Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 35: Logic, Rhetoric, and Argumentation in Philosophy

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So in the art of logic, it's not counting, but understanding what something is, okay? And if you go back to the fundamental thing, you can see that understanding what water is doesn't tell me how much water is in the glass, right? Understanding what a man is doesn't tell me how many men are in this room, huh? And vice versa, counting the men in this room, I have to be able to recognize a man in some way. It doesn't really help me to define what a man is. So the question, what is something, and the question, how many or how much, one is not really, what, reduced to the other, right? By knowing what a man is, an animal with reason, that in no way is the basis of my calculating how many people are here. I don't have to be able to define man to count. I don't have to be able to identify him in some way, right? This is just always counting things if you decide to know what they are, you see? But you have to understand what a man is, or understand what an odd number is, let's say, and understand what an even number is, to understand that no odd number is even, right? And you have to understand the statements from which you, what, reason, right? So you can't really make one art out of the two, but there's a likeness there, right? If I think the moderns are deceived by the likeness, they want to make one thing called the signs of deductionite. I think it's interesting to compare this, because there's a likeness between them. When I get into the syllogism, I often compare it to adding and subtracting, and point out the difference between adding correctly and having the correct numbers to add. And, you know, Aristotle talks about a demonstration, which is a syllogism whose conclusion is necessarily true. Well, the conclusion has to follow necessarily from the premises, and the premise is actually necessarily true. And the prior and the posterior analytics are about that. The prior analytics is taking apart the argument to see if the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, and the posterior, how do you know if the premises are necessarily true? You know, two different things, right? You see, when you're calculating your checkbook or something like that, that's not a problem with you, but checkbook would never work out, right? But there's, how'd you get the wrong number, right? Well, either because you didn't add or subtract correctly, or because you added or subtracted the wrong numbers, right? And I, from my experience, found both things in checkbooks, right? That something wasn't subtracted correctly, or maybe, you know, you wrote the number and you just read it, right? You didn't get the wrong number now. So it's kind of an attempt there, in going back to likeness and people like that, right, to unite the art of calculation and the art of logic, then. Logique and logistique. They're really the same art, huh? But there is a likeness between them. If they do that, what are they doing? What are they doing? Well, it's not... Making a monster. Just going to follow them, or... You see, the art of calculating is one that's easier for us, right? And one where there's going to be, what, less disagreement, right? I mean, if you come back and check it over, you'll agree with me, right? But logic is much more, much more difficult things, right? You know, the art of calculating is kind of mechanical, right? And the art of logic, as I tell the students, is not a substitute for thinking. It's a help to thinking, right? But don't think it's going to do the thinking for you, right? That's, you know, one of my colleagues said, you know, students think the computer's going to write the paper for them. But instead, they're looking for something that will, what, mechanically do what has to be done, in some cases, by thinking out something. That's the reference I have to Richard II there, huh? Dull, barren, unfeeling ignorance, huh? Do you know that particular phrase? And you call it ignorance, what, barren, because it has no, what, offspring, right? But knowledge of two numbers, right, can give rise to another number, right? Knowledge of two statements, in some cases, can give rise to a, what, another statement, huh? Okay? Okay, let's... Put the coordinates here, or boxes, okay? Sogism here in one corner. Entomine down this other corner, the load of sogism. I put the induction over this upper right corner, and I put example down in the lower. So you've got sogism in the upper left, and entomine in the lower left, right? Induction in the upper right, and example in the lower right. That's going to take. Okay. Now, would you put syllogism with induction, or would you put syllogism with what? Enthomine, right? Well, if you talk about the kind of argument it is, Enthomine is like the syllogism. In the syllogism, you have true universellity, right? Let me give a kind of obvious example here. If I say, no odd number is even, right? That is true universellity, right? And then I say, let's say, every three is odd. It's an odd number. Then it's not even, right? Okay. Now, the Enthomine, right? He's a boy, right? Therefore, he what? Acts like a boy, right? Okay. Boys will be boys, right? Proceeding from a very universal statement, right? But it's really true, universal. Do boys always be boys? Will a boy never do the deeds of a man? Sometimes it will be very mature things, right? You see the praise of his papers or some occasion, right? So, it's like an imperfect, what? Syllogism, right? You see, syllogism secundum quid, right? So, sometimes Aristotle calls the Enthomine with syllogism, right? Other times, he distinguishes the Enthomine against the syllogism. It's a little bit like we were saying before. You know, you might divide the boy against the man, right? Another time, we'd say the boy is a man, right? Okay. The kitten is a cat. Probably it's a dog. Then you might just divide the puppy against the dog. He's not a fully mature dog, right? Okay. So, the Enthomine is like a syllogism, right? Sometimes Aristotle calls it a rhetorical syllogism, right? It's used in rhetoric, the Enthomine, no? But it's not a syllogism, simply speaking. You don't have the complete universal to the syllogism. If every man who staggers out of the bar, right, you know, is drunk, you have syllogism, right? This man staggers out of the bar, you know, okay? But if it's possible that a man might have some ailment in his leg, right, okay? Then he might, what, stumble, right, without being, what, drunk, right? So, it's likely that he wouldn't be necessarily, what, sold, right? You see how it resembles the syllogism, right? It's indicated by the word enthuma, it's in the mind, right? It's not the word, the mind seems, right? It's not something that's sensible, singular. Now, in terms now of likeness, I'm drawing likeness there, writing likeness above the line here that separates, on the one hand, syllogism and enthymine from induction example, because enthymine is like the syllogism, right? Like the puppy is like the dog, right? Okay. Now, is example in some way like induction? Well, notice, huh? Well, you know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, I I don't know. You asked me, what restaurant should I go to tonight? I've been to restaurants A and B, and I had a wonderful meal at A, and a lousy meal at B, right? I said, well, I had a wonderful meal at A, right? He said, well, I'll go to A then, right? Now, in a way, aren't I implying that the wonderful meal I had at A is symptomatic or emblematic of the kind of meals you get at that restaurant, right? So it's almost like the age of what? Extremely imperfect induction, right? Because obviously the meal I had last week is not the meal you're going to have this week. It's not the same meal, individually, right? So how can I reason from the one that I had last week being good, right, to the one that you're going to have this week being good, right? Well, it's because I think the good meal I had last week is somewhat indicative of the way meals are at the restaurant. I don't say that because you'd see immediately the weakness of the argument, right? You know, I had a good meal last week, therefore all meals are good, right? But I must be implying something about meals in general there in order to be able to put your meal and speak under that. So examples like an immature, what, induction, right? Involves something of induction, right? So Aristotle sometimes calls the example a rhetorical induction, right? But it's not an induction, simply speaking. There's an example there of the word, that way of naming, where we say sometimes the name that's common to two things is kept by one, right? One that has fully the meaning of it, right? The one that has imperfectly or effectively gets a new name, right? It's like when I divide definitions sometimes of a thing into definition of a thing and encircling, right? But encircling doesn't fully tell you what the thing is, right? What is wisdom? It's the best knowledge. I've drawn a line around wisdom, better than all the knowledge, so I separate from all the knowledge. We didn't even tell you what wisdom is, however. It's the best knowledge, right? Hadn't even begun to tell you what the knowledge is, right? So is that a definition of wisdom? If I can give that an answer to the question, what is wisdom? That'd be a definition of the full sense. So we call it an encyclical, right? You might call it a definition in the right sense, you know. So, if you classify these arguments in terms of likeness, basically, you put the enthymine with the syllogism and the example with induction, right? And so Aristotle is talking about the arguments used in rhetoric. He says, well, an argument is either a syllogism or induction. So the enthymine must be a syllogism, and the example must be a what? Like, I would say, you know, like, the human being must be either a male or a female, right? Boy and girl, one must be a male, one must be a female, right? The boy is a male, and the female is a girl, and the girl is a female, right? So he proceeds as if, you know. So in terms of likeness, there's another way, and that is not in terms of likeness, but in terms of their, what? Usefulness, right? Okay. Now, in some ways, this division according to usefulness is more practical to logic, because logic is not for the sake of the what? Knowing these things, but for the sake of the what? Using them, right? Logic is not for its own sake, right? Now, the syllogism and induction are useful for conclusions about the universal. Okay? So induction is an argument for many singulars to the, what, universal, right? So you can use induction to conclude something about the universal. And syllogism in Quetzalcoatl can be used about the universal, right? So syllogism and induction are used in dialectic, which is reasoning to conclusions about the universal. And so in the dialogues of Plato, where Socrates is reasoning about philosophical questions, questions about the universal, he uses sometimes induction, sometimes, what, syllogism, right? Okay? Because those two arguments are useful for drawing conclusions about the universal. The anthony and the example are useful for conclusions about the singular, especially in human affairs, about the singular, the human things, huh? So in the rhetoric, huh, which is about dissuading men about human things, Aristotle will talk about the anthony and the, what, example, right? And the rhetorician will use both anthony and example, right? Now, Aristotle points out that in political rhetoric, we use example more than the courtroom rhetoric. In courtroom rhetoric, we use the infamy more, right? You kind of see that, right? In political rhetoric, we're debating what to do with the future, right? In the channel and the other, right? And so you tend to take, what, the paths, right? And the reason for math, right? So a lot of times in legislation, they'll take the example of a similar legislation in some state or in some other country, right? And the effect that that had, you know? And the reason for math, right, from one example to another one, right? Like it did in the Federalist Papers. But in the courtroom, you say, who's likely? This question is, if somebody gets murdered, who's likely to have, what, done it, right? Unlikely would be very fortunate. But nevertheless, in both kinds of rhetoric, you can use both. If you want a good example of the art of rhetoric there, in a way, you can see in Shakespeare's play Othello, right? Where Iago, the villain, is trying to persuade Othello that his wife is unfaithful, right? Now, there's actually no basis for this at all. But sometimes Iago uses an anthony, right? Sometimes uses an example, right? Now, an example, among other ones, Desdemona, you know, she ran off with Othello, right? Without getting permission from her father, right? She deceived her father, right? That's interesting, yeah? Because after, you know, Othello was in the service of the Venetian government, right? So they can't really squash him because of this. You look, right, yeah? But the last thing the father said is, you know, the father says, she deceived me, she may deceive you. Well, Iago picks up at that, right? And look how she deceived her father. You know, the size idea, right? Which is up to you, right? And so, you know, that's kind of like the example, right? She deceived her father. You know, you're doing the same thing with you, right? You know, the size idea. You're the same thing, right? But then, and there he uses likelihood, right? A likelihood is what? Opinion, custom, right? And Iago, for us, is very knowledgeable about people. You don't understand a niche woman, right? You know, you're very good at deceiving your husband, right? You know, and, you know, he goes on like that, see? So, you know, she's a Venetian woman, right? So it's likely, right, that she'd be a Venetian woman that she would be indebted at the heart of what? Could be your husband, right? You see? So he's using both examples, right? He uses no syllogism and no, what? Induction, right? And, you know, Iago, he gets a hold of this precious handkerchief, you know, that a fellow was very attached to, you know, that he'd given testimony, right? Which he profits, you know? And he gets a hold of it, right? And he gives it to a man with his life. trying to persuade him, he's not paid for his wife, right? It seems like you've given him this, you know, so that's the sign that he needs, right? Well, it's a very weak sign, but it's a little, right? It's like, you know, if your wife gave her a ring or something, you know? Or somebody else, you know, I mean, you know? That's the sign that he needs, right? The ring, or something like that, somebody needs a pressure between them, right? So many things, you know? Values, you know, never loses, you know, that sort of thing. And now this guy, what's it, you know? It's a sign, huh? But no, see, if the husband found his wedding ring, the wedding ring that the wife had, on this man that he's probably suspicious of because of the other things said, right? I mean, the man, what, towel in the ring and put it on? But, you know, it could be an exception, but he would take it as a sign that this is the final confirmation of infidelity, right? And, of course, in rhetoric, in Sarasawa points out, rhetoric is really an offshoot of not only logic, it's a part of using these arguments, right? But it's also an offshoot of ethical and clinical studies because he tries to persuade even more by moving the emotions, right? And most of all, by projecting an image of yourself as an unbelievable person, right? And Diago does those as well, right? But here I mention Anthony with an example, right? He does use an example, but he himself says that to a man as jealous as he's gotten a fellow, even the weakest proofs will seem like holy script, you know, in Scripture, you know? So it doesn't take much to convince a man, you know? Because if he's been unfaithful, he's already in this state of jealousy, right? But even before that, Yavsham gives himself a man who understands people, sees into people, right? A man who has Yavu, a fellow who's good in mind, right? A man who doesn't speak his suspicions like the, you know? All these things that make him to believe this man, right? You think he really has your good in mind. You think he's a very knowledgeable man, a man who sees into people, right? A man who's slow and cautious to state his suspicions, you know? And then he rouses in emotions, and he gives these things. Okay. Enthomines and examples are useful for reasoning about the singular, right? Or persuading the jury, or persuading the crowd, or persuading the individual even, right? So we put these to the example, and then we put soldiers and induction together as far as their usefulness is concerned, right? In some ways I make, I don't know if I do it here or not, but I make this homely comparison to knives and forks, which are also tools, right? Right. And you know when you set the table, right? You put the forks on the left, right? And the knives on the right, huh? So if it's a fancy meal, you might have a dinner fork and a salad fork, right? You might have a dinner knife and a, let's say, a butter knife or something, right? Okay? So here they're separated by what? Lightness, right? Okay, the two forks are put together. The salad fork is like a dinner fork, right? And a little butter knife is like a bigger knife, right? Okay. But now when they put the steak down, what do you do? You grab the two forks? You grab the two knives? Huh? No. Now the question is not like this, but what's useful for getting at the steak? You grab the fork, you grab the knife, and you go at it, right? Even though the knife and the fork are, what? Not as like each other as the two forks are, right? Mm-hmm. See? The same thing here, right? See? I'm thinking of the lightness of these things, but this is like that, right? But for sure, this has something to that. For sure, right? But now when we want to discuss the general question of philosophy, what do we do? We grab syllogism and infection. Okay? Now we want to persuade a fellow who is like his unfaithful and he grab infamines and examples, huh? Mm-hmm. And he went for his emotions. Mm-hmm. Okay? You see? Or take another example, like the biological example where we say, you know, we would take nature, right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Now, if you're talking about man, woman, boy, and girl, if you talk about them in terms of likeness, you put the boy with the, what? Man. And the girl with the woman, right? You're not going to reproduce in a person. You put the man and the woman together, right? Okay? Because that's in terms of what? Usefulness, right? Not in terms of likeness, right? You see? See that again? So I think you can kind of get a sense of how we divide these four arguments, right? We can divide them on the basis of likeness, on the basis of usefulness. And I think it's good to see both. Maybe in the final analysis, what you're interested in is usefulness at least. The likeness, though, is useful for understanding it, right? But you want to finally say, how do we, how Saki's going to reason? How is the algorithm going to reason? Or how are the Federalist figures going to reason? But then we have to divide them by usefulness. Okay. That's four. So do you know another kind of argument? That's four. I don't know. Okay. Okay. Now, when Aristotle talks about the example, right, he gives a, he extinguishes three kinds of examples in the rhetoric, and the first is the historic example. And then he talks about the invented example. He talks about the proportional example, right? You know, a proportion is like the sub-gretions. And then he talks about the fable, right? So, the fables of Aesop were used, right? As arguments, right? You know, the famous one, Aesop was defending a guy who had been in office for a while and made some money, graft, you know, and so on, got wealthy from his office. And they wanted to replace this man, right, with somebody. And, you know, the fable that Aesop was supposed to have told his defense. He said there was an animal, right? Like it was a hedgehog or something. And he was crossing the stream of the rocks, right? And he was jumping in between the rocks, right? And he fell between the rocks and got bridged in and couldn't get out. And he started to bleed, right? Okay. Along comes the bugs of so-and-so down and start to kick his blood, right? A little animal comes along, and he sees the poor hedgehog, and he's not big enough to get him to bleed from the rocks. And he says to him, do you want me to chase away the flies and so on, the bugs, right? He said, no, no. He said, they've taken all they're going to take. They're just filled up. Chased them away, and new bugs will come. And people, well, I have left, right? He says, so, is it my client now? I think he's got an adult in it, but he's satisfied now. He's going to get rid of somebody else, and they'll take the rest of your money. That's pretty, pretty, pretty good. That's what Aesop had, right? And I just take an example. In class, when I taught to the students, I take an example that I kind of strike home. The example of trying to persuade somebody who's a student in college not to get married while he's in college, right? Okay? It's not an incredible thing to do, right? And you might have historically so-and-so, right? Back a few years, how he was a sophomore in college, and he got married, and then the kids came, and he took a job, and he couldn't get up with his college studies, and he didn't drop off, and he never finished his college degree, and so on. Well, that's an argument, right? A historical example, right? But then, you know, you give maybe this kind of invented example, right? Well, you know, say that nations never, what, appreciate their freedom until they've lost it, right? Nations have sometimes, you know, elected, you know, they say, I think they're elected, right? You know, a dictator, right? And then when they lose their freedom, then they realize the precious of life, right? Well, a bachelor doesn't really appreciate his freedom until he's married, right? This is weaker because the likeness is, what, it's parallel, right? You see, that nations don't appreciate their freedom until they lose it, right? Actions don't appreciate their freedom until they lose it, right? But you can see how the nation regrets, right? And they come to this dictator, now you're going to, what, lose your freedom, right? See? But no, especially if you have to invent the example of people's question. But then you take the parable, right? The parable was, the goose today, the golden egg, right? You say, now, you know, each day the goose lays a golden egg, right? You say, what? You know, that's right, right? And, gee, that's nice. Let's get all the gold, right? Let's kill the goose. And now they have, what? Nothing. Nothing. So you're going out on these dates, you know, with this girl, each date is golden, right? And you say, well, now I want to have her all the time, right? And as everybody used to say, climax boils your man, right? You know? It's not so golden. Here, I see. You know, how do you go over and so on, right? You see? But no, it's much weaker, right? But it's a table, right? So, even in a way, the poetic argument is a, what? Kind of a, you know, growth out. It's like the example, in a sense. It's kind of what the invented one is. You can, you know, place it under this, in a way, right? Though in another sense, maybe not strictly speaking an argument, right? It was saying during the Second World War there, when we were trying to be friendly with the Russians, right? They made some movies in Hollywood, you know, which represented society in Russian, falsely, right? In order that, what, we would think that they're, you know, that this Soviet government and so on, you know, allows freedom of religion and so on, right? Like you have them over here, right? Okay. So, how things were, right? In Russia at that time. That's obviously, if it's argument at all, it's very weak, right? People will see a movie, you know, historical set movie, right? In a certain period of time. You know, it's not really authentic, right? What things were. Is that an argument? Or who would you call it? Indusment. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because it represented us, right? I remember there was a child there, two examples there. The next door neighbor was there. They had one son, right? Kenneth, huh? And Kenneth was the only child. And his mother died, right? Okay. And so, eventually, Kenneth's father decided to marry again, right? And we heard about Kenneth. And so, we heard that Kenneth was going to be getting a stepmother, right? Well, my mother overheard us at the table discussing how we're going to protect Kenneth from his stepmother. You know, in case, you know, she is being cruel, you know, like stepmothers are. And part of my mother, you know, she stopped and explained to us, you know, that stepmothers in real life are not, you know, like the stepmothers. But why do we have that idea in our head? Because of the fairy tales of things that sort, right? You know, like, you know, Snowbite's mother and stepmother, right? You know, the stepmothers represented in the fairy tales as being, what, evil and cruel and so on, right? And so, when he's, when you say, when he's drawing a conclusion there, or he's just kind of, what, accepting it because of what he's represented there, you know? But you can see, in the same way, you know, you know, with Tom's cabin, this may have been a true thing, but he's represented, right? Certain conditions down in the south with slavery. And so, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you say, when you you know, and splitting up our families and so on, right, huh? Okay? So this is persuasive, right? But is it really an argument at all, you know? I don't know if that's why customers... You know, it wouldn't be real. Thomas says, Poete est in vitere et aliquad virtuosa, right? Pericent in representationum. It belongs to the poor to lead us into something virtuous for a super-representation, right? But then Thomas gives an example of that, and how a food becomes abominable, right, if it's represented to us under the likeness of something disagreeable. And I had a speculation, you know, when I was a boy, I got to hate milk. And I remember my mother trying to get me to drink milk, trying everything, right? And, you know, 50 cents a liquor milk or something, get me to drink milk. And finally, you know, they sent me down to drugs to get my milkshake, right? Which I could, instead of my daddy, you know? But I had an impression that I was sick one time, and I was given milk of magnesia, a kind of disgusting thing, and that afterwards I thought of milk under the likeness of what? Milk of magnesia, right? You see? And, well, if you think of it, you know, something good, you're given the likeness of something disgusting, then it becomes, what? Unattractive, right? I think that happens a lot with foods, right? You kind of, you know, you have a kind of irrational, dislike of the food, because of the way you picture it, so to speak, right? But it seems to be interesting. It is. You are the breadwinner. You see, you are the breadwinner. The second means of persuasion is the way you move the emotions of the people, right? A person, a poet, can be moved the way too, right? So you can represent them. So you see that good things and bad things can be represented, you know? Right? It's like, that's not what they are, right? I mean, you know, Hollywood, you can see in a lot of movies, right? The bad things that are bad is that they were acceptable, right? You know? So you're judging by your imagination? Well, yeah, but your emotions primarily, right? It's like the art of persuasion, but more like the art of persuasion in its ability to move the emotions and then in its argumentative aspect, huh? But I think it's working through the imagination, too, in a sense. You know, C.S. Lewis there, there's a passage there that somebody quoted in his logic books, but C.S. Lewis is going down to some part of England he'd never been before, and he's, I mean, he met at the station there by an uncle or something like that, and they start to drive through, and C.S. Lewis is struck by the fact that the place is still different than the way you imagine it. And of course, I was saying, what right did you have to think it was this other way? You know, you know? I said, you know, kind of a popular introduction to logic, right? You know? You know? And very often, we imagine a place we've never been to, right? Or we imagine, you know, somebody we're going to meet that we haven't met before, and they were kind of surprised when we actually, what, meet them, right? You see? And I know my wife met some of my friends back home, right? You know? Like Jim, the former boxer, you know, and so on. And the hard-winking Jim, and so on. You know, kind of surprised that, you know, they have friends like this, and for myself, when I was in high school, I imagined what it would be like to be in college. I wasn't in talking, I thought it would be in college exactly. When I was in college, I imagined what it would be like to be in graduate school, and I didn't try to be what I exactly expected, right? And when I was in graduate school, I expected, I imagined what it would be like to be. ...teacher in our faculty, right? They don't have to be the same either, right? So I think everybody finds that, right? That things are not the way you imagine them to be. And so you see, for example, false imagination, is that an argument? To have an argument that... Like I thought when I'd be on a faculty, let's say, that you'd be having, you know, intellectual conversations all the time with interesting people, you know. Well, I mean, if so-and-so's out in some astuce kind of mathematics and someone else is doing economic analysis, he's going to be talking, making small talk if we happen to end up at a lunch table together or something, right, you know? So I think it makes it different, you know? I didn't really have any reason to think that it was going to be this way, but I just thought it would be that way, you know? But you see it happens more than this, right? You know, everybody's doing the same, you know, but everybody's doing their own thing, right? Then you tend to talk about something. I'm into that show, maybe, right? You know? So, I mean, you constantly are imagining things to be different, right? Than they are, right? You talk to foreigners, you know, and I had a student in Arabia, and he used to joke with me about what the Americans imagine Arabia to be like, right? And they say, there's a camel in my life, he says, and all this stuff. And that's not an argument, is it? It seems to me that it gets you to imagine things a certain way, right? I know, you know, people who have a kind of superficial interest in history, and they love historical novels or something like that, right? Because they're learning about the past, you know, it's kind of an easy way. Well, sometimes these novels do capture something true about the past, but a lot of times, they're quite false, right? But you kind of imagine things to be that way, so it kind of pushes us, right? But even without that, you know, from my own experience, you know, no one, I haven't seen a movie about private school or any movie about college professors, but I imagine things to be a certain way. Maybe they aren't that way. It's not all that you imagine it to be, right? It may be worse, you know? But it's not going to be the way you imagine it to be, right? And that means to move a lot of kinds of things in life. You know, so it doesn't seem to be hard at all, doesn't it? From statements. Yeah, yeah. By imagining, you might be forming different opinions or you're gathering different pieces of information and you go to the imagination. Yeah. Yeah, something like that in the sense that you put together things in the imagination, yeah. And you're probably going for a reason, whether it turns out or not, or you can imagine it, might show you how far off your imaginative reasoning is that you have such an animal. You see, like, Sir, I was talking about C.S. Lewis, and I come down and he says, well, I always thought this part of England was, you know? And it's not at all the way he thought, right? I mean, you know, it's a Sahara visit, I find out, it's not at all the way I imagined it, you know? There probably are a lot of things here that are not simply golden sand. Right? But it's a part of the way to make an example. Okay. Yeah? Okay.