Prima Pars
Lecture 5: Faith and Reason: Their Harmony and Mutual Support

Transcript
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Well, the first idea is that it strikes the senses, right? That which strikes the senses and brings to mind something other than itself, right? So the miracle, for example, is something that the senses, right? Can perceive and it brings to mind the God, right? As being the author of what is being confirmed by a miracle. Or again, the fulfillment of a prophecy, right? The fulfillment of it is something sensible, right? And therefore you realize that this is being foretold centuries before, right? That's the motive of credibility, right? But you might say that to be moved by signs is most natural for a man. That's where we first learn, right? By sensible signs. There is a similar reason we don't come to talk about the sacraments, you know. Why are the sacraments, why is grace given to us under the likeness of something sensible? Well, again, it goes back to the nature of man as an animal that has, what? Reason, right? And because he's an animal, he starts with his, what? Senses, huh? There's a similar reason for this here, too, huh? It's an occurrence of the nature of man as an animal that has reason, right? That he had this sensible, meaning by signs, motives of credibility, right? Who's a modern philosopher there? A lot of them do it. But Hume is, I guess, the most famous one. Hume is always attacking the credibility of miracles. He can not be even for my causality, so. Yeah, yeah. I think he's a reference now to human people like that, right? Because it's close to the end. If anyone says that all miracles are impossible, and that therefore all reports of them, even those contained in sacred scripture, are to be set aside as fables or myths, or that miracles can never be known as certainty, nor can the divine origin of the Christian religion be proved from them, let them be anathema, right? Okay? So it's very strong, then, about the authenticity and the authority of the miracles, huh? As both able to, what? Make credible in the faith. But they couldn't do that, unless, as the fourth thing says here, they could be known with some, what? Certainty, right, huh? Yeah. Okay? That's that thing in C.S. Lewis's biography there, you know, where he's kind of an atheist for a certain period of his life there, and he's walking across the campus, and one of the other professors is saying, you know, the evidence for the resurrection is pretty good, you know? And C.S. Lewis spoke of that sinking feeling he had. How am I going to handle this now? That little book I gave you, was it? Alexis Carle? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Because he was not, you know, he didn't want to publish this or anything like that, you know, openly because his scientific authority would be called in question, you know? But he's kind of forced by the truth itself to admit that something has happened here. Now, the next thing he's important to do, and Thomas is always insisting, following Augustine, Augustine Thomas, that the ascent to faith is nevertheless a, what? Free act, right? And that therefore it's meritorious, right? Okay? Okay. I get no merit for assenting to the statement that no odd number is even, or every whole is more than one of its parts, right? Because my mind or my reason is forced by the truth itself to assert these things, right? But what you believe, you're sent to because you're, what? Reason is moved by a will, okay? But if it's going to be meritorious, will it be meritorious every time? Because you have to be in the state of grace in order to, for something to be truly meritorious, doesn't it? Yeah, yeah, yeah. There's got to be a free act here. Yeah, yeah, it has to be free, but you also have to be in the state of grace. And couldn't you have somebody ascent to faith without being in the state of sanctifying grace? Yeah, you could have unformed faith, yeah. Yeah, so not every act of faith would be... No, no, but it can be meritorious. Oh, it can be, yes. Yeah, faith formed by charity. You know, in Vatican I there, or in Vatican II, rather, in that premium, right, to the De Verbo, right, it ends up with that quote from Augustine, you know, that the whole world, by believing, might come to hope, and by hoping, come to love, huh? So in the order of generation, in the order of time, belief is before hope, and hope is before charity, but then charity can form hope, and faith, so St. Paul speaks of charity believes all, hope's all, right? That's formed faith, right? That's the faith that saves, right? Formed faith, huh? So if anyone says that the ascent to Christian faith is not free, but is necessarily produced by arguments of human reason, and that would be like what we have in geometry, right, at that demonstration, or that the grace of God is necessary only for living faith, which works by charity, let them be anathema, right? So he speaks of it being a gift to God. He saw the text earlier, remember? That faith, even without charity, is still a gift of God. Remember that text back there? Um, anyway, it's got here in the canon, anyway. Okay. And then the last canon here. If anyone says that the condition of the faithful, and of those who have not yet attained... Part two, are you looking for that? Oh, okay, because over there, you're there. Corollary. Yeah. The last page for the, oh, page 10. Right, paragraph right above part three there, which is corollary concerning the nature of faith. I don't know, I see it on top of 13, can you? Yeah, okay, yeah. Right above part. And so faith in itself, even though it may not work through charity, is a gift of God, right? And separation is a work belonging to the order of salvation. Okay. So it's not the faith that saves, but it's the beginning. It's the beginning of the... It's the beginning of the... Yeah. So now the sixth canon here. If anyone says that the condition of the faithful, and those who have not yet attained to the only two faiths alike, so that Catholics may have a just cause for calling in doubt, by suspending their sin, the faith which they have already received in teaching the church until they've completed a scientific demonstration of the credibility to their faith, let them be, what, anathema, right? Because you wonder sometimes, you know, how people nowadays sometimes in the church there, they're so poorly instructed as to what the articles of faith are. People are not in the faith today. Yeah, yeah. Faith is what's important. Tom Sequence works the so-called Naples Sermons, right? Which you kind of make into kind of like a treatise, but he's going through the articles of the faith, right? And apparently he had the churches packed, you know, with people coming over to hear what he had to say. But they don't explain these things, you know. I remember my mother would come back from church on Sunday, you know, and say, you know, why doesn't the priest ever explain the, you know, puzzling over the gospel or some message, you know, some puzzling thing in there, and they never really, you know, explain the thing very much, you know. Maybe they don't believe it themselves. Yeah, could be, could be. Years ago there, you know, before Vatican II there, when you had, you know, more fixed readings each Sunday, right? You probably saw those things that Dominicans did, you know, where they had the, the catenary of Thomas for each gospel, and then they had, you know, anywhere from seven, ten speeches, sermons by the church fathers on that particular thing. What a beautiful thing just to prepare. I, as soon as I, I still have it in four volumes. Maybe I'll get you something. But, I mean, you just go through the whole year, the liturgical year, and read, like, each week, you know, the, the sermons for that Sunday. And, uh, if priest did that, I mean, you know, he'd be giving much better. And, uh, if priest did that, I mean, you know, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the sermons and more orthodox I know I know you prepared him for that way how's he supposed to prepare a sermon when he's been taught in the seminary that Jesus never said those things yeah that's terrible yeah yeah so you wonder what's the state of their faith is right in some of these people you know but I was still wrapping the bottom more catechism I mean we memorize the thing I don't know how much we understood but you know they stick with you and then as later years you had something to come back to and think about now we get to chapter fourth on faith and reason so part one the two fold order of the knowledge of divine things the two ways in which they are to be distinguished the perpetual agreement of the catholic church has maintained and maintains this too that there is a two fold order of knowledge distinct not only as regards its source but also as regards its what object what's the distinction of these according to these two ways first of all by their principle with regard to the source we know at the one level by natural reason or by the natural light of reason at the other level by divine faith by the light of faith and then by their object with regard with regard to the object besides those things to which natural reason can attain there are proposed for our belief mysteries hidden in God which unless they are divinely revealed are incapable of being known known but notice you can also know some things by both by both natural light of reason and by the light of faith it's kind of interesting if you think about the ten commandments say right are the ten commandments known by the light of faith or by the light of reason more by the light of faith and reason but they can be known by faith take the example of the fourth commandment honor your father and mother right well in the book called the topics which is Aristotle's book on Dialogical Reasoning he's talking about what an problem is right he says if somebody is in doubt with his snow is white he says this is not Dialogical problem such a man is lacking sensation he says okay if a man you know doesn't think you should honor your father and mother right he's not in need of argument he says he's in need of being punished just obviously Aristotle right that if you don't honor your father and mother you know it's not a question of should I honor my father and mother you know that's not a question for Aristotle right it's obvious that you should honor your father and mother and therefore someone who questions this is not in need of being reasoned with but he's in need of being punished whereas you see it's naturally known right and that's the fourth commandment or in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle is taking up what virtue is right and virtue lies in the middle between two extremes and Aristotle is pointing out there's no middle what of the extreme okay so you can't say you know well if you if you commit adultery too much or too little that's bad just the right amount no adultery is already Aristotle says by definition an extreme right okay just like Aristotle murder right you know if you murder too much or too little that's bad murder a matter amount don't steal too much or too little no but in the definition of murder or in the definition of stealing or in the definition of adultery is already included it's extreme yeah yeah so there's no mean of that it's an obvious example right it's an adultery example he uses right so there are things that can be known both by the natural light of reason right and by the light of what faith and this is you know forgotten a lot of times in contemporary discussions you know where you know if by the light of faith you know that abortion is wrong right or homosexuality is wrong well then it's only a matter of faith right it's not a religion right you see and Plato there in his last work the laws right the Athenian stranger proposes a law against homosexuality in the laws on the grounds that it's contrafusing against nature okay so natural reason can know that homosexuality is something bad right and it can also be known and even better you might say by the light of faith but it can also be known the natural light of reason but people don't realize that two different ways of knowing can sometimes know the same thing and the first example of this in our knowledge is the senses right that I can know the roundness of this mug here by the sense of what touches I'm knowing it now right and I can know it by my what eyes right and my eyes don't know the roundness of it in the same way the sense of touch does sense of touch knows it through the hardness of it right okay the sense of sight knows it through the what color right but but they're both knowing the shape of it yeah so if you put a rubber ball in my hand I could feel it right you know if my eyes are closed you put a rubber ball in my hand I could feel it and see that it's round it's vertical right and if you just set it on the thing and I didn't touch it I could see that it's round too so it is possible for two different senses to know the same thing but in different what ways okay I was reading the thing by he's a professor he's a I guess a real diehard Calvinist and he claims that like when it comes to like articles of faith and like that he rejects the concept of natural reason is able to know it and he says that you know when Aquinas interpreted I guess Aristotle and said that you you can't know certain things you know by natural reason the things of God that he in effect opened up the way to rationalism and that this is you know progressive way to Descartes and then you know and then this is why we have one of the big I guess messes we have right now in denial of objective truth because you know he you know by saying that natural reason can't know things of you know things of faith you're opening up the way to rationalism I guess I know that is that based on his I guess you know the fact that because we're so depraved you know told depravity that the world is totally useless in knowing the things of God or yeah I mean they might go to that extreme right you know you have the you have fideism as they call it I guess is the name for that people who say you know that you can't really about a God except by faith right and that's conduit to what you know St. Paul was saying in the teaching of the Vatican I right because they quote St. Paul the things from Romans 120 right okay but the church all stated in its own words there so there's something you can know about God right okay but other things about God you can't know except by faith right and those are more properly the articles of faith right and the things that can be known by reason as well as by faith about God are sometimes called the preambula what walks before right okay but basically it's the Trinity and the what incarnation right and then you could say those things are defined by the Trinity incarnation right okay but those are the fundamental things so like when we make this on the cross say in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit we're touching upon those two mysteries right the mystery of the Trinity and we say in the name of the Father the Son and the Holy Spirit and then making the sign of the cross get me in trouble in Saudi Arabia doing that get me in jail when it's speaking about the what what was free incarnation yeah yeah so but you would say whatever is defined by them right so if you define the church let's say as the mystical body of Christ well then the church is going to be a mystery too right okay as the as the as the as the Even though you can know, like with the shape of the mug, you can know that both through the sense of touch and through the sense of sight. Yeah, the things I know by sight, like color, that I don't know at all by touch. And the things I know by touch, like hot and cold, I don't know by sight, right? But I take the example to show that it's possible for the same thing sometimes, right? To be known in two different ways, right? So some people jump to the idea that if the church teaches this, then you naturally can't know it. It can't be something in it. And I said the first example to refute that is that, well, so if the eyes know it, then the touch can't know it, because the eyes are a different sense of the touch, right? Well, the eye has a different sense than the touch, right? But, and they're not going to know the same thing in the same way. If they knew the same thing in the same way, then they wouldn't be the same sense, right? You know? But it's possible for them to know the same thing, but not in the same way. In Aristotle, you know, in the Dianima, we remember those distinctions between the private sensibles, right, which are known by each sense and only by that sense, right? And then the common sensibles, like surface and shape and so on, right? Which can be known by more than one sense, huh? But they know it as a kind of modification of their private sensibles. So I know the shape of this table here by the end of the color of the table, right? Okay? But I know it by my sense of what? Touched by the end of the hardness. The hardness gives way, right? It gets hard and it doesn't give way, okay? So, but I can know the same thing in different ways, huh? And you can say, too, that even with our sense knowledge, there's more certitude when you know the same thing in two ways, right? Okay? That's why it's very important in the development of us, I suppose, is this hand and eye coordination, right? No, but if you have a man, somebody who, like, he's a young man, he hasn't studied philosophy or anything like that, but he does hold tenaciously to the truths of the faith. So he believes, he doesn't know, but he believes that God exists. But then if he goes on and studies these things, and then he sees and understands the proof for God's existence, he no longer has faith about, say, the existence of God, because now it's been proven to him. I've always had a difficulty here for one reason, and that's with faith. The certitude of faith finally is, in a way, infinitely greater than any certitude I can give myself from natural reason. And so if I had, if I believed in God's existence and had infinite certitude, in a way, in that existence, because I was holding it through supernatural faith, then I come to understand the proof for God's existence. I no longer am holding it by faith, and consequently my certitude is infinitely less. And I've never been happy with that. Because I... Yeah, yeah. No, I think you said the light of faith is still extending to those things, but not in the same way, right? You know? Okay, is it because I know I've read what you can't... I've read that in a way that once you do see something by reason, that essentially it does belong to what you call the preambles of the faith, not faith simply speaking. But see, in a sense, that happens to be a big vision, right? A big vision, faith disappears, and now you see it as it is, right? Okay. So... Your certitude doesn't windle. Yeah. But I mean, you know, but to what extent people understand the proof of existence of God, that sort of thing. When I was teaching on St. Mary's College, one time they called me up and they wanted me to speak to the... to a meeting of the American Association of University Women. Of what? American Association of University Women. Okay. And I had no idea what kind of an audience to expect, right? And it was some Catholic woman who called me up, right? Who belonged to it. They wanted me to give some talk about morality. I forget the thing. So I went down there and I... I assumed they were kind of a college-educated group, you know, and I could give a fairly serious talk, right? But I think I probably lost them, you know, fairly early, you know, but they seemed to be like my mother's sewing club or something, you know? Oh, no. Not great. University woman, you know? And so on. And so... But anyway, in kind of the little coffee hour afterwards, you know, we're talking to different individuals, you know, and some Catholic woman comes up and she says, well, it's just not to be what the church says. And I said, yeah, that's enough. That was it, you know. So, you know, they gave me the reasons why it was necessary, right? You know, a beniesse, right? For the well-being, right? For the well-being. Even those things that can be known by natural reason will be known by very few, and by those few with, what, after a long time, and maybe with, what, not too much certitude, or maybe there's some errors mixed in and so on. So, you need the faith even for those things. Okay. So, you can see, basically, it's the incarnation, the Trinity and the incarnation, right? And then the things are defined by them, right? That are knowable only by the light of faith. And then there's scripture references to these two kinds of knowledge of divine things. Now, Thomas, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, that's divided in that way. In the first three books, you're talking about those things that can be known both by natural, by the reason, and by faith. And then the fourth book, which will be divided against the first three books, you're talking about those things that are known only by, what, faith. Wherefore, when the apostle witnesses that God was known to the Gentiles from created things, and that's the quote we had earlier, right? Invisible things of God, the things that have been made, they're made known, and so on. But it comes to treat the grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ, he declares, we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed before the ages for our glorification. None of the rulers of this age, none of the philosophers understood this. God has revealed it to us through the Spirit, for the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. And the only begotten himself in his confession to the Father acknowledges that the Father has hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and revealed them to the, what? Little ones, huh? Okay. So you need that littleness, that humility to obey God, right? In the sense of faith. So that independence of reason comes from a kind of pride. Okay. But now it comes in the second part here to talk about the role of reason in the consideration of mysteries of faith. Now, how reason can be used in the understanding of the mysteries of faith. Now, reason does indeed, when it seeks, and notice the three words now, when it seeks persistently, right? Piously, right? And soberly. It does indeed, when it does seek this way, achieve by God's gifts some understanding, right? And that most, what? Profitable, right? Perfect of the mysteries. Whether by, what? Analogy, huh? From what it knows naturally, huh? And you see that in the case of the, what? Trinity, right? That they will try to, what? See some analogy, some proportion between our mind and will, and so on, and our knowledge and our love. Between our mind, what? Knowing itself and loving itself, right? And God knowing and loving himself, right? Right, huh? And, of course, Gustin talks about, huh? In the Trinity, huh? No place is it, what? No mystery is considered with more difficult to know than the Trinity, right? And nowhere is it more, what? Dangerous to make a mistake. Mm-hmm. And, but nowhere is it more fruitful to discover something, huh? Okay? And so, I guess you remind you a little bit what Gustin says, huh? Um, soberly, what would be, like, it's opposite. What would be the sense of this word soberly here, like moderately? Yeah, yeah, moderation, yeah. I'm not trying to excel your own powers. You've got to understand the thing more than is possible, right? Thomas always quotes that nice thing from Hillary, you know, that Hillary says he's going to proceed forward as long as he can, even though he knows he never arrived. But he always makes progress going forward, huh? The man who's pursuing the infinite, right? Never arrives, but he always gets some more understanding as he goes along. Or from the connection of these mysteries with one another, okay? And with the final end of humanity or of man, huh? Okay? So those are two different ways, two or three different ways that he's saying that reason is helpful, right? One is by the, what, analogy. Analogy is a likeness of what? Ratio's, right? From what it knows naturally, right? And then the connection among these mysteries, huh? Okay? And then the connection of these mysteries, what? With the end of man, huh? Okay? Now, suppose we're going to talk about the word of God, right? Okay? The thought of God, right, huh? Okay? Now, some might say, well, when I think of something, I form a, what? Okay. A thought about it, right, huh? Okay? Just like when I imagine something, I, what, form an image of it, right? Okay? So in my imagining something, there proceeds in my imagination an image of what I'm imagining. And when I'm thinking of something, there proceeds from my thinking, a, what, thought of what I'm thinking of, right? Well, it's something like that in God, right, huh? Because God knows what? Himself, right? And so, and knowing himself by his understanding, right? And so, there proceeds from God's understanding of himself, a thought of himself. Okay? But since his understanding, as we learned earlier in theology, this is very, what, existence, right? Then this thought is also God, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So in the beginning was the word, and the word was towards God. The word was God, right? Okay? Now, there, I'll just touch them out a little bit there. But notice, this is by the analogy of what I know naturally, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? You might say, now, when reason knows itself, like in Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? And, you know, Shakespeare is urging us to use our reason, but telling us what a wonderful thing reason is, right? Okay? So when reason knows itself, and has a thought about itself, then you begin to, what, love reason, right? Okay? Now, this is the Holy Spirit now, right? He's proceeding, right? From this, huh? Okay? So, this is a little example there of what? The use of reason by analogy from what it knows, what? Naturally, right? Okay? Now, how about the connection of these mysteries with one another? How's that? Well, they say, you know, if I have the art to make something, right? And the thing I make gets broken or something, I can use that art whereby I made it to what? Yeah, yeah. See, there's a connection there, right? Okay? So, this word of God is like the, what? Art of God, right, huh? Whereby he makes everything, huh? Like we learned in the beginning of John's Gospel, right? Well, then when that thing made, man, gets broken, then, what? It's appropriate that the word, whereby it was made, also what? Fix it. Fix it, right? Fix. So, therefore, it's appropriate that the word of God became man rather than, say, God the Father or God the Holy Spirit, right? Okay? Or you talk about the fine end of man. What's the fine end of man, huh? What's... Yeah, to see God as he is, huh? Face to face, huh? Okay? And, of course, the word logos, even the Greek word, shows a connection between the reason, which means it's also signified by the word logos, right? Okay. So, because man's end is to know God, huh? Then the son who proceeds by way of what? Reason. Or... Of knowledge? Yeah. Yeah. He is appropriate, the one who's going to lead us, right? Okay? So, this is the way you connect with these, huh? So, you can say there's two ways here, or maybe three ways, right? The second one is kind of divided into two there, right? But there's two ways that reason has a role to play in the consideration of the mysteries of faith, huh? Because reason may see a connection between this mystery and that mystery, right? Mm-hmm. The things it knows naturally, okay? But in the second way there, especially the first way he talks about it, there you're comparing one mystery with another mystery, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, let's take a better example of that second thing there. This guy gets up in church there and he says, she shouldn't be called the mother of God. She should be called the mother of what? Christ. Christ, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, this guy, I guess his name was, what, Nestorius or something? Mm-hmm. Well, is there a connection between Mary being the mother of God, which is a mystery, right? And the fact that it's the same person as both God and man, huh? Oh, there's an intimate connection. Yeah, yeah. Because to say that she's not the mother of God would be, in a sense, to break the two, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Now, she's not the mother of the word according to his divine nature, right? Okay? But she is the mother of him according to his human nature, right? But because it's the same person who has the divine nature and the human nature, right, we can truly say she's the mother of God, right? So, in a sense, to deny that Mary is the mother of God, in a way, is to deny something about the mystery of the, what, incarnation, right? And if you don't, yeah, okay, there you see two mysteries, right? Mary is the mother of God, and Christ is both God and, what, man, yeah, yeah, okay? Or he's the, what, he's the way, the road, right? Or he's also spoken of as the mediator, right? Okay? Well, um, there's a connection between his being the mediator and his being both God and man, right? Because he has something in common with God and in common with man. Mm-hmm. And therefore he's the, what, in between, insofar as he's both, right? Okay? So, you see a connection between the mystery of him being the mediator, right? And his being, what, both God and man, right, then? So you see a connection between one mystery and a, uh, another mystery, right? Um... Well, the final end of man is to, what, to know and love God, you could say both, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And so, um, who is sent to us? Both the Son and the, what, Holy Spirit, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But the Son... enlightens us, right? And the Holy Spirit is what? Come Holy Spirit, fill the hearts of thy faith, will unkindle them the fire of thy love, right? Well, we attribute to the Holy Spirit or appropriate at least to him, right? Unkindling charity in our heart because he proceeds by way of what? Love, huh? So there's two or three ways there that reason helps us in the understanding of the mysteries of faith, right? See that? One is by the analogy of faith, okay? An analogy of... From what it knows naturally, right? Now what does analogy mean, huh? Well, it's going to be a likeness that's not something that's exactly the same. Okay, but get more precise than what kind of likeness is it? What? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's a likeness of ratios, right? Okay, okay. The Lord is my shepherd. God is to us as a, what? Shepherd is to his, what? Flock. Flock, right? Okay. And Thomas' explanation there, if you've seen in the 8th Psalm, you know, where you referred to both man ruling over the beast, right? But also to Christ ruling over us, right? And when he takes it referring to Christ ruling over us, the sheep and the oxen are those in the fold, right? And then the, what? The beasts and the fish and the birds, right? Are those who are, what? Well, he goes back to, Thomas goes back to the text of St. John. All that's in the world is the lust of the eyes and the lust of the flesh or the pride of life, right? And so the beasts are those who are in the sins of the flesh. The fish, because of the importance of maritime for commerce and so on, right? Those who have the lust of the eyes. And the birds, those are the... The prowl, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And Shakespeare plays upon that, huh? You know, in the sixth place, you know, where the falcons go up in the air, you know, and bicep in the air, falcon, they're fighting, you know. So they're trying to, you know, excel everybody else, pride, huh? So you're seeing kind of an analogy there, right, huh? Even in the metaphors, right? Okay. But when reason believes this mystery of the faith and this mystery of the faith, and then it compares them and sees a certain, what? Connection between them, huh? And that's kind of a different thing it's doing, isn't it? Right? And then it's looking at the mysteries by themselves, right? And comparing one mystery to another and seeing a connection between one mystery to another, right? So a connection between the Incarnation and Mary being the, what? The Mother of God, right? Okay. Now sometimes, you know, I know I'm talking to, you know, Lutherans or Protestants, and some like that. They're kind of offended almost by Mary being called the Mother of God, right? And maybe they're thinking of it in terms of the Mother of the Divinity, right? Well, strictly speaking, I mean, she's the Mother of God according to his, what? Yeah. But because the one who has the human nature is God, then she can be said to be the Mother of God, right? And so there's a real connection between that mystery and the mystery of the Incarnation. And to deny one, in a sense, is to deny the other, right? Now, we've seen how reason can be used. Now we have to see how it cannot be used. Okay? But reason is never rendered capable of penetrating these mysteries in the way in which it penetrates those truths which form its proper object, like the Pythagorean theorem. For the divine mysteries by their very nature so far surpass the created understanding that even when a revelation has been given and accepted by faith, right? They remain covered, so they're not completely revealed, right? They remain covered by the veil of that same faith and wrapped, as it were, in a certain, what? Obscurity, huh? That's why they're called tissues of faith. Yeah. You see in the mirror darkness, I think Paul says. And then they give a biblical statement of this. As long as in this part of life we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith and not by, what? Sight, huh? But then the next thing that's important to see is the impossibility of a true contradiction between faith and reason, huh? Even though faith is above reason, there can never be any real disagreement between faith and reason. Like, who was that, that Renaissance guy was reading about Pompanozzi, was it? The two truths, you know, huh? Oh, oh. Yeah, yeah. Oh, that was their... I guess some of the Mohammedan teachers had that same thing. Yeah, yeah, somebody, because I know some... Was this guy back at the time of Thomas? Because there was somebody back at the time... I mean, yeah, this guy's later than Thomas. And he did get it from the Arabians, I forget. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Even though faith is above reason, there can never be any real disagreement between faith and reason. Since it is the same God who reveals the mysteries and infuses faith, huh? And who has endowed the human mind with the light of reason. God cannot deny himself, nor can the truth ever be in opposition to what? Truth, right? So, he's giving a couple of reasons there, right? One is that both the natural light of reason and the light of faith have God as their source. So, there's going to be a harmony, right? But what you know by the natural light of reason, what you really do know, that the whole is more than a part, huh? And what God's revealed, neither deceived nor be deceived, must be true, right? So, can one truth contradict another truth? No. That's kind of how to say the same thing as both true and false. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Truth is saying what is, is, and what is not, is not. And falsehood is saying what is, is not. Or what is not, is, right. So, two things can't be, it's a contradiction, they can't be both true, right? So, since what reason really does know, and it does really know some things, must be true, and what God's revealed must be true, they can't, for that reason, be in contradiction, right? But the other reason is that because the natural light of reason and the light of faith both come from God, huh? So, it's a very serious mistake, you know, to think they can contradict each other. But you find people sometimes saying it even today, you know, as explicitly maybe as the Renaissance character, but... Okay? But there can appear to be contradictions, right, huh? Okay? And notice, you know, as a philosopher, I'm aware of the fact that in philosophy, very often, things that are reasonable seem to, what, contradict each other, right? I took that famous example there that I discovered in the DK12 of Anaxagris, right? Where Anaxagris says the ruler must be separated from the ruled. That's reasonable. And you see that in the case of the judge, right? You must be impartial, not a part of, in order to judge, rule over these disagreeing men, right? And then he says that the mind is self-ruling. And as a logician, I put evidence that the mind can rule itself. But if the ruler must be separated from the ruled, and the mind is not separated from itself, we've got a contradiction here, right? Okay? So even things that I see as being reasonable, they sometimes seem to, what? Yeah, yeah. So it shouldn't be that striking, huh? And you can actually construct an argument against the obvious that most people can't answer. And I told you the one where I tell the students, you know, now the whole is more than the part, and they all agree, right? And I say, now, what is man? Well, he's an animal, right? But he's not just an animal, he's an animal that has reason. So animal is only a part of what man is, right? Hopefully you all agree to that. And I say, now, what animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, and so on, and therefore what is only a part of man includes more than man. So sometimes the part is more than the whole. Yeah, yeah. Well, I'm using the most common, statistical argument. Yeah, I'm confusing two senses of whole and part, right? The composed whole, right? And the definition is a composed whole. An animal is a composing part of the definition of man. Man is defined as an animal that has reason. So animal is only a part of the definition of man, and the definition of man, which is the whole, composed whole, has more than just animal in it. But when I say animal includes more than just man, I'm talking about the universal whole. Okay? And the universal whole is always said of more than one of its parts is said of, right? Okay? So I can, by a statistical argument, make even what is obvious seem not true, right? And everybody's heard of the paradoxes of Xeno, right? That you can't get out the door, right? Because you've got to go halfway to the door if you can go the full way. And if you can go halfway, you've got to go half of that way. And if you can go half of that, you've got to go half of that. Or that, you know, that the turtle gets a head start, and Achilles, the fastest runner, Achilles will never catch him. Right? And, you know, those arguments. So even obvious things, and things we all know are true, you can give arguments that most people can't answer, right? But A4-0, you get things as far away as these, huh? You can get what? Apparent contradictions, right? I mentioned how Heisenberg, the great physicist there, talking about the development of quantum theory, and talking about the strange apparent contradictions between our experiments. So even within science itself, right? There can be experiments that seem to contradict each other. And if you read today a newspaper or something like that, they're always getting a medical report that contradicts another medical report. It's always, you know. So, it says, The appearance of this kind of specious contradiction is chiefly due to the fact that either the dogmas of faith are not understood, right? And explained in accordance with the mind of the Church, or unsound views are mistaken for the conclusions of, what? Reason, right? Okay. So now he gives three little corollaries here in the text. Therefore, we define that every assertion contrary to the truth of enlightened faith is totally, what? False, huh? Furthermore, the Church, which together with its apostolic office of Church teaching, has received the charge of preserving the deposit of faith, has by divine appointment the right and duty of condemning what wrongly passes for knowledge, huh? Lest anyone be led astray by philosophy and empty, what? Deceit, huh? Hence, all faithful Christians are forbidden to defend, as the legitimate conclusions of science, those opinions which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith, particularly if they have been condemned by the Church. And furthermore, they are absolutely bound to hold them to be errors, which were the deceptive appearance of, what? Truth, huh? So Thomas, on his deathbed there, submitted all his, what? Writings to the Church to be judged, huh? Well, a lot of people don't have that, what? Humility, right, huh? If you read the decisions there of the congregations for the defense of the faith, right? You're always getting some Jesuit or other theologian, right? Sometimes Dominican, the theologian too, who's having a hard time, right? Not thinking. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And giving up his errors, right, huh? As Deconic said, you know, you shouldn't love your opinions like your children. You know, you want to hold on to them, obviously, huh? You know, don't identify your opinions with yourself, huh? But I suppose most people love their opinions like their, like the children, right? They're not willing to give them up, right? They identify themselves with that, huh? They should at least recognize them as opinions still. Hmm? I don't love them so much. That goes back to the mutual help, which reason and faith give each other now. I'm looking in both directions now. Not only can faith and reason never be at odds with one another, but they mutually, what? Oh. Support each other, huh? For on the one hand, right reason establishes the foundations of the faith, right? The so-called preambula to the faith, huh? And illuminated by the light of faith, it develops the science of divine things. I suppose by the analogy that we talked about before, right? And by seeing the connection from one mystery to another mystery, right? You see, why do we say, for example, we learn, let's say, by the faith that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, right? And not the reverse, right? Well, in trying to understand that, we use the analogy of faith, right? We say that the what? It's the good as known in some way that is loved, right? So we have to know the good, we, before we can love it, right? So that our love of the good proceeds, in a way, from our knowledge of the good, right? Well, that's something like, huh? What takes place in the Trinity, where the Holy Spirit, who proceeds by way of love, right? Proceeds from the Son, who proceeds by way of what? Oh, knowledge, yeah. Okay? So it helps us to kind of understand a little bit, right? So there's two ways, then, that reason, what? Aids faith, right? These things that reason, by itself, can know, right? It can be used to, what, know those things that are kind of presupposed to faith, right? Okay? And then it can, what, help to develop theology itself, right? By the analogy that we spoke of before, and by seeing the connection among the mysteries of each other, huh? Those two ways. On the other hand, faith delivers reason from, what? From errors, right? And protects it, and furnishes it with knowledge of many kinds, huh? Okay? Many interesting things to think about, huh? So even the sacraments are interesting to think about, especially the Eucharist, huh? If you realize how reason is so weak and apt to fall into errors, right? And the disagreement of thinkers is a sign that most people are mistaken. So that, uh, that's really a very great, uh, need that we have, huh? Especially to be mistaken about the most important things, huh? So we take a little break here, I guess, or? Yeah, it should take me a little bit. Thank you. about the church's attitude to human sciences. Hencesofar is the church from hindering the development of human arts and studies that in fact she assists and promotes them in many ways. And so the universities were a start of the, what, in the Middle Ages, right? Even though they were both against the church, right? The church had a lot to do with the formation of the universities. For she is neither ignorant nor contemptuous of the advantages which derive from this source of human life. Rather, she acknowledges that those things flow from God, the Lord of Sciences, and if they are properly used, lead to God by the help of his grace. Nor does the church forbid these studies to employ, each within its own area, its own proper, what, principles and method. But while she admits this just freedom, she takes particular care that they do not become infected with errors by conflicting with divine teaching or by going beyond their proper, what, limits. Intrude upon what belongs to faith and engender, what, confusion, huh? So with Hegel there, philosophy was trying to judge the faith, right? So, it's going beyond their proper limits, huh? A little thing that inductively I sometimes show, and that is in terms of the limits of different kinds of knowledge. The principle I would see here is that it always belongs to the higher knowledge and the knowledge that has more of the character of wisdom to distinguish between itself and the lower knowledge and to show the order between them, huh? Okay? Now, the first place we see this is in the comparison between reason and the senses, or reason and the, what, imagination, right? To whom does the distinction between reason and the senses belong? Yeah. And there it's very clear, because the senses cannot distinguish between themselves and reason, right? Let alone know the order of the senses to reason, huh? And the distinction between thinking and imagining, between reason and imagination, to whom does that belong to make that distinction or to see that distinction? Yeah. And of course, it's very clear in this case, only reason can see that distinction, huh? And show the order of imagination to reason, okay? Now, reason has more of the character of wisdom than the senses, huh? That's why we're called the wise ape, right? Because we have reason, huh? Okay? Now, what about the distinction between mathematics and natural philosophy? To whom does it belong to distinguish between those two? Hmm? Natural philosophy does, yeah. And natural philosophy is more of the character of wisdom than geometry, huh? So Aristotle, in the second book of spiritual hearing, distinguishes between natural philosophy and mathematics, right? And natural philosophy or natural science is the judge of to what extent mathematics can be used or is useful in what? Natural philosophy. But it's not until the metaphysics, not until the sixth book of wisdom, that Aristotle distinguishes clearly between, what? Natural philosophy and wisdom or first philosophy. So it always belongs to the knowledge which is higher and has more of the character of wisdom to distinguish between itself and the lower one. Plato, in the dialogues, distinguishes between political philosophy and political rhetoric. And does it belong to political rhetoric to distinguish between those two? No. To political philosophy to distinguish between those two and to see the order of political rhetoric to political philosophy. Okay? Because the statesman must sometimes use persuasion and sometimes use force, right? And so he sees the art of rhetoric and the military art as his two tools, right? He can't force everybody. It's not a good idea to do that. And so he's got to persuade some and force some, right? So you need both persuasion and force, right? But to what extent you should use persuasion, but to what extent you should use force? This belongs to the judgment of the statesman, right? The political wise man, right? To whom belongs the distinction between philosophy and fiction? Yeah. What a character of wisdom, huh? And fiction does, huh? And which is more the character of wisdom, revealed theology or philosophy? First philosophy. Theology. Yeah, Thomas will show this in the first question when we get to the Summa, right? So the distinction between philosophy and theology belongs to what? Theology. Yeah. And to show the order between the two, right? Belongs to them, right? Okay. So what happened in modern philosophy was that they revolted from theology, right? Revolted from the faith and so on. And then they could no longer, what? Properly distinguish between the two, let alone see the order among them, huh? So in a sense, once revealed theology is on the scene, if you don't have the faith and don't have revealed theology, you can't make the distinction. And so you find the modern philosophers doing in philosophy things that the Greek philosophers never tried to do, right? But try to find a substitute in philosophy for theology. Right. Okay? So you find them mixing up these things, huh? And trying to judge, you know, theology and so on. So you have Feuerbach writing The Essence of Christianity, right? What it all means, you know? And you see Hegel putting philosophy about theology. So they can't properly distinguish between the two and they can't see the order among the two. So they're kind of in a bind, huh? A real bind. You see this, too, you know, when you say the distinction between you take knowledge in words and statements and knowledge in mathematical symbols and equations, which has more of the character of wisdom, huh? The words? Yeah. And in a way, you can say, you can say in words what a word is. And you can make statements about statements as we do in logic and so on. But can you write a mathematical equation that tells you what a mathematical equation is? No. So it's a kind of knowledge that doesn't know itself. Okay? But you can express in words what a mathematical equation is as well as what a statement is, right? So it belongs to the knowledge in words and statements to distinguish between itself and the knowledge in, what, mathematical symbols and equations and to talk about the order, the connection between the two, right? Okay. Can you say in metaphors what a metaphor is? Metaphorically? No, you can't metaphorically. So a metaphor is. See? If you want to say what a figure of speech is, you can't, you can exemplify it by a figure of speech, right? But you can't say what a figure of speech is by a figure of speech. You can't say what a metaphor is. And by metaphor, you have to define what a metaphor is by definition. And then you're not speaking metaphorically. So the distinction between knowledge, if you can speak of knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors, and knowledge in metaphors,