Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 49: Necessity, Per Se, and the Four Tools of Dialectic

Transcript
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Now, this is the way Aristotle speaks in the beginning of the topics and so-called book about places. But there he also speaks of the sophistical syllogism, which is opposed to dialectical syllogism. And then he talks about what they named from geometry, but the falsely graphic was done, the falsely drawn, right? A syllogism that would have a defect as opposed to what's requiring demonstration. But sometimes you just distinguish these two because these are the two that are what? Good, right? But a sophistical syllogism would appear to be a good dialectical syllogism, but it is not, right? And we'll talk about this later on in a little bit. And there are some things that would appear to be a demonstration that are not, right? Okay? But, anyway, these are the two forms that are good, huh? And sometimes Aristotle will, like in the beginning of the primalist here, he'll go back to what we saw in the logic of the second act, of what contradicting statements are, right? And he'll point out that the demonstrator, right, he takes one half of a contradiction and lays it down as necessarily true, right? And excludes the other half, right? Discards the other half as manifestly false, right? The dialectician, in the concrete, in his conversation with other man, he gives you, what? A choice, right? Do you think this is or is not so, right? And you say there's yes or no, right, huh? According to which one seems probable to you, right? So, the real difference there, right? Because the demonstrator sees one half of a contradiction necessarily true, right? The dialectician doesn't see the side as necessarily true, and therefore he gives you, what? A choice as to what seems more probable to you, right? Okay? Now, let's talk a little bit more about necessarily true here now. One thing that comes out in the post-analytics about the necessary, huh? Is the connection between the necessary and, what in Greek is called the kap al-to, right? Called per se in Latin, right? The through itself or the as such, right? Okay? Connection between these, the through itself or the as such. That phrase through itself as such is very abstract, as we just stated here, right? When you take an example, then you kind of get to see what you mean by this, huh? Suppose I say that two is a number. Is that necessarily true, that two is a number? Or that two is half of four? Is that necessarily true, too? Now, do you see a connection between these here and through itself or as such? Is two through itself a number? Is two through being true, what do you say? And of course, the number pertains to what two is, right? Okay? And so what something has through being itself, through being what it is, right? Obviously belongs to it, through itself, or as such, right? Now, half of four is not a part of the definition of true right, true right. Half of four is really a property of true right, but a property in the strict sense, huh? Something that belongs only to two, to every true and always, right? It's something that follows necessarily upon being true right, okay? So that, although in another sense, right, belongs to two, to itself, huh? Two through being two is half of four, right? Two as such is what? Half of four, right? Okay? Do you see that? Now, take another example here. If I say the triangle, a triangle is a plane figure. All right, say a triangle is a rectilineal plane figure, right? Does that belong to a triangle as such, to itself, to be a plane figure? Yeah. If you're going to define a triangle, you'd say it's a rectilineal plane figure, right? Contained by three straight lines, huh? So to be a plane figure, as opposed to a solid figure like a sphere or a cube like that, that belongs to a triangle because of what it is, right? Anything that pertains to the definition of a thing belongs to it, what? As such and to itself, right? Does it belong to a triangle as such to be a three-sided triangle as such? Yeah. So the genus or indifference, right, anything that is within the definition of a thing belongs to it through being what it is. It belongs to it as such, right? Okay? And sometimes Aristotle says if something's necessary, it's to itself or as such, right? And sometimes he says the reverse. If it's to itself or as such, it must be what? Necessary, right? Okay? Now, what if I say that a triangle has its interior angles equal to two right angles? Well, this is not part of the definition, is it, of a triangle, right? But it's belonging to a triangle as such in some other ways. It's something that follows upon the nature of triangling. And so the geometer, when he demonstrates this triangle, right, he shows that it belongs to a triangle through what it is, right? So, you know, it presupposes another theorem, but let's take it a little simpler than Euclid. Euclid does two still at the same time, right? But because of what a triangle is, you can always draw a straight line through one vertex that's parallel to the opposite side, right? And if you know the parallel theorems, you know these alternate angles are equal and these alternate angles are equal. And then it's obvious that these two are added to those two, and the third one will make, what, two right angles, right? So, you're seeing something now that belongs to the triangle as such, right? So, being a triangle, right? Something that necessarily follows upon the triangle, right? That if a triangle is made, you've made angles equal to red angles, okay? Even though that's not the definition of what you're doing, right? You're making a triangle, right? But something that follows necessarily, right? Now, you can see the importance of this for the necessary and the importance from this for definition, right? The definition gives you things that belong to a thing as such to itself. And the definition also is involved in seeing what follows upon the nature of the thing or what it is, because the definition is speech, making known what a thing is, right? Making known the nature of the thing, right? And once that nature is made known clearly through the definition, then you can see what belongs to the thing through its nature, right? Okay? If the nature is not understood clearly enough, you might not see what follows from it, huh? Do you see that? Okay. Of course, it was Plato, the great Plato, who first brought out the importance of the through itself, the katao-ko in Greek, right? Okay? For epistabic, for necessary knowledge, right? But now, if I say that a triangle is green, a triangle is green, well, a triangle might be green, right? But is the through being a triangle that is green? Does it belong to the triangle as such to be green? And could you know by thinking about what a triangle is? Could you discover that a triangle is green? No. It doesn't pertain to the definition of triangle. And does it follow necessarily upon what a triangle is? So I could never demonstrate that a triangle is green. Reason, huh? Now, I could go back to my senses, right? And I might see a green triangle, right? Okay? That would be a matter of sensing, but not a matter of what? Demonstrating in reason, huh? Okay. Now, snow is white. Does it belong to snow as such to be white? Maybe it does. But I don't see that it belongs to snow as such to be white, huh? In other words, I don't know well enough, huh? The nature of snow to see that it must be white, huh? Maybe somebody else does, but I certainly don't see it that well enough. I say snow is white, or even that all snow is white, because of the induction, right? The snow that I see, right? It's all been white, huh? But if someone went to Mars or some other place and said, you know, there's green snow up there, I'd be surprised, right? Would I say it's impossible? See, if a man lived in darkest Africa, and he was black, and every man he saw was black, right? He'd say all men are black, just like he would say all snow is white. White. All men are black, like all snow is white. Because he'd never seen anything other than a black man, right? But would his mind see that a man must be black? Because when one tries to define man, one defines man as an animal with reason, right? One doesn't put black there in the definition of man, right? So, that all snow is white would be, for me, a statement that I see as probable, right? And we see it as being necessarily true. But snow as such has got to be white, huh? But if someone said that a triangle, I know if a triangle or a metatriangle that didn't have its interior angles, you could have two right angles. I'd say you're crazy, or you're using the word triangle in a different sense, right? Now, sometimes, you know, people will talk about a triangle drawn from the North Pole down to the equator, right? You draw a line from the North Pole down to the equator, and then you go over a while in the equator, and then you go up again, right? So, you've got two right angles down here, and then you've got something up here, you know, an angle up here. So, you've got more than two right angles, right? But that's being, what, sophistical in the first way we'll talk about it. You're equivocating on the word, what, triangle, right? Okay, so, that's not a plain figure, right? It's not a plain surface, right? So, if you're taking a triangle right equivocally, then you see that it has to have its interior angles and right angles, right? What's interesting, the possibility, sometimes there's a lot of reasons for it being necessary to think about the two itself, and sometimes reverse, right? And Thomas says, well, isn't he violating his own rule that we don't argue in a, what, circle, right? And Thomas says, well, the real demonstration is from necessary to, what, to itself, right? But you might tell you it's a probable opinion, and certainly won't have played to this, right? It's a common opinion, that science or necessary knowledge is about the, what, if you stay made, this real knowledge is about the as such, right? And then we might reason from that, back to this, right? Okay? But as far as the demonstration is concerned, the reasons for it to be necessary to its being about the two itself, or the what, as such, right? Okay? So, is that because, is the first thing, is that the demonstration has to be certain? Yeah, yeah. But anyway, apart from that, right, in fact, there are still reasons in both ways, it very much shows the connection of these two, right? And I ask myself, you know, I've talked to you about the first road and the natural road in our knowledge, right? And sometimes I reason that the first road must be the, what, natural road, right? And sometimes I reason that the natural road must be the first road. But because they're kind of convertible, right, then, the nature of the thing, or what it is, is what's first in that thing, right? You must be what you are before you can be anything else. Because the first road, it must be the natural road, and as the natural road, it must be the history. They're very closely tied to an actual first, right? That's why in the definition of nature in the second book of physics there, first is in the definition of nature, huh? You essentially see that as being first, huh? So here you see that connection between necessary and as such, right? And you know my name for Becky's statement, right? The way I translate it to reasoned-out knowledge, right? I think that helps you to see. One could never reason out that a triangle must be green, right? One could reason out that a triangle has its interior angles, it's either the right angle. Because that is a necessary connection to what a triangle is, right? And if I know what a triangle is, I might be able to reason out that it's green. But never that it's green, that would be at best a matter of sensing, right? You see that? Not a matter of reasoning out something. When I define man, I define man as an animal with reason, right? Okay? Now the old stock example used to be of a property of man that he's risible, right? Capable of laughter. Kind of a good example used to take in the medieval thinkers there, huh? But do you see a connection between being an animal with reason and being capable of laughter, right? Because the incongruity that provokes laughter is something that reason will see, yeah? And with the animal aspect, you know, the exterior movements of the body parts, right? When you laugh, huh? You see? But I can see a connection, therefore, between the ability to laugh and what man is, an animal with reason, right? But do I see a connection between being an animal with reason and being white like I am? Because you're an animal, you have to be white? Well, I'll tell you to watch out for black cats, right? Across your path, huh? So, because you're an animal, you don't have to be white, do you? And because you have reason, there's a connection there, right? So maybe an animal with reason is white, but it'd be a matter of sensation, looking at myself in the mirror. Oh, yeah. Or seeing you or something, right? You know? You see that? So, sometimes they would distinguish more than one sense of that. such, right? And we're talking here about two senses, two most basic senses. One is where part of the definition or part of the definition belongs to that which is being defined as such, right? And the other where the property, right, belongs to its species as such, right? But the property is more defined by the species and the others just reverse, right? The predicate will be defining the subject of the statement. This is part of the way we recognize the as such, right? Now, take a little different example of this here. Must a philosopher love reason? Must a philosopher love reason? Must a philosopher popcorn? What did you say about those two questions? Yes. Come up to the second. Now, there must be some as such there, right? If it's necessary that the philosopher love reason, right? But now, I might begin with the very definition of philosopher, right? And say, well, a philosopher, as the Greek word means, is a lover of wisdom, right? This is the very definition of philosopher, right? He's a lover of wisdom, right? Now, Shakespeare says, love and reason keep a little company nowadays. But what about, he's going to be thinking romantically, right? Okay? But now, is there a connection between the other part of that definition of wisdom and what? Because wisdom would seem to name, what, the highest or the greatest perfection of what? A reason, right? Even the way the modern biologists name men the homo sapiens, right? They're using the word homo there, which means man and human being in Latin. They're using it, though, in a broader sense, for a man-like thing. So, popularly, you might say ape. Okay? If I used to say to the students, it used to be a book you see in the bookstores, or one of the ones, there was a book you could see in the window. The naked ape, right? It's about man, the naked ape. I said, is that the scientific name of man, the naked ape? Man has much less, you know, fur, we'll call it, hair, than the ape has, right? So, compared to the age, he's not naked, right? But, that's not the scientific name of man, is it? It's homo sapiens, the wise ape, right? Of course, obviously, man is wise compared to the other apes, because he has, what? Reason, okay? Or excellence of reason, right? So, wisdom seems to name that excellence of reason, huh? So, could I love wisdom, which is the chief good or the greatest good of reason, without loving reason? So, if it belongs to the philosopher as such to be a lover of wisdom, and wisdom as such is the, what? Highest or greatest perfection of reason, well, could one love wisdom, then, without loving reason? No, could one love health without loving one's own body? Because health is a good body, right? And perhaps you could say, going both ways, right? Do you love your body if you don't love health? Or do you love health without loving your body? If I want your good, I must love you, right? If I love you, I must want your good, right? So, if I want the good of the body, which is health, I must love the body, right? If I love the body, I must want the good of the body, which is health, right? So, if I love wisdom, then, I have to love reason. And maybe the universe is true. If I love reason, I have to love, what? Wisdom, right? And then I tell the students, but man is an animal with reason, so if you don't love reason, you don't love yourself. If you don't love wisdom, you don't love yourself. But things belong as such, right? If man is an animal with reason, how does man love himself if he doesn't love reason, right? And if he loves reason, doesn't he have to love the perfection of reason, the good of reason, right? So, what about in the angelic order? What's an angel with love reason? Well, yeah. I mean, he's got something better to reason, you know? He's got understanding, right? I think I mentioned how sometimes we call reason understanding, you know? Understanding can name the act, but it can name the faculty, right? But it's, sometimes they will, what? Divide understanding into, what? Understanding and reason, okay? Because man has a very weak way of the ability to understand, right? This is what understanding means here, right? By the angel, he understands everything he naturally understands at once, huh? My son Marcus, when he was a little boy, said, why can't we be born on everything we need to know? I said, you want to be an angel? I said, an angel is great, knowing everything he actually knows, right? Yeah, it's pretty good, you know? He liked that, huh? So, when Shakespeare defines reason, he defines it as the ability for large discourse, right? Looking before and after, right? But looking means what? Trying to see, trying to understand, right? Man is more trying to understand than actually understanding, but doesn't understand some things, right? But you know, like Augustine says, there are more things in the Bible I don't understand than that I do understand, right? Even though he devoted his life to understanding the Bible, he might say. So, since man has imperfectly what is meant by understanding, he goes to understand, he gets a new name, right? Just like the other examples we gave there, right? It's like the kitten gets a new name, right? And the adult cat keeps the name cat because he is fully what the cat is, right? You can see the angels, right? If he loves, if he feels to understand, he obviously loves truth and wisdom, right, huh? That's why I sense the fallen angels are going to be tormented, right, huh? Because they naturally want to see God face to face, right? But they won't. It's very frustrating. It's very frustrating. Frustration lead back in this life. And the souls in purgatory are extremely anxious to see God as he is, right, huh? So I think it matters to get to see him face to face, right? And you have to be purified, huh? Purged, huh? St. John the Cross said to his friend, you know, pray that I have my purgatory heir. Unusual request, right? Of a friend, right? But, you know, it's a very wise request, huh? Let's look a little bit more at dialectic. Aristotle, in dialectic there, in the first book, he talks about the two arguments that the dialectician uses. The dialectician uses not only the dialectical syllogism, but also uses induction. Now, induction is considered more an argument of the dialectician than of the demonstrator because induction by itself doesn't tell you that something must be so. You know, if you cut open a thousand frogs and each frog has a three-chambered heart, you would guess that all frogs have three-chambered hearts, right? But does it follow necessarily that because I cut open a thousand frogs and everyone had a three-chambered heart, it becomes very probable, you might say, right? That all frogs have a three-chambered heart. But do you see it as being necessarily so? And I could produce a thousand numbers that are odd, right? And that doesn't make it, what, necessarily so that all numbers are odd, right? In fact, there's an infinity of numbers, right, that are odd, and this doesn't prove that they're necessarily odd, right? I think we mentioned before when we talked about induction that we always come to universal statements through induction, right? But in some cases, it's only through induction that we come to accept the universal statement. In that case, we have a kind of probability about it, right? But in other cases, it's not through induction alone that we come to see it, but through understanding better the terms which is composed, right? So, in the case of the accents, for example, we come to understand that a whole is larger than its part, right? Through seeing holes and parts and experiencing them, right? But we understand enough about what a whole is and what a part is to see that a whole must be what? Its parts, right? Because a whole, as such, has parts, right? So, to say there's no more than one of its parts is to say it doesn't have parts. That's a real contradiction, right? And likewise, we might, you know, originally come to understand what an odd number is and what an even number is, and that an odd number is not even through induction, right? But we understand enough about what an odd number is and what an even number is to see that no odd number is what? Even, right? Again, by the definition, right? This is possible, right? So, the dialectician has two arguments, the dialectical syllogism and induction, right? And you could contrast that with what you have in rhetoric, right? Because in rhetoric you have two arguments, too, but they're the anthony and the example, right? But dialectic and rhetoric have a certain likeness, the two of them, and both of them, in the argumentative part of rhetoric, enable you to make a, what, reasonable guess, right? Okay? But dialectic is an art for guessing about the universal, and rhetoric, in its argumentative part, is an art for guessing about the singular in human affairs, right? We're not so much interested in the singular elsewhere, right? But we are interested in knowing if this man is guilty or not, right? Whether we should go to war with this man or this country, right? And so, anthony and example are arguments for guessing about the singular contingent, right? But dialectical syllogism and induction are arguments for guessing about something universal, like whether virtue can be taught, and so on, right? Okay? Now, in the first book of the, well, a book about places there, so-called topics, Aristotle distinguishes the four tools of the dialectician, and as Albert the Great says in his commentary on that, this, in a way, is an art by itself, right? The four tools, huh? But then, in the later books, he gives places where you can use the four tools, right? Okay? But, of course, with the idea of not trying to teach you the whole logic, but some basic things that you can use, right? Well, the four tools of dialectic are very basic here. Now, the fundamental tool of the dialectician is the ability, the ability to select probable statements, right? Statements, right? The ability to select probable premises, huh? And, of course, that involves recognizing what we mean by a probable statement, right? Or a probable opinion, you may be more precise here. You have the opinions of all men or most men, right? For all or most men to give an art to the most famous, huh? On that ability, as far as all or most men are concerned, you're going to run into these things simply from, what? Living with men, right, huh? But the opinions of all or most men in an art or science, the most famous one, to some extent, you will be exposed to these without, search these without searching them out, right? You're Einstein or somebody quoted, right? But you might have to go, what? Read some of these men, right? Okay? I mean, some of the famous things like, smoking is dangerous to your health, you're going to have a thing. Or most doctors may be saying that, right, huh? Okay? So you recognize this as a probable opinion, right? Smoking is dangerous to your lung. But Aristotle speaks of dividing these probable opinions, right? According to the matter, right, huh? Okay? And in a way, he's like dividing almost, like, the sciences, right? Some are opinions of natural philosophy, some in logic, right? And some in ethics or political philosophy, right? Okay? And that sounds kind of obvious, but you'd be surprised how it's ignored, right? I remember after the close of the Second Vatican Council and so on, that people are trying to cash in now on the Second Vatican Council, so they're writing books that are in accord with the Second Vatican Council, so to speak. And this extended even down to philosophy, right? And so I was getting, you know, as you often get as a professor, free copies of books, so I think you'll adopt your courses, right? And they have one on the philosophy of man, whatever that's supposed to be, you know, and one on ethics and one on something else, right, and so on. And, you know, in this sort of ecumenical spirit, you know, you have selections from a bunch of different thinkers, obviously, right, who are thinking different things about the same thing, presumably. But anyway, in the one here, you've got a selection from Aristotle's three books on the soul, right? And then you have a selection from Karl Marx, where he's talking about man in society, right? Well, that's kind of a false comparison, isn't it? You see? Aristotle's somewhere up there talking about the soul, and Marx is talking about man as you meet him in society. Well, no, you should be comparing Aristotle's politics to that, right? You know, Aristotle says man is by nature a political animal, talks about man in society, right? You know? In other words, you're making kind of a false dichotomy, right? You know? As if Marx thinks that man is a social animal or a political animal, right? And Aristotle thinks he's something as a soul. You're making kind of a false dichotomy, right? Have you just, you know? So Aristotle, in his first tool, he's talking about selecting statements, you know, that are held by all or most men, or all or most men in a given field are the most famous, right? But dividing them according to the what? The subject. Yeah, the matter. Yeah. Okay? And there he distinguishes between the natural and those things that contribute to a choice or avoidance or choice, right? Which would be ethical. and then the ones that are pertaining to logic, right? And then the third thing he speaks of is what? And ordering them from the general to the what? Particular, yeah. And see, all of that enables you to select quickly, right? The opinions you want in a given matter, right? And the most basic ones, which affluence all the other thinking of the person. Because you've what? Ordered them from the general to the particular. And especially if the man has a definition of something, right? As you know, that's very basic, right? Influence all his thinking, right? Okay. If you think philosophy is in the search, okay. That's his opinion, right? You see? But if you think philosophy is in the search, that's going to influence all the rest of your thinking, right? You're not going to be looking for demonstrations, for one thing. You see? Okay. So, that first tool is the ability to select probable premises, right? But that involves recognizing what a probable premise is and also dividing them and ordering them, right? According to the subject matter. Say a little more about the aspect of ordering them according to general and particular. Well, you know what general and particular means, right? Okay. So, let's see, you're in ethics now, right? Well, what's most basic in ethics is good and better. What do you mean when you say something is good? What do you mean when you say something is better, right? That's more general than what do you mean by justice or what do you mean by courage or what do you mean by temperance, right? Okay. And that's more general than what do you think of premarital sex or what do you think of, you know, something more particular, right? So, what is a man's opinion about good, huh? Okay. Now, when we first define good, right, the first definition really of good is that good is what all desire, what all want. Okay. But Socrates, you know, in the Euthyphro, he teaches us how to ask a very fundamental question about such things, huh? The question Socrates would ask after we define the good is what is desired, what is wanted, right? Do you want it because it's good or is it good because you want it? And, of course, the answer you eventually see if you proceed correctly is that we want it because it is good. Okay. But there's all kinds of difficulties before you can see that it's right. But now, if a man thinks that something is called good because we want it, that's going to influence all his thinking about good, right? Nothing in itself is good or for that matter bad, right? But we call it good because somebody happens to want it. There's all kinds of people running around with that idea about the good, right? But that opinion about the good is going to influence all thinking about these things, huh? Okay. And notice, if something is good because you want it, then it's better or good because you want it more. Okay? Now, when I take that up in ethics, the first thing I show is that something is not good because we want it, right? Right? But that we want it because it is good, but it takes some time to show that. And then after you show that, right, then you can syllogize that something is not better because you want it more because it's not good because you want it. See? Okay? You always start off with something very simple. You say, if something is good because you want it, and everything you wanted was good for you, wasn't it? And I take always as an example when you're at the party and the host or host says, you want another drink? And you say, yes. And after you drink this last drink, you go, mm-hmm. Well, there's one too many, right? You've got to go and you're embarrassed and so on. And you recognize now that what you wanted was not, in fact, good for you. It's not other people saying it's not good, but you yourself recognize that. But the kid that wanted to drive his car a hundred miles an hour down the curvy road and he ended up, you know, in a tree, right? And he's still alive, you know, he's a tractor, you know, and his car is ruined, you know. Even he might think it wasn't good for him to drive his car a hundred miles an hour, right? But he wanted to do it, right? Okay? So they're very, very obvious examples, you know, to show that something is not good for us because he wanted, right? Okay? But then you have to, you know, do other things to show the opposite, right? Okay? But, once you've shown that, then you can show that something is not better because you want it more, right? So when you take up Socrates' disagreement with Athenians in the Apology, right? You know, Athenians want the goods of the body and exterior goods more than the goods of the soul. And Socrates wants the goods of the soul more than the goods of the body and exterior goods. Socrates thinks they're better. And these are better. And the Athenians think the goods of the body and exterior goods are better. I say, a false solution would be to say, you know, well, Socrates, if you want those more, go for those. Or you want these and go for these. But if you've already shown that something is not good because we want it, then you can't say it's better for us because we want it more. The ball game is over. You've got to give a reason for it. Once you have to give a reason for saying the goods of the body and exterior goods are better, you've found how to give a reason for that. There's one fallacious reason you can give, which is not too hard to solve. But there's all kinds of reasons you can give for saying that the goods of the soul are better than the goods of the body and exterior goods. You see? So anyway, you can find little thinkers who will say that the only reason we're going to call something good is that people actually want it. So that's an example of the most general opinion about good, right? or take the better now. When Aristotle takes up the better there, he says that the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end and the whole is always better than the part. But those are very general statements about the better, right? So if you arrange Aristotle's opinions, you start with the opinion about the good and about the better and then you go down to his opinions about the chief good of man, right? And eventually his opinions about courage and temperance and justice and all the way down, right? Okay. In the same way in political philosophy, right? I mean, Aristotle begins by saying man is by nature a political animal, right? You know, he needs to live in society, right? He's not self-sufficient and so on, right? He doesn't need society of other men. He's either a beast or a god, but not human being, right? And then you start to go down to more particular things, you know? The need for government but then the various forms of government, right? So on, huh? So the most common opinions are going to come up again and again and again, right? So you want to have those down and you, you know, select those when you're going to talk about these things, huh? See that? So that's the first tool of dominant, right? The ability to select probable opinions, right? Requires to some extent the experience of men in general but also some experience of men in these particular things, right? Okay? So I'm always quoting Einstein when I talk about science or I'm quoting Mozart when I talk about music, right? But I have, you know, that might require some reading in my heart, right? Because not everything maybe that Einstein said, most people have gone and read it actually, right? But you tend to arrange these things, right? So I always keep in mind what Einstein says about the hypothesis, huh? That's freely imagined, right? Because that's a very general opinion. Einstein has opinions about quantum theory in particular, right? And so on, right? And it's good to know those two but this first one is more useful to know because it's going to be brought up again an Indian hypothesis, right?