Prima Pars
Lecture 19: God's Simplicity: Essence and Existence in God

Transcript
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Nomen is common to nomen and verbal, right? But here he means it as nomen as opposed to verbal, right? Now, there's a reason why maybe the noun keeps the common name. And as Aristotle defines them, you know, both a noun and a verb, they're a vocal sound that signifies by human agreement, you know, part of it signifies by itself. But in addition, the verb signifies with time. So it has something, you know, in addition to what the noun has and what the name has, and therefore it gets a new name, right? But in English, we've seen they have two words, right? It's a different word, name and noun are not the same, right? But in the same way on Latamia, okay? But now in terms of man and man and woman, there it's reverse, because in Greek you might, or Latin, you know, you might have homo for man, meaning human being, and vir for the male, and femina for the female, right? Well, we just have what? Man. Man for both, right? So, I mean, you're not, that's just the way the language is, right? You don't, you know, you work with the language that you have. So, I don't bother myself in class. I say humankind. I say mankind. I hear it in church all the time, and everywhere I go, you know? And it's kind of, you know, not realizing that you have this sort of thing in our languages, huh? You know? You've probably seen C.S. Lewis' book there, The Four Loves, huh? Mm-hmm. And you realize that the Greek has maybe more words for love, right? And so, we have a little problem in translating it sometimes, right? You see? And, but I just, we have to work with that in our language, huh? You know? Okay? So, but Thomas, when he gets to the 12th and the 13th questions, right? 12th will be talking about our knowledge of God, and 13th about our naming God, right? And then he'll make these things more formally and completely, you know? But we're kind of anticipating here a little bit, huh? In this first objection, huh? So, he says, To the first, therefore, it should be said that about simple things we are not able to speak except in the manner of, what? Composed things from which we get our knowledge, huh? Okay? So, there's Aristotle, and we learned maybe when you did the third book of the soul, Aristotle says that reason's own object is that what it is is something sensed or imagined. Okay? And they are all composed, right? Okay? And, of course, you see even in geometry, you know, when Euclid's going to define point, he says that which has no parts. So, he's knowing the simple, even the point, which is, you know, more known to us than God, but even the point is known, what? Negatively. Negatively, yeah. Yeah, yeah. And it's interesting in terms of act and ability, huh? You know how Thomas says that David did not, you know, I just, most stupidly taught that God is the first matter, right? Now, Thomas is not being gratuitous and saying, well, stupidly taught, but there's no things further apart than God's pure act, right? And the first matter, that is, pure ability in the passive sense, huh? Okay? Everything else in between God and the first matter is composed of ability and act, huh? Okay? So, if he had said God is a stone, he would have been less stupid than saying God, closer to God, right? Because the stone is more actual than the first matter. But now, it's interesting, huh? You could say the first matter and God are simpler than something that's composed of act and ability, right? Okay? But, when we try to define or say what the first matter is, we say it's pure ability, right? Ability in the passive sense. What does pure mean? Well, yeah, but it's really a negation of act, right? It's ability without any act. And then, at the other extreme, we say God is pure act, right? What does the word pure mean there? Yeah, without any passive ability, right? So, in a way, we're knowing the extremes, which are simpler in a sense, by a negation of something found in the middle, which is, what? Composed. Composed. Okay? So, that's another example of how the simple is known, in a way, by the negation of the composed, huh? And this whole tweet is here, which is, this whole question of the three, which is on the simplicity of God, right? But you're really showing that God is not composed in this way, or this way, or this way, or this way, or this way. And then, you'll find He's showing that in no way is He composed, right? And then you go on to say, in order to enter into a composition of other things, right? And so on. So, He's, we're knowing the simple to the divide. Yeah. Yeah. You see that a little bit, you know, in Aristotle's definitions, to a beginning, middle, and end, huh? Because the, the middle has something before it and something after it. But the beginning has something after it, but nothing before it. And the end is after something, but not before anything. So, we use, what, a negation of something in the middle to talk about the beginning and about the, what, the end, right? Okay? And that's a little bit like what I was saying, pure act, pure ability, and these things that are composed of ability and act. And we know the extremes, right, by negating something in the composed, right? Okay? So, that's a very common thing. But why do we do that, right? Because our reason's own object is that what it is is something sensed or imagined. That's a composed thing. Something that has matter in form and stuff. And so, we can't understand things that don't have this, except by negating, huh? This, huh? Okay? And if we have to learn, in a sense, to transcend your imagination, your senses, and you talk about God, huh? You can't, as Boethius says in the De Trinidati, you can't deduce to the imagination, right? Lead back to the imagination, huh? But, of course, you never think without imagining. And so, one of the objections will be, you know, how can you think about God, then? Because there's no image of God, huh? Well, you can imagine and negate what you imagine. So, when you say God is not a body, you're, what? You have an image of a body, but you're negating that God has bodies, okay? So, to the first thereof, it should be said that about simple things, we, meaning we, miserable creatures, are not able to speak, except in the way of, what? Compose things, from which we get knowledge, huh? So, just to reverse, so God, God, by knowing himself, right, knows other things. So, by knowing what is altogether simple, he knows even composed things, huh? We're just to reverse, right? By knowing composed things, and through knowing composed things, we have to come to know somehow simple things, huh? Just like Sherlock Holmes says, right? We've got to reason backwards now, huh? And Watson says, what do you mean? From the effect, back to the cause, right? So, by God, it's just to reverse, right? By knowing himself fully, he knows himself as a cause, and therefore he knows his effects. Okay? So, just to reverse, it's us, right? We're knowing the effect, and through the effect we come to know the cause, and if the cause is the cause, we know that even later. And the first cause is what we know at the end of the 14 books of wisdom. And therefore, speaking about God, we use, what, concrete names, right? So, you might signify his, what? Existing by himself, right? Okay? Because, before us, it's only the composed things that subsist. Okay? And we use abstract names that we might signify his, what? Simplicity. Okay? So, that's... Anisha says all these names can both be affirmed and denied of God, right? So you can affirm the concrete name of God because he's subsisting and deny it because it seems to go against his simplicity. You can affirm the abstract name of God to bring out his simplicity, but you can deny it because it seems to signify that by which something is rather than what is. So human nature doesn't seem to signify what is, namely a man, but that by which a man is a man. But man signifies something that has human nature and therefore is composed, right? So you have those two kinds of names, right? Homo humanitas. And so we carry those two ways of speaking about God, but we have to realize that both have a what? A defect, right? But as the great Aristotle said there, truth does not require that the way we know be the way things are, right? But we have to be careful to distinguish between the way we know and the way what? Things are, right? And especially in this case here, to see that our way of knowing is quite inadequate to know him as he is, right? We know more him as he is not, huh? Thomas is always quoting some book of the Old Testament, but I can't find one when I go to my English copy. But what the prophet says, in that day you should have one name. When you see God as he is, right? You have one name. You want to have these two names, the concrete and the abstract, right? Just the one name, huh? Signifying what you see. And they can take vision, right? You want to have the multiplicity of attributes of God, right? Just have one name, huh? That's in the Old Testament or something? Well, the reference that I can't find in the text I go to, but it makes it very interesting. You know, thinking, right? Maybe so, yeah. I don't know. But I can't find it in my English Bible anyway. When, therefore, it is said that the Godhood, right, or the divine nature or the divine life or something of this sort is in God, right, huh? It ought to be referred to the diversity which is in the way our mind takes these things, huh? Knowing God to compose things and not to some diversity of the, what, thing, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, as I said before, the beginning of the trouble of our mind is not seeing some distinction, right? Or misunderstanding some distinction, right? And sometimes when you talk about God, there's a distinction in God. Like when you talk about God the Father and God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, there's a real distinction in God between the Father and the Son. Now, it's a very unusual kind of distinction, but it is a real distinction, right? Okay? But when you talk about the distinction between God and the divine nature, that's not a distinction in God, but in our, what, way of knowing God, huh? And likewise, when you distinguish between the knowledge of God and the love of God and so on, right, that's a distinction in our, what, knowledge, and not in God, but the distinction in our knowledge corresponds to the imperfection of our knowing the one simple God, okay? So, people are often, what? In error. Yeah, because they misunderstand what kind of distinction is being made, right? Okay? Who is it? Sibelius, was it, huh? Who said that, you know, Father, Son, Holy Spirit, just three names of the same one. Insofar as he became man, he's called the Son, and, you know, okay? But then, there's not a real distinction between these, huh? And that's, of course, heretical. The second objection was saying, hey, in us, they're not the same, right? But every maker makes something like himself, okay? But not exactly like himself. To the second, therefore, it should be said that the effects of God imitate him, huh? They're like him. We're made to the image and likeness of God, as Scripture says. Thomas always talks about to the image and likeness of God, huh? Okay? But they don't even take God, what? Perfectly, but according as they are, what? Able, right? And this pertains to the defect of the imitation, right? Because that which is simple and one cannot be represented except through, what? Many. And thus it happens in these, that composition, huh? From which it happens that in them is not the same, the individual substance, the suppositum, and the nature, huh? Not identical. So I'm not exactly and wholly the same as what I am, right? That's a very strange thing, right? You know, it's Plato first, what? Seemed to see that. Maybe I made some mistakes in unfolding this discovery, right? But to have seen that in some way was really kind of a great accomplishment, huh? Plato is something, you know? You know, Gwethius and Albert and Thomas, all three of them, you know, they say, you know, Plato and Aristotle are the chief philosophers, huh? And Gussin, of course, praises the pigments. I don't think he knew Aristotle too much, but he praises the pigments, huh? Now the fourth article, huh? Whither in God is the same the, what? Essence of the being. Yeah, the nature, the essence, and the existence, huh? To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that in God is not the same the essence or nature, what he is, and his existence to be. Because if this is so, then to the divine being nothing could be, what? Added, right? But the to be, to which no addition is made, is the common being, which is said of all. Okay? This is what you have in Hegel, right? I mentioned how Hegel is logic, right? He identifies the being that is said of all things with God, huh? He does explicitly in the logic, huh? He even quotes, you know, I am who am, right? It would follow, therefore, that God is the common being able to be said of all things, huh? But this is false, according to that of the Book of Wisdom, chapter 14. They gave the incommunicable name to, what? Pieces of wood and stone, to logs and stones. Therefore, the, what? Being of God is not His, what? Essence, huh? Okay? Now, I mentioned how in the Summa Congentiles after He shows that in God these two are the same, right? Then He has a chapter just about it to showing that God is not the being which is said of all things. And, uh, apparently Hegel never read that anyway. but it's, uh, and, uh, you heard my, my kind of, uh, saying that Shakespeare saw the difference, huh? I told you that Shakespeare's pun in, uh, Trois and Cressida. Mm-hmm. When Cressida comes over to the Greek camp, huh? Oh, yeah. The general of the army, he gives her, what, kiss, and then Ulysses once gets on the act, so he says, she's been kissed by the general, but she hasn't been kissed in general. Everybody starts kissing hair and this is, uh, starting the downfall of, uh, Cressida, right? But, but Shakespeare is punting the two senses of general, right? Mm-hmm. See? If you're talking about, uh, Douglas MacArthur, then you've got a universal cause, right? Mm-hmm. But he's not said of anybody else in the army, is he? Mm-hmm. You take soldier now, right? Soldier is said of everybody in the army, right? Mm-hmm. But soldier is general in a different way than General MacArthur is. Mm-hmm. You see? And, uh, but people do make the mistake of those, confusing those two, huh? Yeah? I was noticing I was giving the exam and wisdom, you know, huh? And one of the questions I asked them was from the premium. Why is the man of art or science wiser than the man of your experience, right? Okay? Now, in the text, In the text of the premium, Aristotle points out two differences between art and science and experience, huh? And the first difference he points out is that experience is a knowledge of the singular or of singular, right? Where art or science is a knowledge of the, what? Universal. The universal there meaning what is said of many, right? And then from that difference, actually, Aristotle reasons that the man of experience might succeed in doing something better than the man of art or science. Because what you do is in the, what, singular. He's closer to the singular, right? But then he goes on to point out a second difference between the man of experience and the man of art or science. That the man of experience, through experience, knows only that it is so, right? But art or science, when it's perfected, knows why it is so, it knows the cause. And then he goes on to show that we think the man who knows why, who knows the cause, is more knowing and wiser than the man who merely knows that it is so, right? So he argues, actually, from the second difference to the superiority in terms of knowing and wisdom for the man of art or science over the man of experience. I can see the students in some of their answers there. They're kind of confusing the two, right? Because Aristotle doesn't reason from, you know, art or science knowing universal to speak superior. He doesn't try to do that. It's not so clear, right? But from it being a cause. But they're kind of, you know, running the two together, huh? In a sense, they're getting into this problem, right? They're confusing what sometimes in the Latin is called the universale in causando, like Douglas MacArthur there, and the universale in predicando in being said of, like soldiers said of everybody in the army, huh? But one way people get mixed up here is because this idea that nothing can be added, nothing's added to it, right? Moreover, about God, we're able to know whether he'd be, right? But we're not able to know what he is. Therefore, they can't be the same thing, the being of God and what he is. Okay? You know, I get that terrible Latin word, quittitas. Like Shakespeare, others like to make fun of that, you know, because it comes into the scholastic jargon, quittities, you know? Well, you know, your sellities, your quittities. But what quittitas means is the whatness, right? The what it is. Okay? But against this is what Hillary says in the seventh book about the Trinity. And Hillary's perhaps the most quoted after Augustine, right? Augustine is the primary man for Thomas in the Trinity, but Hillary is also. It's not something that happens to God, right? But it's the subsisting truth of God himself. Now, he says, I answer. It should be said that God is not only his own essence or nature, but also his own, what? Being, right? Which is able to be shown in many ways, huh? First, huh? Because whatever is in something that is besides or in addition to its, what, nature, nature, it is necessary that it be caused, right, either from the principles of the nature, the essence, as the, what, properties, right? These that come, speaking, the properties, following upon the species as the, what, ability to laugh, right? Follows upon man. That's the common example and logic of the property. And it's causing the essential principles of the species, or it's from something, what, outside, right? As hot or heat in the water is caused by the fire, as you know, when you make tea or something. If, therefore, the very being of the thing is something other than its very nature, it is necessary that the being of that thing be either, what, caused by something outside or from the essential principles of the thing itself. But it's impossible that the existence, the being, be caused from the essential principles of a thing, because no thing suffices that it be for itself the cause of its being, if it has caused being. Have to be, can't be a cause of yourself, huh? It's necessary, therefore, that that whose being is other from its nature has been caused by another. But this cannot be said of God, because we say God is the first deficient cause. It is impossible, therefore, that in God be other, what? The being and other, the essence, huh? So if the being of his nature was, what, not his nature, right? It either had to come from something else, right? Being to that nature. Or else the nature would, what, give rise to its own existence, in which case, you'd be saying that it really had existence before it had existence, because it couldn't give rise to something without existing. And so it couldn't give rise to its own existence without already existing. So you've got a contradiction there. So God would have to have his existence with something else, and then it wouldn't be the first cause. It would be an effect, huh? Secondly, because to be, or existence, is the actuality of every form or nature. For goodness or humanity does not signify something in act unless we signify it to what? To be. It is necessary, therefore, that that being itself be compared to the essence, which is other from it, as act is to what? Potency, huh? Okay. Now, so it's all but like, therefore, form and matter, isn't it, but it's not the same thing, huh? In the Summa Karni Gentiles, you have a, when he shows it in the angels, right, that their existence is not the same as what they are, that he has a chapter devoted to showing that this distinction is not the same as pattern and form, but there's some similarity there, right? Because in both cases you have act and what? Ability, right? Okay. But as we've seen already, God is what? Pure act, right? Okay. Since, therefore, in God there is nothing potential as has been shown above, it follows that there is not, that is not other in him, his essence, than his what? Very being or existence, huh? Okay. His essence, therefore, is his being, huh? Okay. See what he's saying there? That his nature was not the same thing as his existence, right? His nature would be to his existence, his ability is to act, and then God would not be pure act. But he is pure act, right, huh? So he can't have any composition of act and ability. Not only matter and form he can't have, but he can have nature and existence, huh? Okay. And third, because just as that which has fire and is not fire is fired up by participation, so that which has being or existence and is not existence is being by what? Partaking. Partaking. God, however, is his own essence as has been shown. If, therefore, he is not his own existence, he will be being by what? Partaking. And not essentially. He would, therefore, not be the first being, which is absurd to say, right? God, therefore, is his own existence and not only his own, what? Nature, right? Okay. I am who I am, right? In summa conjuntis, you'll say the sublime truth that God teaches, what? Moses, right? But now we're seeing reason for that, huh? I think I mentioned how Hilliard, I guess, was a convert, huh? And, of course, he was, you know, if you look at his thing in the Trinity there, it's a little autobiographical sketch, right? And he speaks of picking up the Bible and seeing this in Exodus, right? I am who I am, right? And that, of course, was a motive of, what, credibility for this philosophically gospel man, right, huh? You know, so, if you knew this year, right, you know, this sort of thing, then you take the Bible and say, well, there's something to be said for this book. You know, there's something impressive about it. this, huh? Okay. I notice how Thomas often stops when he gives the arguments, huh? Okay. Now, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, you know, he sometimes gives, you know, 10, 12, 13 arguments, you know. One time I was teaching the Summa Contra Gentiles and asked how he thought, well, he, he, he, he, he, you know what they'll say, the lady does protest too much? He gets too many arguments, you know, this dude kind of gets lost, right, huh? And so the Summa Theology, which is more for beginners, he'll stop with three, right? But I notice he does a lot in the disputed questions too. He'll stop with three, huh? And it goes back to something we see in Aristotle. Three is enough there, huh? Turns out to be enough, enough to be noteworthy, yeah. Okay. But Heisenberg, you know, sees that too, huh? Three is enough. So now you kind of stand back and say, now, can I remember those three arguments, huh? See? Go to bed at night and you lay there and you think, now what are those three arguments that we saw today, huh? Of course, there always would be one from pure act because you can use that to show almost all these attributes, huh? Mm-hmm. That's so central to the ninth book of Wisdom, right? The book on ability and act, huh? That act is simply speaking being before ability, and therefore the first being, the first cause, is going to be pure act. And of course, if a thing's existence was not its nature, then its existence would be to its nature as act as to ability. So the thing would not be pure act. So that's one reason, right, huh? Okay. What's the other reason, Son? It's a little participation. Yeah, yeah. Now, see, I recall the second argument first, right, because I'm kind of a pure act man. But now you're recalling the third argument, you see, okay? Because if God was not his own existence, if he was not existence itself, he'd be existing by partaking of existence, huh? Without the existence itself. Well, and what partakes is after what is so essential, right? Okay. So God would not be the first being, right, huh? Okay? No, we missed one, right, you know? See? I remember when I was first studying the Summa Conjunctiles, you know, and I'd do it, and then I'd come back to me after a while, try to remember the arguments, you know? And I remember some of them, and I forget some, you know? And then, but you're kind of, oh, yeah, I forgot that argument. That was a very interesting argument, you know? Why did I forget that one, you know? So what's the other argument there? Remember the second, you remember the third, what was the first argument? If something's not the same as its existence, then it would be something outside its nature, which would either be perhaps be caused by, you know, by the nature, or by something or something outside, but you can't say that. Either one is a difficulty, right? If it's caused by something else, then God would be the effect and not the first cause. And how can the nature give itself existence, right? Because then you're thinking of the nature as being what? Before itself. Yeah. And how could it be before itself and doesn't exist yet? You see? How could you give rise to its existence? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It's kind of interesting because if you identify the being that is God with the being said of all things, you're kind of identifying God with all things, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. 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