Prima Pars
Lecture 6: Sacred Doctrine and the Necessity of Revelation

Transcript
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Proper speech belongs to knowledge and proper speech. And to talk about the order of them, therefore, belongs to it, right? So you can kind of see inductively, huh, that the distinction between higher and lower knowledge, between the knowledge which has more the character of wisdom and the knowledge which has less so or not at all, belongs always to wisdom, right, and to the higher knowledge. And so the distinction between philosophy and theology belongs to theology and not to philosophy. So I always objected, you know, to what they call the philosophy of religion, you know? Because there, in a sense, philosophy is trying to distinguish between religion and theology in itself, and it doesn't belong to philosophy to do that. Philosophy can't do that. Only theology can do that. But you see, Aristotle anticipates that, right? When he has natural, in natural philosophy, he distinguishes between natural philosophy and geometry. And in first philosophy or wisdom, philosophical wisdom, he distinguishes between first philosophy and natural philosophy, right? But it's only in theology that we distinguish between philosophy and theology. Now, once the moderns had revolted against that, they could no longer, what, see the distinction, right? You see, the Greek philosophers, they could judge the religion of the poets, huh, for the simple reason that the religion of the poets was, what, based on imagination, okay? So I mentioned how the great Xenophanes, you know, said, well, if horses could make statues and so on, they'd make their gods look like horses, right? And the Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed and so on, and the Greeks make them blonde and so on. But they see that they're, what, speaking about the gods by their imagination, right? They imagine the gods to be like kind of superhuman beings, huh? And you know how Zeus is terribly concerned about domestic conflict there between him and his wife and so on? Because they're on opposite sides of the Trojan War and so on. He's terribly disturbed about this. Well, I mean, you can see that the poets, as Plato points out in philosophers before him, you can see that the poets are speaking about the gods by, what, imagination, right? And imagination can be judged by reason, right? And so Plato and Aristotle and so on, they're correcting what the poets say about the gods, right? And when Aristotle, you know, in the premium, you may remember that, in the premium to wisdom there, you know, when he's talking about those who say the gods will, what, be envious of us if we pursue wisdom and so on, right? And Aristotle says, well, God cannot be envious, right? But he's correcting, you know, this anthropomorphic imaginative picture that the gods have. Well, you see, the modern philosophers, if they want to put Christianity below philosophy, or the Christian theology below philosophy, they would have to make, what, Christian theology something of the imagination, right? Which, of course, is to misunderstand it, right? And Thomas, of course, in the first question, the Summa, will be distinguishing between the way even which Scripture does sometimes use metaphors, right? And the way the poet does, right? And he can see those distinctions, but the modern philosophers cannot, right? And, of course, it's kind of interesting, huh? What Plato and Aristotle say is Plato says that philosophy is becoming like God, right? So far as possible, right, huh? Okay? And Aristotle will say that God alone, or God most of all, is what? Wise, right, huh? So from their own principles, they would say that if we could have a share in God's wisdom, right, then that would be wisdom in a higher sense than what? This wisdom that we've got by our reason, alone, huh? Okay? But the modern philosophers are forced, in a way, having given up the faith, right? What is this thing that's been around for a couple thousand years, right? Well, they kind of have to falsify it and say, well, it's something of the imagination, right? Certainly not a higher wisdom than we philosophers have. Okay? So they have to downplay the motives of credibility and so on, right? And try to make it something merely, what? This, you know? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But since Christian theology is based on faith and they share, you might say, in God's wisdom, then it's wisdom in a higher sense than what the philosopher has. But what the Greek poets had about the gods was something less than philosophy. It was something more imaginative, huh? And imagination is less than reason, huh? Okay, now the use of reason should never change the original meaning or sense of the mysteries of faith, huh? This very great quote from Vincent, since Vincent A. Lerner. For the doctrine of the faith which God has revealed is put forward not as some philosophical discovery capable of being perfected by human intelligence, but as a divine deposit committed to the spouse of Christ to be faithfully protected and infallibly promulgated. Hence, too, that meaning of the sacred dogmas is ever to be maintained which has once been declared by Holy Mother Church. And there must never be any abandonment of this sense under the pretext or in the name of a more profound understanding, huh? May understanding, knowledge and wisdom increase as ages and centuries roll along and greatly and vigorously flourish in each and all and the individual and the whole church. But this only in its proper kind has to say in the same doctrine, the same sense and the same understanding, huh? Let's go over from Vincent A. Lerner. So, let's look at the canons here now in faith and reason. If anyone says that in divine revelation there contain no true mysteries properly so called, but that all the dogmas of the faith can be understood and demonstrated by properly trained reason of natural principles, let him be, what? Anathema. If anyone says that human studies are to be treated with such a degree of liberty that their assertions may be maintained as true even when they are opposed to divine revelation and that they may not be forbidden by the church, let him be anathema. If anyone says it is possible that at some time given the advancement of knowledge a sense may be assigned to the dogma as propounded by the church which is different from that which the church has understood and understands, let him be anathema. Incidentally, in the encyclical on the Eucharist there by Paul VI, there you are. I think I came to the passage in that, didn't I? When I was talking about the importance of these general things in theology, the text there where Paul VI was saying that the dogmas of faith are expressed by means of universal and necessary thoughts. Do you remember that passage? Thank you for that. From the Mysterium Fide, the Encyclical and Eucharist. And that's why they're not tied to any particular age or time. But they're good for men for all time, right? So you have a very simple example and nothing too profound here but you know, suppose the church says God has no parts. when you're making use of the thought of whole and part, right? And that is a thought that everyone has in every age and every time, right? They belong to a universal and necessary experience, that thought of whole and part. So is that ever going to change? Or would it be inappropriate for people of some age to you know? Because everybody would know what a whole and a part is, right? And so everybody to some extent will understand what it means to say God has no parts. That casts a little light upon this you know, how something can be defined, you know, in the 4th century B.C. or A.D. rather and be good in the 20th century, right? Because you're expressing these things with thoughts that are tied to universal and necessary experience or common experiences to be called sometimes. That's connected with this other truth that we know more what God is not than what he is, right? And it's more useful to negate the general than the, what, particular. So we show in theology that God has no parts. We don't show that God doesn't have two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen. Well, that's true too, right? But when you say that God has no parts you exclude any parts, right? So you don't have to go through and say he doesn't have two legs, he doesn't have, you know, four legs and a back and a seat. He has no parts, period, right? So you negate the general, right? And you're closer to God by negating the general than if you could only negate the particular. If you say God doesn't have two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen that separates God from water, right? When you say God has no parts you separate God from anything that has parts, right? So you're getting closer to what God is, huh? And by saying he, by saying he has no parts and by saying he doesn't have two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen. He doesn't have the letters C, A, and T, you know? Right? But that separates him from the word cat. See? But say he has no parts separates him from the word cat from the molecule of water from anything that has parts, right? And those most general things are thoughts that are tied to a common experience like whole part. And so in the performance of our supreme pastor office we beseech the love of Jesus Christ and we command by the authority of him who is also our God and Savior all faithful Christians especially those in authority or who have the duty of teaching that they contribute their zeal and labor to the warding off and elimination of these errors in the church and to the spreading of the light of the pure faith. But since it is not enough to avoid the contamination of heresy unless those errors are carefully shunned which approach it in greater or less degree we warn all of their duty to observe the constitutions and decrees of which such wrong opinions though not expressly mentioned in this document have been banned and forbidden by this holy see. So, read through the dogmatic in Korean symbol arm, right? To make sure that you're all set there, you know. But there's some ones that take them more by instead of chronologically like that that take them by different subject matters, you know. But you shouldn't be aware of those things. So, we begin summa next time then? When are we going to meet again now? What's your... January 5th, really? So, the week after, I think it's the 5th. So, the Thursday after New Year's, right? Yes. Yeah, I think it comes on Sunday, doesn't it? So, second... It is the 3rd, 4th. Yeah, 5th would be Thursday, right? The 2nd, 3rd, 4th, yeah. So, we'll meet on January... In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us, and help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So let's look at the prologue first, the Latin word, I guess, meaning forward, huh? Okay. You guys don't have that, huh? Some of them don't, yeah. Okay. But it's a fairly short one, huh? Because what Thomas has, if you look at the prologue to the Psalms, let's say, other works, it's much longer, but a lot of the things you have in that longer prologue will be found in the first question of the Summa. What the book is about, what the order is, and so on. So Thomas says, because the teacher of Catholic truth ought to instruct not only those who are proficient, right, those who are advanced, but it also pertains to him to instruct those to begin. According to the words of the Apostle, which is St. Paul, in the Epistle of the Corinthians, as little ones in Christ, huh? I gave you milk to drink, right? Not food, huh? So the intention or the proposal of our intention in this work is those things which pertain to the Christian religion to treat in a way that is suitable to the instruction of, what? Beginners. This reminds me of what Porphyry says, right? He's writing for beginners, right? He's going to stay from, sit in questions. Then this next paragraph shows you of what a good teacher Thomas is, because he's taking into account the difficulties that what he's seen as students have in learning theology. We have considered, huh, that beginners in this doctrine or teaching, in those things which have been written by diverse people, are impeded in many ways. Now, how are they impeded, huh, by what they've come across? First, he says, an account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments, huh? Okay? So that's a sin of, what? Too much, huh? Okay? Partly because those things which are necessary for them to know are not treated in the order of, what? Learning, huh? That's a very important point, huh? This is often, what? Eclective, right? When I first came to Assumption College, you know, everybody had to take four courses in philosophy, and they were ordered by Leval people in the order of learning. And that order of learning is lost. You can't really, what? Teach so well, huh? And, of course, Thomas, he makes a point sometimes that when St. Paul, in the epistles, say, is enumerating virtues and vices, he's not doing so according to the order of learning, huh? But he's singling out those virtues or vices that are important to emphasize with these particular people, right? So those things which are necessary for knowing are not treated according to the order of learning, but according as regards to the, what? Exposition of books, huh? Okay? Of course, you see a little bit of that dissipated in Dionysius, the divine names, huh? Because how many times in Scripture will you find it said that God is good? Well, countless times, right? So what do you do every time it says that God is good? Is it going to stop and explain what it means to say that God is good? And you're going to be repeating yourself again and again, right? Okay? So, what did Dionysius did? He wrote the book on the divine names, right? So he brings together everything he can think of to say about God's goodness, and then I can think about God's knowledge, etc., etc., right? And then you can kind of, what? Say it all together, right? Or according as the occasion for disputing arises, huh? Okay? So if you look even at Thomas's, you know, question on his disputate, they're not as, what? Much in the order of learning, as is the two, what? Sumas, huh? Okay? And for sure, the question on his disputate, the quadibitalis. But you will, right? People's got in your mind, need a question, you know? Let's hear it, right? And they may have very little to do with each other, one question, another question, and they presuppose things, you know, to answer one question, some other question. Partly because the frequent repetition of these things, right, generates, what? Boredom and confusion in the souls of ears, right? I heard I complain to Kassarik about repeating something. He says, well, I'm going to repeat it until I understand myself, he said. Something to be said, the repetition of the motherhood of studies, but there could be a point where it produces certain confusion, right? And boredom in the minds of ears, huh? So he says, these, therefore, and other things of this sort, striving to avoid, huh? We will try, with hope in divine aid, to, what? Follow those things that pertain to Sacrum Doctrinum, and this is now more on the name of what this is, sacred what? Sacred teaching, right? Okay. Now, I guess they've written a book called what? Doctrina Christiana, right? Kind of the same thing, huh? But notice in both of those titles, as I've pointed out, I think, before, the emphasis is upon the teacher. And at the other extreme, you have mathematics, which is named from the, what? The student, huh? Now, at the end of the Gospel of St. John, when he says, go forth and make, you know, students of all men, then you have the word mafetes, huh? We get the word mathematics, right? So, in that sense, this is the furthest from, what? Mathematics, huh? Requires authority the most, huh? And geometry, arithmetic, mathematics, the least, okay? He intends to proceed to those things, or to pursue those things. Breviter in delucidae, huh? He's going to be, what? Brief, huh? Brevity is the soul of wit, huh? And, what? Clear. Yeah. Lucidae comes from, what? Light. Okay. He's going to proceed in a brief and enlightening way, which is quite true, huh? According as, what? The matter, what? Admits, huh? Okay? Because the matter doesn't matter for us, right? To be completely elucidated, huh? Okay? So, let's look now at the question one. And that our intention, and that our aim, huh? Might be contained within certain limits. It's necessary first to investigate about sacred doctrine itself. What sort of knowledge it is, and to what things it, what, extends, huh? Okay? And about this, he says, ten things are going to be examined or questioned, huh? And first, about the necessity of this, what, teaching, huh? Secondly, whether it is a science, and of course, we have to see what the word science means a bit. And then third, whether it be one science, or many sciences, huh? Of course, he's going to conclude that it's one science and not many. And fourth, whether it is speculative, looking knowledge, or practical doing. Because that, of course, is the famous division of philosophy, and speculative philosophy, theoretical philosophy, looking philosophy, to use the English word, and practical philosophy, which is the philosophy of doing, right? So, native wisdom comes down, you know, to console. A Boethius, in the constellation of philosophy, she has a Theta on her garments, which represents Theoretica, huh? Theoretical philosophy. And then a Pi, which represents the practical philosophy, huh? Theoretica is put upon the practical, right? Those are the two kinds of philosophy, huh? Sometimes they have logic as a third part, but that's more the tool philosophy. Then five, about its comparison to the sciences, is above them or below them, right? Or amidst them. And then six, whether it be a what? A wisdom, right? Now when Aristotle distinguishes the virtues of reason in the sixth book of Nicomache and Ethics, sciencia and sapiencia are divided against each other, right? But then other times they'll say sapiencia is a sciencia, although it's the highest one, right? Okay? So you can say, even if it's a sapiencia, it could still be a sciencia, right? But if it's a sciencia, science, it isn't necessarily wisdom, right? It's a little bit like if we said in English, you know, knowledge and wisdom, right? Well, something can be knowledge without being wisdom, but it can't be wisdom without being knowledge, right? But sometimes you might divide wisdom against knowledge because it's having something particularly excellent right about it. We've talked about that many things before. Now notice articles two through six, right, could be grouped together, right? Because you're asking, in a sense, what kind of knowledge is this, right? Is it a science, is it one or many sciences, is it speculative science or practical science, right? How does it compare it to the other sciences and is it a wisdom? But now seven is something quite different, right? Seven is what is the subject of this science. What is this science about, right? And then the last three articles are more about how this science or how this knowledge, how this teaching proceeds, right? Now, if you've seen the sentences of Peter Lombard, or Thomas' exposition of that, He has an article entitled, Whither Sacred Doctrine Proceeds Artfully, in accordance with the, what, matter, right? And there he gives a much more, what, complete, you might say, right, distinction of the many ways the scripture proceeds, right? Here, he's limiting himself more to just mainly one way the scripture proceeds, and that is that it proceeds sometimes argumentatively, like in the book of Job, he says, right? Or in the epistles of St. Paul, you know, where he's advising the syllogist of, you know, where the premises are backed up and so on. But there are other books that proceed in quite different ways, right? Some proceed in a modus narrativus, like the historical books, right? Others, like the psalms and orativus, et laudativus, prayerful and praising, right, huh? Others, in a revelatory way, like the book of Apocalypse and so on, right? So there's all kinds of different ways it proceeds, right, huh? But Thomas, in the Summa Theologiae, is going to be proceeding in this argumentative mode, right? So, he singles out that and says, is it appropriate in this doctrine to proceed, at least sometimes, by argument, right? Okay? And that will be the, what, the eighth article, right? Okay? Then it's kind of striking that he, in the ninth article, asks whether it ought to use, what, metaphors, right? Metaphor and symbol there are used synonymously, right? So, Dionysius, for example, wrote a book about the divine names, which is the names set properly of God. Then there's another book on symbolic theology, which is about the names set of God metaphorically, like he's fire, or he's water, or he's a rock, and so on, right, huh? And, now, Thomas, in this book, if he's going to be proceeding argumentatively, he's not going to be proceeding metaphorically or symbolically. So it's kind of interesting that he, what, brings the article in, huh? But it's relevant, nevertheless, because sometimes you'll see in the objections that a man will take something that is being said figuratively or metaphorically as if it's being taken properly, right? And so you have to be aware of the fact that Scripture will speak sometimes, what, metaphorically, right? But maybe it also wants to kind of make you, what, be aware of the fact that that this matter doesn't admit to being, what, being perfectly accessible, right? By argument, right? And, again, of course, if the Bible is addressed to all men, that's another reason why it might want to use metaphors sometimes, huh? But, in general, metaphors have a certain, we'll see the reason for that when we get to that part, anyway. And then the tenth article, whether the sacred Scripture of this teaching should be laid out according to many senses, huh? And there Thomas will talk about the distinction between the sense of the letter and the spiritual sense, and the various kinds of spiritual senses and so on. Okay? So notice, those last three articles are about how this teaching proceeds, right? Okay? The seventh one is for the subject, right? But the ones before that, down to, except the first one, is about the kind of knowledge this is. Okay? So you could divide, perhaps, these ten articles into four parts, right? Yeah. But maybe you could divide the first article against the other nine, because the first one is really talking about, does there exist such a thing, huh? The question, does something exist, right? Is before, right? And then the other nine articles, the kind of knowledge this is, what it's about, and how it proceeds, right? Okay? Make sense? Yeah. Okay? As I mentioned, talking about the fairly short prologue here, in the prologue, say, to the St. Paul's epistles, or the prologue to the Psalms, and so on, you'll find Thomas dealing with many of the things that are taken up in this first question, right, for that particular book. Now, notice in this first article, Thomas is going to ask whether this teaching, this sacred teaching, is necessary, right? Okay? Okay? And the word necessary is a word that's equivocal by what? Reason, right? Okay? And in the fifth book of wisdom, huh? Aristotle takes up the word necessary, huh? It's interesting where he takes up the word necessary. He takes it up at the end of the first part, which is about the names of clauses. So, in that first part, you have the name beginning, then the name cause itself, then the name element, and then the name nature, right? Now, all of these are names of clauses. But attached to those names of clauses is the name, what? Necessary, right? Now, why is the name necessary attached to the names of clauses? It's a connection between necessary and cause, okay? And Aristotle distinguishes there four senses of the word necessary, right? And three of these senses are connected with the extrinsic clauses, huh? And one of them with the intrinsic clauses. So, if I say, for example, that two is necessarily half of four, that's due to what two is intrinsically, right? If I say that a triangle necessarily has its interior angles, that are two right angles, that's up with what a triangle is, huh? If I say, man is necessarily corruptible, right? It's tied up with the fact that he has matter as a part of him, right? My matter is able to be a lion or worms or dust, right? There's something in me that's able to be something other than me, so I'm necessarily corruptible, okay? So, that's one sense of necessary tied up with the intrinsic clauses, huh? But that's not the sense of necessary here, in this first question. Another sense of necessary is tied up with the extrinsic clause called the, what? Mover, huh? The mover the man. And we've had some big winds down there, you know, so I'm not. And maybe there's some winds that you can't, what? Resist, right? If you're there and the wind comes, you necessarily are moved from where you are to God knows where, right? Okay, maybe out of this world, for all you know. Okay? But that's a necessity now from an extrinsic cause, right? Okay? Or if they grab me, you know, the terrorists, wherever it is, and pinion my arms, and, you know, I must go along with them because they are too powerful for me, right? Okay? You're too strong for me, right? But now the other two sentences that are necessary are tied up with the end. And the idea that some end cannot be without this, what? Me, you might say, right? Okay? And the distinction that Aristotle makes here is between what is necessary for the being and what is necessary for the well-being. Okay? So if I say that, let's say food is necessary in this life, right? It's necessary because you can't be without food, right? Okay? But it's not necessary in the sense of the efficient cause, or from intrinsic cause, right? Because I'm a man, because I don't necessarily have food. So men have starved to death, etc., etc., right? Okay? But you can say, if I'm going to live, right, then I must, what? Have food, right? If I'm going to live, I must breathe, right? Okay? Now, other things I say for well-being, like Tom says, you need a horse. Okay? You need to bring some distance, right? So is it necessary for me to have a car to get in this class? What do you think? Depends upon your strength. Well, it would take me an awful long time to walk up here, right? You wouldn't see me too often, I guess. And in this winter, I might not make it at all. Right? Okay? So in order to get here well and efficiently and so on, I need a car, right, man? You did? You went out to California, you know, and you get back there, everything, at least to the old, you're still students, the faculty of philosophy is still the old city, right? So you had your room in the old city, and your classrooms there, and your entertainment, and your restaurants and everything. Everything is in the walking distance, right? You get out to California to teach, first thing you can learn is you can't get anywhere in California without a car, right? And so, it's necessary, right? Now, let's apply this a little more to something close enough to this first article, right? Because in the first article, we're asking whether this knowledge, called Sacra Ductrina, right, whether this knowledge is necessary, right? Now, if someone asked me, as a philosopher, something we're known, is logic necessary for philosophy? Is logic necessary for the philosopher? Well, I would answer that question, yes. But is it necessary, in the sense that philosophy cannot be at all without logic, or it can't be well without logic? I'd probably say it can't be well without logic, right? Logic was, in fact, the last part of philosophy to be, what, discovered, right? Aristotle, who comes at the end of the golden age of Greek philosophy, is called the father of logic, right? But people were doing natural philosophy, they were doing geometry, right? They were doing even ethics, right? They were doing all these things before, right? Aristotle found logic, right? But they were making more mistakes than they had to be, right? Okay? And other difficulties they were having, right? So you could say that logic is necessary, maybe not absolutely for philosophy, you can do philosophy without logic, but you can't do it well, right? So it's necessary for, not for doing philosophy, but for doing it well. It's necessary in this sense there. Do you see? But if you couldn't use your reason at all without logic, you would never even get logic, right? Okay? You see that? Now I'll take an example of the other. My two greatest teachers, Charles DeConnick and Vincent de Yon, at DeVol, Charles DeConnick always taught courses in philosophy of nature. So he taught a course in the first book of natural hearing, the first book of the physics, or a course in the second book for the first year students, always. And if you're there for more than one year, you get both of these. And then he taught a course on one of the later books for the advanced students, huh? And so I had a course on place in book four and time in book four and so on. And Vincent de Yon was teaching things more dealing with logic and things of that sort, right? Now why did the two great teachers not teach wisdom? They did physics, right? Well, it goes back to the order of learning, right? You have to know natural philosophy and logic before you can really, what, learn wisdom, huh? Okay? That's part of the reason why wisdom is called metta-ta-physica, right? After the books in natural philosophy. Now what am I doing in a course in metaphysics at Assumption College, right? To students who have, you know, a very minimal background in logic and in philosophy of nature, right? Well, I tell them I'm not going to really teach you wisdom. I'm not going to be wise by the end of this course. I'm going to give you a little foretaste of what wisdom is, right? And there's two reasons why it's important that you get this foretaste of wisdom. One is that if you're philosophers, or if you aspire to be philosophers, that is to be lovers of wisdom, right? You can't love something if you don't know what it is in some way, right? So you could say to know what wisdom is, is necessary, right? To be a philosopher. Because a philosopher is a lover of wisdom and it's impossible to love wisdom without in some way knowing what it is. So what I'm doing is necessary for you guys. Right? Well, this is necessary in the first sentence, right? You cannot be a philosopher without loving wisdom and you can't love wisdom without knowing in some way what wisdom is. But secondly, I said, if you are a lover of wisdom, if wisdom is your end or goal, then all of your philosophical studies, right? Even in geometry and in logic and in natural philosophy and even ethics and so on, all of this should be ordered to eventually getting to what? Wisdom, right? You can't order all your studies to wisdom if you don't in some way, however imperfectly, know what everything is being ordered what? To. To. So it's necessary to know what wisdom is to be a lover of wisdom and it's necessary to know in some way what wisdom is to direct all of your what? to this last end and goal of the whole philosophy. Do you see that? Okay. Now, in which sense of necessary if you had a chance to read this article, in which sense of necessary is Thomas going to be saying yes? This knowledge called Sacra Doctrina is necessary. Yeah. Both, yeah. But not with respect exactly to the same things, right? He's going to say that man is directed to an end that surpasses the grasp of his what? Reason. Actual reason, right? Okay. And he can't direct his whole life and his actions and so on to this end unless he'd be made aware of it and he's by faith and so on. So in that sense you can say that's the reason why this doctrine is what? Absolutely necessary, right? Okay. You can't pursue an end and direct all your activities towards that end without some foreknowledge of that end. And that's like what I was saying about wisdom, right, in philosophy. Unless you know what this philosophical wisdom is, but first philosophy is, right? You can't direct all of your philosophical thinking and so on to that end. But then he'll say, what about these things that natural reason can find out about God is necessary for those? And he says, well, not in this first sense, in this sense of being. But in the sense of well-being, right? That unless you have sacro-dactina, most men would never have any knowledge, even of those things that natural reason can't find out. And those who have some ability to find them out, right? If they're willing to take the most of their life, right? And because of the great difficulty of these things, they have many, what, mistakes, huh? Okay? And therefore, you need this document. Now, both of those points were made in the Constitution there, the First Vatican Council, right? You know, you're plagiarizing the Constitution. You know, if I was correcting this, the First Vatican Council would say, hey, I think I heard this before now. You should acknowledge where you got this from. Okay. So let's look at the first article here, which, like most reasonable things, is divided into three parts, right? And the first is kind of a contraction of the, what, back-and-forth arguments that you have in the question on his disputate, right? But Thomas will cut it down to the most essential arguments, huh? And mainly arguments against what he's going to maintain in the body of the article, right? But you should have said contra, right? Because it's more an authority, in many cases, than an argument. But you should have a little difficulty there, right? And then the body article, he will think out the answer. And then in the third part, he will reply to the objections on the opposite side, right? Now, occasionally, like in the question that just we talked to, you have to reply to both sides if the truth is somewhere in between. But for the most part, it's on the opposite side of the major objections. To the first, thus one proceeds. And of course, as we said before, this first article reasonably comes first, right? And this goes back to something we learn logic, the question, does it exist, is before the question, what it is, yeah. Just like the question, whether this is that, is before the question, why this is that, right? If you don't know that this is that, you won't ask, why is this that? And if you don't know that something exists, you won't ask what it is, right? You might ask what the word means, but not what the thing is. So reason wants to know what is, and what it is, but in that order, right? To the first, one proceeds thus. It seems that it is not necessary to have some other teaching besides the philosophical teachings, the philosophical disciplines, huh? You must use the word disciplina there, right? Taken from the, what's good, right? Post-inductrina. To those things which are above reason, this is the first objection, man ought not to try, right? According to that of the Ecclesiasticus, huh? Chapter 3. Do not seek those things that are above you, right? But those things which are subject to reason are sufficiently treated in the philosophical disciplines. Therefore it seems to be, what, superfluous to have some other teaching besides the teachings of the philosophers, right? Good objection, right? Moreover, teaching cannot be except about what is, about being. For nothing is known except the true, which is convertible with being. There might not have been the ninth book of this story. But about all beings, there is treatment in the philosophical disciplines, and even about God, right? Whence a certain part of philosophy is called theology, or the divine science. This is clear from the, what, philosopher, he called Aristotle by Antonin Messier, right? The philosopher, in the sixth book of metaphysics, right? So in the sixth book, if you may recall, wisdom there, he distinguished, what, wisdom from all the other knowledge, right? He distinguished the theoretical sciences from the practical and productive and so on, and then he distinguished the theoretical into natural philosophy and mathematics and wisdom, right? But then he called wisdom there, theology, right? Okay. Sometimes we call that natural, what, theology, that's true. Okay. But we'll see when you get to Septimo, seventh article. The reason why this teaching here has got more right to be called theology than first philosophy does. Because first philosophy is not about God, it's its subject. Its subject is being and one. But God is the, what, the end of the goal, right? But, so if I found the seventh article, in this science, not only is God the end of the goal, but he's also the, what, subject. So this is much more theology than first philosophy is. Okay. Okay, so if philosophy talks about everything there is to talk about, and B, it covers everything, right? Then it's not necessary that in addition to or besides the philosophical pens, that there be some other, what, teaching, right? Okay. Now, again, this is what is said in the second epistle to Timothy, that all scripture divinely inspired is useful for what? For teaching, for refuting, for correcting and instructing to justice, right? And also those first two, to teaching and to refuting, makes it seem to be like the theoretical, right? The theoretical says that's to do the wise man, right? To teach the truth and refute errors. And then the practical, though, comes up with the idea of correcting people, right? And teaching them how to act, which is to instruct them to justice. So I doubt that you've right that the fourth article, whether this knowledge is speculative or practical, it seems to be both what the great St. Paul is saying. But scripture divinely inspired does not pertain to the philosophical disciplines, which are found by, what, human reason, huh? So St. Paul is saying it's useful, right? It's useful, therefore, apart from the philosophical disciplines, for there to be another divinely inspired, what, knowledge of science, huh? I answer, it should be said, it is necessary for human, what, salvation, for there to be some teaching by divine revelation, in addition to or apart from the philosophical disciplines, which are investigated by, what, human reason, right? And first, because man is ordered to God as to an end that exceeds the grasp of his, what, reason, huh? According to that of Isaiah, and I guess St. Paul repeats this, doesn't he? I has not seen, right? Your has not heard, it's added sometimes on this text here. I has not seen God without you, or does not see without God, the things that you have prepared for those who see, what? Love you, right? So he's taking authority that man is directed to an end above, what, reason, right? Above comprehension of reason. So I think it's in St. Paul, I has not seen, nor has your heard, as entered the heart of man, the things that God has prepared for those who love him. It reminds me of that fragment of Pharaoh Kleist, you know, it says, the things that can be seen, heard, and learned are what I prize the most. He has no knowledge of this, right? But neither eye is seen, nor ear is heard. It's interesting to the heart of the mind, you mean the mind of the man, right? The things that God has prepared for those who love him. He has no knowledge of this, right? He has no knowledge of this, right? He has no knowledge of this, right? So the end is what? Necessarily has to be foreknown by men, right? Who ought to direct their what? Intentions and their actions to the end, right? Whence it is necessary for the salvation of man that certain things become known through divine revelation which excel what? Human reason, huh? So I was comparing that to my saints and students, right? Okay, it's not unnecessary, right? That you have a soon foretaste of first philosophy, right? Because this is your end as a philosopher, right? This is your goal. And you can't direct all your studies to this goal if you're not somewhere aware of what this goal is, right? Well, the same thing here, huh? If there's an end, right, that's above the grasp of our reason that God is directing us towards, but man is not, you know, just an automaton, right? He's got to, you know, direct himself, right? God who created you without you and not saved you without you. Well, then we have to in some way know about the sin to direct our intentions and our actions to it, right? I think the Vatican wanted to say that's absolutely necessary for that, right? Okay? But this is very sincere, right? It cannot be, huh? You cannot be directing your life and actions to this end if you don't have some foreknowledge of it. Make sense? Okay? But to those things which can be investigated about God or found out about God by human reason, it was necessary for man to be instructed by divine revelation, right? Now, this is necessary, it seems to me, in that second sense, huh? Because these things can be without what? Revelation, right? And as we saw in Vatican I, that's an article of faith now, that God can be known by natural reason, right? It doesn't mean that very many men would know him by natural reason, right? Or know him very well, maybe, right? But that he can be, right? And in terms of divine providence, huh? That Plato and Aristotle and the Greek philosophers didn't have revelation, right? But arrived at a certain knowledge of God, huh? Actually, Plato saw, you know, something in the definition of eternity, right? There's no before and after he saw eternity. You know, most people think of eternity as being endless time, right? But even endless time would not be eternity because in endless time it's still a before and after. But Plato, in the tomatoes there, sees that eternity has no before and after in it, right? So, Plato and Aristotle could arrive at a certain knowledge of God, huh? And the fact that they didn't have revelation is a confirmation of what the Vatican I is saying, right? If only Christians had used their reason to arrive at the knowledge that can be known by reason alone, you might say, well, that's, you're self-deceiving yourself, right? Right, okay? And you heard me compare that to the other thing that the Church Fathers say, you know, that the non-conversion of many of the Jews, right, was not good, but God brought this good out of it that they were witnesses to the authenticity and antiquity of the books of the Old Testament, right? Which prophesied about Christ, right? And the pagans, you know, might say, you know, we just invented those books, so you, you know. But when the enemies of the Christians, right, witness to the authenticity of those works, huh? Then that's a, what? Impressive, right? Yeah. Okay. That's a great group. You know, what do they say about the testimony of the enemy is the most convincing, right? What did George III say, you know? Wasn't very happy about the American Revolution, right? But he's kind of amazed, huh, that, you know, Washington's going to step down at the end of the war there, right? And not assume power over the country, right? And he says if he walks away, he says he'll be the greatest man in the world. Real admiration there, you know, despite, you know, being very mad about the revolution. He was him about George Washington, right? He'll be the greatest man in the world. But anyway, the fact that the Jews then, right, witness to the authenticity of those books, despite these horrid Christians, right? It's a sign that Christians did not have somebody invented those books. Okay? The same way, you know, people are saying now, you know, the Ten Commandments are, well, that's a matter of religion, right? Then you go back to Aristotle's Necomachian Ethics, and you see he doesn't believe the origins of his time, you know, like that, right? But for him, adultery is always wrong. There's no mean, he says, you know, either too much or too little, right? But it's always wrong. He's already got a definition, you know, in excess, right? So a man can see this, right? Or he says, you know, in the topics that if a man doesn't want to honor his father and mother or asks whether he should honor his father and mother, he doesn't need to be convinced or he should honor your father and mother, he needs to be punished. A man should know this, you know? So it's not something, you know, that because God gave it to Moses on the mountain. Yeah, he did, right? And that confirms this. But it's not as if this could be known only through God speaking to Moses on the mountain, right? How did Aristotle do? To the best of my knowledge, God didn't speak to Aristotle on Lumpus or someplace, you know? There's no evidence that he did. But you can know this by natural reason, huh? And he says, so I think the second thing he's talking about now is necessity for the well-being. To those things which can be investigated by human reason about God is necessary for man to be instructed by divine revelation. Because the truth about God investigated by reason approaches, right? By few, right, huh? In other places, Thomas and Phelps, this is why it would be by few, right? First of all, there are few men who have the mental ability to do this, right? And even those who might have mental ability are often, what? Distracted by the, what? Necessities of life and so on, right? And even those who might have the ability and the leisure, oh, I've got to go through all these things to get there? Like when Euclid was instructing the king, you know, isn't there a shorter way to these things, you know? So, because few men are capable of this, and they would have to have the leisure to do it, right? And the desire to go through all the things, we suppose, right? Very few men would attain to this, right? So wouldn't that, that's not good, okay? And even those who could, it would be a pair of long tempest for a long time, right? And with the admixture of many errors, right? And this is shown by the disagreement among men, right? The problem for reason is deceived. But the knowledge of this truth, on the knowledge of this truth, depends the whole, what? Salvation of man, right? Which is in God, right? And therefore, that the salvation of man might, what, conveniencius, right? More suitably, and cheritius, more certainly, right? Arrive. It was necessary to be instructed about divine things, the divine revelation, huh? So that's that second sense of necessary for the well-being, right? I think when, in fact, we want to touch upon these two things, we use the term absolutely necessary, right? But that means it could not be without that first sense of necessary for the very being, right? So, we conclude, therefore, it's necessary, besides the philosophical disciplines, which are investigated by reason, to have some teaching by, what? Revelation. Are you convinced? So notice, in my examples there, logic is necessary, right? In one of these senses, it's necessary, right? This foretaste of first philosophy is necessary for the philosopher in this other sense, right? But sacred fact is necessary in what? Both of these senses of what? Necessary, right? But not necessary in this intrinsic sense, right? Okay? Because I'm a man, I don't necessarily believe, right? And God doesn't believe us by violence, like in the movie sense, right? Okay? But he's pretty strong in St. Paul, like a pericade. But he's pretty strong in St. Paul, right? Locks him off his horse, right? He's pretty strong in St. Paul, right? Yeah.