Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 33: Reasoning, Guessing, and the Four Arguments

Transcript
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So what he's saying here is, in a way, if you must guess, right, have a reason for your guess, right, then. Don't just guess wildly, right, okay. Now notice, huh, if I try to imagine your parents' home or something, right, then, I have no reason to say that your parents' home is two stories or a ranch or whatever, right? So it would be kind of purely imaginative on my part, right? We wouldn't have any reason for guessing one rather than another, right? That would be a wild guess, a pure guess, right, then. But in a sense, he's saying here, let's have a reason for our guesses, right? Now, obviously, if we can get more than a guess, knowledge, that's even better, obviously. But let us at least begin with a reasonable guess, right? Now, if we do some philosophy of nature sometime in another course, we look at the fragments, you know, of the natural philosophies that come down to us. And when I teach those, I say, now, we're looking for at least reasonable guesses that these men are making, right? And the reason why what they say, they might have for saying what they say, right? And notice, in most cases, a man guesses the truth before he, what, knows it, right? Even in the easiest sciences for us, like geometry, the geometry would tell you that he guesses that something is true before he finds the reason why it must be so. And, you know, in these simple terms of geometry, like you have an isosceles triangle, you would probably guess that the angles at the base of the isosceles triangle are, what, equal, right? Or an equilateral triangle. I would guess that the, what, angles would be all equal, even before the rigorous proof is found, right? I would have looked for the reason why those angles must be equal if I had not already, what, guessed that it was true, right? So, in man's thinking, apart from those things that we kind of naturally come to know, like the axioms of their parts, we tend to guess the truth before we know it, right? And sometimes a reasonable guess is as far as we, what, get, right? I might mention there that in the Greeks, the Greeks found two common arts of guessing, and one is called dialectic, and the other is called, what, rhetoric, right? They found two arts of guessing, and dialectic is an art of guessing about general questions, and rhetoric is in part, although there's other parts to it, but part of rhetoric is about guessing about the singular contingent, who done it, about what should the country do, and so on. So there are two arts of guessing, not of making wild guesses, but of making, what, reasonable guesses, and then in mind a number of arts of guessing that are more particular than dialectic and rhetoric. And so, the weatherman, for example, right, he has an art of, what, guessing the weather, right? You might say there's a 70% chance of rain tomorrow, okay? He's guessing there's going to rain tomorrow, but he's obviously, what, doesn't know, okay? And then the economist has an art of guessing, what the economy's going to do, right? And you read the interviews with, say, a cop-notch economist in the U.S. News & World Report, and he'll say what the economy's going to do over the next few months, right? But there'll always be some phrase, barring unforeseen circumstances, the economy should... And you see Merrill Lynch, you know, talking about, you can get their paper now, and what the effect of the Bush tax refund upon the economy, you know, the effect, you know, in case of what the effect is going to be, right? But no, see, people are paid to guess, huh? The weatherman's paid to guess, the economist is paid to guess. The weatherman's paid to guess, right? By industry or by government, right? And people are not paid for making wild guesses, huh? They're paid for making reasonable guesses, huh? Now, of course, you might have a low opinion of the other man's part, huh? But he has some basis for saying it's going to rain tomorrow or likely, you know? You know, expect some showers or something, right? You'll see. I know back home, you know, they used to have a contest in Davis, you know, we could out-guess the only weatherman. But what we call experimental science, huh? This also involves guessing, right? But when Einstein speaks of the guess, he says it's not a reasonable guess. He says that the guess of a scientist is freely imagined, huh? So it's a wild guess. Einstein, huh? Einstein. He says that the guess of the experimental scientist, or the physicist, of himself, right, is not a reasonable guess, right? It's a freely imagined guess. And therefore, his guess has to be, what? Tested, right? As it is by its consequences and so on, right? So you have something even weaker there than a reasonable guess, right? But a reasonable guess is something less than knowledge. So, reasoning, then, is coming to know or guess a statement from other statements and because of them. You have to see that in there, right? You're not just going from these statements to those statements. But the statements you're coming to is because of the ones you first, who are accepted, huh? And sometimes a man will make a bunch of statements and say, and therefore. And then the conclusion emerges because he's just asserting that, right? It doesn't really come out of his premises, right? Now, perhaps you're going to change the language a little bit differently here and say that reasoning is coming to know or guess a statement through other statements, huh? And then we could add a phrase of this, known or accepted, right? We'll get that here again, too. From other statements, known or accepted, huh? It's that same phrase there. So reasoning is coming to know or guess a statement from other statements already known or accepted, right? And because of that, right? Or reasoning is coming to know or guess a statement through other statements, right? Already known or accepted them. Sometimes you don't add that on freely, but that's kind of understood there, right? Okay. So that's what reasoning is, huh? Now, calculating is something like that. But calculating is what? To know or guess a number. A number. From? From other numbers, right? Okay. Or some other numbers, right? Now, someone might say, why did you use the word guess here when you talk about calculating? Is it adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing? Isn't that a rather rigorous thing, right? Well, that's true. But even if you add or subtract or multiply or divide correctly, the number you get, you may still be only a guess. Why? Either you started with numbers that were a guess. Yeah. So when we sit down, let's say, to calculate how much it's going to cost out there or something, right? Or how much, you know, it's going to cost us for this dinner, right? It's going to cost us for this dinner, right? Okay. And so maybe we have the... The number of guests are going to be coming to dinner, right? And then we have to multiply that by the number of beers, let's say, right? Okay? So I can multiply the number of guests that I have, I think they're going to come, right? And the number of beers, on average, that each guest will drink, right? And multiply those numbers very correctly. And yet, am I sure of the number I get? No. Because some guests might not show up, right? Or there might be some uninviting guests, right? So they might get sick, whatever, right? Some guests are from coming. And they might be particularly thirsty that night because of the hot night. Or, you know, it might be a stevious, right? They might have taken the pledge or something else. And so the numbers I multiplied, I wasn't sure about, right? So in calculating, calculating, we'll see, is a bit like the syllogism. In the syllogism, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. But, if you're not sure about the premises, the conclusion is not what something you can be sure about, even though it follows necessarily from that. Right? So, in order to be sure of the conclusion, you'd have to both be sure of the statements of which you reason, and the conclusion would also have to. And it's possible to have one of those without the other, right? Now, sometimes, I guess, goes due to the fact that even though your statements might be true, or you might even be sure about them, the conclusion doesn't follow necessarily from that, right? Because it's not really, you know, you've got the syllogism there, right? So, if you have an idea of what reasoning is now, I sometimes say to my colleagues, huh? Even in philosophy, I say, now, do you try to get the students to reason in their class? And they say, yeah. And I say, what is reasoning? And even people, you know, teaching a philosopher, they don't have any definition of reasoning, you know? They've really not thought out distinctly what reasoning is, huh? And notice, this here does say more, what, clearly and distinctly what reasoning is than the word reasoning does. I kind of like to use the word coming more, you know, because you can use the word going, right? So it's coming to know, or guess a statement, right? From and because of, right? Other statements already know and accept it. So, you know a little bit what reasoning is, huh? It meant the same thing as reasoning. An argument is the genus of argument, huh? Too old, okay. But these tools that we're studying in logic are speeches, right? Okay. So argument is speech bringing together the statements from which we're going to, what? Reason, right? So it's speech bringing together the statements from which we reason. Now the statements from which we reason, as we maybe said in the text I already mentioned in the class here, the statements from which we're going to be what premise is. I'm kind of stubborn, I could use, spell the word premise that way, but a lot of people want to spell it with P-R-M-I-S-E, right? But I got attached to premise. So premise, you know, you can use the premise as a property, right? But I was P-R-E-I-S-S. It's the same people's budget. It's the same people's budget. It's the same people's budget. It's the same people's budget. It's the same people's budget. E-R-E-M-I-S-E, right? I'm probably a minority, I don't know, one, but some of the minority, right? And the statement to which you reason is called the, what? Conclusion, right? What is it, a central word, premise? Well, the Latin word, premise, is used to translate the Greek word, the Latin word has a sense of, what, sent before, right? But the Greek word, in a sense, is more accurate. Potosis is a Greek word, but it comes, I think, from the word proteino, which means to stretch forward, right? So the premises, huh, not only come before the conclusion, right? But they stretch forward, producing the, what, conclusion, right? Notice, in reasoning and in calculating, for that matter, we pertain to two different arts, huh? Which the Greeks called logike and logistike, right? They have a similarity, right? Both arts are coming to know something you don't know, right? But we imitate the premium, the logic, the nature premium, right? The reason, so far as possible, it limitates nature, right? Now, notice, in nature, two dogs come together, male and female, and produce another, what? Yeah. Two dogs don't come together and produce an elk animal. That's going to be unnatural, right? And two elk, which is not a dog or a cat, but a, what, a elephant, right? So when two statements come together, they produce, what? Another statement, right? Okay. So like the parents of that, right, huh? Okay. And likewise, in calculating, when two numbers are added together, or multiplied, or whatever, you get another, what? Number, right? Okay. As the British astrophysicist there, so Arthur Eddington, right? The head of the scientific team that confirmed the general relativity, right? And he says, you know, if you put in numbers, you'd write out more numbers, right? Well, that's natural, right? Limitating nature, right? The offspring resemble the parents, right? And you'll see another likeness there, too, that just as in the sexual reproduction, it's two parents, huh, are enough to produce a third one, right? So in the most exact reasoning, all you need is two statements to produce a, what, third statement, huh? In the syllogism, you'll see that, right? In the syllogism, you have just two premises, and they produce a third one, right? And notice, you need at least two numbers, where you can add, or multiply, or divide, and so on, right? The idea of two producing one is likeness there. So argument, then, is speech bringing together the statements of which we reason. So what we're going to do now is to look at the main arguments, right? And this is the four kinds that we start talking about here on the second page. Now, we're going to denumerate these four kinds of arguments first, but towards the end of this paper or these pages, we're going to divide the arguments, right? How you get the four, right? A couple ways you can divide it to four, right? But it's, I think, useful to first meet each one of the arguments by itself, along, and that's the road from the senses into reason, right? So sometimes I draw that road on the board for you, okay? The road from the senses into reason, right? Now, you notice that they're on the road. Now, you notice that they're on the road. right? And sensing is easy, right? But as further you go along the road, the more difficult it is. It's an uphill journey, right? And that kind of fits also the fact that you put the more universal above the less universal, right? And so a thing when sensed is singular is the way he says, and when understood, it's universal, right? So the chair is my eyes, the singular chair, right? The chair that I can grasp and feel is singular, right? But when I understand what this is in front of me, this is a chair, right? I'm understanding something what? Universal. Because what a chair is, it's common to this chair and to other chairs, right? So the thing is singular in sense, and universal. We'll talk about that a bit when we talked about the natural road, right? And therefore those arguments that begin with something singular are more known to us, right? And they're easier for us, and they're closer to our senses, right? So the argument which the logician calls example, and the argument which the logician calls induction, these two kinds of argument begin from something singular. An example can be just one singular, right? While the induction begins from what? Many singulars, right? Okay. So these two arguments. Now the last two arguments that we made along the road, the entamine, and at the very top here, the syllogism, the entamine begins more from something universal, right? Usually not something quite universal, but something maybe is true for the most part, you know? But it's not so much starting from the singular, but more starting from the genoid. But the syllogism is completely, what? Universal. So in that sense, the syllogism is most into what? Reason, right? Okay. So we're going to talk about example, and then about induction, and then about entamine, and then about the syllogism, right? Which are these four kinds of arguments, so. And let's start with the argument called example, a very familiar argument, huh? But the word example is equivocal by reason, huh? And the first meaning we usually have in mind that example is not an argument at all, but it's a singular use to illustrate, right? The universal, right? So if I say, for example, I'm saying, a glass is a tool for holding liquid. For example, here's a glass, right? A chair is something to sit on one person, etc. For example, here's a chair, right? Okay. That's not an argument at all. That's a singular use to illustrate the universal. And this is necessary in all knowledge to use singulars to illustrate the universal, because of our dependence upon the universal, because of our dependence upon the senses, where our knowledge begins, right? Okay? And so if the professor talks about the universal, without using the example, it's almost impossible to understand. Okay? Okay? So it's a singular use to illustrate the universal, and it's very much like what we call the sample one. You go into a great cheese store, let's say, right, huh? You're going to buy a wedge of cheese, you know, from this great big cheese they have there, right? But you wonder whether you want that big bit of cheese, and the guy gives you a, what? Sample, right, huh? Hmm, yeah, I'll take a quarter pound or a half pound or whatever it is, right? Okay? The sample is a piece, a part of the whole whole, to indicate the quality of the whole egg. Okay? And then I buy wine with the guy, so I'm going to give you a sample of his wine. Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. The difference between a sample and an example, though, is in the kind of hole that you have. In the case of an example, the hole you're illustrating is a universal hole, right? I'm using this glass, this piece of chalk, this piece of chalk, that's right? So, by a sample, it's like a, what, integral hole, composed hole, right? Okay, I cut off a piece of that bigger part, right? Okay, I've got a pie here, I want a piece of pie, I don't know, let me just give a sample here. Yeah, one, nice piece of the pie now, right? I can taste the sample, right? But the word example is logically connected, right? You see, Diana spoke of how good English was, right? Sometimes, you know, Diana would take the word in Greek, sometimes the word in Latin, and sometimes the word in English, right? Hard to hear the word in French. But English has particular excellence, right? Does sample have another meaning, or just means the parts, but examples from sample? Yeah, I think sample is used more for the integral or composed hole, right? And the example is used more for the universal hole, right? But there's some, I think, part to illustrate the hole, right? Now, we're going to use the word example here, though, as Aristotle does, for an argument. This is an argument from one singular to another singular of the same kind, okay? So, it's an argument from one singular to another singular, which you have to add of the same kind, right? Now, of course, the strength of this argument depends upon the likeness there between the two singulars, right? And the more alike they are, right, the stronger the argument is, right? Okay? So, when we buy something, we often use this argument, right? I bought a Plymouth, and it lasted me ten years. Now, I'm going to buy another car. I'm thinking I'm going to buy another Plymouth, right? Okay? My father-in-law saw how long my Plymouth fit, so he went out and bought a Plymouth, too, right? He's got a woman. Well, the fact that, you know, that past Plymouth was good doesn't mean that the next one would necessarily be good, right? This is obviously an argument in which, like, the conclusion doesn't follow necessarily, right? But if I had a Honda out there, and I said that a couple of weeks ago, I've had very good luck with the Hondas, right? You know, they start all through the winter, even if the car is down in the garage, you know, in one car garage, and there's a few cars there, my son and my wife, I mean the car. And they always start in the morning, right? Okay? I had a Chevrolet, and, you know, it's like it wouldn't start or something, right? So, if I do a Honda, right, rather than another, what? Yeah. It's an argument for one singer to another singer at the same time. But it depends, to say, upon the lightness between the two, right? One time, years ago, my wife and I went to Joseph's Restaurant in Boston, which I don't know if it still exists, but it's a great restaurant. And we went there on a Saturday night, and we had a dinner. And everything was marvelous, right? Even the potatoes, they would make a whole meal on the potatoes that were so good. It's such a delicious, right? So then, that year, my friend comes into town, he's a great connoisseur, he's been in Paris, and, you know, he wants to go to a really good restaurant in Boston. Well, the only one I knew about was Joseph's, right? So, he went to Joseph's on a Monday evening, right? He and I, and had a very, I would say, ordinary meal. That was a little fair, but you haven't, you know, recommended this, huh? Okay. And notice, I was proceeding, right, by disarmament, right? Okay. But notice, huh, in retrospect, maybe the grand chef is there on Saturday night, but Monday night is the, what, the hicks in the kitchen, right? Or something, right? See, maybe if I'd gone with my friend on another Saturday night, he would have had a more comfortable meal, huh? Even though that would not be necessarily so either, right? But the point is, in my life, they, huh? I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. you see? So, I think this argument depends upon the likeness between the two. We're always using this argument without thinking about it, right? If you ask me a recommendation to a restaurant now, let's say two Chinese restaurants in town, and I've been to one of them and had a good meal, the other one had a lousy meal, right? And I tell you that, you probably go to the one where I had a good meal, right? You don't necessarily get the better meal there, right, than the other one, but this is a reasonable guess. There's a reason for this, what, guess, right? There's a reason why you're going to this restaurant, and then you simply flip the coin, right? You see? You're using past experience, right? And this gives me the guess that we call suspicion, right? I suspect you'd have a good meal there than there, right? Let me tell you, you know, the two places, right? And sometimes that's the best argument that we have, right? You want to know which restaurant to go to. That's the best argument I can give you, right? I had a good meal here, and I had a lousy meal there. So, to go there, you get a lousy meal, and you go here with a good meal, you know? So, there's an argument from one singer to another singer at the same time. Take the example here that I give from Shakespeare's play, right? Henry V, huh? And this is when the English are, this is set during the Hundred Years' War, right? When England invaded France a number of times, the war, you know, was not continuous, but it lasted over a hundred years, right? And you have these famous battles, you know, like in Henry V, you have the battle of what? Agincourt, yeah, okay? But there's an earlier battle, it's really a year, you know? And so, the English are preparing to come over, and the French king is, what? Concerned, right? Okay? So, he urges his nobility to prepare carefully for the second invasion in his lifetime, right, of the English. And this is the words of the king. It fits us then to be as provident, as fear may teach us out of late examples, left by the fatal and neglected English upon our fields, huh? So, he remembers the last time the British came over, right, huh? And they were not prepared for them, right? Neglected English, right? The fatal English, right? See? He knew the havoc that they think. And so, now they're coming again, right? He realizes the need to be as best prepared as they can, see? Now, the young dolphin, right, wasn't around the first time he just came. And of course, you know, what can those northerners do, you know, with us, white-picking Frenchmen, you know? You see? He's overconfident, right? And you'll see that later on in the play, too, right? But the king has, what? Experience, right? Now, notice, this is an example of what Shakespeare says, huh? Looking before and after, right, huh? You're looking before what happened in the past in a similar case, and you're trying to foresee, I mean, you only have to try to foresee what it's going to be like when they come a second time, right? And notice the word that Shakespeare uses there, provident, right? Which is the Latin word for foresight, yeah. When Thomas takes up the virtue of prudence, huh, prudencia, in Latin, he's giving integral parts of prudencia. And one of the integral parts of prudencia is providentia. And you know how he has objections in the Summa, right? One of the objections is prudence and providence mean the same thing. So how can one be a part of the other, right? And that's ethnologically true. If you go back in the Latin dictionary, prudencia is a contraction of providentia. So the English translation for prudencia would be foresight, right? And Thomas says, well, the whole virtue is named from this part, because this is the principal part, huh? Okay? And I notice in reading over the years, Sir Winston Churchill, you know, he'll tend to use the word foresight, right, rather than the word prudence, right? And foresight is a better word to use, huh? But you, in a sense, foresee what's coming after, right? Who's looking before and seeing. So you're looking before and after, right? Okay? We do this spontaneously, you know. I've read a lot of accounts of the time when MacArthur wanted to plan the, wanted to go through the Inshan landing, right? Okay, and... And... Washington was not, was afraid of the Incheon landing, you know, and they sent the chief of staff of the army and they sent the top admiral to try to convince MacArthur not to do it right, or against it, and of course I read, you know, two or three different accounts of people who were president, it was kind of interesting because the chief of staff, you know, spoke against it, you know, and the admiral spoke against it, you know, and then MacArthur got up, you know, everybody's kind of nervous about MacArthur's going to do, you know, and MacArthur MacArthur says he's going to do exactly what Wolfe did in Quebec, you know, and it strikes me so much because you know what Wolfe did, right, no one thought that Wolfe would go up the river and climb the hills and come up on the plains of Abraham, and he hit them exactly what they'd be expecting, right, and that led to the, what, capture of Quebec, right, I'm going to do the same thing, right, it's automatically, right, going back like that, right, you know, and seeing what Wolfe did, right, sure, it was a hazardous thing in some sense, he had to slip, you know, by the French there at night, you know, and then climb the hills, right, that seemed hardly climbable, right, but they found the way up, right, you know, and MacArthur did the same thing, you know, behind the enemy, and you at least expect them, right, MacArthur used to joke in the head of yours, you know, hit them where they ain't, that's the way up, it's all kind of cottagey, right, but it's the way of the strategy there, um, that's another thing in Shakespeare, you know, anytime you get a little quote like this for one reason, like I, you know, put this down for exemplifying, um, in the early sense of example, example, right, exemplifying example, to get my sense of an example there, but notice what Shakespeare says, as fear may teach us, it's interesting that fear is said to, what, teach us, huh, in, in, uh, even the early, um, it's in Adonis, right, little animals being chased by the other animal, right, and he's trying to escape, and, uh, Shakespeare says wit waits on danger, wit meaning wisdom, huh, it's fear, uh, that makes us take, what, counsel, right, huh, very careful, right, wisely and slow, they stumble, they stumble, they stumble, they run fast, as Friar Lawrence says, kind of interesting, one of my friends there, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from Yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah, from, yeah So, no, it's, this kind of argument is used in rhetoric and particularly in political rhetoric where you're often arguing from the past to the future, right, and the most common example that we always give in modern times is that we always go back to Munich, right, and where they try to appease Hitler, right, you know, and Chamberlain came back to England, you know, and you can see it in the documentaries, you know, I was, you know, peace in our time, you know, we're down there cheering and Churchill's saying, you know, you're just going to have to fight them under, what, less favorable circumstances now, right, each time they, yeah, so when you, I might say now, when we tried to appease the dictator Hitler, right, it didn't satisfy him, it just made him more voracious, right, so then they, you know, they will appeal to that when some other dictator is demanding something, right, and thinking, well, maybe if we give him this, we can avoid war, and, you know, and it just makes him more, right, or maybe if you go back to the papers, like the feminist papers, right, you'll see they're using this argument called examples all the time, right, and they go all the way back to the Greeks, right, and the Greeks, you know, could not unite, and they fought among each other, you know, the Albanian war, and so on, and if the 13 colonies don't unite, you know, we'll be, ...falling out and sobbing over boundaries and fighting with their spells, right? Or they would point to the Union of England-Scotland and how the economic prosperity in Great Britain, right? And then they'll argue enough to this, right? There's all kinds of arguments of this kind, for example, very common. You know, students at school, it's kind of interesting. If a student takes a course from a professor and gets a good mark, then you very often take another course from that team professor. Well, if you took a course from a professor and got a low mark, right, you'll, you know, you're going to take it again, right? Okay. So, I mean, students are always passing information, you know. If the student liked the course, you know, then, okay, maybe you'll persuade his fellow student to take that course, right? Or if he hated the course or it was too difficult or, you know, you see. But you don't realize that they're using all the time this argument called what? Example, right? They're taking a past course and using that to judge in what? Future course, right? Okay. Now, notice, you might like Professor X in this course and think Professor X or this is course. In this course, this other material, right? It's more difficult material or something, right? But, as I say, it depends upon the, what, likeness, right? I remember when I was first teaching, I had a student in logic, which is like the first course. And then, next semester, so I had him in the philosophy of nature, right? And so I asked him how I'd like the philosophy of nature chorus. Did he say he liked it? But it was much different than the logic course, right? It was a different knowledge, right? You know, so I mean, you know, you have two courses that are quite, like, different, yeah. I mean, if I'm teaching a course called Love and Friendship, you know, you might have an over-enrollment, right? You know, a promise to, okay? And, but someone might love my logic course, you know, you might have liked that at all, right? You see? So, I mean, it depends upon the, what? The likeness of the two, right? You know, so you see, at the same time, the strength of this depends upon how much the two are alike, right? You get these skeptics, you know, which are historians, right? And, you know, if you ever get a pure historian, right, you're interested in the singular as singular, right? And they see the uniqueness of every historical period, right? And this one historian that I knew very well, he said, you know, the purpose of history is to show the fallacy of all historic analogies. Oh. You know, you only saw the differences between, you know, you see? But, but that case, you know, you couldn't, they use this in going to a restaurant, you know, going to buy a car, or, you know, you see? Okay. So, you understand an argument then? You can call it an example, huh? Okay. Another case is the sentence. Reason from one singular to another singular, right? But usually like a singular from the past to a singular in the future, right? You're just staying in the level of the singular, right? Okay. Now, induction, huh, is an argument from many singulars towards the, like, universal, okay? So, you're going much further along the road, right? You're going from the singulars to the universal, right? So, induction is an argument from many singulars to the universal. So, this is the argument, so I cut out with this frog, and he has a rechambered heart, and this frog, and this frog, and so on. I am progressing towards the statement that all frogs have a, what? A rechambered heart, right? Okay. Sometimes they translate the definition there of induction in Greek and might in there as an argument going forward is universal, right? And going forward is taken from the going forward, the movement of an animal, right? So, it's singular, right? This frog is a rechambered heart. This frog is a rechambered heart. This frog is a rechambered heart, right? And the more you go through, the more you advance to the statements at all. So, it's an argument from many singulars to the universal, right? No, when you say many singulars, you actually have statements.