Prima Pars
Lecture 13: God's Existence: Self-Evidence and Demonstrability

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You're part of the thing you bought, you know. Part of a book isn't as good as a whole book, right? No, no more. A few pages of this thing, so what? Want your money back? If however, among some, it is not known about the predicament of subject, what it is, the statement in itself is evident, right? But not among those who ignore the, what, subject or ignorant of the subject and the predicate of the statement, right? So I say to my students, I know they don't know what a perfect number is. So, say, it's obvious to me, I said, that a perfect number is a composite number. But isn't to you? It's obvious to me. What's wrong with you guys? Well, if you know what a perfect number is, it's a number, what, equal to the sum of everything that measures it. Measures in a strict sense evenly. So four is not a perfect number. It's measured by one and two, but not by three, and one and two don't add to four. But six is the first perfect number. It's measured by one and by two and by three, but not by four or by five. And one plus two plus three, it adds up to six, right? Okay? Well, now, a prime number is measured only by one. So obviously, no prime number could be a, what? A perfect number. So it's obvious to me that a perfect number is a composite number. But it's not to my students, so they don't have to decide to know what a perfect number is. You see? Okay? So that's some of the distinction that the great Boethius gives, right? That there are some statements that are known to themselves by all men, because all men know their parts, their subject and predicate, like all and part. Others are known only to the, what? The wise, not necessarily wise in the fullest sense, but those who have some education, right? There's the softness, huh? Okay? That some common thoughts of the soul, that there are some thoughts, they call the common thoughts of the soul, and per se known, apud sapientis only, among the wise only, as bodiless things are not in place, right? So there's to be one of those greats, where's God, you know? So where's heaven? Well, the answer is wherever God is. Boy, they're thinking, you know, spatially of these things. It's like, you know, when the communists, you know, were still in full power there in Russia, you know, and they said, that's not there. And he's reading back, you know, there's no God up here, you know? Time to eat it sometimes. Sometimes of the totalitarians. It's not funny. I say, therefore, that this statement, God is, in itself is what? Per se known, right? Because the predicate is the same with the subject. He is, I am, who am, right? God is his own existence, his own to be, as we'll be clear later on in the question of the simplicity of God. But because we do not know about God, what he is, right? He is not known to us, per se, but needs to be demonstrated to those things which are more known towards us, right? And less known towards nature, namely through what? The second son. That goes back to the thing that Aristotle taught in the second book of wisdom, right? What's more known to us is less known by nature, less known simply. Now, it goes back to reply to the first objection here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that to know God to be in something common under a sitting infusion is naturally inserted in us, huh? Insofar as God is the beatitude of what? Yeah. Man, huh? For man naturally desires beatitude. And what is naturally desired by man is naturally known by him. But this is not to know simply and without qualification that God is, right? Just as to know the one coming is not to know Peter, although Peter is, what? Coming. For many think that the perfect good of man, which is beatitude, they estimate to be, what? Wealth, right? Others, what? Pleasures, right? Others, something else, like power, right? I just got through, a few weeks ago, reading a biography of Mao, to the bottom of Chairman Mao. A real monster, you know. But he was so taken up with power, right? And it's kind of amazing, you know, his pursuit of power. And when he was trying to get power, he would not cooperate with the other communists for fear that they would have more control over things. He would sacrifice armies and so on, just to make sure that the armies that remained were under his control. And larger armies, you know, of fellow communists, you know, were destroyed, so that he could emerge superior. It's kind of amazing. But towards the end of his life, he was kind of losing power. And people were starting to, you know, it's just ridiculous, the things he was doing. He was taking food from China and exporting it to get, what, technology and so on, and build up his war machine and so on. And he was actually killing millions who were starving because of this. And some of his, you know, close associates were revolting against us, right? And finally, at the end, he just couldn't control anymore. They were going to stop this nonsense. And so, he was having this self-pity, you know, for his losing some power, you know, and associating in his mind, anybody who fell from power, right? Invited Nixon because Nixon, you know, lost power after the Watergate business. He had Nixon come back to see him, you know? But it was really all these characters in history, you know, who had fallen from power and, you know, crying about Napoleon and so on and so on. And I think I'm going to think of it, you know, because, you know, likeness is the cause of love, right? You know? Kind of, if you think he's redeeming in heaven, I don't think he's redeeming really, but in the redeeming there, a little bit of his attachment to these other great men who have fallen and lost their power, you know, towards the end. And that's kind of funny. So. You know, they describe Khrushchev after he fell from power, you know, just moping around the house, you know, like a kid to live for, you know? It's kind of frightening. So. It's interesting, you know, when Socrates argues that man is born knowing some things he didn't acquire in his life, it's kind of an exaggeration of this, but, you know, since he takes his clear examples on mathematical things, right? Like he'll take, for example, you know, where you get the idea of a flat surface. You say, well, this little cager is not flat, right? But this table is flat. Okay? You say, well, I see a little bit of a dent here, you know? Okay? So, when you examine these so-called flat surfaces in the world around us, we see that they're not really flat. So how do you get the idea of what is really flat, truly flat, the flat itself, from something that is not really flat, right? See? And how can you make this judgment that this approaches much more to being flat than this does, right? But still falls short of it if we didn't have a knowledge of flatness not derived from what? These things around us. And he uses a very interesting comparison, huh? He says, if we brought in a painting or a statue of somebody, right? And you made the judgment Well, that's a painting of so-and-so, but then you made the judgment that it's not exactly like he is. Must you not have any knowledge of this man who's represented in the painting or the statue, not derived from the painting or the statue? So if I go down to the Worcester Art Museum and look at some earlier character, I can't say what he was. That's Lord Salisbury, right? But his nose is a little bit shorter, a little bit longer than that. I can't make the judgment because I have no knowledge of Lord Salisbury except the painting I see there. But when, say, Lafayette came back to the United States after Washington had died, right, and he saw the country filled with paintings and statues of Washington, he said, hey, that's not really what he was, but that's pretty good, the statue, I guess, of Washington and Virginia State House there. So that's really, you know, pretty close, right? But he could make those judgments unless he had a knowledge of Washington not derived from that statue. That's the way Socrates tries to argue that we must have gotten this in a previous life. But he also touches upon this idea of happiness, huh? And I often take the end of Vanity Fair, I don't know if you know that novel by Thakry, that's his greatest novel, I guess. But it ends up, you know, with the vanity of fanaties. And, but it says, for who in this life, he says, ever gets what he wants? Or, if he does, he's satisfied with it. You know? We always seem to be pursuing something that either we don't get, or if we do get it, it doesn't turn out to be the satisfying thing we thought of it. And so on. And so, we seem to be pursuing a perfect happiness, right? But at the same time, we judge that this is not something possible in this life, huh? And common people will say that, right? And people in general. You know, nobody's going to be perfectly happy in this world. You know, it's impossible, right? Okay? So, any happiness that we do have in this life, and sometimes, you know, you hear people saying, you know, that was the happiest year of my life, or that was the happiest part of my life, and so on, right? And so, some parts of our lives certainly are much more happy than other parts, that's for sure. But even those parts that we say were the happiest parts of our life, we realize there's something imperfect about them, right? Well, what is this happiness that we are judging to have been, what, approximated a bit by this part of my life, but have fallen, what? Sure, huh? Well, that shows in a kind of confused way that you're knowing about, what? God, huh? It's the idea of a perfect good in some way, right? Okay? But it's kind of, what? Confused, right? Romeo thinks it's Juliet, right? Isn't so, right, huh? Okay? When I was a little boy, I thought my father was a very foolish man. He didn't fill the refrigerator with soda pop, though. Because with his money, he could have orange soda, grape soda, root beer soda, all the wonderful sodas. He'd drink soda all day long, and be a happy man, right? Didn't know how to be happy. So even if I had gotten that, I would not have been happy. But I thought he had, right? So you're always pursuing happiness in some, what? False happiness, in a way, huh? But that has some resemblance to it, huh? In the great consolation of philosophy, huh? Abraith is distinguishing between true happiness, which is really God, ultimately, huh? And false happiness, huh? And he says, well, take up false happiness first, because it's more known to us. It's kind of interesting, you know, when Thomas is showing that God is completely happy at the end of the first book of the Summa Kani Gentiles. And even that false happiness, right? And he goes through all the parts of false happiness and shows that even if there were happiness, God would still be supremely happy, right? You know, I wouldn't, either false happiness is fame, right, huh? And Thomas is up, you know, well, God has the admiration of any mind that understands him at all. You know? It's marvelous. And actually, Thomas, you know, when he's talking about the end of man in the Summa Kani Gentiles, and he's first kind of reaching the conclusion that the end of man is to know God, right? But then he goes in to know God how, you see? And then he talks about this kind of confused knowledge that everybody seems to have in some way of God, right? And how that is not completely satisfactory, right? And then he shows that the knowledge that the philosopher has by demonstration, which we'll be getting here as we go along, doesn't completely satisfy us. Why? That way it's imperfect, right? And then why even the knowledge we have of God by faith is not sufficient to satisfy us, right? And then eventually he's going to talk about seeing God face to face. This is the knowledge of God that will finally satisfy us. And that's really what the end is, huh? But he seems to be more explicit about there being a kind of a confused, right, knowledge of God. And therefore it's an explicit question, is that satisfactory knowledge of God, right? Is that really the end of man is to have that kind of confused? It's a little more explicit. Interesting. Here he's a little more reticent about that being that. Okay, now the second objection is saying, well, if you understand what the word God means, you'll see he has to exist, right? Okay. Now Thomas says, to the second it should be said. And this is not the strongest objection. First. First, that that one who hears the name God may not understand, right, that it signifies something than which nothing greater can be thought, right? Since some believe God to be a body, right? Okay. But even given that someone understands by this name God, that it signifies this which is said to be that then which nothing greater can be thought, huh? Not nevertheless an account of this does it follow, that he understands that which is signified by the name to be in what? Reality, right? And that's kind of the phrase he's used in Latin, a lot, and Thomas does. In the rare matora, in the nature of things, literally, but we would say in reality, right? But only that exists in our, what? Apprehension, right? Okay. So you're kind of assuming that there is something existing, right? Then which nothing greater can be thought. How do you know there exists such a thing? Now there does exist something in which nothing greater can be thought that must exist. It doesn't necessarily exist. But how do you know there is such a thing? You're kind of assuming that, right? You can't just assume that because that's what you mean by the word. See that? You see that? He's basically saying just because it's in your mind doesn't necessarily mean it's outside your mind. It's in reality. That's all. Well, the guy's trying to say that God is that then which nothing greater can be thought. Right. And that which exists outside the mind and not just in the mind is greater than that which exists only in the mind. Therefore, God must exist, right? And Thomas is saying, well, but you're assuming that what the word means, even if it does mean that, right? Which it may not mean for everybody. But even if that's the meaning you have in mind, you're assuming that there exists such a thing, right? In which nothing greater can be thought. How do you know that? See? Okay. See? You can't assume that there is something in which nothing greater can be thought. Therefore, it must, what? Be. Yeah. Yeah. It would essentially come down to this, that, you know, obviously we can understand God the way he is in himself. We can only know him negatively, etc. But I can't understand immediately that there's not an opposition between something existing by his essence. Maybe there's a contradiction implied there, maybe there's not. But in a way I have to, in a way I'm assuming that there's not a contradiction between something existing by his essence. That's, that's, that's, that's, that's a proper interpretation of this, isn't it? Well, in a sense he's saying you're confusing the meaning of the word, right? Mm-hmm. And assuming that what the word means is something that exists, right? That's exactly what you have to prove, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. That's exactly what you have to prove. Thank you. Thank you. You might say, by God, I mean that which nothing greater can be thought, but that doesn't tell you that there is such a thing. And I have to prove that there is something that which nothing greater can be thought. And you could say this other ways. You could say, oh, by God, I mean something that necessarily exists to itself. What necessarily exists to itself must exist, right? Therefore, God must be, right? Now, you can assume that's what I mean by God, right? How do you know what I mean by God exists? I have to take things that I know exist, right, and show from them that there exists something necessarily through itself, which is the way you do in the third argument for existence of God, right? So it's already assuming what you're trying to prove. Yeah. That's the problem. So he said, even given that someone understands by this name God that signifies what is consider, namely that in which nothing greater can be thought, not on account of this does it follow that he understands that which is signified by the name to be in reality, right? But only in the, what, grasping of his understanding. Nor can one argue that it is in reality unless it be given that in reality there is something than which nothing greater can be thought, which is not given by those positing God not to be. To the third, it should be said that truth to be in general is known to itself, but for the first truth to be in God, this is not known to itself towards us, in a sense that truth that you know must be, it's obvious, is that truth that is said of all truths, that's not God, right? Okay. That's kind of confusing what is said of all with what is a cause of all, right? As I say, I'm glad that some people think that it is obvious, right? Because then you have another extreme, right? It's interesting when Thomas talks about the immortality of the soul in the second book of the Summa Congentiles, he goes a lot also into the opinions of those who say that no soul is immortal, right? And then the opinion of the Platonists who say that the souls of the animals are also immortal. So the position of Aristotle that just the human soul is immortal is in between two extremes, those who say that every soul is immortal and those who say that no soul is immortal. And of course what's interesting when you have the two extremes is that extremes can't explain each other, right? If no soul is immortal, why should anybody think that every soul is immortal? And if every soul is immortal, why should anybody think that no soul is immortal, right? So, just like the Trinity was saying before, you know, that if there really are three persons and three natures, right, why should anybody think there was what? One person and one nature. And if there's just one person and one nature, why should anybody think there's three of both? But if there's one nature and three persons, then there's an element of truth in both the extremes. So the middle can explain the extremes. At least it can show that there's some part of the truth there. But the extremes can't explain each other. The guy says there's three persons and three natures. He says there's no truth, and the guy says there's one person and one nature. And vice versa, there's no truth there, right? So they can't explain each other, right? So it's kind of, as Aristotle says, a sign that you found the truth, that you can not only defend it and answer the arguments for the other things, but see why they thought that they did that way, right? But the extremes can't explain. They can't explain the other contrary, right? This is interesting, too, because this is St. Anselm's thing, right? But he doesn't even mention it. Is that a sign of his respect? Sometimes when he disagrees with Albert, you know, some say, you know. Because in that question, there's a lot of controversy as to whether Anselm understood it the way some people think he understood it, too. Because as I understand, too, St. Bonaventure takes that up, but he agrees with it. He falls into the obvious side of the issue. The thing with Anselm, of course, Anselm doesn't have the authority that Augustine has. Even Augustine, there are things in Augustine that can be misunderstood, huh? And Thomas, a lot of times, will spell out what Augustine really means, huh? And he doesn't, you know, do it with Anselm, you know, but Anselm's way of speaking might have led some people, at least, to this idea that the sense of God is per se known, right? And maybe Anselm meant that, maybe he didn't, because he maybe needed Thomas to tell you what Anselm really meant, huh? Something like that, you know, when Aristotle critiques Plato, right? And Thomas, you know, sometimes, following some of the Greek commentators and so on, sometimes he'll distinguish, you know, Plato really meant this, and Thomas, Aristotle is refuting what Plato really meant. Plato said this, but he didn't really mean it, but Aristotle is refuting what he said, because some people are being received by it, right? And, but in some cases, it might not be altogether, what? Clear. Clear, yeah, yeah, yeah, okay? And, and sometimes you say to students, you know, students will say, well, I didn't mean what, I didn't mean that, right? I said, I said, that's what you said, on your paper, and I correct what you say, I don't correct what you, what you mean, but didn't say, well, I didn't mean that, I'm sorry. Right, there's some, you know, advantage, you know, to, to, uh, correcting the words of somebody, right? And sometimes people will say things in a way that, um, uh, it's not correct, right? Even though their understanding is not incorrect, and so if you attack the words, it's kind of way of clarifying, you know, sometimes in the liturgy of the church, I know that's one of the things that they, some theologians will explain differences of Eastern liturgy and Western liturgy. Yeah. Things in Eastern liturgy sound like they're not right, but then the church will say, but what we mean is, when we select the, when East baptism doesn't say, I baptize you, but so-and-so is baptized, and then, and they say what they mean is, and that explains it. Yeah, yeah, different forms of sacraments, different things like that, they'll explain that. I was looking at the old biography they have of, uh, Benedict XVI there in the, uh, on the Vatican website, huh? Oh. And, uh, some of the things he wrote, you know, for some of his degrees, you know? The ones on Augustine, the ones on, on, on Bonaventure, on, on history, or his theology, his DNA was? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, we were interested to see some of those, what he'd said about those things, you know? Mm-hmm. Okay. Article two, whether God to be is demonstrable. The second one precedes us. It seems for God to be is not demonstrable. For God to be is an article of faith. But those things which are faith are not demonstrable, because demonstration makes us to know, but faith is about things that do not appear. The substance of things hoped for, right? Mm-hmm. The conviction of things not seen. As they translate, they say, kind of, weird evidence of what is not seen. As is clear through the Apostle. Right? Therefore, God is not demonstrable, right? No, so you're trying to defend somebody saying that's the evidence of what is not seen, you know? It might seem to be a clear contradiction, and some would say that, you know. What he means, you know, you see that it should be believed, right? You know? That's what he means. You don't see it in yourself, right? Mm-hmm. You know? You're still believing it, right? Right? But you see that it should be believed. And then we kind of interpret it in a way that would, that's what you mean, it means. And we hope. Okay. More of the middle term in demonstration is the what it is. But about God, we're not able to know the what it is. But only what he is not, as Damascene said. Oh, so Damascene is saying the same thing. And therefore are not able to demonstrate God to be. Moreover, if it were demonstrated for God to be, this would not be except from his effects. But his effects are not, what? Proportion to Yama. Since he is infinite, and his effects are, what? Finite. Though the finite to the infinite, there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause is not able to be demonstrated through an effect that it is not proportioned to it, it seems that God is not to us. They said, if I told Terry, he was supposed to have gone to the Summa and taken the objections so he could embarrass his Catholic associates, but didn't bother to get the answers. I don't know if that's true, but I wouldn't put it, put it vulnerable or below. You can see, you know, the difficulty, he gives those who, who had seen objections, right? He gave them a rough time, right? You know? He gives the ammunition against the faith from St. Thomas. That's why he got the ammunition against them. But you have all these wonderful objections, right? But those who weaken the faith, you don't give them these objections, you know, because it's to confuse them, right? But if you're persistent, you want to see the objections and see how they answered and so on. It's the same thing he sings. But against this is what the Apostle says, that's St. Paul again. Epistle to Romans, chapter 1, verse 20. Invisible things of God to the things which have been made are understood, looked upon. So that's the same text that the Vatican I used, right? He says, Anathema to say, you can't know God for the things that have been made. But this would not be unless through those things which are made one could demonstrate God to be. For the first thing that is necessary to understand about something is whether it is. Okay? So Aristotle said it before, right? The first question is whether it is, and the second question is what is it? So the reason he wants to know what is, what it is. But if you're interested you ought to know about what it is, then you know later on what it is. That's what we'll follow here. So he says, I answer it ought to be said that demonstration is of two kinds, and this is what Aristotle taught in the first book of the Apostle, or what? Analytics. One demonstration is through the cause, and this is called procterquit, which simply means on account of what, right? So they call that a lot of times in the Latin or in the English even demonstration, procterquit, demonstration by the cause. And this is through things that are before simply, right? Because the cause is simply speaking for the effect. The other is the demonstration through the effect, and this is called demonstration quia, meaning demonstration that it is so, right? And this is through those things which are before towards us. Because usually for us the effect is more known than me, what? The cause. And this is through those things which are before towards us. For since, for when some effect is known to us or manifested in its cause, to the effect we proceed to a knowledge of the cause. So in natural philosophy and ethics we proceed to the effect of the cause. And it's only in mathematics, right, that we tend to begin at the cause. But from any effect one is able to demonstrate its cause to be. If nevertheless the effects are more known to us. Because since the effects depend upon the cause, when the effect is posited is necessary for the, what? Cause to forexist. Whence God to be, since it is not known through itself towards us, is demonstrable through effects, what? Known to us, huh? Okay, now the first objection was saying, isn't this an article of faith? Well, strippy speaking, no. But it might be for some people who can't understand the arguments who don't have the time to or the willingness to go through them. To the first, therefore, it ought to be said that for God to be in other things of this sort, which through natural reason are able to be known about God, as is said again in Romans 1.19, they are not articles of faith, but what? Priandida, which means literally what? Walks before. Yeah. Okay. For thus, faith presupposes what? Natural knowledge, just as grace presupposes nature, right? And perfection the perfectible. But nothing prevents that which by itself or in itself is demonstrable and knowable from somebody, right, to be taken as believable who does not, what, grasp the demonstration, huh? That means most of us, right? De Connick said he believed that God existed more from what his mother had taught him than from the study of the five ways, huh? And the second objection, huh? To saying that the middle term is what it is. To second it ought to be said that when the cause is demonstrated through the effect, it is necessary to use the effect in the place of the definition of the cause, to proving the cause to be. And this most of all happens in regard to God. Because to proving something to be is necessary to take for a middle term what the name signifies, not the what it is in its very nature, huh? Because the question about what it is, meaning its very nature, follows upon the question whether it is, huh? When you ask if this or that exists, you have to have some meaning to the this or that, right? But you don't have to know its nature really. And you wouldn't try to know its nature fully until you know that it is, huh? Okay. But the names of God in this life are placed upon them from its effects, right? As later on will be taken up in the what, 12th and 13th, right? Questions. Whence, in demonstrating God to be through its effect, be able to take for a middle term what this name, what God signifies, like unmoved mover, right? First cause, huh? And the third objection was saying, well, the effects are not proportioned to God. Well, that doesn't show you can't know God at all through them, but you can't know him, what, adequately or perfectly, huh? To the third, it should be said that the effects that are not proportioned to God, one is not able to have a perfect knowledge of the cause. But nevertheless, from any effect, one is able to be manifestly demonstrated for us that the cause is, as has been said. And thus, through the effects of God, one can demonstrate God to be, although through them, we're not able perfectly to know him according to his very, what, essence. Now, to say the angels, through their, what, natural knowledge, right? Since they're much closer to God, much more like him, they have a much more perfect knowledge of what God actually than we do, right? But even they are not effects that are what? Proportion to God, unfold his whole power, right? I'm all you can do, the angels doesn't say. but in seeing what he's done for the angels right they know much more what he can do than we do my teacher gets circus to say when you die and you see a guardian angel and he says oh god you got angels saying no no no no he's hanging out but it's just a marvelous thing yeah i didn't robbers is this you know so um they have much you know higher effects of god right you know effects much more closer to god you know much better actually how god how the angels in the old testament didn't stop men from worship worshiping them because the incarnation hadn't happened yet so they were much higher but after incarnation and the apocalypse changed no no well that's much but they treated us more as equals you see after incarnation yeah yeah so they appeared men right no i don't think they accepted the worship but they didn't they wouldn't have worshipped them no but i mean they didn't object so much to our inferior position yeah the same connection kind of yeah change things so with that with that ontological argument if somebody has an all i guess i was probably wrong what i was thinking but if somebody had an all i guess you don't have this but if somebody did have a knowledge that there wasn't an opposition something existing of being but if somebody had an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an all i guess that there wasn't an