Prima Pars
Lecture 12: Scripture's Senses and God's Existence

Transcript
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Okay. Analogy, when the truth of one scripture is shown to not be repugnant to the truth of what? Another, right? And I suppose that's when Augustine is writing the Army of the Four Gospels, right? And there seems to be, you know, discrepancies, you know, two guys curing, one guy curing the other one, something, you know, or before or after, and he has various ways of resolving this, huh? And then allegory is used by Augustine there for what? The three spiritual senses, huh? Yeah. Just as also Hugo of St. Victor, right? I'm always attracted to him because of his name, huh? So I was christened, I was christened Hugo, Louis Dwayne. Oh. Yeah. And my confirmation name is Victor. My father was, you know, Victor, so I said, I don't think Victor is that. Yes. Yeah. Just as Hugo of St. Victor, under the allegorical sense, also comprehends the, what? Anagogical, right? Mm-hmm. Laying it down in the third book of the sentences. Laying down in the third book of sentences, only three sentences, huh? The historical sense, the allegorical sense, and the tropological, which is the, you know, the name for the, what? The what? Yeah. Yeah. That makes some sense, huh? Because there's something similar about the allegorical and the anagogic, right? You know, the Old Testament's signifying the final thing. So you can see why man might put them together, right? Then you have three to begin with, right? And you can subdivide one of them into two, right? Okay. These minds that are obsessed with the rule of two or three. I think that's what St. Thomas does in the quotable questions, I mean, he takes up a sense of the scripture and makes sense of how he provides the allegorical and the unicardical. Putting them together. Yeah, yeah. Because the morals, they're more similar. In the moral sense is much different, right? In the sense, historical sense. Yeah. Now, the third objection was a little more particular. What about the parabolical sense, huh? To the third, therefore, it should be said that the parabolical sense is contained under the, what? The sense of the letter. Okay. For through vocal sounds is signified something properly and something, what? Figuratively, right? Now, as I mentioned before, I think the best explanation of that is Thomas in the commentaries in St. Paul, where he says that in figurative speech, right, the meaning of the speaker is not the meaning of his words. But there is a, what, connection of some sort between the meaning of his words and his meaning. So St. Paul is not a lion. Okay. Nor is the sense of the letter, the figure, if you have a figure, like the metaphor, right? But that which is figure, right? So when I say, the Lord is my rock, what's the sense of the letter there? That God really is a rock? No. No. No. It doesn't make any sense. The real sense is that he's my support, and I can rest upon him and so on. Okay? That's the sense of the letter. That's the sense intended by the speaker, right? It's not the meaning of the word rock, though. It's not the meaning of rock. It suddenly becomes, you know, have a different meaning. You know, when the metaphor becomes very common, sometimes people think that's the meaning of the word, right? But then if that became the meaning of the word, it wouldn't be a metaphor. So when I say, you pig, you ate the whole pie, the metaphor would lose all its force if a meaning of pig now became gluttin, right? Gluttin is the meaning of the speaker. It's not the meaning of the word pig. Instead of calling you a glutton, you're a glutton. It's more expressive of my emotions and my annoyance of you to say, you pig, you ate the whole thing. You see? Okay. For when scripture names the arm of God, right, huh? The sense of the letter is not that in God there is such a bodily part or member, but that which is signified, huh, to that member, namely God's power of what? Operating, doing something else. In which it is clear that to the sense of the letter, say, scripture, never can there be anything false. But there would be if you said the sense of the letter, saying God is the arm of God, right? Or saying God is a rock. It means that God has an arm or that he's a rock. Then there would be some falsehood there in scripture. Okay? So that's why I say you've got to be careful about the translation of senses literalis, huh? You tend to look at the grammar and say, well, literal sense, yeah. But in English, the literal sense seems to exclude the metaphor, right? Okay. So I thought since in the letter, just avoid that, huh? Just a question for you. I don't know exactly how to express it. But when we were talking about how two people could have two different interpretations, but they could both be true or whatever, as it applies in their life. How does that then relate to what, because one or both of those might even be completely different from maybe what St. Paul had in mind originally when writing or whatever, somehow it falls into God's authorship. Well, God is a chief author, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But, um... That's what God had in mind. Okay. Okay, so that's just the answer then. Yeah. It's not necessary for a prophet to know all the meanings, right, so that God would have. Yeah. Like, I have to spoke prophecy without knowing it. St. John says he spoke prophecy. Right, but then the question, though, that still falls on the literal sense, then. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Now, let's look at the premium here to question two. Now, because the chief aim of this sacred teaching is to treat of the knowledge of God, God, and not only according as what he is in himself, but also according as he is the, what, beginning of things, huh? And this means the beginning in the sense of what the maker, the creator, right? The mover. And the end of them, the purpose of them. And especially insofar as he's the end of the reasonable creature, huh? Now, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, right, the division into books, you want to call it that, it's divided into four books, the division of the first three books, right, exactly corresponds to that, right? Because the first book is speaking about God in himself. The second book is speaking about God as the beginning, the chipium, the maker, right? And some things about the things he has made, right? Then the third book is about God as the end of all things. And then about the divine providence, moving things towards this end in general. And his special providence, finally, with regard to the rational creature, right? Okay. Now, one thing that differs, though, in the two Summas, is that in the Summa Contra Gentiles, the fundamental division is between those things that can be known about these three, by reason as well as by faith, and that's in the first three books, and only by faith in the, what, fourth book, right? But the fourth book is subdivided into the same three. In the first part, you talk about what belongs to God himself that can be known about only through faith, and that's the Trinity. And then, and what he has made, right, only by faith can be known, and that's the Incarnation mainly, right? And then the final state of man, right, his goal, his end. things that can be known about that only by faith. But it's not as neat, the Summa Theologiae, partly because Thomas is going into much more details into what we might call moral theology. So that the order to God is an end, which is where you begin with God being the end of man in moral theology, and then everything else is related to that, is expanding, right? So you kind of distort a bit, huh? For that reason, the structure goes through parts, but you're still following that, right? And you can see that as he goes on here, because he says, First we will treat about God, huh? Now you might say, well, you think you're going to be talking near just about God and himself, but he doesn't mean that. Secondly, about the movement of the rational creature in God. Well, that's part, maybe a principal part, of the third part. God is the end, right? And then you have another, a third part, about Christ, Christ is man, right? Who, according as he is man, right? Is the via, the road, for us tending to God, right? So it's almost like the second part of the Summa, right? And the third part, right? Are both about getting back to God as the end of the universe, and the second part, particularly, about the motion of the rational creature towards God, right? And the third part, the necessary help we have, right? To get back to God, through God becoming man, and through his instituting, his sacraments, and so on. So Christ, the whole thing about the incarnation and the human nature of Christ, and so on, and his life, even, you know? And the sacraments is in the, what, third part, right? So both the second part and the third part, in some way, come under, what? God as the end, right? Okay. Well, what about God as the maker? See? Well, that's pushed in to the first part, and now he subdivides, because he's going to do the first book. The consideration about God would be three parts, three parts. First, we will consider those things which pertain to the divine essence, right? Divine nature. Secondly, those things which pertain to the distinction of the persons, okay? Don't have that distinction you have in the Semar Argentinos. But both of those pertain to God himself, right? And then the third part, of the first part, those things which pertain to the perception of creatures from you. That's really God as the, what? Principium. Yeah. You see? So, it doesn't fit as neatly. It doesn't emphasize as neatly as it's a Sumar Argentinos. But I think it gets a little bit, you might say, I'll say bloated. It's going to be wrong with you. But it gets a little distorted, I mean, a little disproportion, because of the much greater detail that you enter into in what? In the moral theology part, in the prima pars and secunde, secunde, right? And, you know, I have, in my office, or in my edition here, I have it in five volumes, you know, and the secunde, secunde, you know, it's almost as big as the prima pars and the prima secunde together, right? And Thomas will give us a reason why he's going into detail, because this is practical matter and you have to descend more down to details, right? Although it's Monsignor Dianza, Summa, it's just the common principles. You've got to go to, to, to get the proper principles. So you've got to be in the confection there, you've got to be in the confection, so you've got to get something more particular, even in the second part of the Summa. But nevertheless, you'd say the second part of the Summa goes down into the virtues much more in detail than the Summa counter-gentilis does, right? The Summa counter-gentilis remains more speculative in that sense, huh? I mean, it does have the practical in there, too, but it doesn't have the great detail that the Summa does, huh? Okay? In the Summa counter-gentilis, when he's dealing with, it would be in the third book where he's dealing with God as end, but there, he would end up going into explicitly, wouldn't he, the fact that man is ordered to a supernatural end, so he would be going into things which are... Oh, he would into ethics and moral theology, too, there, right? Yeah. But not in the detail here, right? Yeah, oh, yeah. And this is enormous compared... I mean, you might say that the Summa theology got more on moral theology than dogmatic theology, right? Mm-hmm. You couldn't say that about the Summa counter-gentilis, huh? No. So, as you saw before, theology is both, but in moral magic you've got to, you know, enter into great detail. I remember consulting Alphonsus about some moral question, you know, you know, see, he's going further than Thomas, you know, and spelling things out a little bit more, and, but you're already, you know, approaching that here, huh? So that kind of, you don't see in the three parts of the Summa Theologiae the three parts of theology, a one-to-one correspondence, right? The whole of the second part, the whole of the third part, the way he presents it, seem to be talking about getting back to God as the end, right? And then God in himself and God as the maker are both in the, what? First part, right? But he distinguishes, you know, the part on the essence of God from the Trinity, right? Okay. Now, in looking at this part here now that we'll be coming to next, nobody calls primo there, huh? Those things which pertain to the divine essence. Before you get to the distinction of persons, right? Okay. You're going to have this second question which is on the existence of God, right? Okay. Now, if you look at the beginning of the third question, you can say that in starting the third question he's going to talk about really what God is, right? Or what he is not. After you know that he is, right? Okay. And then when you get down to question 14, he's going to talk about the divine what? Operations, right? Okay. Now, notice the way he begins in the premium to the 14th question. He says, after the consideration of those things which pertain to the divine substance. Okay. I think it's interesting to use the word substance there, right? It remains to consider about those things which pertain to his what? Operation. Operation, right? Okay. And that will take us up to the beginning of the what? Consideration of the Trinity, right? And, of course, you have to understand the divine operation before you can understand the Trinity, right? Okay. So this part that Thomas has before he takes out the Trinity, right? You might say it has three parts. In question 2, he talks about what? The existence of God. In questions 3 through 13, as he says here, the substance of God. And in question 14, the what? Operation of God, okay? Okay. Now, that's interesting. He's doing it, right? Now, go back to my comparison here. What did the great Heratitis say? The way up and the way down is the same. Oh. Okay? Except if you're going in a different direction, right? Okay. Now, if you think of the center of the circle as representing God, right, and the radii coming out from that going to the and the way down and the way down way down. circumference, as being a procession of things from God, right? And the points at the other end of these radii, which are many, as opposed to the one point, going from one to many, as these things we see from God, what is one in God is many in what? Creatures, isn't it? Now there are many, many's in creatures, but one thing we learn about creatures is that the existence of the creature and the substance, meaning what he is, are not the same thing. In other words, for example, the existence of a cat is not the same thing as what a cat is. And the existence of a dog is not the same thing as what a dog is, right? Okay? Likewise, the substance of a dog or a cat, what it is, is not the same thing as its operation, what it does. So, in you and me, our existence and what we are and our doing are three different things, really. Okay? Now, the way up and the way down, as the great Heraclitus said, are just the same. So, in learning about God, we are going, what? Up, right? Okay? And the things we see from God, the recordings will speak down, right? So, since we have to start to know God from creatures, in a sense, we can say that in this life, we are knowing God from creatures, right? From creatures. When we see God as He is, face to face, we have one name, as Thomas says. Okay? But, when we know Him from creatures, there is this multiplicity of creatures, and that is going to be found in our, what? Knowledge of God from creatures. Although, we will find out that the existence of God and the substance of God are the same thing. And we'll find out that the substance of God and the operation of God are the same thing, really. And yet, in question 2, we talk about the existence of God in questions 3 through 13, especially 3 through 11, right? We talk about the substance of God, and then starting in question 14, we talk about the operation of God as understanding, as willing, and so on, right? And why do we have these three parts, right, if they're all the same thing in God, huh? Well, the multiplicity in our knowledge of God here comes to the fact that we're knowing God going upwards, right? From creatures, and the multiplicity is in our knowing, not in the one we know. And we don't affirm the multiplicity again, right? Okay? And, in a way, it's just the reverse of God. God knows simply the composed, right? God knows, in a unitary way, multiplicity, right? But we know the simple, the composed, and the one, in a way, through the, what? The many, right, huh? So that's why we have these three parts, huh? Okay? But that's in, the multiplicity is all in our knowledge, right? Okay, you see? So we take a little break now, before we begin the next appropriate time to do so. Yeah. So, we see the division now here, huh? Thomas will mention now the fundamental division into God himself, right? God is the, what? Principium, the beginning, the maker, the creator, and then God is the end, and so on. But, then unlike the Summa Contra Gentiles, where you have the three books corresponding to that, he does, you might say, the first two are included in the first, what? The first part is Summa, right? And both the second part, which is dealing with the return of the rational creature in particular, to God, right? And then, the help you get to Christ, who as man, is the rogue to God, right? And the third part, they all pertain in some sense to what? Coming back to God, huh? You saw those words of, I think the 16th, they're talking about it in baptismal there, and wrong, you know, but why baptism, you know? Well, eternal life, he says, is the answer. So, I mean, you know, even with the sacraments, which you take out in the third part, you're looking towards the, what? The yin, the goal, which is eternal life, huh? Mm-hmm, okay. So, we saw, then, the next division there, the first part, where he considers the divine essence, and then those things which pertain to the distinction of the person, and then those things which pertain to the procession of creatures from him, right? Notice, the first two of those three things pertain to God and himself. Mm-hmm. But because the distinction of persons is such a, what? Above reason thing, right? It kind of singles it out, right? Mm-hmm. Now, about the divine essence, first, we ought to consider where the God is, right? Okay. Secondly, in what way he is, or more, in what way he is not, huh? And that's what he calls later on, is the consideration of the substance of God, huh? Mm-hmm, okay. And third, we ought to consider about those things which pertain to his, what, operation or doing, right? Maybe about his knowledge and his will and power and so on. So, that's what I was going on the board with the circle, right, huh? Mm-hmm. These three things, these three parts, why are those three parts if they turn out to be the same thing in God? Well, that's the way we have to know God through creatures, huh? There's a multiplicity in our thinking about God because we're not able to, in this life, see him as he is, right? When we see God as he is, there's no multiplicity in the scientific vision itself. No change. Okay? Which won't be a part. Okay? Now, about the first three things are sought, now about the existence of God. First, whether a God to be is per se known, but it's obvious. Secondly, whether it's demonstrable, able to be demonstrated, right? Of course, the answer to the first question will be no. Okay? And to the second one will be yes. And then finally, the third article, whether God is, right? Okay? It goes about proving that God is. Now, in a way, you know how truth is between two mistakes? You know, one mistake about this would be to say that the existence of God is obvious, right? Okay? The other extreme would be to say it's not obvious and it can't be proven either. It's not accessible. Okay? Now, we saw in Vatican I, right, that your anathema, if you don't accept that it can be known, or through reason, it can be proven, right? Okay? It can be known to creatures. And that's the middle ground, right? Okay? So the one makes it too well known, and the other extreme, not knowable at all. No, no. Okay? And this is a common thing, that truth is between what? Two extremes. Two extremes, huh? Okay? So like with the Trinity, you know, you have those who say that as there are three persons, there must be three natures here. And that's saying too much. And then those who say, and as there's one nature, there can only be one person, and there are these just different names of the same person according to different things he does. The truth is in between there. That there's one nature, but three persons, huh? And then at the incarnation, you have the reverse, you have the multiplicity of the natures, and the unity of the person. Then you have the same two extremes. Those who say, you know, that because there's two natures, there must be two persons. Like in the story, it says, she shouldn't be called the mother of God, just the mother of Christ, and so on. And then you have the other extreme, right? Where all of this two, what? If there's one person, there must be one nature, huh? Okay? So is Christ a king as man or as God? Both. Because he's as a person. Yeah. I would say both as God and as man, right? There's one psalm, I know, the Lord is king and so on the road, right? So in the divine nature, it is. He's also king as man. He's the king. What about priests, though? They would only be as man, though. Yeah, yeah. So it's interesting, huh? You know, I was talking about how sometimes they say king, prophet, priest, right? But sometimes you just say king and priest, right? What's interesting about king is that both as God and as man, he can be called a king. And both as God and as man, he could be called a, what? Teacher. Yes. Okay? But not a priest, both as God and man, right? And this is certainly, you know, seen most clearly as the most priestly act, you might say, dying on the cross, huh? Mm-hmm. Because it obviously belongs to him only according to his human nature, right? His human nature cannot die, et cetera. It's kind of strange, isn't it? Mm-hmm. Let's think about that a little bit. What about the expression? You've heard priests of God, priests of the Most High God, like Mophisa did. Mm-hmm. And we speak of priests of Christ because of our conformity as priest to his priesthood. It's peculiar because if we sometimes get the expression of priests of the Holy Spirit, then I don't think that that's a, it wouldn't seem to be a proper use of the thing. I think they call priests an alter Christus. It either refers to Christ as humanity or it refers to the divinity, but it doesn't refer to the priesthood of the Son of the Trinity. Even act like praying, I don't think God's to be speaking praise, right? No. And, you know, when they're attacking the Holy Spirit, they're taking God because he, you know, he's supposed to groan in us, you know, and then Thomas has to explain why he's speaking is. But he makes us pray, really. But, you know, to really pray would be to make him an inferior, and therefore he'd have to be something less than God. Christ can pray because he is man. In that sense, Christ's priesthood is very much science-humanity, right? So let's look at the first article here. Where there for God to be is known to itself. Now something must be known to itself, right? Can everything be known to another? The through another always presupposes the through itself, right? If the coffee is not sweet to itself, unless it's something like sugar, right? It's sweet to itself, right? Ahem. He says, those things are said by us, or for us, to be known to themselves, the knowledge of which is naturally, what? In us, huh? As is clear about the first beginnings, meaning like the whole is greater than the part, and can't both be and not be at the same time, huh? I know it's a connection there between natural and per se, right? Per se, this then is translated as what? Literally, through itself, right? But also, as you could say, as such, right? So what belongs to you by nature belongs to you as such, through yourself. But as Damascene, St. John Damascene says, in the beginning of his book, the knowledge of God existing, right, is naturally inserted in all of us, huh? Okay? Therefore, God, to be, is known to itself, huh? And there is some way, maybe, in which God is, what, naturally known, huh? And people, you know, mostly will believe that there's a God, right? But it's a very confused, huh? You are. Moreover, those are said to be known to themselves, which at once, when their parts are known, right, are known, huh? Which the philosopher, and that is the Aristotle, of course, attributes to the first beginnings of demonstration in the first book of the Postal Analytics, in the old stock example. You know what a whole is, you know what a part is, right away you know that every whole is more than one of its, what? Parts, huh? It's interesting, nobody tries to enumerate all the axioms, huh? There's an axiom, for example, that nothing is the beginning of itself, and nothing is before or after itself, right? This is a very even, a more clear example of that. But understanding what this name God signifies, right, that once you know that God is, once it is had that God is, huh? For one signifies by this name that then which nothing greater can be, what? Signified or thought. But what exists in thing, in reality, right, and in understanding is greater than what is in the understanding only. Whence, when, one has understood this name God, right away in the understanding it follows that it is in, what? Reality. And notice our word reality is taken from re, huh? Okay. The Greeks would say, what? Anthos. From being. On. We say really. Okay. Okay. At least in things. Therefore, for God to be is known to itself. Moreover, truth that truth is, is per se known. Because the one who negates truth to be concedes truth to be. For if truth is not, it is true that truth is not. So truth must be. Okay. But if something is true, it is necessary that there be truth. But God is truth itself. I am the way, the truth, and the life. Therefore, for God to be is known to itself, huh? Okay. Now, the fun I have is a statement there, right? Mm-hmm. Statements exist. A man denies it, right? Mm-hmm. Making a statement, huh? Yes. You can't deny what statements are, and how it doesn't make any statement. So it's obvious the statements are, right? Something like that with truth, right? You can't say it's true, that there's nothing true without admitting it. There's something true. But against this, huh? No one can think the opposite of what is known to itself, as is clear through the philosopher, by the philosopher in the fourth book of wisdom. In the first book of Apostle Analytics, about the first beginnings of demonstration. But it's possible to think the opposite of this, that God is. As is said in Psalm 52, the fool said in his heart, there is no what? God, huh? Therefore, God is not per se, no. Notice the word there, incipients, huh? Mm-hmm. Incipient one. Okay? And Thomas explains the word sapientia, as I've mentioned before. It's sapida sciencia, which means, what, in English? Savory knowledge, huh? Okay? Wisdom is something to be savored, right? Okay? And Thomas is adorote devolte, right? Dulce sapere, remember the words there? To sweetly savor, right? Christ there in the Eucharist. I mentioned how Shakespeare, you know, he has Romeo running the ship on the rocks. You know, he has a metaphorical way of speaking. He's going to take his life, right? The apothecary has given him the poison. And he compares himself to a foolish, right? Ship captain who's running his ship right on the rocks. And he says, come, bitter conduct. But conduct means conductor. Come, bitter conduct. Come, unsavory guide. And they talk about crashing on the thing. What does unsavory mean? Incipiens, same word, huh? So you know how Shakespeare is very close to that way of speaking in Latin, huh? I think I said before, I think that the Latin word sapientia is more interesting than the Greek word sophia. Or even the English word wisdom, right? Savory knowledge, huh? You don't savor these things, you don't really appreciate them, huh? Just like when you drink a good wine, you've got to savor it. You drink a soda, you don't have to savor it. You know? You really appreciate it, right? You've got to fall upon it. Thomas says, I answer, it ought to be said that something is able to be known to itself in two ways. In one way, in itself, or by itself, and not towards us, right? In another way, in itself, and also towards us, huh? Now from this, some statement is known to itself that the predicate is included in the ratio of the subject. As man is a, what? Animal, right? For animals of the definition, you might say, of man. If, therefore, it be known to all what it is about the predicate of the subject, that statement will be known to itself by all. Just as is clear in the first beginnings of demonstrations, whose terms, whose limits, are some common things which no one is ignorant of, as being and non-being, whole and part, and things of this sort. So I say to the students, no one can live without experiencing whole and part. Unless you take your steak and one bite, and your beer and one sip, you know, and one swallow, you're going to experience whole and part. Everybody's going to come to know those. And if everybody knows what a whole and a part is, then they'll see that a whole is more than a part. If they say they don't know it, well, what? Give them part of their cellar this week, because they don't know the difference. And they'll reveal that they do know the difference. They do know the difference. They do know the difference. They do know the difference. They do know the difference.