Prima Pars
Lecture 18: God's Simplicity: Matter, Form, and Divine Essence

Transcript
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You've got to put down a judgment and a sentence, right? You know, T.J. Gerseric, he had this quote from Thomas, Homo sedens fit sapiens. In his Latin, it was worse than mine, so he says, it turns out that the man sitting makes wisdom. I think it means the man sitting becomes wise, right? Homo sedens fit sapiens. And the fifth objection, about his being, the way he can go, right? To the fifth it should be said that to God, one does not, what, approach by bodily steps, right? Since he's everywhere. He's right here, inside of us. But by the affections of your mind, huh? And the same way, by the affections of your mind, you receive from him, right? And thus excess and recess, under the likeness of locomotion, designates our, what, spiritual affections. Okay? What about, I was thinking of this, with the creed, when we hear light from light, that's, it's obviously a metaphor, huh? Well, you've got to be careful with that, because sometimes it's hard to tell, you know? Because sometimes light has a sense of, like St. Paul says, everything that manifests something is light, huh? Oh, I see. Yeah. So, there's some places, you know, where Thomas will take some of these things, like light, and maybe for one church father, this is kind of a metaphor, right? Mm-hmm. Another man sees the idea of light as manifesting things, and that's no longer a metaphor for him, right? Uh-huh. Okay? See, it's just one thing when a word takes on a new meaning, right? And when a word doesn't take on a new meaning, but there's a likeness between what it means and what you want to say, right? Mm-hmm. Then it could remain a metaphor, right? So, sometimes you see, you know, in the newspaper or something like that, you know, representing a guy getting a bright idea, shows a guy's head there, a little light bulb going on, right? Well, that's metaphorical, right? You know? But, uh, I think light can become, you know, properly carried over, right? Just like the word to see, right? Mm-hmm. When I say to the students, do you see what I mean? Mm-hmm. I don't think I'm speaking metaphorically. But when I speak of the I, the soul, I think I am, right? Mm-hmm. So, I am this one meaning of the I, to the mind, right? But one meaning of the word to see, is to understand, huh? So the word's been carried over in a new meaning given, huh? But sometimes it's hard to tell the difference between the two, and some, some person might, you know, use the word metaphorically, another person see a new meaning. Seems like the context of the creed has to do with the substance, right? It's gone from God, life from light, so that's what I was thinking it was, maybe the similarity or something. And then the sense of light is sort of like spirit. That it's the least immaterial. But the other thing that's different from that thing that I saw where I was talking about is better to use, like, grosser things for theology than like rock. Yeah. So you won't be deceived, but light is on the opposite extreme there. Yeah. It's more immaterial. But you're trying to explain that God understands, right? If you go to the metaphor of fire for God, right? Oh. And as I think I explained before, fire is sometimes a metaphor for the divine substance, and then the light represents a divine understanding, right? Yeah. And the warmth of the fire, the divine love. Yeah. But sometimes fire is taken as a metaphor for the Trinity, and then the substance of the fire represents the Father, and from the Father proceeds light, which is the sun, and then the warmth, which is the Holy Spirit, and so it's a beautiful metaphor for those, right? So since the second person proceeds by way of God's understanding himself, right, you attribute to the second person, you know, the life, like every man who comes into this world, huh? Hmm. I was thinking of how the rule of two and three comes up, you know, in the creeds again, huh? Hmm. Because in the Apostles' Creed and in the Nicene-Constantinople Creed, the articles of faith are divided into what? Three. Three. Three, according to the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. And some things, because they're proper to that person or because they are accommodated to that person, or appropriated to that person, are taken up with that person, huh? But then in the Athanasian Creed, which they think goes back about to the fourth century, and if not by Athanasians, as in people who know his work, and in the fourth Lateran Council, the creed in there, 12.15 there, then you divide the articles of faith into two. Those can serve with the divinity of Christ and then with the humanity of Christ. Now, both of these divisions are good, but one is into three and one is into two, huh? Well, it's interesting, you know, you go to the Mass and the two parts of praise, there are some, right? One is the Gloria, and the other is the Sanctus and the Benedictus, huh? And the Gloria, you use the same division that you use in the Nicene Creed, according to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. That's the way you praise God there. But in the Sanctus and the Benedictus, you praise the divinity and then the humanity, huh? So, there, that praise is divided in a way like the Athanasian creed and the other. Now, with the two prayers of mercy, you divide, you ask mercy of the Trinity, Kyrielaeson, Christielaeson, Kyrielaeson, that's the Trinity, and then the incarnate word, Agnus Nei. So, there are the divinities here and the humanity is there, right? But in the creeds, you have both, huh? Okay? Now, in the famous praise of God in the Tedeum, right? That has the same order as the Sanctus and the Benedictus, huh? It praises the divinity and then deposes the humanity, yeah? And that's the distinction that is used in the, in theology, right? Okay? Because in the prima paris, you have all about the divinity, huh? And in the teres of paris, you have all about the humanity, huh? So, you don't divide according to the Trinity, you divide according to the divinity and the humanity, huh? So, the Athanasian creed and the creed of the fourth ladder and the consul, that order is followed more in theology, right? That division, right? Because you take up God the Son or you don't take up you know, his humanity and everything that he underwent and so on when he was a man. Now, in the Hail Mary, you know, the Hail Mary has got two parts, right? And the first part is really a praise of Mary, that you greet her, Hail Mary. And you divide the praise of Mary something like you do in the Sanctus and the Benedictus, right? Because you first praise Mary in comparison to God. You say, Hail Mary, full of grace, which is partaking grace under thy nature. The Lord is with thee. So you're looking towards God, right? And you're not talking about, you know, the Lord goes with you in terms of the incarnation because this is said before the incarnation by the angel, right? Hail Mary, full of grace. But then you say, Blessed art thou amongst women and blessed is the fruit of thy womb, which I think Elizabeth says really. then you're praising Mary with respect to her role in regard to the humanity of Christ. And when you get to the second part of the Hail Mary, we're going to be asking for things. What you address here is Holy Mary, right? Mother of God, right? Well, holy is always said in respect to God, so Holy Mary is, say you should be devoted to God. When you say Mother of God, it's essentially going back to the Incarnation, because you're not the Mother of God according to the Divine Nature, according to the Human Nature, right? So the praise of Mary in the Hail Mary is divided like the praise of the Sanctus and the Benedictus. When you get a CD with Mozart's Mass or something like that, the Sanctus and the Benedictus, they're always in a separate slot, right? And of course the music changes when he goes to the Sanctus and the Benedictus, because he does have someone in the Creed too, when he goes from the Divinity to the Incarnation. The music always gets more gentle and more tender and kind of, you know? It just changes, you know, and you know what he's doing here. So there you find that the rule of two or three is being used in both the creeds and in the praise of God, right? But sometimes it's the three and sometimes it's the two. You have to see which one is more appropriate, huh? Let's look at the second article here. It proceeds thus to the second. It seems that in God there's a composition of form and matter. For everything that has a soul is composed of matter and form, because the soul is a form of a body. But scripture attributes the soul to God. For as introduced in Hebrews 10, 38, for the person of God, my just one lives from faith, right? Which would be taken away, I guess. This will not please my soul, right? So God is sent to have a soul, right? He must have a body then. He must be composed of matter and form, right? That's kind of unusual. It's not very often that God is called soul, but there's something. Therefore, God is composed of matter and form. Moreover, anger, joy, and things of this sort are passions of the body and soul. That could be a conjunction. As is said in the first book about the soul. So, you know, they say anger is a desire for revenge, but it's with the courage and the blood around the heart and so on, right? So it's body and soul. But these passions are attributed to God in scripture. For it is said he was angry with the Lord of his people. Therefore, God is composed of matter and form. Moreover, matter is the principle of individuation. This is true of material things, right? But God seems to be an individual. For he's not set of many. He's not universal. Therefore, he's composed of matter and form. But against this is that everything composed of matter and form is a body. For an immense quantity is what first inherits in matter. But God is not a body. Therefore, God is not composed of matter and form. I answer it should be said that it is impossible, what? God to be matter, right? First, because matter is that which is in, what? Ability or potency, right? In the passive sense. It has been shown, however, that God is what? Pure act. Not having something of potentiality. I notice God being pure act is meaning backing up. That he is not having zalequid de potentiality. So you're in the second figure of the main syllogism, right? Okay. So, you know, someone says, matter has ability, God is pure act. Can you syllogize on those two? You've got to say, matter has or isn't ability, right? And God is not an ability. Then you can syllogize God as not matter, right? But you can reason from God being pure act to his not having any ability, or not being an ability. Yeah. So that's really kind of a backup thing, right? Yeah. You can see how important I think was that Aristotle did in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, though, right? That act is simply before ability. Yeah. And therefore, the first being, or the first cause, must be pure act. You're right. He's going to use that a lot in the Ninth Book. The second, because everything composed from matter and form is perfect and good through its what? Form. Form. Whence is necessary to be good by what? Partaking, right? According as matter partakes of form. But the very first, good and the best thing, which is God, is not good through what? Participation. Yeah. Or partaking. Because what is good, parasensium, essentially good, is before what is good by partaking. Yes. Whence it is impossible that God be composed of matter and form. That's kind of like an axiom that what is what? Soul, essentially, is the cause of what is soul by what? Participation. Is love reasonable? I mean, Shakespeare says love and reason keep a little company nowadays. But is love essentially reasonable? It doesn't have to be. No. But it can partake of reason, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. What about anger? Is anger reasonable? It can be. Well, I mean, when Christ is angry with the Pharisees for their hard-heartedness, or when he chases them out of the temple, he has anger, right? But this is a reasonable anger, right? But is it reasonable, essentially, anger? No. It's reasonable by partaking of reason in some way. Yeah. And when you talk about the moral virtues, it's something of reason impressed upon the emotions and so on. So there are partaking of reason. Now, could, if anger is reasonable only by participation, must there not be before it something that is reasonable of what? Essentially, right? That's reason itself, huh? So when Aristotle distinguishes the human virtues, he does so bearing in mind that man is the animal that has reason, right? And then you have two kinds of virtues. The virtues of reason itself, foresight and art and wisdom and reason out, knowledge and so on, natural understanding. And then the virtues of what is not reason but can partake of reason, huh? And both the will and, to some extent, the emotions can partake of what? Reason, huh? And so there are four cardinal virtues, right? One is in reason itself, and justice is in the will, and fortitude is in the irascible appetite, and temperance is in the accusal appetite, huh? So, if God is the first good, is he a good by participation? By partaking of the good? Okay. So you say, God is not good by partaking of the good, huh? Well, what is composed of matter and form is good by partaking of the good. Therefore, God is not, what? Composed of matter and form, huh? The old teacher, Kasurik, said, you know, the problem is not really informal logic, because the forms are, you know, fairly easy to see, and they're used again and again and again, right? It's a question of the material, you know, that's in that form that gives you a difficulty, huh? You know, people think about anxiety, but I've solved their problems, right? Is it the main problem in thinking is what? It's the form of the argument, huh? Well, not really, huh? You've got to know something about the form, but if just a few forms may be being used again and again, and once you've gotten down, you're set for life, huh? There's an infinity of arguments. But the matter can give you trouble again and again, right? Okay, so that's a nice argument, huh? Third, because each agent acts through its own form, right? Once, as something has itself to its form, so it has itself to this, that it be, what? Acting, huh? Now, notice, the reason why an agent is said to act to its form rather than its matter is that every agent is going to give, what? The reason why an agent is said to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act to act. actuality to something else, right? And to its form, it's an act, and therefore it's something to give. But to its matter, it's more of what he sees rather than he is. And then he's got a reason. Since God is what? Is the first and to itself an agent, he's the first mover, the first maker, right? Is necessary to be what? First and to himself a form. But God is the first agent, since he is the first efficient cause or maker, Christ has been shown. Therefore he is through his, what? Form, and not composed of matter and form, right? So there he's reasoning from God being the first, what? Mover or maker, he must be form alone, right? It's a little bit like the second argument in a sense. If he was composed of matter and form, he would not be a mover or maker to himself, but to his form, right? And therefore he wouldn't be a mover or maker to himself first, right? He wouldn't be the very first, what? Mover or maker. So, as the Boethius say, Divina Substantia Forma Est. It's interesting, even the first book of natural hearing, the first book with the rude multitude called Physics, right? Aristotle, when he reasons against Plato, he takes a common fact that he and Plato have that form is something, what? Godlike, right? And sometimes we explain that in terms of God is pure act, right? Form is act, so you're like God, huh? It's opposed to matter, which is ability, you can see, huh? So, Divina Substantia Forma Est, huh? It makes form very Godlike, huh? So you don't want to have an unformed mind, do you, huh? There would not be a Godlike mind, huh? Of course, charity is the form of the virtues, right? Interesting. So now you stand back and you kind of sit back in your chair and think, now, let's see, there are how many arguments? Three, right? Thomas seems to think three is enough. I've noticed he does a lot in the questions disputate, too. He'll say, Hex Ficiot, you know, these are enough, you know? And the Summa Argentina sometimes, you know, you have more than three, you know, and it's kind of, you know, but maybe that is appropriate for a beginner, right? I have to see which one of those arguments, you know, that's just a tidbit for the mind, huh? Now, so how does he prove that God is not matter and form? I mean, if I look at the text, he just kind of sits back and tries to, try to remember what he says, you know? And sometimes you remember, some of the arguments, and the other ones just say, oh, you need to go back, oh, I forgot, huh? So how does he argue that God is composed of form and matter? Does he argue for him as being pure act? Do he argue for his being pure act? Doesn't that come in, but not, no. I don't know. What is composed of matter and form has some ability in it, right? God has no ability. Did he argue that way? I thought he did. Yeah. And then that his pure act would kind of back up that he had no ability to pass his sins, right? I think that was one of the arguments, wasn't it? It might have even been the first one, right? And then how does he argue? And there he's talking about from goodness, right? That something is good to its form, right? This is brought out in the first book of Natural Hearing again, too, that form is something good, right? Lack of form is something bad, right? That's part of the common understanding that Aristotle has, that form is something God-like and good and desirable, and matter is good only insofar as it desires form. So if God was composed of matter and form, he'd be good by partaking of goodness, huh? And therefore he'd be the first good, huh? He won't know. That was like the second arm, wasn't it? Something like that? It was one of the most first. And what is so essential he must be before, what is through by partaking of it, right? Mm-hmm. And just like I was saying, with reasonable anger and reasonable love, if they're not reasonable essentially, they must be partaking of something that's reasonable essentially. Mm-hmm. And then what's the third way? You have a third way of reasoning, too, if I remember. It's a third way of reasoning. The first mover? Yeah. Is it quite somewhat? Yeah, something is a mover or a maker through its form, and not all that's matter, right? And so something that's composed of matter and form, it's a little bit like the second arm, as I was saying. He's partaking of what? Of the ability to be a mover or a maker, right? But God is the very first one. So if he's first and through himself the mover or maker, he must be just for. And therefore, I was quoted with this, that God divinus substancia forma est, huh? It's no matter there. Okay, we've applied in objections here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the soul is attributed to God by likeness of act. For when we wish something for us, it is from our soul. Once what is pleasing to the soul of God is what is pleasing to his what will. But I think God is rarely called a soul, isn't he, right? Right, yeah. And I think that kind of confirms what Thomas is saying, that the exception includes the rule. I mean, you don't fight this around very much. Because you might make the mistake of saying God is a soul, right? Or that God is the soul of the world or something, right? You know, people have thought that. We also have to make the mistake of saying God is a stone, right? I'm going to worship a stone myself. But I might worship the soul of the world, if that's what he is. You know, he's sacrificed to various parts of the world because he's the soul of the world, okay? Anger and other passions of this sort are true for God according to a likeness of the effect. Because it is proper to the one angry to punish, right? And therefore, his justice is usually said to be what? Anger metaphorically signifies God's what? Justice, right. Well, these are something like the other objections. Now, the third objection is a little bit different there, right? Because the guy was thinking about in material things, individuation is due to your matter, right? But that's not true. Even the angels don't. To the third, therefore, it should be said that forms which are receptible in matter are individuated through matter, right? So the shape of the top of your mug there in mind, right, are individually not the same circle, are they? Because they're in different parts of matter. So they are individuated through matter, which is not able to be another, since it is the first subject standing under them. The form of her, as far as itself is concerned, unless something prevents it, is able to be received by many, like this circular shape of them. But that form which is not receptible in matter, but is subsisting through itself, by itself, from this very fact is what? Individuated. That it cannot be received in another, right? And such a form is what? God, right? Whence it does not follow that he, what? Has matter. Has matter, right? Now it's interesting, sometimes, there's a famous passage there, in St. Paul there, where he says, when he was in the form of God, he did not... Yeah, and he took on the form of man, right? Well, form of God means the divine substance, the divine nature. So that's one place where it's called form, right? Now form is used sometimes, you know, for what we call species and logic, and then form could involve matter, but that's in a different sense of the word, right? You know, sometimes, like, we might speak of the forms of God, Government, right? That means the species, the particular kind of government, and then species could imply, what? Matter and form, right? And that's a different use of the word form. But that's one place I think is where form is applied to my nature, Divina Substantia Forma, yes. Let's say our little prayer. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Prepare for us. And help us to understand how that you have written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Here up to the third article, I believe. To the third one proceeds thus. It seems that in God is not, excuse me, it seems it is not the same. God and his what? Essence or his nature, right? Now essence or nature means what he is, right? And in case you didn't know it, you and what you are are not identical. What am I? I'm a man, right? What is Socrates? He's a man. But is Socrates and what a man the same? No. Because then he'd be the only man, right? And to be a man would be to be Socrates, huh? Okay. The question is, are they distinct also in God, right? Or are they the same thing, huh? The first argument. Nothing is in itself, right? That seems to be, what, an axiom, huh? Aristotle talks about that in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, which the rude multitude call the physics, right? Where he distinguishes the eight senses of in and out, but in no sense of in is something said to be in itself, right? So, that's an axiom. But the essence or nature of God, which is his, what, deity or godhood, is said to be in God, right? Therefore it seems that God is not the same as his, what, essence or nature. Or you might say, you know, strictly speaking, that the nature of God is in God, right, huh? Okay. But nothing is in itself. Therefore the nature of God is not God, right? Is that the way it is in God? Is that the way it is in our knowledge, right? Okay. When you study later on the way we know and the way we name, you discover something you've known all your life to be, but maybe not why. Why do we have all these abstract names, like, and then concrete words, like, healthy and health, right? Sick and sickness, right? Wisdom and wise, right? Goodness and good. Why do we have those, huh? But it goes back to our reason's own object being the what it is of a thing sensed or imagined. And these things are all composed of matter and form. And form is that by which something is something. So we have one word for the concrete and one thing for the form by which it is. And we can't avoid that way of thinking even when we think about God. But we negate the imperfection of our way of knowing when we talk about God, huh? But that's why we have both of these, huh? In fact, they'll say, you know, get used to this after a while, that God is whatever he has. But I am not what I have. I have human nature, but I'm not human nature. I have health, but I'm not health. I have some knowledge, but I'm not knowledge. But God is whatever he is said to have, right? But why do we use that word have? It's because we're knowing God from creatures, huh? And we have to use the abstract name to bring out his simplicity. And we have to use a concrete to show that he's, what? Perfect, right? I mean, if God was not wise, he wouldn't be perfect, right? And so we have to use the word wise said of God, right? But then, lest you think that God's wisdom is something, what? Added to God, huh? We say God is wisdom itself, okay? But lest you think that God is just that by which something is wise, which is the way wisdom signifies, right? Then we add that he is, what, wise. And so, Dionysius says, both ways of speaking are, what? Nothing, right? Are imperfect, huh? Okay? But we have to use both, right? But realize that that distinction is because of our way of knowing. Okay. This will probably come out in the answer to this. Moreover, the effect is likened to its cause, or is assimilated to its cause. Because every agent makes what is like itself. You'll find that statement coming up again and again in Thomas. But in created things, the individual substance, the suppositum, is not the, what, same thing as his nature. For man is not the same thing as his, what, human nature, huh? And Socrates is not the same as human nature. Therefore, neither is God the same as his, what, divine nature, right? Well, we are like God, but you'll find out that there's quite a distance, right? And I told you about the time I was teaching Introduction to Philosophy, and I was teaching Shakespeare's exhortation to use reason, huh? And Shakespeare in there calls reason godlike, right? I happen to have one Mohammedan in the class, a guy from Saudi Arabia, and he objected to reason being called godlike, right? Nothing's like God, huh? So I spoke to him about the Fourth Vatican Council, you know, who says you can never know the likeness between the creature and God without a greater, what, unlikeness. I remember Paul VI, he framed that one time, that text in one of his talks. So I wanted to make him realize that we're not that far away in that respect. He objected to, you know, but to some extent there must be some likeness between the maker and the maid, huh? But it can be a greater distance, maybe, huh, than likeness. But against this, about God, it is said that he is, what, vita, life itself, and not only that he is, what, living. As is clear from the words of our Lord there in the Gospel of St. John, I am the, what, the road, huh? Who does in Greek? The truth itself and life itself is God, huh? As man, he's the via, the road. As God, he's truth itself and, what, life, huh? But just as life has itself to the one living, so Godhood to what? God, huh? Deitos to dem. Therefore, God is his very, what, divine nature, right? His very deity, his very Godhood, huh? Now, he says, I answer, it should be said that God is the very same as his essence or nature, to the understanding of which it should be known, that in things put together from matter and form, it is necessary that the nature or the essence or the what it is differ from the, what, individual substance, the suppositum, huh, the underlying thing. Because the essence or nature comprehends in itself only those things which fall into the definition of the species, just as humanity comprehends in itself those things which fall in the definition of, what, of man, huh? So humanity signifies, what, human nature, that by which man is man, right? And nothing outside of that by which man is man, huh? For by these things, they're the definition of human nature, man is man, and this is what humanity signifies, or human nature signifies, that by which man is man, huh? But individual matter, huh? With all the accidents in the human nature, Individuating it, does not fall into the definition of the species. So this flesh right here, this individual flesh right here, is not in the definition of what a man is, is it? Otherwise a black man wouldn't be a man. For there's not fall into the definition of man, these individual fleshes and these individual bones, or the accidents like whiteness or blackness or anything of this sort. Whence these fleshes and these bones and these accidents designate this matter. They're not included in what? Human nature. But nevertheless they are included in the man, right? Whence that which is a man has in itself something that human nature does not have. And in account of this, man is not wholly the same, excuse me, in account of this is not wholly the same, man and what? Human nature. But the human nature signifies as a what? Formal part of man, huh? Because defining principles or beginnings have themselves like a form, right? With respect to the individuating, what? Matter, huh? Narastal defines the first two causes, matter and form. He defines matter as that from which something comes to be, existing within it, huh? But he defines form as a definition of what was to be. You can say that the definition certainly, or excuse me, the form completes the thing, huh? Making it to be what it is, huh? Okay? So this is a table not because it's wood, but it's first a table because of its form. So you see the connection there between form and what a thing is. And that's why this article 3 is right after article 2, huh? Because the nature of the thing is like the, what, form to the individual. Okay? So these things are very well ordered, as you can imagine with Thomas, huh? In those things, therefore, which are not put together from matter and form, in which individuation is not through individual matter, that is through this matter, but the forms are themselves, through themselves, what? Individuated, huh? It is necessary that the forms themselves be the subsisting individual substances, the supposita. Once in these, the suppositum, the individual substance, and the nature don't, what? Differ. And thus, since God is not composed to a matter and form, as we saw in the previous article, it is necessary that God be his own, what? Deity. Deity, his own divine nature, his own life. And whatever other thing else is said of God, right, huh? Whatever else is predicated or said of God, huh? Okay? So let's go back just for a second to remember that both in natural things and in mathematical things, what a thing is, is not altogether the same as the individual. So let's say if I have two misosities triangles, or two circles, even the same size, how is it possible that you have two circles? The exactly same kind of thing, aren't they? Or two isosomies trimers. How do you have that? It is right, because of the matter. Yeah. And because of the matter being subject to what? Extension. Extension, to the continuous, right? Mm-hmm. So I can put one here and one there, right? Mm-hmm. Or like the two points, at the beginning and at the end of the line, huh? Mm-hmm. How do those two points differ? Not as regards what they are, right? One doesn't have a different nature, so to speak, right? Mm-hmm. But because one's here and one's there. So you have to have matter, and you have to have, what? Matter is subject to quantity, and then being divisible, right? You can have many individuals of the same kind. Mm-hmm. So we can have many windows at exactly the same time, and the door over there. And the simplest answer is because you have enough glass. So you have some kind of matter, in this case glass, that's subject to quantity. Enough glass, right? And you can cut it off and make several ones, right? Or your mother lays out the dough and makes Christmas cookies or something, right? But you have enough dough to make so many cookies, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So it's dough that's subject to what? Extension, right? Okay? So, your flesh is cut off from your neighbor's flesh, right? Okay? Just as the dough of one cookie is cut off, right? Through the division of the continuous from the next one on. And you have the continuous in that. Not in the ordinary sense, but Aristotle sometimes calls it an intelligible, understandable matter. But it might be better than an imaginable matter, right? But you have that continuum, that extension, huh? And you can take something here and something there, right? So the very first theorem in Euclid, if you remember it, it's to construct an equilateral triangle, right? Mm-hmm. And he takes one end point and draws a circle, and then he takes the other end point and draws a circle, and then when they meet, they can prove that these two lines equal and those two lines are equal, and therefore, they're equal to each other. But you have, what, one circle here and one circle there, right? Okay? Mm-hmm. So you take away matter, and you take away extension, and then each thing is going to differ in kind. It's going to be the same as what it is, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? Mm-hmm. So, that's what Thomas is deducing here in the third article, from the fact that in the second article we saw that there's no, what? Matter. Yeah, God's not composed of matter and form, so. There can't really be this distinction between the individual and what it is, huh? You have to admire Plato that he, in a way, saw this, right? He might have made a mistake of putting what a man is by himself in another world, and had some problems there. But Plato was the first one to realize, in a sense, that material things and what they are, or amaterial things, let's put it that way, and what it is are not identical, right? At the same time, when he put what a thing is, what a man is, what a dog is, what a cat is, in a world by itself, there's only one what a man is, only one what a dog is. And he was anticipating what we're going to be saying about God, and even about the angels, that each angel, like God, is about the same as what it is. You know, the species. Yeah, yeah. And there's no two angels of the same kind, huh? I think I mentioned how Thomas, at one point, says, you know, would the angels love each other more, if they are the same kind? He said, well, he says, the more intellectual you are, the more you love the common good, right? And you have more of the common good here with this diversity of species, so they love each other more because they are, what? Different. Yeah. Not the same kind. Yeah. This understanding of the concrete and abstract-wise, is this part of the answer of why this inclusive language is kind of scary when you have, like, humankind and all this kind of stuff, that it's actually philosophically wrong outside of people's agendas? Well, you see, there's another problem there because when you study Greek and Latin and you know English, say, you notice how sometimes in Greek or Latin, they have more words, right, to name things, and sometimes we have more words, right? Yeah. See? The one thing I've noticed in reading the Peri Hermeneus of Aristotle, we talk about, in English, the parts of the statement are the noun and the verb, right? Okay. And in English, we can speak of name as common to noun and verb, okay? But in Greek and in Latin, they have the same word for name and for what? Noun, right? And so when you read the commentary, say, of Ammonius Hermaeus, the Greek commentator on the Peri Hermeneus, that Thomas followed, by the way, a lot, he's always explaining. Now, here he means by Onamah, Onamah as common to Onamah and Rema, huh? Yeah. Onamah. Onamah.