Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 42: Syllogistic Form in the Second Figure and Applications

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Yeah, and some dogs are white, right? But now, see, not every dog is white, right? Does every dog white? That's not going to satisfy conditions, you see? Oh, yeah, no. So, first you don't succeed, try and try again. After a while, you know, it becomes kind of automatic, but first you're going to struggle with it, you know? And sometimes you try to satisfy it with the example of one condition, you try to match it with the other condition, right? If you took that example, say, you say, dog and animal, right? Okay, and then, what, say stone, right? Now, those examples satisfy the every C and no C is a condition, right? But now I've got to see if I can draw a B such that some animals are not it, and yet every dog is it. And every stone is it, too. It's kind of hard, right? You know? Dog and the C? Tree, animal, dog. Tree for egg? Yeah, because some tree is not an animal, that's true. Some dog is an animal, that's true. No dog is a tree now. What did I do now? You've got to have one more example now. Okay. Something that is always an animal, and always say, what? Okay. It's a little hard to do, isn't it? That's how you haven't continued, you know? That's two hours. Oh, okay. So the things we can't find an example? Well, let's take some habits are not good, right? Is that true? There are good habits and bad habits, right? Now, every virtue is good, right? Every virtue is a, what? Habit. It's a very firm disposition. Now, when I think of another C such that every C is good, but never, but no C is a habit. It's something that is always good, but not a habit. Okay? Or even just take a good act, right? You know, a good act. Every good act is good, right? But no good act is a habit. Habit is not the act. So then you have to stop and bring it to examples, right? I don't know how I get those out of this. All right. Yeah, buddy. Now, so that's not socialism. How about this one down here? Well, notice you could, you know, universal negative statement, no C is B, but nothing is said to be a C, right? So, you could convert this to no B is C, right? And you could bring down some A is B under there, right? Some A is B, and therefore some A is not C. But we're asking whether there's a conclusion that C is a subject A as a predicate, right? And I can't convert the particular negative, right? So, I'm not going to get any conclusion with C as a subject A as a predicate. What about conversion here, right? I did my darndest, as they say, but I couldn't come up with anything, right? Unlike that one in the first, in the two universal ones, where you converted twice, right? Here, I can't convert, right? And I had a form, which was every, what, A is B, no C is B, and we converted no C is B to no B is C, and then syllogized it, no A is C, and I'm turning it around, right? But here, we've got a particular negative, huh? And we can't convert that, huh? So, I think there's no syllogism here that sees a subject A as a predicate, and I'm going to look for examples, right? So, who would you take as examples here, huh? Bigster, how would I do it? I could say some habit is what? Is a virtue. I'm going to take habit and ritual? Habit is a virtue, and no bias is a virtue. Okay, now you're getting there still primitive, right? Every vice is a habit, right? If no vice is a virtue, what's the other term receive? What? Stone. Stone. No stone is a virtue, and no stone is a habit, right? So, if I satisfy both conditions, some A is B, some habit is a virtue, that's true. No vice is a virtue, that's true. No stone is a virtue. I satisfy condition number one, and this is a virtue. And I have one example where every C is an A, yeah, I still know that example, right? That knocks out the two negatives, and it's being always so. And then, maybe there's a negative, yeah? No stone is a habit, yeah? And that knocks out the two affirmatives as being always so. So, nothing is always so, right? Because you want to put the either oral form, right? Because, I mean, necessarily so, it's either affirmative or negative. But this shows there's no what negative is, it's always so. This shows there's no what affirmative is, it's always so. So, therefore, there's nothing to force in the W, it's always so, it's always so negative, right? Same statement, huh? How many valid forms were there in the second figure? There's none, of course, in particular. Two in the mix. Yeah, two in the mix, and then the first group, right? A mix. Two in the mix, and two in the first one, so, basically, right? So, let's put down the four pieces. Remember that. So, we have no A is B, and every C is B, right? All right, let's convert this, right? And you can syllogize that no C is A in the first figure, right? Then we had the one that was a little more difficult, the reverse, every A is B, and no C is B. And then we converted no B is C, no C is B to no B is C, and we syllogized in the first figure that every, that no A is a, like, C, and then we converted. Right, this is nice. Yeah. So. No C is A. Then we had no A is B, and some, right? C is B, right? And here you convert, no B is A, and by magic you're back in the first figure, right? And you can show that is that some C is not what? A. Then you have the one that was more difficult. Every A is B, and some C is not B, was that it? A. I mean, it's kind of common sense to tell you that if every A is a B, there's no exception. If you're an A, there must be a B. And some C is not a B, can that some C be an A? No, because every A is a B, right? But the way we show it vigorously is by saying that if you don't admit that it's necessary that some C is, like, not A, that isn't necessary, then by the square of our position, it's possible that every C might be an A, right? And if every C were an A, then you add that to this, and you conclude, what? That every C would be a B. That kind of exists, right? So you can't think that every C is A with these two, because every C is A with this kind of exists that. So if these two are laid down, you must reject it as incompatible. So the cause of the worst incompatibility. And every C is A is incompatible, right? And if you have to admit that C is not A, right? You see? Because they can't both be false, right? So every C is A is false, and these are true, right? You see that? Now notice, in the second figure, all conclusions are negative, right? And if you compare it to the first figure, the first figure you could draw a universal negative or a particular negative, too. But in the second figure, there's two ways of drawing a universal negative, two ways of associating a particular negative, right? But we say this is less powerful, because power consists in being able to get a special universal conclusion, right? And here you can get only a universal negative, but in the first figure you can get the universal affirmative as well as the universal negative. But if you add the two together, right, there's only one way of universal affirmative, and that's in the first figure. But there's three ways of syllogizing a universal negative, one in the first figure, and the two here. And those four are the most important ones to remember for all your reasoning, right? But there's, in the first figure, one way to syllogize a particular affirmative, and one way to syllogize a particular negative, right? Well, here there's two ways to syllogize a particular negative, right? So just looking at the first two figures, you can say that there are one way to syllogize a universal affirmative, and those two figures together, one way to syllogize a particular affirmative, right? But three ways to syllogize a universal negative, and three ways to syllogize a particular negative, right? As I say, the most important pieces are the three ways of syllogizing a universal negative, and a way of syllogizing a universal affirmative. So if a man has a universal negative conclusion, you can sometimes use it backwards, right? He must be using one of these three forms. But if he's got a universal affirmative conclusion, then you've got to go back to what? That's the first one. Now, incidentally, when you're syllogizing with something individual, like, for example, Socrates, or God, for that matter, right? Socrates, or God, for that matter, you know, a negative statement is, what, you would say it in a way, convertible, right? If no woman is Socrates, right? Socrates is not woman, right? If nothing composed, if God is simple, or if God is not composed, nothing composed is God, right? And we turn around with that. But, I mean, syllogism, you're using only universal terms, right? It's not too hard to see, right? That if no woman is Socrates, that Socrates is not a woman, right? Or a... This is not a woman, a woman of sacrifice. God is not composed, that means the woman is God, right? So you can turn around easily. Now I guess we'll leave the third figure to next time, right? And the third figure, you'll find out, you have only particular conclusions therein, right? So they say that it's easier to syllogize the negative than the affirmative, right? And easier to syllogize the particular and the universal, right? That's what you might expect, right? You'll see that. Now what do you see about the premises here? It's a little harder to generalize. The major is always universal. Universal, yeah. But the minor is all four. All four, right? The major and the second figure are universal, but they're more. I don't want to have a nice marriage with the syllogism right now. Especially with women students, you know, they say, I understood everything in the course until you started talking about A, B, and C, and then I got to go, boom! But you have to, you know, just throw this in slowly, you know. Some people want to, you know, get my devices, you know, go with, you know, Latin words, A, B, or A, E, I, O, for the four quarters of the square position, but I never thought through that. I think I got logic, I was thinking I was on my board, you know. I was on the spot a little bit, but I didn't try to memorize something, you know. And sometimes people would take, you know, like, when you went through the 16 in the first figure, and then we came to those universal rules, right, that the major premise has to be universal and the minor premise affirmative, right? But they'll try to make that a rule that you follow in deciding. Well, this is something that comes to you after you decide it. What's the thing? And then you make the induction. You say, yeah, you go to four valid forms, and in each of these ones, the major premise is universal in the first figure, and the minor premise is particular, right? I mean, it's affirmative, right? The major premise is universal in the minor is affirmative. That's the kind of thing you induce after you've gone through the 16, you know. You don't make that the rule of which you decide. But later on, you're better than mine if you want to, you know. We shall see you. Some books will use to talk about distribution, and I'll say whether it's just, you know, distribution. I'll give rules about whether the predicate is distributed. Yeah, but it's universal, not the same thing. No. Spread out all of them, just some of them. See, Thomas is, you're so glad you're in theology, you're used to second figure an awful lot, huh? Because you're so glad you're in God is not. Yeah. We won't be able to meet this week, I'll pray. No, you're in the meetings, chapters 11, 12, 13, actually. Okay, so we'll meet two weeks from now, I mean? Yeah. Okay. I thought you'd have time to forget all about the socialism. That was always again, a few more times. Yeah, I noticed that when I started, after we learned it then, when we did St. Thomas, then Father McGovern would always make us get the soldiers. Yeah. You saw the second figure, universal negative. Yeah. You see, like, when I teach the philosophy of nature, you know, and we show in the first book of natural hearing, that what changes is composed, right? Okay. Okay. Everything that changes is composed. And we kind of see that clearly if you follow that. And then we say that in theology, when you, after you show that God is simple, meaning not composed, right? Thank you. Thank you. Syllogize, right? But change is composed. God is not composed. Therefore, God does not but change. Well, it's like that second case we saw in the second figure, right? Every A is B and no C is what? B, right? Except in terms of term, you have God, a singular, right? Because you can already turn it around, right? If no woman is, if Socrates is not a woman, right, you can say no woman is Socrates. See what I mean? It's an individual term, right? So it's like it's universal negative, but it's not universal negative in that sense, right? I mean, no woman is, Socrates would be universal negative, but Socrates is not a woman, right? But you can turn it around, right, and say no woman is Socrates, right? So if you're saying, in a sense, that everything that changes is composed, and God is not composed, right? Turn around and say nothing composed is God, right? Yeah. Everything that changes is what? God. Everything that changes, right? Turn around, right? But not to get, you know, to be dandy about it, but I mean, you have to see that that's, that that's a vow, right? It's just a universal negative if you turn it around, right? Mm-hmm. It has a convertibility, universal negative, although it's not a universal negative in one way of stating it, right? Mm-hmm. See, breakfast is not a dog, it's not a universal negative state, it's about a singular, right? But you can turn it around and say no dog is a breakfast in. Mm-hmm. Right? So you can keep that validity, right? Yeah. Back to what I mean, body to say, you know, when Socrates is saying, he's socializing that the harmony of the body, the soul is not the harmony of the body, right? He takes three things that are said of one and are denied of the other, right? And one is that, um, resists the body, right? And it seems like the harmony of the body does not resist the body, but the soul does resist the body, like in the man casting or something like that, right? Or fighting his passions. Mm-hmm. So the soul is just the body, the harmony of the body is not just the body, therefore the soul is just the harmony of the body. Mm-hmm. And then he syllogizes that the soul, um, is, um, and he's argued before that the soul is just before the body, but even Simas admits that the harmony of the body is not just before the body. Mm-hmm. So what is it from the one that's united to the other, right? Mm-hmm. And then he argues that, like we saw earlier in the dialogue, that there's a harmony of the soul, right? Which is, the philosophy he's hanging at, the harmony of the soul. But there's not a harmony of harmony, right? Mm-hmm. You see? Um, so the soul, therefore, is not the harmony. Mm-hmm. You see? You see what you're doing, you tend to use the second figure a lot, right? And it makes no difference, you know, whether, which one you affirm it at, which one you deny it at, right? As long as you affirm it if one is denied it at the other, you see? Yeah. So those two forms are two, no A is B and every C is B, in reverse, yeah? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. And in a lot of cases, it didn't make any difference, which, so you can do it either way, but try to just find something. Mm-hmm. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. A particular conclusion, right? Just the four universal ones, the two in the first figure, one affirmative, one negative, and the two negatives, that's it. You can use again and again, right? You can use the third figure much, yeah. I was thinking of, kind of difficulty, in spiritual books sometimes they'll say, they'll give the advice, you should trust completely in God, but distrust completely in yourself. And it seems like you have to make some kind of distinctions, because you would say, if I trust completely in God and don't trust it all in myself, then God wants everyone to be saved, but some people aren't saved. So the reason they weren't saved was from themselves. Mm-hmm. So then they, it wasn't, you can't say it's all on God, so we can trust completely in God, but we also have to, if I said, I distrust completely in myself, that is, I'm trusting that I will reject grace, then I won't have any hope. Mm-hmm. So it seems like, that advice, isn't really something you can do, so it's difficult too. Yeah, I'm going to be kind of a way to state that. I was thinking again of, you know, I mentioned to you as you're reading Shakespeare's play, How You Like It? Do you know that play? Can you tell you about that? I think I read it, but it was a long time ago. I don't remember. Yeah. Well you know, Shakespeare, in the beginning there, he has the phrase, the natural bond of sisters, right? And of course, if there's a natural bond of sisters, the same reason there's a natural bond of what? Brothers, right? But he uses the phrase, the natural bond of sisters, but we're just going to, you know, think for that, right? Now, the two girls there, Rosalind and Celia, are not actually sisters, they're cousins, right? But they have a close bond, right? Which is like the bond of sisters, right? Okay. But then, the brothers, the Duke and his, what, remember brother who's his serp of the throne, right? Mm-hmm. They're actually brothers, but they're in conflict, right? Mm-hmm. And one, the original Duke, the true Duke, has fled to the forest of Arden, right? They're looking like Robin Hood out there with his followers, right? And his younger brother, as you serp the throne, and then you're going to, you know, plot to leave his brother in the forest there, right? But he's obviously been unjust, right? Then you have another pair of brothers, Oliver and Orlando, right? Where you have the reverse, where the older brother, Oliver, has inherited most of it, from his father, right? He's not providing it all for his younger brother, right? His education, and that sort, right? So you have, you know, in that case, the older brother being, in a way, unjust and kind to his younger brother, right? But in the other case, you have the younger brother usurping the throne of the older brother, right? So you're bound to think of, hey, there's something unnatural here, because if there's a natural bond, the sisters, there's also a natural bond and brothers, right? And so they're both in conflict with the natural bond there, right? But in a sense, the two cousins are being so close to each other, right? And that's why the Duke without his niece to stay, because they're so close, right? The one that's in company, but eventually he's going to banish the niece, because he gets jealous of her, right? Right. And banish her to Inchipua, you know, in the forest again, right? But in a sense, the fact that they are as close as sisters is kind of a, a showing up, you know, even more so to the brothers, right? Yeah. Because the bond of two cousins is not, by nature, is strong, is that of two brothers. Well, eventually, one of the brothers ends up in the forest, and eventually, both brothers, right? There's eventually reconciliation in the forest, right? But the forest is kind of symbolic of what nature is. And it's very clear because the duke, you know, when you first meet the duke in the forest there, and you're getting used to it, you know, hath not old custom made this, you know, or, you know, pleasing them. He did pop, you know, and he kind of likened his problem in existence, you know, in the woods. It's a very kind of beautiful way. He said, see, see, in one line, he captures perfectly, you know, that he didn't even bring out that problem, you know, in kind of our own existence. But he says, in this our life exempt from public haunt, he says, finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks. Sermons in stone, and good in everything. The idea of nature there is the measure of what's good and bad, right? There's something bad that is, you know, unkindness, and even more than unkindness, right? You know, of brother for brother, right? So they eventually reconcile it in the forest, right? The two pairs of brothers, right? And eventually, Orlando is going to marry Rosna at the end of the play, and Oliver, his older brother, is going to marry Cecilia, the other cousin, right? And the usurping duke, you know, he meets a monk in the forest, right? And he gives up the world and goes off to get pet in the monastery, right? So everybody's reconciled, you know. The duke is going back to see the stone again. And there's about four weddings there, right? And of course, it seems very natural about weddings, too, right? But thinking about that, and going back to the fact that our Lord, when he chose the first apostles, they're the ones that are closest to him, Peter and James and John, right? Peter and Andrew are brothers, right? And James and John are brothers, right? Why did he choose brothers, right, as the first apostles? All the apostles, those four were brothers, right? They're kind of, you know, the three that are associated from that, right? Why did he choose? I mean, is there something to be learned, right? There's something to be thought about there, in that he chose those who already had the natural bond of brotherhood, right? To make them apostles, and they're going to have now a supernatural bond, right? But why did he choose those who already have a natural bond before he gives them a supernatural bond, they might say. Why is that? Well, the minimum is to show if there's a harmony, right, between the natural bond of brothers, the supernatural bond, right? Maybe more than that, that it's not only compatible, but that the natural bond of brothers in some way disposes, right, the supernatural bond, right? It's just kind of clearly, you know, in this remarkable family there, the Therese, you see it come from, right? But, you know, I guess it's about all the sisters, I guess all of them, right? Ended up in the convent, right? You know, and there's some reason to think, you know, that even the sisters are, you can have some of them, you know, and it's talked about even the parents, you know. I mean, there's something there about the bond of sisters, right, that is compatible, right? Although, you know, St. Trez says in her life, you know, sometimes, she had this, I mean, it's urge to go speak to one of her sisters, and because of her life, she'd go, you know, and she'd see, and you described one scene there where she's kind of, you know, you know, you know, in case she wants to see them, but it's not a thing to do or something, you know. So, I mean, yeah, you have to rise above it, but nevertheless, I don't know, was Moses and Aaron brothers, or what? Yeah, Aaron. And Mary was her sister, right, you know? So, I don't think it means that the supernatural bond of brothers will necessarily be stronger, right, than the supernatural bond of those who are not brothers right now. And there's an article in there, a very interesting article about, you know, faith and what faith is necessary and so on. And Thomas, when he reasons that, he will point out that it's natural for man, right, when he's learning a science, huh, to believe is what teacher, right, and you don't just believe any Tom, Dick and Harry, right, but when you see the, you know, respect, let's say, that we have the tradition for Euclid or whoever it might be, right, it's reasonable to give a student faith in this man, right, and the thing I've noticed in philosophy, without that faith, you're not going to really come to, what, understand, right, these things. The end is not to simply believe, but to know, right, but you don't come to know very much unless you really believe, right, the master, right, you know. I was kind of struck by that because an example I saw kind of recently, I was studying the fifth book of wisdom again, and, you know, Aristotle gives the meanings of beginning, right, and the first meaning of beginning is the beginning of the table, right, and the second meaning is where it's most convenient to begin, see, and when I get up to leave the table, I'm not going to start from here because I'm here now in the middle, so I'm going to begin here, right, okay, and at that point Aristotle says, like in what, knowing, you don't always begin with the beginning of the thing, but what is more known to us, right, well, Thomas is very clear in his commentary, right, but what Aristotle is doing is they keep comparison, but he's not talking about the beginning of our knowledge there, that's a comparison, right, so that just as in knowing, we don't always begin with the beginning of the thing, as the great Heisenberg says, when we study reality, we never start at the beginning, I mean the beginning of reality, right, so likewise, when we start a journey, we don't always start at the beginning of the road, but the place which most can be in, you know, so if I live halfway down the road to Boston, in other words, getting the road to Boston, that would be ridiculous, right, but it's a likeness, right, but the beginning in our knowing doesn't come up really until the fifth sense, right, Thomas is very clear about that, right, well, someone's describing to me, you know, hearing a conversation between Monsignor Dianne, right, and John Gallup, and Gallup is looking at the text of our style there and kind of misunderstanding the second sense of the beginning, right, as if it's somewhat involved, you know, and someone included, you know, the beginning of what's more known to us, right, and Dianne's saying, oh, look at Thomas is saying, right, and so Gallup had misunderstood the text, right, as Monsignor Dianne said from the time, you know, Kajetan's mistake was trying to comment directly on Aristotle, right, you know, if Thomas is coming to Aristotle, you know, you read Aristotle first, then you read what Thomas says about Aristotle, then you think about the text, right, and you could see how, you know, Gallup was not doing that, which is what Thomas says, right, and so I was looking in my, in Pripyat Greek there at the Greek commentators there, and commentaries on the metaphysics that they have coupled in, and they seem to be making the same mistake Gallup was making right there, you know, so I can see how easy a man goes astray if he didn't believe, right, you know, and so I think I got further in philosophy because I believe men like, you know, someone's Indiana, you know, you believe in Thomas and so on, and I can see very much the necessity of, what, believing, right, huh, I think I've been a lot from Shakespeare, but I didn't believe that, you know, Shakespeare was a poet, you know, I wouldn't have read him as carefully as I did or kept on reading the miscarriage as I did, and so I can see the truth of that, right, but Thomas says, you know, a God in a way is doing something similar, right, when he requires faith, right, or the Vedic vision, right, but this is something in harmony with the nature of man to believe before he knows, right, and if that's true, even the things that we're capable of knowing are in actual powers, right, we can't get very far in knowing. Those things we're capable of knowing, right? Naturally, without belief, right? How can he come to the most privy now to without belief, right? That's kind of interesting the way he's preceding it, right? Because he's saying this is, he's raising a sense of what's natural to man to what is supernatural, right? Just like when he talks about the sacraments and how God uses something sensible, right, to lead us to something understandable and something spiritual, right? But this is a harmony of the nature of man, right? You see this in philosophy and everywhere else. You have to start with the sensible and bring somebody from the sensible to the things that are not able to be sensed, right? And God's doing the same thing there in the sacraments when he has a sensible sign of an invisible reality, you know, in grace. So in a way, I mean, you know how in a monastery or something like that you call each other brother or sister or something of this sort, you know? I mean, those words come from nature, right? It's like, you know, they say, you know, if you had a bad father, human father, right? And people have had a bad human father, it's hard for them to see their father, right? You know, but if you see what a father, a human father should be, you know? And I see it very much in Teresa in the suit, I think, you know, because she's a very good father, right? And a very good respect for a father, and even the father, you know, is sick later on. You have human concerns as well as spiritual concerns. But then you see her, you know, meditating on the Our Father, like they would say, you know, and just venting on the word of Our Father, she hasn't gotten beyond that. I mean, she's stopped at that. You know how sweet it is to call Him Father, you know? I mean, it's very compatible with their attitude towards your own human father, right? Well, I basically wish if you had a human father that was a skull in the world or a whistle or whatever it might be, or, you know, a concern for you, it would not be as easy for you to be devoted to God as your father in a somewhat different sense, obviously, right? So I think that there's some meaning that people don't bring out much. Maybe somebody has it, but I haven't seen it, you know? But I don't know exactly who's been struck by that or emphasized that, but maybe you run across something and that sort, but why did He choose brothers, right? For the first apostles and for the apostles closest to Him, right? Maybe there's a significance even, you know, in the fact that He does associate James and John with them, but then just Peter rather than Andrew, right? You know, so that isn't always that the brothers, right? You know, are together, right? But still, it seems to me there's something there's something to be learned from this, right? You might make, I don't know, they're making kind of an induction here, right? Taking the way Thomas talks about the sacraments being sensible, the way he talks about necessity of belief, right? But he argues in the sense from the human, right? But this had to be done in a way on the supernatural level, right? It's natural for a man to be done from the sensible, right? To the immaterial, even in philosophy, right? Both should be done with more, right? So God is doing the same thing with the sacraments, right? Brothers, right? Discussion of the natural here. I don't know if I did, but... Because that was, I think, somehow you were going to answer the difficulty about how you should take those values when you should be totally confident in God and totally distrust yourself. Yeah. It seems to go against the hope you're either going to be presumptuous because the God argument was fair because you're trusting in yourself. Yeah. Yeah. I'm just going to be kind of raising a more general thing there about, if you think of Fides and Ratios here, this work by the Holy Father, if you have, if you don't trust reason at all, right, you know, that seems to be an impediment, right, to the faith, what is St. Paul has that phrase, the Latin words, right, reasonable service of faith, right, if you rejected the reason, you're really what, based on faith, right, part of the lay there had a letter from Augustine one time where someone had asked Augustine whether faith and reason were compatible, right, and Augustine said, well, we're capable of faith because we have reason, so, you know, so I mean, you can't, I was reading St. Paul there, the first epistle to the Corinthians, right, you get the impression that the Corinthians are not the best of all, you know, they're just not the best of all, right, and, you know, Thomas presents the Corinthians as being mainly about the sacraments, right, that's about the baptism and about the marriage and what sort of sacrament of the Eucharist, but, anyway, he gets into the section there on the marriage before Paul is going to explain what it should be, he's criticizing some of the goings-on there, right, and in particular, apparently some man has shacked up with his father's wife, and this is terrible, right, and I guess, I mean, St. Paul is saying, even to the pagans, this is, you know, terrible, and you should not be tolerating this, right, they have to be exiled this man or, you know, ostracized him or, you know, he goes into a lot of these things that they have to interact with this, right, partly their pride because they're better than this man, obviously, but big deal, and you better miss man, right, you're the pig, you know, this is awful, because I could help but think, I mean, neither St. Paul nor Thomas, for that matter, mentioned Adepus the king, right, you know, I mean, you know, this is horrible to the Greeks, right, that a man should even unknowingly, right, you know, speak with his mother, right, and so, I mean, St. Paul, because I meant for something that natural reason would tell you is terrible, right, you know, so, free myself now, but I mean, it starts off by saying that the harmony of nature, right, the conflict, right, but then how one can dispose for the other, right, you know, they talk about the virtues, the human virtues are in one way more stable than the supernatural virtues, and that supernatural virtues, or the infused virtues, as they call it, can be lost by one moral sin, right, but the human virtues are quite a very repeated act, so one act contrary to them doesn't entirely destroy that virtue at all, right, but if you don't have those human virtues in addition to the infused virtues, there's an instability in your life, right, you know, I mean, where's the one epistles with St. Paul says something about, you know, that, you know, a man doesn't take care of his family is worse than the babies, right, you know? Yeah.