Prima Pars
Lecture 22: Divine Simplicity and God's Non-Composition with Creatures

Transcript
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You see? You see? So I was misunderstanding the text because Thomas was too brief and didn't unfold himself. Someone was writing something on one of the arbitrary decisions of God, right? And Thomas is very brief in those proof decisions of God. But you go back to some earlier works or some other works and he unfolds it much more, right? Okay. But even in the Summa Contra Gentila say the arguments for motion. If you look at the Summa Contra Gentiles there are two arguments for motion instead of one. Even the first argument you have the two premises you have here but instead of back to one argument you have three arguments backing it up three arguments backing it up, right? See? It's unfolded, right? So sometimes an earlier work is fuller, right? And that's why I used to always kind of laugh in the scriptural scholars to say Mark is the first gospel because it's the shortest. Well, I know myself from my own writing and I know from Thomas' writing, right? That sometimes I'm really thinking about something and I work it out, you know? And then a later date I come back to it and I more briefly explain the thing, right? Sometimes it's the reverse, I mean, you know? Sometimes you think something then you say I should develop that a little more, you know? And then you come back and you develop it more, right? But both things are done, right? So you've got to have a little bit of appreciation of that fact, right? Okay? So I kind of appreciate the way the Summa Khandi Jantila will give a whole chapter, you know? Six arguments to show God's pure act, you know? And consider it by itself and give it a kind of prominence here, right? We don't have any article where the God is pure act, you know? And the Summa Khandi Jantila is, you know, there's no potentia passiva in God, right? Okay? It's just equivalent to saying it's pure act. But it's got a whole chapter to itself, right? Well, here he doesn't do it, right? That's where he seems to first develop here as far as I can remember here in the Summa in the middle argument in the first article, okay? Well, in the Summa Khandi Jantila, before he even takes up the simplicity of God, that he's not composed, right? He's already had a whole chapter devoted to God being pure act. Okay? And of course, that's closer to, you might say, you know, the beginning there in the ninth book of wisdom, right? Where you learn about act being simply before ability. And he goes back to it, he calls it over here in that middle argument, huh? Okay? So this is the fourth argument, then, in the Article 7. And notice he's also, he doesn't even touch upon that, does he? He doesn't even mention pure act, does he? But he's assuming that you will bring that in, right? Okay? He just says, quod deo non est, huh? Okay? But notice, in bringing out the other premise, that in everything composed, there's acting ability, he manifested with that distinction, and I did, right? That, um, because either one of the part is act with respect to the other, right? And that's what you had in the, what? Second, third, fourth, fifth, and even the sixth articles, right? Or at least, salt of the least, I guess, all the parts are as ability with respect to the whole. And that's the, what? Quantitative whole, right? Okay? Or again, if you're talking about the, even the word cat, C-A-T, right? You wouldn't say one letter is to the other, the other is act is to ability. Oh, wow. Okay? That's about the quantitative whole, right? But C-A and T are able to be the word cat. They're able to be the word, um, act. They're able to be the initials of Thomas Aquinas College. I get that on T-A-C all the time. They all refer to themselves as T-A-C, you know? Um, so, all of the letters are to the word cat as ability to act, right? That's the way the quantitative whole was, right? Okay? And same with the chair. You might say the, the legs and the seat in the back, one is not as act to the other, but all of them are to the whole chair as ability as to what? Act, huh? Yeah? When you study the, the four kinds of causes, then, and Aristotle distributes the four kinds of causes, matter, form, move, or end, and then he gives the three corollaries, and then he comes back upon the four causes and shows how you can understand them more universally, and he says that, what? Um, parts are to the whole as matter is to form. And you can see, you know, he's defined matter as that from which something comes to be existing within it. So, wood is the, is the, um, matter of the chair. The wooden chair comes from wood and wood is inside the chair, right? Well, you can see the parts are like that, right? Because the whole comes to be from its parts and the parts are in the whole, right? So, parts like matter. So, the, the parts of the whole like matter is to form. You see? But, uh, built in act, right? But, uh, in this kind of a whole, it's a quantitative whole, you don't have matter and form. One part's not to the other, right? All the parts are to the whole as matter is to form, as ability is to act. But the thing composed of matter and form, like you and I are, composed of body and soul. The soul is the first act of a natural body composed of tools, as Aristotle tells us. Okay? But the body composed of tools because there's a quantitative whole. One part is not to the other as act is to ability, but more of the parts are to the whole, like ability is to act. And fifth, huh? Because everything composed is something that does not belong to what? Each of its parts, huh? And this, in holes of dissimilar parts, is altogether manifest, right? For none of the parts of man is a man, huh? Okay? Nor is any of the parts of the foot a foot. Nor is any letter of the word cat the word cat. Okay? But in holes of similar parts, although something that is said of the whole is said of the part, as a part of air is air, right? And a part of water is water, right? Something nevertheless is said of the whole that does not belong to each of the parts, huh? For if the whole water is bicubit, huh? The part won't be bicubit, right? Okay? The whole line is a foot. Part of the line is not a foot long, right? Okay? Thus, therefore, in everything put together, there's something that is not it. There's anything in God that's not him. And it's kind of funny, I'm thinking about what a strange creature I am, or a strange being I am, right? There's something in me that's not me. And, of course, as I tell the students, you know, you've got matter, right? And the matter that's in you is able to be a lion or worms or something else, right? So there's something in me that's able to be something other than me, huh? I'm in a very precarious situation, huh? Now, this, although, is able to be said about something having a form, that it has something that is not it. For example, in the white, there's something that does not pertain to the, what, definition of white, right? Nevertheless, in the form itself, there is nothing, what, alien, huh? Okay? There's this alien number. Hence, since God is, what, ipso forma, divina substancia, forma estes, or rather, what, to be itself, right? I am who I am. In no way is he able to be, what, composed, huh? In this reason, Hillary, the great Hillary, touched upon the seventh book of the Trinity. God, who is strength, right, is not contained from things that are weak, huh? Nor he who is light itself, huh, is fitted together from obscure things, huh? Looks very, as Thomas calls it there in the prayer after communion, huh? That's it, I don't have a subtle argument, right, huh? Okay. God doesn't have anything that isn't him. In the healthy, can there be something besides health? Yeah. But in health itself, can there be anything besides health? Well, that's what God is. In what exists, there can be something besides its existence. But in existence itself, can there be anything other? No. But everything composed, there is something that isn't. Therefore, God is not composed. That's a little more difficult argument, right? The three arguments in the middle are shorter and easier to see. Notice the difference between the second and the third argument. I often puzzle. I look at the Summa Gagnetiles or the Summary, for that matter. They often say God is the prima causa and the primumens. He's the first cause and the first being. And I say to myself, now, obviously, the first cause and the first being are the same thing, maybe. But are they synonymous, those two phrases? I say, because being doesn't mean the same thing as cause, does it? So to say God is the first being is not exactly to say the same thing as these are the first cause. And then I get into thinking, you know, what sense of first is involved in these two, right? Because first means, what? Before all the rest, right? As you know from the chapter 12, there's other categories. There are four central meanings of before. And then he brings in the fifth, the crowning sense. So you have the same sense of before when you speak of the first being and the first cause. Obviously, you speak of the first cause. You mean the causes before all other causes. Okay? The causes before the causes that are also effects. That's obviously tied up with the crowning sense of before and after, the causes before and the effect. But what sense is the first being? If you take first there to mean, define it by before in the sense of cause before effect, then you have the same meaning exactly, right? Are you going to take the second central sense of before? I kind of like to do that, but I'm not sure Thomas is exactly doing that. But the second sense of before is, if this can be without that but not vice versa, then this is before and being, huh? And that's kind of nice later on when you get into taking up the divine causality, because Thomas wants to explain that creatures don't follow from God by natural necessity, that the free act of his will, right? And so it's important to see that God is before creatures, not only as a causes before effect, but also that he's before creatures in the sense that he can be without them, and they can't be without them. In Aristotle's example there, he's talking about cause before effect. He wants to distinguish it before from the sense in which something's before and being, right? And so he takes an example where the cause and the effect are simultaneous. I'm sitting, and it's the statement that I'm sitting is true. And I don't sit down, and then that statement gradually becomes true. No, it's like that, right? And so any time that statement is true, I'm sitting. Any time I'm sitting, that statement is true, right? You see? So he's showing that that sense of before and after is not the same as in being, right? But God is before creatures in both senses, okay? So is that the sense of before, right? A lot of times Thomas will take to the idea that when saying God is a perfect being, he's the fullest being, right? The most perfect being. And then you seem to be looking at the fourth sense of before and goodness, right? Okay? So now if you look at the second and third argument, they're a little bit different, aren't they? But they're very similar, aren't they? See? Everything composed or put together is after the things put together in it, right? And dependence exceeds, right? Okay? Now he doesn't say an effect of, right? Okay? Well, when I'm trying to explain that the crowning sense of before is not fifth in order, right? I always try to explain that it's most like the second sense. Because in the second sense, what is before and being, or rather what comes after the being, I should say, depends upon what is before and being, right? Even though it's not a cause, right? And so it's a little bit like cause and effect, right? What's interesting is the word depends here, right? In the second argument, and doesn't use the word cause, right? And then the third one, he says, everything that is composed has a cause, okay? And then he reasons from God being the first cause, the first efficient cause, that he can't be composed, right? Okay? So, I mean, the fact that you have those two arguments is probably a sign that they aren't entirely synonymous, first cause and first being, even though the first being is the first cause, and the first cause is the first being, right? Okay? But again, it's a beautiful example of how closely those things are related, huh? Because when Aristotle argues, you know, that act is simply speaking before ability, right? He seems to be talking about the before and after in being, more than the before and after in cause and effect, although they're involved too, right? Because what goes in ability to act does so because of something in act, right? But it shows you how tight these things are, huh? You know, I was explaining the great turnaround in, you know, States of the Metaphysics this semester. And you may recall that when Thomas gets to the fifth book of wisdom, in his division of the book of Aristotle, he says, this is the beginning of the consideration of being as being and the one and the many, right? And since being and one are said in many ways, Aristotle distinguishes the senses of the words that are being used here before he does anything else. So book five is the beginning, right? Of the consideration of being and one, but it's devoted to distinguishing the meanings of being and one and the other words like that. But I also say to the students, you could also consider this as the end of the, what? Consideration of the axioms. Because they are the same words that are used in wisdom, wisdom, most of all, that are also used in the axioms. And if you can't distinguish those meanings, you know, you can't understand the axioms distinctly, and you can't answer the objections that come from the sophists, like, you know, my schistical argument from Holland Park and so on. So, what is the end of the defense of the axioms is the beginning, right? Well, that shows, you know, how, what? How strictly order these things are, right? That the end of one is the beginning of the other, you know? It's like I was saying to students, they're saying that you go north and you get to the, to the end of the United States. And that line up there is also the beginning of Canada, right? Now, the fact that the end of the United States is the beginning of Canada, Canada, you know, that imaginary line there that divides the two countries, shows that there's no country between us and Canada, right? You know? It shows you how strict the mind is there, right, huh? As you go from the consideration of the axioms to being as being, right? The end of one consideration is also the beginning of the other, you see? It's a marvelous, huh? But you can say here, huh, that when he goes to the consideration of being as being, and the culmination of that is the consideration of act and ability in the ninth book of wisdom, right? And he goes from that to what he's going to do in the last books, 11 through 14, determine the truth about the first causes, right? The before and after in being almost seems to be the same thing as the before and after in what? Causes, right? Okay? And when you're talking about one or the other, you'll tend to use the words for the other one, right? When you're talking about how act is before being or ability simply, you do so by pointing out that the thing that goes from ability to act, although it's an ability for it, it's an act, it's because the cause being that something already can act, right? Okay? And vice versa. When you're arguing, you know, for the first mover, actually, the unmoved mover, well, you're arguing for the fact that what's in motion is inability, right? And it can't give itself the act it doesn't have and so on. So you're going back into that, which is how closely knit those things are. And it has these two arguments right next to each other, of course, number two and number three, right? Is that clear enough, then? It's a hell of a lot of fun. It's got a reason. You've got to stop and kind of chew on what he says and so on. And I know myself, you know, from years of reading Thomas and Aristotle, when I first read some texts, you know, I understand some things, some things I don't write. And I make an attempt to understand them at the time, you know, but sometimes I say, you know, I'll be back here someday, you know, understand it better the next time. I'm writing, you know, and it kind of makes me come back and say, I don't realize all the things are in there. So when my teacher, you know, would give you something, he'd tell me, go read that, Duane. I'd come back and ask more questions and he'd say, Duane, you know, read very carefully. And he'd go ahead and show me what's written in the thing, you know. So you can imagine, you know, after that kind of a line from him, you know, but I started to read more and more carefully, right? But, you know, it kind of used to say when he gave the lectures at Laval, you know, he'd just teach us how to read Thomas, huh? And read him carefully, you know. Most authors aren't worth reading that carefully because they're not a very careful writer, you know. But somebody like, you know, Aristotle or Thomas or Shakespeare, for that matter, right? They're worth reading carefully. And essentially you have to read them carefully to really profit from them. I think sometimes people, you know, they get indigestion because they try to do too much at a time. And really, you know, the kind of lecture you'd have is maybe his finger there, you know, and then he'd stop and he'd talk about it. And sometimes he'd go in and talk about some modern philosopher who's got a dog in the trouble because he doesn't see this little point here, you know. And that's kind of the way you have to do it, right? So come back to one little thing and you read out something else to kind of cast light upon that, huh? Okay. Now, the first objection was saying that God's effect should imitate and be like him, right? But they're all composed, okay? So he says, to the first therefore it should be said that those things which are from God imitate God, huh? As the things caused imitate the first cause, huh? But it's of the very, what, notion of being caused, huh? That it'd be in some way composed. Because at least it's what being is other than what it is. Because it's receiving its, what, existence from God, right? So he's going to make that more clear later on. So it's the very idea of being caused that your existence is not what you are. And therefore you must have a composition, right? So he's kind of, you're not just saying, you know, that, well, the creature is like God but not perfectly like God, right? And that's true, but he's saying that the creature is caused by God, right? And it belongs to the caused as such to have composition. At least the composition of what? What it is and its existence, huh? Okay? Because we see its existence from God, right? If what it is and its existence are the same thing, then it would be uncaused, huh? I'd say that would be more manifest when you take up, you know, the effects of God. Question 50, I guess, down there. Now to the second it should be said that with us, composed things are better than what? Simple things. Because the perfection of the goodness of the creature is not found in one simple thing, but in many. But the perfection of the divine substance, or divine goodness, is found in one simple thing, as will be what? Shown below, right, huh? Now maybe Thomas could be a little more unfolding himself there, right, huh? Because there's a difference in creatures between the immaterial substances, what we call sometimes the angels, right? What the philosopher calls the separated substances, meaning separated from matter, and the immaterial substances, right? In the material world, it seems that the composed is more perfect than the, what? Simple. But in the immaterial world, it's just the reverse. The more perfect the angel, the more simple it is, huh? And one way that they see this is that as you go up towards God, an angel has fewer thoughts. But those thoughts, what, express more and more clearly than what the larger number of thoughts of the lower angel express, huh? And, of course, I've heard you've got God who says and understands everything perfectly with just one thought, huh? You've heard my little poem, huh? You know, God the Father said it all with one word. No wonder when that word became a man. He spoke in words so few and said so much. He was the brevity and soul of it. Remember that? But I take that theorem, right? You know, from the second book of Euclid, right? You see the comparison, right? A little proportion. Where I say that words are to what you say, a little bit like the temperature, is to the, what? Area, right? Yeah, okay. So what's contained, you might say, the meaning, huh, that's contained in the words I say, right, huh? It's something like the area that's contained by the perimeter, right? Well, you know about that great love I have in the fifth theorem of the second book of Euclid, right? Where he's showing with rectangles, right? That for all rectangles of the same perimeter, the square would have more area of the same perimeter. Remember that? It's a beautiful theorem because he shows that the difference in the area between the square and any oblong, right, rectangle, will be the square of the difference in the lengths of the sides. Okay, so you really, just to exemplify the examples here, five by five, four by six, three by seven, two by eight. All of these rectangles have, what? A perimeter of 20. But the area goes down from 25 to 24 to 21 to 16. As you can see in these examples, the difference in area is the square and the difference in the sides. Five and six is one, 24 is one, right? Five and seven, or five and three, either one, two. Two, two squared is four, it's 21, right? Five and eight, or five and two, the difference is three, three is nine, squared, nine is the difference, right? And then you realize it's possible to have one with more perimeter, say 24, and an area only of, what, 20, right? So you can contain more, what, area with less perimeter. That's kind of interesting, huh? It's also interesting that you can say in a way the square is the simplest of, what, figures, right? So in a kind of distant way, you're saying that the simpler contains more, right? Take a little anticipation. Take a little bit. Take a little bit. Take a little bit. Take a little bit. Take a little bit. You're going to find the angels, right? The higher up you go in the angels, the better he understands, right? But the fewer the ideas or thoughts he needs to understand it. Until you get to God, his understanding is definitely perfect, right? But God is only one thought. God the Father said it all in one word. Okay? He said himself perfectly. And everything else could be said. You know? He, uh... Had the last word, right? As well as the first word, right? You see? And so, it's interesting. In the immaterial world, as you go up in the angels, you have what? Fewer thoughts, they become simpler, but they're more perfect, right? And so they... And that's much closer to God, right? For whom... Who is most perfect, but most simple, right? You see? So as you approach God, going up from the lower to the higher angels, you get simpler and simpler, with more and more perfect time. But we, you know, we terrible material creatures, and... we kind of, what, get mixed up, right? Because in us, the compose is what? More perfect, but the more perfect is composed, right? Okay? But we can, you know, see a little bit of what we're missing, right? You see? In this beautiful theorem of Euclid, right? Where the simplest of rectangles contains the most area, right? And it can even contain more area with less perimeter. And if people are... are... kind of a wonder, right? That abouts the amount of wonder, right? That I can, you know, enclose more area with less fence than you, huh? You know, you've got it done. You used more fence. But you enclosed a smaller area. What do you mean? How could that be, right? You know, and... they say that the ancient geometries, you know, the crooks, you know, they would buy and sell land back perimeter, and then they would get more land. And you think you're going to get a good deal, right? Okay? Because you're getting, you know, more perimeter, right? Or it could take me longer to ride around this piece of property other than that, that this piece of property that takes me long to ride around is smaller. It's not something, right? You know? But that's kind of anticipation, right? And then you see something like that in these authors, right? Thomas was saying more with fewer words, huh? And the same thing is true about Aristotle, right? But as the Bible says, the full multiply of his words, huh? And people use a lot of words and say practically, what? Nothing, you know? It's not such a waste of time to watch TV, you know? I mean, they had to say anything, you know, and they'd talk, talk, talk, talk, talk, and they'd hardly say anything. Like the faculty name or something, right? I remember, first, the faculty was at St. Mary's College, and I first taught, you know? And, you know, we had these terrible faculty names on Friday afternoons. I remember this one distinguished man, he'd been in Arthur's administration in Japan for the world, so I can see back there, he's so fed up with the professors going on and on, talk, talk, talk. He's not saying anything, I remember saying that. He's a very distinguished gentleman, I mean, it was so true, he does say anything. Talk, talk, talk, talk. And so sometimes you see even this terrible material world, right? You see a little hint, right? That there might be, right, this other thing where the simpler is more perfect, right? It's kind of a glimpse of a world that is, what, much different from our material world, huh? Okay? So one place where it takes place is this wonderful theorem of human, right? Another place, as I say, you can see in the human beings, right? They say more with fewer things than the moderns, right? You know, Locke apologized at the end of the, as in human understanding, you know, for his being so prolix, right? But he's too lazy, he said to the back of the room, right, cut it down, see? Okay? But another example of that, too, you see sometimes in the fine arts, in the book about the poetic art there, Aristotle takes up, you know, tragedy and epic, right? Kind of together, right? Tragedy first and then epic. But they're very similar, huh? And, like I mentioned before, you know, the saying among the Greeks, you know, that Sophocles is Homer writing tragedy, and Homer is Sophocles writing epic, and they saw the similarity and he's too great. Those are the two greatest poets of the Greeks, obviously. And, but Aristophanes, he makes comparisons, and so on, between them, and then he asks, which is the greater literary form, the tragedy or the epic, right? And he's not saying who's greater, you know, Sophocles or Homer, because he calls Homer the poet, right? You see? But nevertheless, he maintains that tragedy is a higher form, a more perfect form, than the epic, huh? Because he basically, he says, has the same, what, effect, huh? They move pity and fear, right? But the tragedy is so in a much more compact way, huh? See, why the effect of the Ilias like that is spread out over a long thing, and it's so, you could say in a sense that the tragedy is simpler than the epic, right? But it gets the same effect, right? Okay, sometimes, somebody's more powerful, almost, huh? So, you have kind of a hint, you know, that the simpler could be more perfect. Okay, that's an interesting thing to see, yeah? And, I don't know, music in a very technical way, you know, but, I remember, you know, they talk about, say, a very perfect piano concerto of Mozart, let's say, the 23rd piano concerto, which is my brother Marcus's favorite concerto, and my friend Warren's very good one, my wife Rosalie's favorite concerto, and I said, one of my favorites, too. But they describe, you know, how simple he wrote the thing, huh? And, they talk about, you know, how they compare Mozart and Haydn, Haydn will, you know, go from one key to another, kind of just, you know, variety is the spice of life, you know? But in Mozart, you know, he'd be much more sparing in his use of these things, you know, when he changes the key, it's for a very good purpose, you know? You realize, in some sense, that Mozart is simpler, but far more profound than Haydn or anybody, other composer, huh? You know, when they talk about some of Moses' great pieces, you know, one of the simplest things he ever wrote, you know? You say, how does he do this, right? How does he do this? So you get a little bit of a hint there in those two examples I was giving you from Tragedy and Epic and then from, you know, Mozart, who was the composer, how sometimes the more perfect seems to be, what, simpler, right? I notice when I read, you know, novels or something like that, you know, very rarely do I say it. I can remember that line. I mean, it's, it's said so well, how come everybody said so well, you know? And, but Shakespeare often struck up a line and said, this is something, you know? And, so there are sometimes, even in this crude material world we're driven, a hint, you know, that some things are simpler and more perfect, but it doesn't seem to fit the material world as a whole, right? and so we're kind of positively turned to God, that we don't, we're surprised in a sense, it should be, at least the first time around, that God is both infinitely perfect and completely simple altogether, right? I think that's, I think Thomas was struck by that, huh? And that's why he has these two questions next to each other, the question of simplicity and the question of perfection of God, right? there's something that's brought out by he's putting those two together that he does not brought out in the, well he has the same, they're next to each other in the Summa Concientilis too, but not in the, in the compendium, you know? But, um, there's something very striking for us material creatures when you go to this, huh? Okay, should we take a little break here? Since we're at the, Now, the eighth article. Now, why does the eighth article come by itself here after the general article, right? Well, what's the difference between the first seven, let's put it that way all together, and the eighth one, huh? The first seven is looking to God in himself, whereas this is looking at a new relationship to others. Yeah, yeah. And as a student of the philosopher Anaxagros, right, I mentioned how he shows, actually, he's reversed off of it here, but he shows in that DK12 there, the greater mind is not mixed with other things, otherwise you couldn't rule over them, right? And then later on, he says, it's the thinnest of all things and the purest of all things, right? And I said, at first I thought when he was saying purest, he was merely saying affirmatively what he had said negatively before. It's like if we said that God is in no way composed, and then we said God's altogether simple, we're not really saying something different, but simple is grammatically, you know, affirmative, but really it's understood through the negation of composed. But then, in second thought, I said, no, maybe by saying it's the purest of all things, he means that the greater mind is not a mixture of things itself, it's not put together, huh? But when he's, before he's saying it's not, you know, entering into a mixture of other things, and this would make sense if it's being the thinnest of all things, then it can't be a mixture of things, because then there'd be something thinner than it, okay? Well, something like this, except that the order here is the reverse, right? And God himself is not put together, and then he doesn't help to put something else together, together, okay? To the eighth one proceeds thus. It seems that God comes into composition with other things, huh? That God is put together with other things, you might say, right? We've eliminated that God is put together himself, but I want to see that he's put together other things. For Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the celestial hierarchy, that's about the angels, right? Albert the Great wrote a commentary on that, Thomas did on the divine names, but Albert has the one in the celestial hierarchy, but Thomas refers to a lot, huh? He talks about the angels. The essay of all things, huh? Is the essay which is what? Which is the divine being, right? Okay? The higher one. He's saying in a sense that God is the being of all things, huh? Okay? Well, this is part of the misunderstanding of what Dionysius means by that, right? But why does Dionysius say that God is the essay omnium? That it seems into that God is the essay that is mixed with all things, right? Or the essay that's said of all things, huh? I mentioned how in Summa Grandi Gentiles, Thomas, I have a chapter, you know, devoted to showing that I am who am is not the essay that is said of all things, huh? Therefore, God comes into composition of other things. Moreover, God is a, what? Form, huh? For Augustine says in the book about the words of God, huh? That the word of God, capitalized there, which is God, is a certain form that has not been, what? Formed, huh? Okay? But the form is a part of the composite, huh? Of matter and form. Therefore, God is a part of something composed, huh? Moreover, whatever things there are and differ in no way are the same. But God and first matter are and in no way do they differ. Therefore, they are wholly the same. But the first matter enters into the composition of things. Therefore, God. So, David of Dinant, I don't know if he mentions David of Dinant here, but he's a guy who said that, you know, that two are the same. Stupidly taught, as Thomas says. But then God would be mixed with all things, right? And this would be a kind of, what? Pantheism, huh? Okay? Now, the proof of the middle here. Whatever things differ, differ by some differences. And thus is necessary that they be composed. But God and the first matter are aminosumplicia, huh? Altogether simple. Therefore, in no way do they, what? Differ, huh? Now, back to the great mistake about the first cause, in a sense. Okay. But again, this is what Dionysius says in the second chapter about the divine names. That there is neither, what? Touch, right? Of him, God. Nor any other communion, right? Of being mixed together in parts. And more was said in the book de Causes, huh? By the Arab philosophers, going back to the Neopatine philosophers. It was thought to be by Aristotle at first, but when Thomas realized it was not by Aristotle. But it's an interesting book. Pretty good. That the first cause, Thomas has a commentary on it, right? That the first cause rules all things without being, what? Mixed with them, huh? Okay. Now, he says, I answer you. It should be said that about this there were three errors, huh? A few mistakes, huh? For some laid down that God was the, what? Soul of the world, huh? In the footnote here, saying it was Varro who said that, right? Okay. And Augustine touched upon this in the seventh book of the city of God, right? Discussing these Roman thoughts. And to this opinion also could be due to that of those who say that God is the soul of the first heavens, huh? Okay. Others say that God is the formal principle of all things, huh? And this was said to be the, what? Yeah. I don't know who he is, but this in here, followed the doctrines of Amarice Carnutensis Deschartes. Well, the benes, huh? Oh, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. And I suppose to that should introduce the one who would say that he would be the being of all things, in the sense that mixed with all things is there a being, huh? And the third was the error of David of Dinanto, who he most stupid thought, that God was first matter, right? As we say, you know, we always defend Thomas about not being, you know, attacking people, you know, with things. You couldn't be further away from God if he's pure act. When you say God is pure, what, passive ability, right? He couldn't have made a greater mistake if he just said God was nothing or something. But if he's something, you know, he couldn't get something further away from God, huh? All of these contain a manifest, what, falsehood, huh? Nor is it possible for God in some way to come into composition with something else, right? Neither as a formal principle, right? Nor as a, what, material principle, huh? Notice the first two opinions would be making him kind of a formal principle, right? And the third, you know, but he's in the material principle, right? Okay? Now, he's going to get back to his three reasons, huh? First, because we've said above that God was the first, what? Efficient cause, the first maker, huh? But the efficient cause, with the form of the thing made, does not come together the same in, what, number, okay? But only the same in species, right? So, man generates man, right, huh? Same in kind, but not the same in number, right? So, when your mother makes Christmas cookies, you know, and you stamp the dough with the Christmas tree thing, you give it the same shape, right? But is it the same in number? Hmm? No. No. Then you wouldn't be able to go for one together, right? No. No. No. No. No. You know, that's if you're at the first one you made. Yeah, yeah. And matter even less so, right? Because matter doesn't come together with the efficient cause, the same in number, and not even the same in what? Form or kind, right? Okay? So the dough, right? Doesn't agree, right? Even in kind with me. Because this is an ability, meaning passability, that is an act, right? Okay? That's his first argument, right? God is the first efficient cause. It's an extrinsic cause. Secondly, because since God is the first efficient cause, it belonged to him to act to himself and first with nothing before. But what comes together in the composition with another is not first and by itself acting, but more the what? The composite itself, right? So the form of the composite is that by which it acts, but it's not what acts. For the hand doesn't act, but the man acts through the hand, right? And fire heats through heat, huh? Whence God is not able to be the part of something composed, huh? Third, because no part of something composed can be simply what? First among beings. First among beings. Neither matter and form, which are parts, neither I suppose, which are the first parts of composed things. For matter is an ability, but ability is after act, simplicitare, right? And the form which is a part of the composed is a form that is partaking, huh? And just as the one partaking is after that which is through, what? Essence, right? Essentially so. So also the thing partaken. Just as fire in things knighted is after that which is fireth essentially. But it's been shown above that God is the first being, what? Simply, huh? So the first two arguments are taken from God being the first deficient cause, right? And where he doesn't agree with the matter of form in, what? Number, right? And sometimes not even kind, right? Okay. And then the other arguments from the deficient cause being, what? First and through itself acting, right? So if God was just a part of something else, he would not be first and through himself acting, but this composite would be to him, right? Okay. And then the third argument is from what? From God being, again, the first, what? Being, right? Okay. Then he gets kind of a separate argument that therefore matter can't be the first being because ability is after act, right? Simply. And a form, a guy can't be a form of some other composite because then he would be, what? Partaking. Yeah. Okay. So you're convinced God doesn't enter into composition of other things? Okay. Now, he applied the first objection from Dionysius. He says that the deity is said to be the being of all things, not, what, formally, but, what, effectively as an efficient cause and as a, what, exemplar, right? You know how when I talk about God as a cause and there's four kinds of cause, right? I say, in how many senses of cause has God a cause? What? Not material. No, no. But I sometimes say he's a cause in two and a half senses. Okay? Because in Aristotle talks about form, he distinguishes between the form and the exemplar or the model, right? And the form is intrinsic to the thing, which is a form, right? Where the exemplar is outside of the thing, right? But something is what? Imitates it, right? Or is made like it, huh? Okay? My father's company, they made farm wagons and they had the patterns up in the wall, right? And they would take them down and they're going to make it, wait, right? So you're making a form in this other matter, this new matter you brought into the wood shop, huh? Like the pattern on the wall, right? So God is a cause in the sense of end and mover or maker and exemplar, but not the intrinsic form. So I say half and not at all, for this matter. So he's a cause in two and a half senses, huh? Well, sometimes we kind of run together, fish and exemplar together, right? You know, you'll see them sometimes speaking that way. So we just speak of God as the Alpha and the Omega, right? But another way you could say God is a cause in two and a half senses, huh? So we're said to be made to the image and likeness of God, and you're speaking of God as a cause, what? As exemplar as well as the maker, huh? So that's the way to understand Dionysius, huh? Dionysius has to be explained sometimes by Thomas, huh? And Augustine, too, right? Not just to understand these guys, but to not misunderstand them, right? And once in a while it has to do with Aristotle, too, you know? Because Aristotle is talking about what does God know in the 12th Book of Wisdom, right? And he seems almost to be saying that it would be unworthy for God to know anything less than himself, right? Okay? And some people understand Aristotle to mean that God knows only himself and doesn't know other things, right? And yet, you know, we have at least two places where he attacks Empedocles' opinion because according to Empedocles' opinion, we know something God doesn't know. And Aristotle, that's that's absurd, right? So I think Thomas tries to understand that what Aristotle is doing is trying to say, what is it that God knows chiefly, right? Okay? And he doesn't mean that he doesn't know anything else, but he's going to know anything else by knowing himself, right? And nothing else could define the divine mind because nothing else would be worthy of the divine mind, right? You see? And nothing else could be the primary object, you might say, of his mind, right? Other than himself, because it's something other than himself to be the perfection of his mind, right? So it has to be himself. But some people misunderstood that as if God didn't know anything but himself. And Aristotle, you know, in at least two places we have, you know, it takes us being absurd that this rejection of the absurd of the argument of Empedocles, huh? You know, Empedocles says, by love we know love, and by hate we know hate, and by earth, earth, and by air, and by fire, fire, and by water. Because we have these things in us, we know them, right? But then he says that there's no, what? A hate in God, huh? Which is interesting that he says that, right? But then if there's no hate in God, then God would know hate, and we'd know something he didn't know, which is an absurd consequence, huh? So, sometimes you have to explain even Aristotle, but more so, Augustine and Dionysius, you know? But you know my real thumb, right? Aristotle means what Thomas says he means. I think it's a very good principle. And I think you could say more or less, too, Augustine means what Thomas says he means, too. But sometimes you might be stretching it a bit there, you know? And Dionysius means what Thomas says he means. It's good enough for Thomas, it's good enough for me. Okay, the second argument was saying that God is what was taken from form rather than essay, right? The first one's taken from essay. And he says, well, God is a form, but the form is in the sense of exemplar, right? Not the form, which is a part of the composite. This comes up again when Thomas is explaining. ...the beatific vision, because how do we see God as he is, right? And we can't see God as he is by a created form. So God himself has to be, what, joined to our mind, right? So God is both what we see and that by which we see him. Then Thomas always gets an objection, well, God is not a form or something else, right? But in that union, God is not joined to our mind to make one thing, right? But simply is that by which you're going to understand him and see him as he is, right? Thomas has to defend that, huh? Because without that, you're not going to see God as he is. And that's a matter of faith that you are going to see him as he is. But you can't see him as he is by a created form, because that would be limited. Wouldn't be up to it, you see? But, um, uh, God is not joined to our mind as if he's what a form of a composite thing now that you're making up here, right? Like body and soul, right? But just as that by which you're going to understand in this case. That's kind of interesting, huh? That this will come up for a subtle thing. Now, the third objection is a different kind of objection, right? But it fails to understand the difference between what? In the Latin, they express it by... In a way, yeah, yeah, yeah. Diverse as opposed to what? Yeah. See, in a strict sense, things differ. They have something in common. And then they need something in addition to what they have in common, or by they differ, right? So the dog and the cat, right? They have in common. They're both a four-footed animal, et cetera, right? But the one mouths and the other barks or something, right? And maybe more essential differences than that, huh? See? Well, that's not the way you can understand the difference. You want to say the difference between God and the first matter, right? Right, huh? Okay? They're other by, what? Themselves, huh? And not by a part of themselves, which is their difference, huh? But, you know, this comes up even when you talk about the difference between the cat and the dog, right? Because they have the genus in common, and they differ by their differences, right? Now, someone asked, but what do the differences differ from each other? Well, if you don't say the differences differ from each other by themselves, but by another difference, well, then you have to ask, but what do they differ? And you have differences, you know, differing by differences by differences going on forever, right, huh? So there must be some things that are other by themselves, and not other by a part of themselves, which is their difference with the other thing, okay? Okay, so Tom's going to go into this a little bit here. Simplicia, simple things, right, do not differ by some other differences, huh? For this belongs to what? Composed things, huh? For man and horse differ by what? Rational, irrational differences, huh? Which differences do not differ further from each other by other differences? But then you have to have those differences also differing by other differences, and those, and so on forever, right? Whence, he says, if you want to make this explicit in words, right, if you want to make, strengthen the words, they do not properly, they're not properly said to differ, but to be what? Rural. Yeah, or you could say in English, simply other, right? Okay. For according to the philosopher, whoever that guy is, he comes up a lot in here. For according to the philosopher, in the 10th book of wisdom, 10th book of the metaphysics, other or diverse is said absolutely, right? But everything differing, in the strict sense, differs by something, right? Okay. Whence, if one wants to make strength here in the word, the first matter and God do not differ by something, but they are other by themselves, huh? Whence it does not follow that they are the same, huh? Get that? Look at that when you say, the 10 highest gender, right? Do they differ from each other by differences? No. Then you have to have a genus for the highest gender, right? There is no, right? You can say they differ by themselves, right? They're other, right? What a thing is in its size, they're other, right? You don't look for another difference by which they differ, right? They differ by themselves. But something that is composed of genus and difference, they will differ by what? Not by themselves, because by themselves, they involve the same genus, right? So it's by the difference that they differ, not by themselves, huh? Okay. But the differences differ by themselves, huh? Okay. But maybe you shouldn't say differ, they're other by themselves, right? I mean, that's a little bit of the equivocation, huh? Okay. And you might, you were suggesting the word distinct, right? You see? Okay. But things are distinct to which one is not the other. Ability is not act. Okay. But do ability and act differ by something else? No, they're other, one from the other, by themselves, huh? Especially if you're talking about something that is nothing but act, which is God, right? And the first matter, which is nothing but ability, right? You see? Then they can't, what, differ by something other than themselves, right? They're other by themselves, huh? It's a very important thing to see. You agree? I agree. Hmm? You don't think that everything can be other than everything else by something other than itself, do you? It goes on, everything must be completely other than everything. I mean, you always have to have a difference for every difference, right? You'd be going on forever, right? Yeah. So you'd never know the difference between anything, right? People always want to define words. What do you think about it? Yeah, you always have to know the difference before you know anything is different, you know? A and B are different because of these differences they have, right? Okay? But why do these differences are different? Well, you have to know some other difference whereby they differ, right? Before you can know that they're different. And then you have to know the difference by which they differ before you can know that. You always have to know some other difference before you can know anything. So unless you saw that reasonable and unreasonable are rational, irrational, are other by themselves, right? You don't need to know the difference. You can say, what's the difference between an odd number and an even number, right? They're both numbers, right? Yeah. Well, you'd say, well, the even number has a middle. The odd number doesn't have a middle, right? Now, by what does have a middle and not have a middle differ? By something else? No. They're other by themselves, right? Okay? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. What's the difference between something and nothing? Do they differ by something? Do they differ by nothing? No. Something and nothing differ by themselves, it seems to me, right? To be or not to be? That is the question, right? It's a question because you can't both be and not be, right? You must be one or the other. So are they different to be and not to be? But are they different by some difference? See? They're different by themselves, right? Now, sometimes we might speak that. Another thing might say one of the existing variables, as he says, right? And say, well, strictly speaking, if to differ means to have a difference, right? Or by you differ. Then they don't differ, but they are what?