Prima Pars
Lecture 8: Sacred Doctrine as Wisdom and Its Nature

Transcript
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And so you see things that are less visible, really, better than things that are more visible, right? That's the nature of our mind, huh? Whence the doubt which happens in some people about the articles of faith is not an account of the thing being itself uncertain, right? But an account of the weakness of the human, what? Understanding. But then he touches upon what Aristotle says in the beginning of the parts of animals, which he calls the 11th book about the animals, right? Because sometimes they take the history of animals and so on, and, you know, a number of them all together, right? But usually it's what we call the parts of animals. For Aristotle, of those two criterion, right, that you have in the animal, he shows the more important one is the thing you're knowing, right? Okay? He uses a very simple sign of this, that we'd rather see, what, someone we love briefly or even at a little distance, right? Imperfect. Than to see the boss of somebody all day long, right? That's what we don't care for, right? You see? Okay? So it's better to see the person you love imperfectly, right? Than to see someone you don't love at all much clearer, right? Okay? Or it's better to hear Mozart on an imperfect, right? You know? Than to hear some other composers on a perfectly, you know, suitable system, right? You don't want to listen to heavy metal perfectly. No, no. My ears don't want to either. Heavy metal is in the junk here. So he says, even if there was some way to say, you know, that there's a lesser suititude here, right? Because on our side, right? Because people can doubt these things, right? Nevertheless, the least that we could have in the knowledge of the higher things, right? The highest things, is more desirable than the most certain knowledge which is had about, what? Lesser things. As Aristotus says in the 11th book about the animals. That's actually in the premium to the parts of animals, huh? Okay? I think what you have, I think there's 10 books to the history of animals, right? And then comes the, what? Four books and parts of animals. So it's called the 11th book. But in the beginning of that, huh? So even if you attain to these higher things only by belief, right? And not by, what? Evidence, right? It would still be better to attain to the higher things by belief than to attain to the lower things even by, what? Reason. Evidence, right? Okay? Okay. It's better to know what the soul is, even imperfectly, right? Than to know perfectly what the triangle is, what the circle is, huh? Like you can see that, huh? Einstein, you know, was talking about the responsibility of the scientists, you know, to make known to the general public to some extent his discoveries, right? And, because people are impoverished if they don't, what, partake in some way of these scientific discoveries, huh? But you know when a scientist tries to explain his theory to the public, the public is going to get a rather imperfect, what, understanding of it, right, huh? And they described these times, you know, when Einstein would be giving these kind of public things, you know, and all these stupid questions you'd get and so on and so on. And I guess, so one of them, you know, they, I've told you this before, but a woman says, what do you feel about all this? Oh, no. Einstein says, well, just a minute, he says, he went over and he got out his violin and then he started playing Mozart. That was the end of the question period. What do you feel about all this? Because we're playing some Mozart. Einstein had a good judgment there about music, you know, he realized Mozart was much superior to Beethoven, right? He said, Beethoven made his music, but Mozart found it. Mozart's music seems to have been always a part of the universe, he says. Okay. So, he's a little nuanced in reply to that first objection, right, huh? Okay. But, you know, I was thinking, you know, of the, in the Adorote Devote, right, when Thomas says, in the second quatrain, he's talking about why he believes these things, right, huh? Credo quid quid dixi dei filios. Nilo, hope, variable, veritatis, various, right? Nothing is more certain, right, than what the word of God says, right? So, in some way, this is more certain than fast, right? But even if you want to say that there's something in the objection, you know, in saying that, well, I can't really deny that a whole is more than a part, but I could deny that there are three persons in God or something of that sort, right? But even that would not make this, what, of more worth, because the chief criterion is what you're knowing, right? So, knowledge of a better thing is better knowledge, right? Okay. And it's the greatest criterion. Aristotle himself saw that, right? And, of course, if you take that criterion and you say, well, how much better is God than other things? Well, it's infinitely, right? So, the knowledge of God, however perfect your knowledge of God might be, it seems to be infinitely better than the other knowledge that you might have. So, when they ask me, what are you going to do in your retirement, I'm going to think about the best thing. See if they figure out what I may do in my retirement. Spend my time thinking about the best thing. Yeah? What's that? What's that? Let them figure it out. If you don't know, I'll help you. Now, the second objection, though, is saying, hey, don't you borrow things and take things from philosophy and use them in your science, huh? Aren't you a bower, huh? It says that this science is able to take something from the philosophical disciplines, not because it needs them, right, a necessity, but for the greater manifestation of those things which are treated in this science, huh? For it does not take its beginnings from other sciences, but immediately by God through revelation. And therefore, it does not take from the other sciences, as it were from higher sciences, but it uses them as, what, lower ones and as, what, servants, handmaidens, right? Just as the architectonic sciences use the ones that administer to them, as the civilian science uses the, what, military science, huh? So President Bush is a commander-in-chief, right? But he's also commanding other things. And this, that it uses these, right, is not on account of its defect or of its insufficiency, but on account of the, what, failing of our understanding, right? Because from those things which are known, what, through natural reason from which the other sciences proceed, we are more easily led by the hand, right, than those things which are above reason, which are treated in, what, the science, huh? Okay. And, um, a little footnote to that, it's the word manuduchitor, okay? Mm-hmm. Um, if you have the whole prima parsi, I don't know if you, you probably don't have it here, but, um, if you look at question 117, article 1. You could hurt me too. What? You're kidding. Me three. Well, uh, two terms, two terms. The article is where Tom's been for me. Well, I'm in the middle. Oh, oh, oh, I thought he meant I was missing. Yeah, but I didn't. No, he didn't, too. I heard you say it, that's why I had to say it. Well, I, I oversaw my question. Well, it's whether one man can teach. Wait, where is it? Where is it again? Question 117, article 1. The beginning. Whether one man can teach another, right? Okay. Um, I'm not going to go through article here, but look at the last. Well, I'm not going to go through article 1, but I'm not going to go through article 1, but I'm not going to go through article 1, but I'm not going to go through article 1, but I'm not going to go through article 1, but I'm not going to go through article 1, but I'm not going to go through article 1, but I'm not going to go through article 1, but I'm not going to go through article 1, but I'm not going to go through article 1, but I'm not going to go through article 1. paragraph, right, where Thomas, the last paragraph of the body of the article, okay, where he says the teacher leads the student, right, from what is foreknown to a knowledge of the unknown, okay, okay, in two ways he does this, right, okay, first by proposing to him some aids, right, or tools, right, which his intellect uses to acquiring science, as when he proposes to him some statements that are less universal, which nevertheless, from things already known, the disciple is able to judge, right, or when he proposes to him some sensible examples, right, or some likenesses, right, or some opposites, right, and other things of this sort, from which the understanding of the one learning is manuduchito, right, is led by the hand to a knowledge of the unknown truth, right, but in another way, when he strengthens the understanding of the one learning, not by some act of power as we're of a higher nature, as has been said above about the angels illuminating it, that can be called upon an angel to help us, right, it stinks not out of my mind, okay, not that, because all human understandings are one grade in the order of nature, but insofar as he proposes to the disciple or the student the order of principles to what? Conclusions, because perhaps through himself he does not have such a power of bringing things together that he can deduce conclusions from the principles, and therefore it is said in the first book of the post-analytics, the demonstrations that soldiers are making us to know. Well, this is a very important text that Mazzini Dhyan, you know, would expound on, right, and he gave us a course on the monudexio necessary for wisdom, and a course on the monudexio necessary for logic, because these are both very difficult sciences, but this is something other than what you're doing mainly in geometry, right, we're proposing the order of what? Principles and conclusions, right? That's almost, oh yeah, through geometry, because it's so proportioned to us, but in the other sciences, and the more difficult they are, the more you need this, what, leading by the hand, right, okay? So, because what is being proposed to us in sacred doctrine is so elegant, right, we need to have, what, be led by the hand, right, using things that are, what, more known to us, okay? And, you'll see that throughout this, right? Okay. So, when Augustine is talking about the Trinity, he'll go back to what? What we know about our own mind, right, and how your own mind might know itself, and say, hey, I'm lovable, and then love itself, right? And then you start to, what, have something that has a certain likeness, right, because we're made in the image and likeness of God, right, and you can be led by that, that's an understanding, yeah? So, when Thomas, you know, if you look at Thomas's even commentary on St. John there, in the beginning was the Word, right? We're going to talk about how our thought is to our thinking, and so on, and kind of lead us from that to see what St. John is saying about God, right? But then he's using that on the account of the weakness of our mind, right, that we've got to be led in that way, yeah? So, that's a distinction that Thomas gives in that question, 117, Article 1, between mind and dexial, right? And then the more finishing thing, you might say, the teacher, proposing the order of principles to what? Conclusions on it. See, there's talking about the beginning of the physics there, right, where he gives the reason why we know the confused before the distinct, and he gives us three kinds of examples ways to show that, in fact, we do, and you can break that down into very singular examples of what I do when I teach that. Okay, so we'll stop there in the fifth, fifth, start. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our might, amen. Cardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, bring it to us, and help us to understand all that you have it. In the name of the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Now, if you want to follow the rule of two or three, right, in these ten articles, you could divide the first article against the other nine, right? Because the first one, in a way, is about the existence of this teaching, this knowledge, huh? And the other nine articles are about the teaching itself. And those nine articles you could divide into, what, three, right? Because the first five are about the kind of knowledge it is. And then the seventh one, seventh article, is about what the subject of this knowledge is. And then the last three are about the way of proceeding, huh? Okay? About the road, huh? And those first five articles, huh? You could divide if you wanted to into two, right? Because three of them are asking about it as a science, you know? What kind of knowledge is it? Is it a science? And if it's a science, is it one science? Or many sciences? And if one science is speculative or practical, right? And then the next two articles are more about its preeminence over the other sciences, huh? And if it is a science, now how does it relate to the other sciences in terms of its excellence and so on? And the one we saw last time, the fifth article, showed that both it's speculative and it's practical, because in a way it combines both, it excels all the other sciences. And that kind of prepares a way for it being called a, what? A wisdom, right? Because wisdom means the highest thing there, you might say, in knowledge. So let's look at these six articles, that's where we're at now. It seems that this doctrine or teaching is not wisdom, huh? For no teaching which supposes its beginnings elsewhere is worthy of the name of wisdom, because it belongs to the wise man to order and not to be ordered. That's from the premium to wisdom, I think, any of the first book of wisdom or the metaphysics. But this teaching supposes its principles elsewhere from God, right? The knowledge of God or the knowledge of the blessed. Therefore, this teaching is not, what? Wisdom, right? That's a good objection, huh? Moreover, to wisdom it belongs to prove the beginnings of the other sciences, whence it is called the head of the sciences. In the sixth book, Unicum Hock in Ethics, he takes up the virtues of reason. But this teaching does not prove the beginnings of the other sciences. Therefore, it's not wisdom. Moreover, this teaching is acquired by study. I hope you're all studying. But wisdom is had by infusion or by pouring in. Whence it is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, as is clear in the 11th chapter of the book of Isaiah. Therefore, this teaching is not, what? Wisdom. But against this is what is said in the book of Deuteronomy, chapter 4, verse 6, in the beginning of the law. The quote is, This is your wisdom and understanding before the people. Now, he says, I answer, it should be said, that this teaching is most of all wisdom among all human, what? Wisdoms, right? Not only in some genus or kind, but simply without qualification. For since it belongs to the wise man to order and to judge, and judgment is had about lower things through a, what? Higher cause. He is said to be wise in any genus who considers the highest cause of that genus. As, for example, in the genus of building, the artist who disposes the form of the house is called wise and the architect. Architect, of course, in Greek means, what? Chief artist. With respect to the inferior artists who worked the wood and prepared the stones. Whence it is said in the first epistle of Paul to Corinthians, chapter 3, verse 10, As a wise architect, I have laid a, what? Foundation. And again, in the genus of the whole of human life, the man who has foresight, he's prudent, is called wise, right? In so far as he orders human acts to a suitable end. Whence it is said in the book of Proverbs, the 10th chapter, the 23rd verse, prudence, or foresight is the English word for that, is wisdom for man, right? He, therefore, who considers simply the highest cause of the whole universe. Incidentally, in Greek, I guess, and in Latin, they'll tend to speak of the cause as being, what? Above the effect, huh? So the first cause would be the, what? Highest, right? And you have this word in Latin that the effect depends upon the cause, right? And depends means hangs upon, right? Like a woman's pendant, huh? Here we go. But in English, we tend to imagine the cause as supporting the effect, huh? Of course, some of you speak that way in Greek or Latin, too. You speak of the underlying cause. That's why the native Anglo-Saxon word for cause seems to be ground. Shakespeare likes to pun on those two meanings of ground like it does even in Roman Juliet. We see the ground, Ron, these woes do lie, right? But the true ground means the true cause you cannot put out for the circumstance to cry. So when he speaks of the altissima causa, in Latin there, he means then the, what? The very first cause, huh? Once above all the other causes. For the whole universe, which is God. Therefore, he should be most of all be called quite wise, right? Because not just the first cause in building, or the first cause in human life, but the first cause simply, of all things, huh? Whence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as is clear through Augustine in the twelfth book of the, what? Trinity, huh? Of course, we saw Aristotle saying that, too, that it's the divine science system, huh? Sacred teaching most properly determines about God according as he is the highest cause. Because not only as he guards that which is knowable about him through preachers, which the philosopher is also right, as is said in Romans, this is to the Romans, chapter 1, verse 19, what is known of God is manifest to them. That was the text quoted in the, what? Vatican I, right? As to the possibility of knowing God by natural reason. But also, as it guards what is known to him only about himself, right? And is communicated by revelation to others. One sacred doctrine is most of all called, what? Wisdom, right? Okay? So you have that distinction between simply and what? In some way, right? Okay? And of course, we use that sometimes when we talk, even in philosophy, huh? And we say that first philosophy is wisdom simply, right? So you have that distinction between the two and the two and the two and the two and the two and the two. Well, ethics is wisdom about what? Human things, right? Ethics is about the first cause of all human things, namely happiness, the end, the goal of all human things. So you could say that ethics is wisdom in some way, right? It's a wisdom about human things, right? And you could say that natural philosophy is a kind of wisdom, because it's a wisdom about natural things. You have to qualify it, though, right? But because first philosophy is about all things and about the first cause, then it's called simply what? Wisdom, right? And you'll see in the metaphysics, Aristotle sometimes will call it simply philosophy, or simply wisdom. But a fortiori, right? Sacred doctrine is wisdom in that sense, because it's even more about God, right, than first philosophy is. Because we find out in the fourth book of first philosophy that the subject of first philosophy is being and one. And God is only the, what, end or goal. But here, in sacred teaching, sacred doctrine, God is the very subject of sacred doctrine. Right? But furthermore, we know things about God through revelation. Things that God alone knows about himself, right? Which the philosopher will not know about God. So I've read Aristotle a lot, but I don't see any evidence that he knew about the Trinity. And even though he sometimes say we use the number three to praise God with. But he doesn't seem to have any knowledge of the Trinity, or the Incarnation, for that matter. Now, how does he reply to these objections? It's kind of interesting, huh? He says, to the first it ought to be said that sacred teaching does not suppose its beginnings from some human science, right? Because that would make it, what, inferior to that human science, right? So it's not drawing its beginnings from any human knowledge. So it doesn't put it underneath any human knowledge. But rather from the divine science, the divine knowledge. Which, of course, is the, what, summa sapiens, the highest wisdom. So it takes its, what, beginnings from the divine science, by which, right, all our knowledge is ordered, right? As by a highest, what, wisdom, right? So he's saying, you know, hey, the knowledge of God is the summa sapiens here, right? And this sacred doctrine is derived from that, right? So it's closer to that, which is the summa, the highest, the greatest wisdom, right? From which all human knowledge in some way is directed, right? So obviously this knowledge has more the character of wisdom than any other human knowledge, huh? It doesn't have more the character of wisdom than the summa sapiens here that God has, but it does more than what? Any other one, okay? Now, back to the second objection there, right? What about proving the principles of the other sciences, huh? He says that the beginnings of the other sciences are either known to themselves, right? And are not able to be proven, right? Or they're proven in some other science through some natural reason. But it's proper to the knowledge of this science, which is through revelation. Or it's proper to this knowledge or science, right, that it be through revelation. Now, however, that it be through what natural reason? And therefore, it does not pertain to it to prove the beginnings of the other sciences, right? But only to what? Judge about them. For whatever in the other sciences is found repugnant to the truth of this science is wholly condemned as, what? False, huh? Okay. We saw it already in Vatican I. Okay. Whence it is said in the second epistle to the Corinthians, the tenth chapter, the fourth, the following verses, destroying councils, right? And every altitude extolling itself against the, what? Knowledge of God. Okay. So he's saying it doesn't prove the beginnings of the other sciences, because that's proven by some natural reason, right? But it does have a, what? Jurisdiction over them, right? Because it judges them, right? And it considers them as whether they are in harmony with this revelation or not. Okay? So in that sense, it's, it has a character of wisdom. Now, the third objection was based upon, hey, wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit are, what, breathed into us, right? Okay. Well, here Thomas is going to say, well, this is a different wisdom than that, huh? He's going to distinguish between the wisdom that's acquired by study and the wisdom that is a gift of the Holy Spirit, huh? He's going to say something here about what the difference is. In the Secunda Secundi, the Summa there, when he takes up the virtues in detail, right? And he gets the Holy Spirit. And you may recall how he takes up faith, hope, and charity, and then the four cardinal virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. And he considers other virtues that there are by their connection with one of these seven main ones, huh? And he also takes up the gifts of the Holy Spirit that are corresponding to these. Well, the gift of the Holy Spirit called wisdom is taken up with what virtue? See, well, I don't know. To charity. With charity, yeah. Not with faith, right? But with what? Charity, right? And that's relevant to what he's going to be saying here in this reply to the third one, huh? To the third, it ought to be said that sense judgment, huh? Now, what is judgment, by the way? It's the definition of judgment, huh? My philosophy will say judgment is the separation of the true from the false. Sometimes you say also the good from the bad, right? In philosophy we say by some beginning in our knowledge, right? Okay? To some beginning or some measure whereby we separate the true from the false and the good from the what? Bad, huh? Okay? So in simple theorem and geometry, right? If these angles are equal, how do you judge that these two must be true and that they can be unequal is false, right? How do you separate those two, right? Well, if you know the theorem, what Euclid does is say that if one of these sides is longer than the other, like say this one's longer than this one here, you could cut off from the base here a line equal to what? That over there. and then you could draw a line over to this corner like that. And now you've got two triangles, right? By your own admissions that have an equal angle, right? And, since this side is equal to that, and this side is common, two triangles contained by what? Having an equal angle contained by equal sides. Therefore, this triangle, the lesser one is equal to the greater one, right? A hole is bigger than a part, right? You see? So, by that beginning, and I acknowledge that the hole is more than a part, I say, it's false, right? That those can be unequal, right? And prove that they must be, what? Equal, right? Okay. That's just... That's separating the true from the false by some beginning. And ultimately you go back to the axiom about what being an unbeam. Someone says to me now, an odd number can be even. An odd number cannot be even. Let's separate the true from the false. Well, I'd say that an odd number can be even. That's false. An odd number cannot be even. That's true. I separate the true from the false. How do I do that? Well, because I know that an odd number is a number divisible, not divisible by two, and even is. So it can't both be and not be divisible into two equal parts, right? So I'm going back to the impossibility of both being and not being at the same time in the same way. And so by that first beginning in our knowledge, I ultimately judge everything else. Why do I know that a whole is more than a part, right? Well, if you know what a whole is, you know a whole is what has parts, right? So it must be more than what? Just one of those parts. Otherwise, it would have parts and wouldn't have parts. So it's a contradiction, right? So you judge everything ultimately by the axiom about contradiction. But that's the first beginning of all, right? So you separate the true from the false from some beginning, right? It says, Since judgment belongs to the wise men, according to a twofold, two kinds or two ways of judging, there is a twofold what? Way of taking wisdom. For it can happen for someone to judge in one way by way of what? Inclination. Just as who has the habit of virtue rightly judges about those things which ought to be done by what? Virtue, huh? Insofar as he is, what? Inclined to them. So, you know, there's that famous conversation between Desdemona and the maid there at the end of Athelda, towards the end of. And the idea was, would you sleep with someone besides your husband? You know, for all the world, right? And of course, Desdemona just couldn't do this. He cannot do this as possible. And the maid says, Well, I do it. And the next morning says, I didn't do it. I didn't do it. Well, it's kind of interesting because Desdemona is going to be accused falsely, right? Of adultery, right? But she judges these things as, what? Repugnant by the very inclination of her, what? Virtue, huh? Okay. Whence it is said in the 10th book of the Ethics that the virtuous man or woman is the measure and the rule of human acts. So in Desdemona, there is the rule, right? The measure, huh? But no, she's judging by the, what? Inclination, the virtuous inclination of her, what? Appetite, right? Another way, by way of knowledge. Just as someone instructed in moral science is able to judge about the acts of virtue even if he does not, what? Have the virtue, huh? So watch out for these moral theologians, right? Make sure they have sinned before they do it. So he says the first way of judging, right? By the inclination of the appetite. Of judging about divine things pertains to the wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Spirit. According to that of the 1 Corinthians 2, verse 15. The spiritual man judges all things, right? And Dionysius says in the second chapter about the divine names, speaking of Erotheus, Erotheus taught as not only, what? Learning, but as undergoing divine things, huh? Okay. And of course, when you take up the difference between the reason and the will, the will undergoes more than the, what? Reason does. And so that's very significant. He used the word patiens, you know, undergoing divine things. And of course, as Father Bollet used to point out, you know, there's a way in which the will is more proportioned to God than the reasoner. Because reason, as a knowing power, tries to get the known into the knower, right? So you're trying to get God into your little mind, you know? Right, see? But love goes to the thing loved, right? So it's like the difference between jumping into the ocean, which is more like the will, and trying to put the ocean inside of you. It's more like what reason is trying to do, huh? So the one who loves God is able to judge well, right? Because of the inclination of their heart, right? Their will. And they have a kind of wisdom, therefore, that is what, attached, or connected with, the virtue of, what, charity. And that's why in the Secunda Secundi, where Thomas takes up the virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit in particular, he attaches a consideration of wisdom to charity, right? Okay? The second way of judging, huh? Pertains to this teaching, right? According as it is had to, what, study, right, huh? Although its beginnings are had, what, from Revelation, right, huh? But you're judging other things by those beginnings had from Revelation, right? It's more like the judgment of the philosopher, right, huh? Okay? But the judgment that is tied up with the gift of the Holy Spirit of wisdom is more like the judgment that the philosopher talks about the virtuous man having, right? It's interesting, in ethics, where Aristotle says, you know, the starting point in ethics is to know that it is bad. And if a man doesn't know that, right, he's never going to get the reason why. Now, it seems to me that that point is also true about the fine arts, you know? Now, you've got to recognize that Shakespeare is better than Fletcher, right? Before you can give any reason why it's better, right? Okay? Or you can see the excellence of most of you here, if I'm not, without, or before being able to give any reason why, right? And if you can't see that it is better, and you want to know why, before you're going to admit this, you're out of order, okay? You know, it's like a lot about, you know, homosexual marriage or whatever it is, you know? I mean, what was it just spontaneously rejected by the inclination of one's virtue, right? Or even the little virtue, shall we say? You know? And not to wait, or some kind of a quasi-scientific demonstration of the indiquity of this practice, you see? And of course, if people, you know, have been brought up badly, they have vice, and then they misjudge all these things, right? Mm-hmm. By the inclination of their, what? Mm-hmm. The bad inclination of their appetite. And I suppose that would be true if someone's brought up, you know, and they're all things to compare instead of wine, say, or listening to rock and roll instead of music, right? Their judgment is really, really corrupted, right? And they don't spontaneously reject these things as bad. He used to help in the hospital, and he said there was a girl, there was an abortion clinic nearby, and a girl had an abortion, and she was bleeding to death, and they rushed her to the hospital, and her friend came over, and he had to go out and tell this friend waiting that she had died. Yeah. So he's, you know, she's trying to be helpful. Well, here's her insurance card, and here's this, and here's that. And he says, well, she doesn't need it anymore because she didn't survive the procedure or whatever. Yeah. And her friend, her friend's response was, well, she just had an abortion. Mm-hmm. That was the response. Yeah. And he said, I want to strengthen her. He said, just an abortion. Yeah. Yeah. She didn't see that there was like, it was like, your nails clipped or something. Yeah, right. Okay, so that concludes,