Prima Pars
Lecture 10: Sacred Doctrine's Method: Argumentation and Metaphor

Transcript
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Let's go on to the eighth article now, which is the first of the three articles dealing with how, not what this science is about, but how it talks and proceeds. And Thomas, of course, has first the article on being argumentative, because that's the way of proceeding. That's only one of many ways of proceeding, but the way of proceeding followed, especially in these books, right? But most books of sacred scripture did not proceed in that way, although Thomas says this is Job, right? The book of Job is ordered to defending faith against the primary objection to the faith, which is the evil in the world, and especially the things that the just, the good, suffer, you know? And so, or the epistles of St. Paul, he says, that's more argumentative. Okay, to the eighth, he proceeds thus. It seems that this teaching is not argumentative. For Ambrose says in the book about the Catholic faith, take away arguments, where faith is sought, huh? But in this teaching, especially faith is sought. Whence it is said in John 23, 1, these things are written that you might believe, huh? Believe what? That Christ is, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God. So he gets the same profession of faith as Peter, except Peter says you. He's addressing Christ directly in Matthew chapter 16, but John is writing, so he says, he uses Jesus as a son of the son of the son of the son of the son of the son of the son of the son of the son of the son of the son of the son of the son of the son of the son of God. But again, you can kind of see that the subject of the Gospels there is the, what? The word of God made flesh. You kind of ascend there from the human nature to the divine nature in those professions of faith. Therefore, sacred teaching is not argumentative. Moreover, if it were argumentative, it would either argue from authority or by some kind of reason. But if from authority it does not seem to be fitting to its dignity. For the place from authority is the most infirm, the weakest, according to Boethius. If from reason, it does not belong or fit to its end. Because according to Gregory in one of his homilies, faith has no merit. For human reason gives, what? Experience. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not argumentative. But against this is what is said in Epistle to Titus, chapter 1, verse 9, about the bishop, embracing, right, that which is according to teaching, a faithful sermon, or embrace that, that you might be able to exhort, huh, in healthy teaching, right, and to argue against those who refute, those who contradict, right? Okay, I answer. It ought to be said that as the other sciences do not argue to proving their principles. The geometry doesn't try to prove that the whole is more than the part, or that all right angles are, what, equal, right, huh? But from their beginnings they reason to showing other things in these sciences. So also this teaching does not argue to proving its own, what, beginnings, which are the articles of faith, but from them it proceeds to showing something else. As, for example, the Apostle in the first epistle to the Corinthians, the 15th chapter, the 12th and the following verses, he argues for the resurrection of, what, Christ, huh? To proving the come-resurrection of the faithful, okay? But nevertheless, it should be considered that in the philosophical sciences, that the lower sciences neither prove their beginnings, nor do they dispute against those denying the beginnings. But they leave this to a higher knowledge, huh? But the supreme one among them, namely metaphysics, or first philosophy, disputes against those denying its, what, beginnings. If only the adversary concedes something, right? If he doesn't concede anything, then we turn to the state of a... That's your stop. That's your stop. If, however, he concedes nothing, one is not able to dispute with them, right? Because in dispute you're proceeding with what your opponent says, right? But nevertheless, one is able to solve his, what? His reasons, yeah. Okay? Whence sacred scripture, since it has no sign superior to it, disputes with those negating or denying its beginnings, huh? Arguing, if the adversary concedes something of those things which are had by divine revelation, as through the authorities of sacred teaching, we dispute against heretics, huh? And from one article against those negating another one, huh? But if the adversary believes none of those things which are divine revealed, there does not remain any way further to proving the articles of faith through reasons, but to solving his reasons if he induces them against the, what, faith, huh? You see this very clearly in the Summa Congentee, as you know, where Thomas gets into the fourth book where he's dealing especially with the articles of faith. And then he'll take up, say, the heretics, and you'll reason from scripture against the heretics, right? But then he'll have some arguments just drawn from philosophy, trying to show that things are possible, that there are three persons in God, and so on. And then he'll solve those arguments. So they're different things, really, what he's doing. He'll try to show from sacred scripture that there are three persons, that the Son is God, too, and the Holy Spirit is God. But then he'll give arguments, say, this is impossible. And that'd be a different type of chapter. And there he's not trying to prove, by reason, that there are three persons in God. He's trying to show that the objections that say this is impossible are defective, right? They have a weakness in them. Necessary. For since faith rests upon infallible truth, right, the truth of God who can either deceive or be deceived, it is impossible to demonstrate something contrary to the truth, right? It is manifest that the proofs which are induced against faith are not demonstrations, but arguments that can be, what, untied, solubilion, like that. Socrates is there in the Mino, right? He talks about an argument that cannot be untied. And, you know, when Mino is asking him, is knowledge really better than right opinion? Because Socrates points out in his time of the apparent contradiction there that there's two ways to get to the good. One is by knowing the way to the good, and the other is by having the right opinion on how to get there. And you've heard by simple examples, right? A guy going down the road and wants to get to Boston. There's a fork in the road, and one road leads to, say, Boston, and the other to, let's say, Providence. If he knows this is the road to Boston, he'll take it, right? But also, if he thinks that's the road to Boston, but doesn't know, he'll take it too. And so in either case, he gets to Boston, right? And so Mino says, well, then is it any better to know than to just think correctly? And Socrates says, well, as far as actions are concerned, right? Socrates said, well, so long as you continue to think correctly, fine, but you might, you know, stop thinking correctly because you're not sure about what you're saying, right? And something might change your mind. But if what you think has been tied down, you know, and tied down by nausea of the claws and so on, then it's not going to get up and run away. And that's what you might say, a demonstration of an argument that ties something down, right? But you could tie it down with that. When the angles and the triangle are equal, the opposite sides must be equal. It's tied down, right? Won't run away. But lots of things we used to have opinions about. Maybe you talk to somebody else and we'll read another book or something and we'll start to change our opinion. So, what sense is this teaching then argumentative and how many ways is it argumentative? Well, it can reason from articles of faith, right? To other things, right? That's one way it's argumentative, right? And he gave an example there from St. Paul, right? It's also argumentative in that it may take something that the man who denies something, the man who denies something beginning of the science, right? You might find some passage in scripture or something like that that he accepts. Reason one way it's argumentative, right? And then third might be argumentative when you're showing that these objections to the articles of faith have some defect in them, right? Okay? So at least in three ways it's what? Argumentative, right? But two of them are taken in regard to its beginnings, huh? And one you might say to its conclusions. Okay? And it's argumentative in these two ways because, like first philosophy, it's a wisdom, even more so. I mentioned before how in Thomas' commentary there, kind of prologue there, his first questions in the sentences, right? He asks whether this doctrine is, what, artful. It's beautiful the way he says it, huh? Artificialis in Latin, but you shouldn't translate it artificial. But artful. And the reason why he speaks that way is the same way Aristotle speaks in the first book, the Nicomachean Ethics. That an art has to adapt itself to its matter. And so Thomas says, is the way the sacred scripture proceeds artful? And he goes to show that it does proceed artfully. And he shows it has many ways of proceeding besides being argumentative. Sometimes it's narrativus. Sometimes it's orativus and laudativus, huh? Right? Some books it narrates things, right? Okay? And the book of Psalms is prayerful and praising and praising and so on. Other books it's revelatory, right? You have the prophets and healing things and so on. Other ways it's what? Commanding, right? Other ones it's threatening and so on. Sometimes it's urging us and so on, huh? So he'll go through all these different ways that sacred scripture proceeds at different times, huh? And one of the ways is argumentative, but only some of the books proceed in that way. So he shouldn't say that this Article 8 here is Thomas' whole consideration of how sacred doctrine proceeds, right? There's all kinds of ways of proceeding, and he'll give the reason for this, right? I mean, even in terms of the principles being above our reason and being received from God revelation, means that the mode of scripture will be revelatory in the sight of God, but on our sight it's going to be prayerful to receive these things, huh? So don't think, don't get a narrow view of what Thomas thinks, but he's emphasizing this way of proceeding, which is only one of the many ways the scripture proceeds, right? Because this is the way he's going to proceed mainly in this book, right? Do you see that? Yeah, I wanted to ask you why is he concerned? Why should he care if somebody doesn't think that's argumentative? Yeah. That's the way he says the book of Job and the book of, and if this is St. Paul, very much argumentative, you know? In fact, he's exactly what he's taking here from, St. Paul. But other books he won't speak that way, right? If you look at the Psalms, he says, or ativus and laudativus, prayerful and praising, right? But that's not proceeding in argumentative mode, right? And Thomas understands that, and he doesn't. So, but he's emphasizing in this way, he doesn't mean whether his teaching is only argumentative, or whether that's one way that it does proceed. He's emphasizing, he's going to proceed in that way in this book, here, right? Okay? It seems to me, if you look at the works of, the most famous works, anyway, of St. John of the Cross, right? They resemble not the book of Job or the Epistles of St. Paul, but more the Song of Songs, right? Okay? The Song of Songs proceeds in a different way. The Song of Songs, as Thomas explains, it actually is one of the Psalms is the same subject as the Song of Songs, and it's an epithelomium, you know? And I don't know if you know Spencer's epithelomium, it's an invitation to that, but epithelomium originally means on the day of marriage, right? So it's praise of the groom, the bride, and the groom. And in a way, the Song of Songs is praise of Christ and the church, primarily, the bride and the groom. So that's not argumentative. And Thomas will identify it as an epithelomium, you know? But going back to what the man originally, the best man does in kind of a diminutive way, you know? He kind of phrases the groom and the bride on that day, right? And he proposes toast and so on. In a sense, that's kind of the literary form, by the way, of Song of Songs, right? So Song of Songs has a form that I think John the Cross is imitating more in his back name of the soul and so on. But in that form, right? But this is imitating more in the way of proceeding in what? Job in the business of St. Paul, right? Okay? And you know, in Christ, you know, in the chapter there in Matthew there, where he says, what do you think about this Christ? Whose son is he? And he actually refutes them, right? You see? But they're in a sense denying the divinity of Christ and so on. And he's, what? Refuting them, right? From Scripture, which they happen to accept. So that's one of the three ways of arguing, right? So Christ argues from time to time, right? But then he uses other ways of proceeding. Sometimes he prays, sometimes he praises and so on. Sometimes he narrates. So, sometimes he prophesies. Right? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, you don't use all of these ways at the same time. Different books, you know, use more one way than another. But this book is primarily this argumentative. Okay, on the first objection, he's agreeing with Ambrose. He said, we don't reason to the articles of faith. We reason, what? From them. Okay, consider the beginnings, huh? To the first, therefore, it ought to be said that although arguments of human reason do not have place to proving the things which are of faith. Nevertheless, from the articles of faith, this teaching argues to other things, right? It reminds me of what the great Plato said. And Aristotle, in the, in the, uh, first book, in the Comarchian Ethics, he says, Plato was right, he says, to ask as he did. Are we on the way to the beginnings or from the beginnings? And, of course, you can ask it right here, right? Are we reasoning to the articles of faith or are we reasoning from them? Well, the answer here, and the first, uh, probably the first objection is we're reasoning from them. Okay? Okay. Heraclitus had said earlier, you know, beware of that man who doesn't know which way the road goes. You know, in philosophy, Descartes... tries to reason from the existence of God to the existence of nature. Well, the road goes in the opposite direction. So, a second objection now. There was an either-or argument, right? Either you argue from authority or you argue from reason, and if you argue from authority, that seems to be, although the dignity of this science, seems to be the infirmissivosa, the most infirm, and you argue from a reason, this does not fit the end. Faith has no merit, as Gregory says, for human reason is experience. And the second Thomas replies, it should be said that to argue from authority is most proper to this teaching, right? In that the beginnings of this teaching are had by revelation, and thus it is necessary that one believes in the authority of those to whom revelation has been made. That's interesting. Maxime proprium, right? I should sit down sometime with the Ingridian symbol or, right? Some similar thing, which has a collection of all the authoritative, the most authoritative, you might say, pronouncements of the Church and the Councils down through the centuries, right? About all the things that pertain to the faith and so on. And I remember, you know, Karl Rahner talking about, you know, this Denziger theology and all that. Well, here are times the same, to argue from authority is most proper to this teaching, right? Denziger, you know, the editors are, I mean, the publishers are where it is, I didn't create a simple alarm. That's what theology should be, Denziger theology. You don't do that only, but, okay. Nor, he says, does it derogate to the authority or to the dignity, the worth of this teaching, for although the place from authority, which is founded upon human reason, is most weak, as the great atheist was saying there, nevertheless, the place from authority, which is founded on divine revelation, is most, what, efficacious, because he can neither deceive nor be deceived, right? But, nevertheless, sacred teaching uses also, what? Human reason. Not in order to prove the faith, because by this would be taken away the merit of faith. That's referring back to what Gregory was saying and the objection to that side of the either-or. But, to manifesting some other things which are treated in this, what, doctrine. So, I suppose you could reason from Christ being both God and man to Mary being the mother of God, right? Although, I see that they're going in reverse, but he denied that she should be called the mother of God. Then, there's my back, right? They seem to be denying another article of the faith, then. And, there's the stories. That's how they discovered him, huh? For since grace does not take away nature, but perfects it, it is necessary that natural reason, right, be subservient to faith, right? Just as the natural inclination of the will follows, what, charity, huh? So, they say charity begins at home. Is that true? Right? So, there's an order in charity, right? Okay. Whence the apostle, meaning, of course, by Antoinio Masia, St. Paul, says in the second epistle to the Corinthians, the tenth chapter, the fifth verse, putting into captivity, right? I'm reminded of what he said to the, I'll make you fishers of men, right? That's kind of captivity, right? For the fish. Catch your fish, huh? Every intellect in the service of what? Christ, huh? So, we've been taken captive. And hence it is that sacred teaching also uses the authorities of philosophers, right? When, where, through natural reason, they were able to know some, what? Truth, huh? So, the authority of Thomas kind of rubs off on what Aristotle are. Okay? But notice, you know, it's important to see, huh? When you say that the usefulness of Aristotle's philosophy and theology is a, what? Sign of the truth of that philosophy, right? Well, we don't say that Aristotle's philosophy is true because it's useful in theology. That's a sign that it's true, right? But it's useful in theology because it is true. Okay? He gives the example as Paul in the Acts there induces the words of Heratus saying, and as some of your poets said, huh? We are of the genus of God. I mean, the image and likeness of God, huh? But now he's going to make some more distinctions here. But nevertheless, sacred teaching uses these authorities of the philosophers as extraneous arguments. That's the part where he says that, right? And what? Probable ones, right? Okay? But it uses the authorities of canonical scripture properly, right? Arguing from necessity. Okay? And then, in the middle. The authorities of the other doctors of the church arguing from what is proper to argue but with, what? More probability there. Okay? Of course, you know, when the church says, you know, the mind of Augustine on grace is the mind of the church on grace. It takes on, you know, an extra authority there. For faith rests upon our faith, you know, rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and to the prophets who wrote the canonical books, not to the revelation if it was made to some other, what, doctors, huh? And he quotes great Augustine there. When Augustine says in the epistle to Jerome, only those, what, books of scripture which are called canonical. What does the word canon mean? List. Measureable. Measureable. Measureable. Measureable. So these are the ones that measure us, huh? I've learned to bear this honor right to those books, right? That no author of them in writing heard, right? I most firmly believe this, right? Others, I read, no matter how much they, what, stand out for their holiness and their teaching and so on, not, thus do I think true because they, what, so held and wrote, okay? Of course, somebody like, you know, Augustine or Thomas had a great deal of authority behind them, you know, now. You look at the Catechism, the Catholic Church. It's a new one, and, you know, how many quotes are in there of Augustine or even of Thomas? And did I bring in that, the one there and that Augustine there? Yeah, that's great. Yeah, yeah, very, very strong, you know? You know, that same issue has, as it goes back to 86, same issue has a letter of then-Carnel Ratzinger to Father Curran, telling him, last straw. Decision holds. Now, Article 9, where the sacred scriptures should use metaphors. Now, here he's going kind of to the opposite extreme, it seems, right? And Aristotle says you can't define by metaphors, right? You can't reason for metaphors. You pig! Therefore, you're four-footed, right? You can't reason why I pig you. Honey, did you do this? You're sticky! Mm-hmm. Your honey lips. Let's see what the objection is to this. That which is proper to the lowest teaching does not seem to belong to this knowledge, which among all other ones holds the highest place, right? As has been said. But to go forward through various likenesses and representations is proper to the, what? Poetic part, huh? Which is the lowest among all the teachings, huh? That's putting C.S. Lewis and there the guys down, and Tolkien down in the, but they are teachers in a sense, right? And we could say Shakespeare's a teacher, and Homer's a teacher, right? And Sophocles is a teacher, right? So why should the highest thing proceed the way the lowest one does? That seems quite unsealable, right? Moreover, this teaching seems to be ordered, or seemed to be ordered, to the manifestation of truth. That this was I born as I came into the world. I'm making a testimony to the truth, right? Whence to its manifestors reward is promised, right? Who elucidate me will have eternal life. But through these likenesses truth is hidden. Therefore it does not belong to this doctrine to treat of divine things under the likeness of bodily things. It's obscuring the truth, right? Now a more particular objection. Moreover, as some creatures, or the more some creatures are sublime, the more they accede to what? Divine likeness. But if some things are taken from creatures and carried over to God, then we're not to take from things from the more sublime creatures to speak about God, and not for the lowest. But nevertheless, in Scripture, frequently it's found that the reverse, right? So the Lord is a rock, you know? They say the Lord is a cat, they'll be closer with it. At least the cat is alive, right? The stone is not even alive, right? The cat is a much more marvelous thing, right? So, you don't often say to be a cat, God, or a dog, or even a tree, but a stone? The Lord is my rock. So this third objection is a little more particular. It's saying, you know, if you give, metaphor, it's like, oh, you ought to take them because of likeness, right? You never take something that is more like God than a rock. It's a terrible thing. Scripture should do that sort of thing, huh? Shocking. But again, this is what is said in the prophet O.C., I have multiplied, what? Visions to them. And in the, this is said by God, and in the hands of the prophets, I am, what? Like it. But to treat some things under likeness is a metaphor. Therefore, to sacred doctrine pertains to use metaphors. In a sense, the parables of our Lord, too, are kind of like an extended, what, metaphor, right? An elaborated metaphor. Now, Dionysius has that book called On the Divine Names. Then there's another book, I guess, on called Symbolic Theology, which is about the metaphors. So he sees the distinction between the two and that you don't reason for metaphors. So you'll find both books in Scripture. By answer, it should be said that it is suitable for sacred Scripture to consider divine and spiritual things under the likeness of, what? Bodily things, huh? For God provides for all according as it is fitting to their nature. But it is natural to man that he come through sensible things to understandable things. For all our knowledge has its origin from the senses, huh? Now, Thomas would often point out this, right? Like he talks about giving grace in the sacraments through a, what? Sensible sign, right? That this is not only conformed to the word made foolish, but it's also conformed to the one you're trying to aid by these sacraments, right? To man, right? That he be led to something spiritual through something sensible. Well, the same way here in the Scriptures and Metaphors. Whence, suitably, in sacred Scripture, are treated for us spiritual things under the metaphors of bodily things. And this is what Dionysius says in the first chapter of the Celestial Hurricane. It is impossible for us, otherwise, to shine the divine rays, right? Unless it be, what? Chirkum velatum, huh? Velatum means what? Veil and chirkum around, huh? So the thing that's being revealed to us, the ray of divine light is surrounded with it, right? Veils, by variety of sacred veils, right? Okay? So that's his first reason, right? Okay? So the kingdom of heaven is like a, what? Pearl, right? Or it's like a treasure in the field, you know. It's very appropriate to man, right? Okay? It is suitable also, huh? To sacred Scripture, which is commonly, what? Proposed to everyone, right? According to that of Romans 1.14, I am in debt to the wise and the foolish. Incipientius, right? To the insipid, huh? I mentioned before, I mean, sapientia, I mean, sapida scientia, savory knowledge, right? To the insipid, huh? Foolish. Yeah. You know, Shakespeare says there, when Romeo's coming in, to do a foolish thing, take his life, take the poison, right? Come, come, bitter conduct, huh? Come, unsavory guy, right? He compares himself to the pirate ship on the rocks, huh? But when he says unsavory, what does he mean? Foolish. Yeah, yeah. And sapid means foolish, right? Democrats there. Sipid. Sipid. So, since one is indebted, one is in debt to both the wise and to the, what? The foolish, huh? The insipid. It's necessary that spiritual things be proposed under the likeness of body things, so that, what, even the rustics, right? Might grasp them, right? Who are not suitable to, what, grasping? I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. They don't stand with things in themselves, right? There's that story told about, wasn't it, St. Patrick was sermonizing to the Piratio Shire. Who does, as you say? And they were having problems with the Trinity, right? Supposed to have picked, was it a shamrock or something? They had, that's one in three. Yeah, okay, okay. Okay, so, it's kind of a metaphor, right? You know, they're very distant from the Trinity, obviously, but it was acceptable to them, right? But you see it in all of Christ's parables almost all the time. And the body of the article here mentions two reasons there. The first reason is in regard to all men, right? We all get our important things. Yeah, yeah. Well, it's appropriate to take something sensible, right? To lead us to these things, right? The metaphor very clearly does that. Metaphors ought to be drawn from things that are clearly sensible, right? And lead us to something. But then he gives a second reason, which is in particular to the, what? Those who aren't able to attain these things in themselves, the understandable of itself very well, right? Okay? Something appropriate to them, right? In the hands of God. But maybe, you know, he can give a reason. Maybe he'll come up later on, he'll apply the objections here. It also has a special reason for the wiser, maybe, too, though, right? That they can look for what's underneath these things, huh? So I remember reading, when I first was reading the Church Fathers on the burning bush, right? And the Church Fathers see, in the burning bush, which is a remarkable thing, because the bush is not being consumed, right? But that the fire there represents the divine nature of Christ, and the bush is human nature. And the bush, not being consumed by the fire, is this human nature not being consumed by the divine nature. So, these profound lines see underneath this, they, what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Or like when they said, you know, it's in lawful to give tribute to Caesar, and so on. Christ says, well, whose image is that, right? And they say, well, Caesar's, well, give to Caesar's, and to God, what is God's? And the Church Fathers say, well, then what has the image of God on it? And that's the soul, give to God the soul, right? Now, the first objection was, how can this teaching, which is the highest of all, proceed in the way that the lowest one proceeds, right? Well, he says, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the poet uses metaphors on account of, what, representation, limitation. Representation is naturally, what, delightful to man, huh? And Aristotle, of course, in the book on the poetic arts, says that imitation, man is by nature the most imitative of the animals. I have a very good meow if you want to hear something. But, you know, I imitate all different sounds of all different animals for the grandchildren, right? So, I used to pretend I had a kid in there, you know, and meow. And so, man is more imitative than you're going to get animals. But Aristotle says that first we learn by imitation, right? And we all wouldn't actually delight in him. He's following his teacher, Aristotle. But sacred doctrine uses metaphors on account of necessity, right? And perhaps referring back to the first reason, right? And usefulness, as has been said, right? Now, sometimes you could be more explicit about this, huh? That the poet is trying to help us understand something that falls below our mind. And the theologian is trying to bring something above our mind, down to our mind, right? And so there's something common to the two, which is that something is not, what, proportionate to our mind. But in another way, it's just the reverse, right? Because in one case, it's above our mind. In another case, what, below our mind. And so we tend to express these things metaphorically, because they're not quite accessible to our reason, right? In one case, it's because of the thing itself. In another case, it's because of the weakness of our mind. So that's why I kind of put Dante aside as not being what is typical of a poet, right? Because he's, in a sense, trying to do more of what Scripture's doing, to bring these things down to our level here. But the poet is really trying to raise things up. So they say, if there is original of the Trojan War, right, it's probably some kind of a pirate raid, you know. But when Homer gets through with it, right, it's like the Book of Job, right? You know, man's life on Earth is a warfare, you know. It's like the whole human life is there. And the struggle of it. So he's given much more meaning to some battle than he really had. And, you know, he just runs throughout the fine arts. So the great portrait painter tries to capture the whole man's character in one expression on his face. And so he's trying to give a facial expression more meaning than he really has. He's trying to capture more of the man in his face than any expression in real life that he has. Look at the face of Judge Alito there all these days, you know. These terrible questioners and so on. And occasionally he says, this is some music, you know, and he has a chance to laugh and so on. It gets a little bit different. Okay, now the second objection was that you're hiding this truth here, right? But the second should be said that the ray of divine revelation is not destroyed on account of the sensible figures by which it is, what? Veiled around, as Danyusha says. But it remains in its, what? Truth. So that the minds to which the revelation is made does not permit to remain in the likenesses. But it elevates them to a, what? Knowledge of the understandables. And through them to which the revelation has been made, others are also, what? Instructed about these things. Hence, those things which in one place of scripture are treated under metaphors, in other places are more, what? Expressly expounded, right? And then he gives two other reasons here, right? And the hiding of the figures, the hiding of the figures, or that they are responsible for, is useful to the, what? Exercise the studios. Okay, you mean people like the church fathers. So, and against the, what? Making fun of them, of the, those without faith, right? About whom it is said in Matthew 7 and 6, do not give what is holy to the, what? To the dogs. Okay. So, exercizium studios, studiosorum, is another reason you could add to the two reasons given in the, what? Body of the article. And then, contra rizionis, contra, making fun of it, right? To a, what? Kind of a fourth reason, right? Was it Augustine who says when he first picked up scripture, he found it unworthy to be compared with Cicero? No. Jerome, maybe? I think Jerome said that, yeah. And then later on, he realized that scripture, you know. It's kind of hype. There's something hype in the body, right? There's something hype in the body, right? There's something hype in the body, right? There's something hype in the body, right? There's something hype in the body, right? There's something hype in the body, right? 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