywhere, not just by the philosophers, right? And people are constantly being puzzled by that, right? But this is a common equivocation, huh? Okay? Now, the other way it takes place, huh? One is when the common name, and I'll take myself some more room right now, at least the second part of it. The other way it takes place is when only one of the two has fully or completely or perfectly the common meaning. And the other, only in some imperfect way. And the one that has fully and perfectly and completely keeps the common name, right? And the one that has it only and perfectly is given a, what, a new name, right? Okay? That's just quite different from this first case, huh? Sometimes it's kept by the one that has fully or perfectly the common meaning. When we say kept, I mean kept as its own, right? Kept as its own name. By the one that has fully or perfectly the common meaning. And the one that has imperfectly or effectively the common meaning, gets a new name as... Now, if you read The Modern Philosophers, you might find a famous work by John Locke called an SCM, Human Understanding, right? He's talking about human reason, right? So he calls it an understanding, right, huh? Now, understanding can be said of our understanding and of the understanding of my guardian angel and even of, what, the divine understanding, right? And what does understanding in that sense mean? It means you have the ability to understand, right? Well, God and the angels are able to understand everything they naturally understand all at once. They're not just thinking out. They're not to reason it out. They don't need any discourse, right? They're going to have to think about things before they understand them. They're going to understand our way. One time, my son Mark, he was at old school. He says, why can't we be born with knowing everything we didn't know? He said, you want to be born an angel. I said, that's what he did to it. And their mind is full, right? Maybe they'd actually know. So, the angels are God. They keep the name, what? Understanding. And man, who has a defective and perfect, barely understands, and he has to think and think before he understands a little bit more. He's given a new name, and that is reason. So reason is defined as ability for what? Discourse, right? For a large discourse. Looking before and after, right? Why don't we define reasons of ability to understand? Because in a way, it is ability to understand, right? But man doesn't understand very much, and he has to go through a discourse to understand a little bit he does come to understand. So, better to give him a new name, right? Because he has so perfectly, right? The ability to understand. Excuse me, quick, huh? So, in Latin, you'd have the word intellectus, right? For understanding. And you could divide intellectus into intellectus, which is what the angels and God have, and roxio, which man has. In English, you can divide understanding into the understanding and reason, right? So sometimes you'll see that Thomas will say, you know, our reason is an understanding, right? But sometimes he'll divide reason against understanding, huh? Meaning the power of understanding, huh? Now, it's just a little different than the first case, isn't it, huh? See here, the one that keeps the common name is the one that has fully and perfectly and simply speaking, you might say, common meaning. The other one gets a new name, right? That's a very profound example, right? I'm giving you. But take a more familiar example here, huh? Daddy, what's the difference between a kitten and a puppy? Well, I might say, kitten is a cat, right? A little cat. And a puppy is a little dog. Okay? So here I'm saying that a kitten is a cat and a puppy is a dog, right? But now sometimes we divide kitten against what? Cat, yeah. It's only kitten, right? It's not yet a cat. So cat could be divided into cat and what? Kitten. Cat keeps the common name because he's fully developed, right? The kitten gets a new name, right? Okay? Just like if we said that a boy is a man and a girl is a what? Woman, right? You can say that. But sometimes, very more often, we'll distinguish the man against the boy. It's to separate the men from the boys, as we say, right? Then obviously, it's to separate the men from the boys. The boys are not men, right? Okay? And then we say to the girl, you know, maybe she gets to poop or something, you know, say she's a woman now, right? Okay? So, that's an example, right? Of this, right? Because what distinguishes the man from a woman only the adult has what? Fully, right? You see that? That's very important, huh? Aristotle sometimes calls the argument intimium, he calls that he syllogism. Other times, he calls it rhetorical syllogism. And he calls it the argument called example, the argument from one singer to another singer of the same kind, he calls that an induction. Rhetorical induction sometimes, right? And other times, he'll divide syllogism against intimium, right? And induction against what? Example, yeah. Sometimes he'll say, you know, there's only two arguments, kinds of arguments, syllogism and induction, right? And so intimium's got to be one of them, example and the other. So, intimium is the syllogism, example is induction, I'll say, right? Okay? So, notice, syllogism is said of syllogism and intimium. Induction is said of what? Induction and example. Same kind of thing, right? And entimium is like an imperfect, incomplete syllogism, huh? It is something of the syllogism but not fully or perfectly. And example is something of what an induction has, but imperfectly, right? See? So if we send, you know, a hundred people to eat in this one restaurant, and we have a hundred reports that they get got a lousy meal, and so we conclude that, you know, all meals at this restaurant are lousy. That's a kind of induction, right? See? But if I go to eat there once and have a lousy meal, and you're asking me what restaurant to go to, and I say, I'm going to go there, you know, to tell you my experience, I have something of induction there, don't I? I'm taking the one meal I had there as representative of meals at that restaurant. So it's something like an induction going from the practitioners in general, but obviously it's very, what? Very imperfect, yeah. See? So, simply speaking, without qualification, fully speaking, it's not a induction, right? It's the argument called example. Example, by the way, is equivocal by reason, right? Example can mean a singular use to illustrate the universal, or it can mean an argument from one singular to another singular of the same kind. There's some connection between those two meanings, right? In both cases, you're using a singular to make known something, in a way. So, most texts where Thomas talks about analogous names, he doesn't talk about these two, but he does talk about these two ways of speaking in other texts. So, and they are very common, very common in daily speech and in, what? Philosophy, right? And in theology. So, that was a subdivision of the first way that a name becomes equivocal by reason. It seems to be said of two things sometimes, but then it's kept by one of them as its own name, right? And then the other one gets a new name, right? It almost seems, especially that first one, the first of those two particular ways of doing it, almost like a nivico, right? It's a little bit like, as we'll see later on when we compare the nature of things to numbers, right? It's like if you have what? Two instead of what? Two and two plus one. Well, this would keep the name two and two plus one would get a new name. Three. Okay? Because notice three in a way has a two in it, but it's not just two. And because there's something added to the two, right? It gets a new name, right? But it's just two keeps the name two, right? And what's an animal? An animal is a living body of sensation. But man is something in addition to, right? He's more than that, as Shakespeare says, right? He has reason in addition to sensation, right? So what is just an animal, just a living body of sensation, keeps the name animal, right? The other one gets a new name. So here, we run across these philosophies. Now, the other way that a name becomes a biblical is by being carried over. Now, perhaps there are two ways that this comes about. Sometimes it's carried over by being, as we're generalized, you know, it's by dropping part of its meaning, right? So you can apply it elsewhere, right? Okay? In a way, by dropping, you know? you know, you know, part of its needy. And the other way, you could say in general, is by ratios. The way it's carried over is by ratios. Now, the most famous example of this in philosophy is the word pasio, the Greek word. And it's difficult to translate this in English. Originally, the sense of passion in Matin, or the Greek equivalent, is suffering. But the word suffering in English is stuck on its first meaning. Would you say, for example, that understanding something is a form of suffering? Well, the word suffering doesn't seem to have been moved that way. Speaking more metaphorically or accidentally, you said that, huh? Perhaps the best word in English to get something of the idea of this movement would be the word undergo. You see, suffering in its first meaning implies that you are being acted upon by something, right? And secondly, that you're being changed, right? By being acted upon, right? But most of all, you're being changed to the worst, right? So the passion of our Lord, right? The suffering of our Lord, right? You're being acted upon something that is changing you for the worst, right? Now, the English word to undergo probably has originally a bad sense, right? If we say about somebody, he's undergone a lot. What is that? Probably taken that. Yeah, yeah. He's under the weather. The weather, the air and so on, has acted upon him, right? In a way that is what changed him, right? It works, right? He's undergone a lot, huh? Okay? He has almost that sense of suffering, right? Now, you could drop the idea of being changed to the worst, right? And just say that you are acted upon and changed, but not for the worst. So if I have a piece of clay here, let's say, in the shape of a sphere, and I mold it into a cube, it's undergoing something, right? It's being acted upon and it's being, what? Changed, right? But you wouldn't say for the worst. It's not a real suffering, is it? Okay? Then, Aristotle says that what is sensing? Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting. Well, when you study the various abilities of the soul, the very abilities of an animal or a plant or a man, we distinguish these abilities by their acts, okay? So we distinguish, let's say, the ability to hear and the ability to see by hearing and seeing, right? But we distinguish the acts by their what? Object, right? Because hearing and sensing, hearing and seeing are both sensing, but hearing is sensing sound and seeing is sensing color. So sound and color distinguish hearing and seeing and hearing and seeing distinguish the eye and the ear, the ability, right? Okay? So, ultimately it distinguishes the abilities and powers by their object, then. But one very fundamental distinction is does the object act upon the power or does the power act upon the object, huh? Well, now in the case of my digestive power, right? The power seems to act upon the object and transform it. The object being food, right? And so I chew the food and acting upon it and then they tell me all these digestive juices that are, you know, tacking it and breaking it down and so on. But now in the case of seeing and hearing, is my eye acting upon color, my ear acting upon sound, or is sound acting upon the ear, color acting upon the eye, which is it? The latter. Yeah. Yeah. So, sensing then is a kind of what? Undergoing, right? It's a result of being acted upon, right? Okay? But is seeing or hearing a suffering? No. No. Is it really a change? Or is it a fulfilling, a perfecting of the eye or the ear? It's really a perfecting of it, right? Notice how far the word has moved now, right? Okay? But still, because the senses are in a way a body organ, right? The eye and the ear and so on. The object can, if it's too bright or too loud, can actually, what, harm in the body, right? Okay? But then finally we come to the reason itself and is reason originally, acting upon this object or is it object to acting upon it? But here you're altogether free of that idea of suffering at all because, to use a famous comparison there in the Tiamat, if you hear something very loud, you're kind of deaf for a while afterwards, right? At least temporarily, you know? You see something very bright, you know, blinding, you know? But if you understand something very understandable, other things are not less understandable but more so. So it doesn't seem to be at all any kind of suffering there, But still, you're being, what, acted upon, undergoing, huh? So the word undergoing, they say, in its original meaning, huh? It involves being acted upon, changed, right? To the words, right? And then you start to move it, by dropping out the idea for the words, to just say you're being changed. And finally, we even drop the idea of change, because strictly speaking, seeing and hearing is not so much being changed, but it's being fulfilled, right? And the same way, coming to understand, it's not being changed so much, it's being fulfilled, perfected, right? So it's moved from a meaning, where it's being something bad, to something that is not only good, you know, free of bad, but it is being perfected, becoming good, right? The best thing I've ever seen in Gabriel Marcel, which is, I was still a passage here, he's criticizing John Paul Sartre, right? And Sartre is saying, anything being accurate upon is bad, right? Because the other is imposing itself upon him. Well, that destroys friendship, and the real, you know, the teacher, the student, you know, kind of thing like this, right? But you know, your friend, you know, acts upon him in many ways, right? Your mother and father did, and so on, right? You know, the teacher does and so on. So I mean, but for him all being acted upon, right, is bad, it's, you know, what's your famous word, not fair, see, it's ultra, right? Hell is the others. You know, he's stuck on that first meeting, huh? Yeah, yeah. That all undergoing is what? Suffering. Suffering, yeah, yeah. I'll spoil that teacher, right? A friend of my brother, Richard's, huh? you know, say, you know, they're sort of up on the foot, so they say, why are you doing this to me, right? And sometimes it seems that way to us, right? Why are you inflicting this upon me, right? Sometimes, you know, the kid will see, you know, if he's made to read some good literature or something, he's got to read Shakespeare or something, or he's got a music appreciation class, he's got this and he kind of resents this, you know, or finds this, you know. But the point is, there's a reason why the first meaning of undergo is something bad, right? Because it's more sensible, and that's where knowledge begins with the senses, huh? If I was to stick a pin in you, you know, you'd be more aware of the fact that I'm acting upon you than I am, you know, when you see me, I'm acting upon your eyes and I'm acting upon your ears. You don't really think about that very much, so do you? Because it's pleasant to see and hear, right? And so you're not painful, right? But if I was shining a bright light in your face that's actually hurting your eyes, you know, or I was shouting your ear, you know, with a bang-bang sound that's pretty kind of hurting your ears, right? Then you'd be very much aware of the fact that you're being acted upon, right? Because of the contrariety to your, what, nature. You get that pin or that knife that's sticking in your ribs, right? You're very much aware of the fact that I'm acting upon you. So that's why that's the first meaning, right? We name things as we know them, right? And this is very sensible, right? It's very clear that this is acting upon that. And it's contrary to the nature of the thing being acted upon, right? And actually destructive along the way to destroying it, huh? You see? And notice that, even after the weather, you talk about being under the weather and so on. But, you know, sometimes if it's too hot in the room or it's too cold, you know, then people will, what, talk about it, right? It's cold in here, you know, or it's hot in here, you know. But then if it's too cold for your body or too hot for your body, you're being acted upon in a way that is, what, contrary to the good of your body, right? And you're more aware of it, right? But notice how you're dropping part of the meaning, right? So that's the most famous example of this song. But sometimes take the word genus, right? The word genus there, as we defined it, is a name said with one meaning, right? Of many things, right? Of any kind, signifying what it is. And the difference was also a name said with one meaning and so on. But sometimes you'll see that even Aristotle or Plato or Thomas will use the word genus or difference for a name that's said maybe equivocally by reason, right? Of many things, right? And yet it's kind of like a genus, right? And of course it means a genus, right? Okay. Well, it seems to be this kind of equivocation, right? It has something of the meaning there of genus, right? Every part, huh? Oh, so a little bit of the word property there, right? A property in the full or perfect sense there, right? Is a name of something following upon what? Nature, right? But it's a name of what belongs to only one species, to every membrane and always, right? Like half of four is a property of two, right? Only two is half of four. Every two is half of four. Always two is half of four. But then we could call less than ten a property of two, two. Why? Every two is less than ten. Two is always less than ten. But you've dropped out now. What? Only, right? Okay. So someone might say that half of four is a property in a different sense of two than less than what? Ten. Ten, right? But is it purely by chance that we call less than ten also a property? No. But we've dropped part of the meaning of the word, right? Okay? Maybe I'm supposed to mention an example here, right? Again, the example is even a genius, right? We've dropped the idea of it would be difficult, right? Now, if I define seeing, I mean, excuse me, if I define looking, right, as trying to see, right? Well, to see there is a part of the definition now, but is it really univocal there? Well, to see can mean, what, the act of the eye or imagining or understanding, right? And looking has three meanings, right? So sometimes we'll define something. In a way, we have a few definitions there, right? But in another way, we have one definition because we can state it in one word. But the words are not exactly like what we said with Jesus and a difference. We have just one meaning, right? So that's one way that a name becomes equivalent. It's carried over, right? How do you carry it over to other things? Well, by dropping part of the meaning, right? In a sense, by generalizing that. There's a question there. When you speak of, let's say, Othello or King Lear as a tragedy, and then you speak of Macbeth or Richard III as a tragedy, right? Well, Othello and King Lear don't seem to knowingly choose evil, right? And so their downfall is really more pitiful, right? But some of you want to say that Macbeth is not a tragedy, right? Because he knowingly chooses to kill the king and knowing it's bad, right? He's a monster. No, they don't want to say that, right? And A. Fort Siroi, Richard III, would be the way he's portrayed in Shakespeare, right? It has something of the character of a tragedy, right? It's a serious work. It's not purely, maybe, equivocally, but it loses some of that meaning, right? Maybe, you know, when you call the divine comedy a comedy, right, huh? Well, maybe comedy in the original sense is a likeness of the laughable, right, huh? And that comedy, you know, will go from misery towards happiness, right? Okay? Well, the divine comedy is not a likeness of the laughable, right? But it has something of the comedy because it goes from a place of misery, inferno, to a place of happiness, the paradiso. So, it's not called a comedy purely by chance, is it? You may have one letter down to the rest where you have to explain what it calls a comedy. It's a stoward discourse to authenticity in the letter, right? But, certainly, it's not a comedy, original sense of the word, right? Because people are, when they first see divine comedy, it's kind of fiction, it's odd, right? They shouldn't be called a comedy. Very serious work, right? Maybe it's code, code, by reason in this way, right? Now, the other way is by ratios, huh? Now, by ratio, we mean the order or relation of one thing with another, right? Now, perhaps there is at least three ways that this happens, huh? One is by the ratio of the second to the first. If you look at the Trinitatis, for example, we distinguish between looking philosophy and practical philosophy, right? And logic is not really a part of looking philosophy, right? But it is the, what, tool in philosophy, right? It's the tool for acquiring what is in philosophy, right? The practical philosophy to some extent, huh? So, if I call logic philosophy, not because it's philosophy in the original sense of the word, something pursued out of one direct, but because it's the tool of such knowledge, right? But then, I call it philosophy by its ratio to what is first called philosophy. 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Yeah. The last sentence you just said. Yeah. Logic is called philosophy, not because it's a knowledge pursued out of wonder, right? But because it's a tool for pursuing such knowledge, right? So if by philosophy you mean a knowledge pursued out of wonder, just to come back to the origin of philosophy, a knowledge that's for its own sake, right? Then logic is not philosophy in that sense at all. But logic is necessary for acquiring that knowledge, right? So it has a certain order or relation to that knowledge, right? What is the order or relation it has? It's a tool for that knowledge, right? A tool for acquiring that knowledge. So it's called philosophy in the second sense by a ratio, by relation it has, right? An order that it has to the what? First one. Okay. Now Thomas gives an example of this Samus Summa Conjunctides. He says, if being is said of substance and quantity, right? It's said first of substance, that's the fundamental thing. But it's said of quantity because it's the what? The measure of substance. The size of substance, right? It's something of substance, right? Take Aristotle's example there, the word healthy, right? If my body is healthy, that's the first meaning of healthy, right? The body is healthy, right? But now if the doctor says that your diet is healthy, same thing? Healthy is said of my diet because it preserves the health of my body, right? So it's not healthy in the same sense, is it? But it has a ratio or an order to the health of my body, right? He says my exercise is healthy, right? Or my complexion is healthy, right? And my complexion is a sign of the health of my body, right? Okay. So, that's one way the word is said, right? The second way is by other ratios to the same thing. By other ratios to the same thing. An example that Thomas gives of this in Summa Contra Gentiles is there in the same text. For the first example, he says, if being is said of quantity and quality, it doesn't mean the same thing. Not the difference, right? Being said of quantity and quality. But it's not purely by chance, because quantity is the measure of substance, and quality is as worthy disposition of substance. So they have other ratios to the same thing, right? So there's a reason why they're both called by other ratios to the same thing. Now there's one more way by which a name can become equivocal by reason of ratios. And that is by like ratios to other things. By like ratios to other things. An example of that was the word before, right? If you take the second meaning there, say, of before, which is before and being, right? And then the third meaning of before, which is before in the discourse of reason, or more generally before in our knowledge, right? Well, you could say that just as this can be without that but not vice versa, so this can be known without that but not vice versa, right? So there's four terms there, right? But there's a, what? A likeness of ratios, right, to other things, right? Now, the two other situations you could have with ratios would be for things to have the same ratio to the same thing, right? But in that case it would seem to be, what? Inivocal, yeah. So I have two sons, Paul and Marcus, right? And they both have the same ratio to me. Paul is the son of me. Marcus is the son of me, right? So when the word son is said of Paul and Marcus, I would say that's inivocal, right? Okay. The other one would be to have other ratios to other things, right? And that would seem to be no basis for it. It could have go by reason, right? They have nothing in common, right? They have other ratios to what? Other things. So, Paul is my son, two is half of four. I don't see that. I'm not four. And to be half of something and to be a son, I think that's like ratios, is it? So, you can make a box, you know, but those two, one would be too much alike, it'd be univocal, and the other would be, you know, nothing in common, right? So, you have these two ones here where you have two ratios, right? But either other ratios to the same thing, so, Aristotle's famous example is that in the fourth book of metaphysics is that of healthy, right? Many things are called healthy but by other ratios to health, right? So, my complexion is called healthy because it's a sign of health, right? My diet or exercise is called healthy because it preserves or restores my health, right? Okay? And then by like ratios to other things. And this is what the Greek word analogy originally meant. Now, you see, in Euclid, he uses the word proportion for a likeness of ratios, but then people begin to call a ratio a proportion, right? Now, you notice the scientists can say this is a proportion and that means a ratio. So, proportion has now come to have two meanings, and that means unfortunate in some ways, right? Proportion can mean both a ratio and a what? Likeness of ratio. But originally the word, you know, logos in Greek means ratio, and analogous means like this likeness of ratio. So, I think it's kind of unfortunate the language there because when proportion means ratio, then you have proportionality meaning likeness of ratios, but it's not as good, huh? We better keep the word ratio to mean the order, relation of one thing to another, and proportion and likeness of ratios. So, proportion has four terms, right? So, when they call naming equivocal by reason, analogous naming, right, huh? They're naming it from one, what? Part of a, part of a, part of, in a sense, right? I think you sometimes get a more narrow understanding of what name equivocal by reason is.