Prima Pars
Lecture 23: God's Simplicity, Perfection, and Likeness to Creatures

Transcript
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Diverse, but I think in English we'd, you know, the English way for diversity would be other, right? Because diversity is taken as the opposite of idem, or idem, same and other, right? Okay, so maybe instead of diverse in English you could say other, okay? Other by themselves, to themselves, huh? Okay, now, maybe we should take a perfection next week, huh? Okay, let's go back a moment though to the premium to this consideration of the substance of God, huh? Let's see what Thomas said in that premium, if he said anything that we've forgotten here. It's at the beginning of question three where he gives the premium to the consideration of the substance here a little bit, okay? Okay, knowing about something that it, whether it be, right? We know whether it is, we know that God is, for example. It remains to inquire in what way it is, right? That we might know about it what it is. But because about God we're not able to know what he is, but what he is not, we're not able to consider about God in what way he is, but more in what way he is not, huh? Okay? First, therefore, it ought to be considered in what way he is not. Secondly, in what way he is known by us, right? That would be question 12, right? And third, in what way he is, what? Named, huh? Okay? Now, the order there is that we name God as we know him. So, you take out the knowing in 12 and the knowing naming in 13. Now, one is able to show about God in what way he is not by removing, right? That means negating from him those things which do not belong to him. As, for example, composition doesn't belong to him, right? And motion, right? And others of this sort, huh? Okay? That's interesting with Thomas. He mentions composition and motion explicitly, and then the audio is not, right? Because in both the Summa Congentilis, as I mentioned before, and in the compendium, he first removes motion from God, and then composition. But those two first, right? Okay? But then he goes on, he says, first, therefore, one ought to inquire about his simplicity, through which is removed from him composition. And that's what we've done now in the articles of question three, right? But then he gives a reason, kind of, right, why he's going to go to perfection second, it seems, huh? And because simplicia, the simple things, the simples in bodily things, huh, are imperfect, right? And like parts, right? Secondly, one inquires about his, what? Perfection, right? Okay? So after you show that God is altogether simple, you and your material mind, right, are apt to then think next, what? Imperfect. He must be very imperfect, right? Okay? And you could say, in material things, when you're going towards the first matter, you get something simpler, right? So the atom, you know, even in our modern science, is simpler than the molecule, and the proton or the electron or something is simpler than the atom, right? Okay? So it's kind of natural then to think that God might be imperfect because he's altogether simple. And so we're going to correct that thinking of you right away before you do this. So then we take up, secondly, the perfection of God, right? Okay? And then third, the what? Infinity of God. Now, when you study the infinity of God, you'll see how it's very closely related to his perfection, right? Because in a way, you're talking about the infinite perfection of God. So it kind of could fall right upon that. And then fourth about his being, what? Unchangeable, right? And in a way, you can argue to God's being unchangeable because he's altogether simple. And we learn in the first book of natural hearing, whatever changes is composed, right? So you can syllogize from God being simple to his being unchangeable. And I always mention when we do the first book of natural hearing in philosophy of nature, you know, that you come away from the first book of natural hearing with this statement in your mind, that whatever changes is composed. But then, after you show in theology that God is not composed, you've got syllogism, the second figure, that God does not change, right? Okay? But also, when you realize that God is perfect, and perfect in the way that Aristoteles says he's perfect in the fifth book of wisdom, he's universally perfect. He's lacking in nothing, right? He's not merely lacking in nothing of his kind, but he's lacking in nothing of any kind. When you see he's universally perfect, then that's another reason why he can't change, right? There's nothing he could acquire, right? And also, when you see that God is infinite, right? Even the guy who thought it was material infinity thought the thing was unchangeable, right? Like Melissa's thought of it. So you've got three reasons to see that God is unchangeable, right? And it kind of repairs the way, right? Especially for we natural philosophers, right? Who make a big deal about the fact that change would be impossible unless the thing that changes was composed. That's what comes out very clearly in the first book of the physics. You know, how can the healthy become sick? You know how Heraclitus says, day is night, because day becomes night, night becomes day. But how can the healthy become sick? Because health can't be sickness. The healthy as such can't be sick, right? Unless there's something in the healthy besides health, it's impossible for the healthy in any sense to become sick, right? And so you begin to realize that what changes must be composed. It's composed of the contrary, like health, and the subject of the health, right? So once you have that firmly in your mind, that what changes is composed, and then you see the simplicity of God, that he's not composed, well then you've got the second figure, right? But the same thing is affirmed of one and denied of the other, right? It's like the way Socrates argues in the Phaedo, right? When he's arguing that the soul is not the harmony of the body, right? He takes three things that are said of one and denied of the other. He has the arguments against it, right? But that's what they call the second figure, the syllogism, where the middle term is the predicate in both premises, but it's affirmed of one and denied of the other, okay? A mother is a woman, Socrates is not a woman. Therefore, Socrates is not a mother, right? That's the kind of argument, okay? Socrates argues the soul resists the body sometimes, like the man is just an inclination of the body. But the harmony of the body doesn't resist the body, right? Okay? So that's the way he argues, right? This is the way we argue here. Now, why did you take up unity last, huh? Because in some ways, that's very closely related to composition, right? But it's also related to God being infinite. How could it be more than one infinite thing, huh? And if he in no way changes, he's in no way multiple, right? But the main thing I'm going back to the premium for here is that connection that he makes explicitly between why he seems to be taking up the perfection of God next to his simplicity, right? And that's because your experience of what? The simple and the composed and the perfect and the imperfect is screwy as far as understanding God, right? You know? Because you're thinking of the composed being what? More perfect, right? Okay. Just Jim was saying it's top security. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, you're thinking of that beautiful church you're talking about down in Tampa, Florida, right? And all these different polarisms and so on, all this composition and so on, right? Okay. And you know, going back to Shakespeare for a moment, I think Shakespeare's sonnets are pretty good, you know? But I don't think I put the... Any of his sonnets are as perfect as King Lear or Hamlet or these plays, right? So can a sonnet be as perfect as a play? I don't think so. But it's simpler. So you've got this, you know, you're all messed up as far as understanding the way God is, right? So I think that's significant that he says that. I have a question I want to ask about the third objection again, the organic response to the third objection in Article 8. Yeah. When he says that, okay, so for man and horse differ by rational and irrational differences, which certainly, okay, but then he says the differences can differ by further differences. They have to simply be other. But if we take, instead of the example of man and horse, if we were to take, say, Socrates and Plato, two men, two differ, they differ not by a difference. The difference, what they differ by would be their matter rather than by a difference. Mm-hmm. And so couldn't I say that they're, okay, well, what, does this matter differ? Does this matter differ? Socrates' matter differ from Plato's matter simply in that they're other? But can it matter? Can it matter to the other? That's really a different kind of distinction, right? Yeah, yeah. You know, Thomas will sometimes distinguish between what he calls a material distinction, right? And that's tied up with the continuous, right? Yeah. So you say, what's the distinction between the two endpoints of a straight line, you see? Because the points are exactly, what, the same kind of thing, and they don't differ by, what, a difference, right? Well, they differ because one's here and one's there, you know? And he's not really considering that kind of a distinction here in this objection, I think. He's thinking of the formal distinction, right? Yeah. And then the question is, is all formal distinction by a difference that is not you? And that gets you into this other problem that you have to have infinity differences for being different. Okay? Say A and B differ by X and Y, and X and Y differ by, you know, C and D, and you always differ by something other than yourself, well, then you're going to have to have, what, infinity differences before you think we're going to differ. And you might say, go back to the great principle there, the axiom that through another is after the through itself, right? Mm. Okay? So things that are other by another, presuppose things that are other by themselves, right? Okay? So if everything differed by a difference other than itself, then you'd have nothing differing by itself. Yeah. You don't just mind everything. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. You don't say it's the modern philosophy, it's a similar mistake like this, you know. They'll identify, kind of, I don't see any difference between being, which is sort of everything, and matter, huh? Because they both seem to be, what, simple, huh? Okay? And that's a big mistake, too, right? It was probably that mistake of mixing up the cause of all and the set of all, right? But mixing them up because of their simplicity and having nothing by which they differ. So if we have nothing by which we differ, we must be the same. See? And not seeing this other possibility that we could be other by ourselves. Okay? You see that? Okay. So much for the simplicity of God. Thank you. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. You're up to question four, the De Perfectione, the perfection of God. So Thomas says a little premium, right? He says, after the consideration of the divine simplicity, we're not to speak about the perfection of God. And because each thing, according as it is perfect, is said to be good, first we're not to consider about the perfection, the divine perfection, secondly about his, what? Goodness. Goodness. So the question, actually there's two questions on goodness. They are attached to the consideration of the perfection of God, huh? Okay? Just like the consideration of the eternity of God is attached to the consideration of his being unchangeable, or the consideration of God being everywhere, in some way, to his being, what? Infinite, huh? Okay? It doesn't attach anything to the consideration of God's simplicity, or to the consideration of his unity, huh? But it could have attached to the consideration of God being the measure of all things, because it's property of the one to be a measure. And said first of the one that's the beginning of number, but then it's carried over to the one in the other genre. And it's in the laws, I remember rightly, where Plato says, man is not the measure of all things, like Proteus said, right? But God is the measure of all things, huh? So Thomas often points that out about the one, right? It's the measure of things, and Aristotle has said this in the Tenth Book of Wisdom, the book on the one and the many, but he doesn't happen to give a consideration of God being the measure of all things, huh? Okay? So sometimes they, it's to say the infinity of God, they say he's in Latin, immensis, which means what? Immeasurable or unmeasurable, yeah, I don't know, you'd say un or immeasurable, but... Okay. Now about the first one asks three things, the three articles now of questions. Four, on the perfection of God. The first is whether God is, what? Perfect, huh? And secondly, whether he is universally perfect, having in himself the perfections of all things. Of course, the answer to both those questions will be yes. But Aristotle speaks of that sense in which God is said to be perfect in the chapter on the perfection. Perfect. You know, other things, things other than God are said to be perfect in their kind. So Homer is the perfect poet. Mozart is a perfect musician, right? But, he lacks many perfections, obviously, Homer does, right? Mozart lacks many perfections. But God doesn't lack the perfection of any kind of thing. So universally perfect. And then, why does he stick in this third article? Whether creatures are able to be said to be like God, huh? Well, in the perfection of God, right? The distance is so great, how can they be said to be like God, huh? So very often, scripture says, who is like the Lord? But then, at the same time, in other places, scripture said, we're made in the image, or to the image and likeness of God, which kind of touches upon the distance there. I told you my trouble there at the Mohammedan, right, in my class there, objecting to Aristotle calling, not Aristotle, Shakespeare calling reason godlike, right, huh? And in the Merchant of Venice, he calls friendship, and enmity godlike, huh? Well, of course, God is love, right? Mm-hmm. So on. So there's something godlike about friendship, huh? Especially the highest kind of friendship. But still, there's a great distance, huh? And I think it's in the, it's in the fourth ladder in the council, I believe, is where it says, you can never note a likeness between God and the creatures, or a likeness of the creature to God, without at the same time a greater, what? Unlikeness. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I remember, John, I mean, Paul VI quoting that one time, it's kind of got me thinking about that text, and then coming back to it, so. I used that with this Mohammedan there to talk about what the attitude was about, something that's like God. But you can, in a sense, both affirm it and, what? Deny it. That'd be important for understanding the names that we transfer from creatures to God, huh? Okay, to the first, that's the one, proceeds. It seems that to be perfect does not belong to God. For perfect, he's talking about the word, you know, in the first objection, he says the word totally factum, huh? Holy made, huh? And perfectum comes from factum, I guess. But to God, it doesn't belong to be made, huh? Okay? There is totality. He's not a self-made God, huh? Not one made by everybody else. That's why we talk about the procession of the word, huh? We never use the word factum, right? Cenitum non factum, is that what the creed says, huh? Yeah. It's important, huh? This makes you stop and think about the word, right? But of course, that from which the word is taken is not necessarily that to which the word is applied, huh? Tom's always giving this thing for a lot, these sloppy dim, you know? Maybe a false etiology, I don't know, but what hurt the foot, right? Oh, yeah. Yeah. And that's not what a stone is, but that's where it got its name, right? Because it hurts the feet when you're walking along. See, you notice it's a thing that there's bemento. But example I think sometimes is the word, what? Geometry, right? Which means what? Yeah, measure the earth, measure the earth. But of course, geometry is an abstract science, huh? You're not concerned with anything sensible. You're concerned with sphere and cube and abstraction from any material sphere or cube, right? But nevertheless, the name is taken from measuring the earth, huh? Maybe that's the way people first got thinking about these things or something, but it's not what the meaning of the word is. You know what I'm saying? A lot of times I hear people, you know, they say philosophy is a love of wisdom. And there are the confusing, I think, the etymology, that from which the word is taken with the meaning of the word, huh? At least as you find it in Plato and Aristotle. The meaning of the word philosopher is a lover of wisdom. But Plato and Aristotle use the word philosophy to name the knowledge, huh? that the lover of wisdom pursues, not to name the love of wisdom itself, right? So most people are confused there and they mix up the id a quo moment in pointe term, that from which the name is taken or placed upon something, and that adquem to which it is placed, okay? Or what you could say the etymology with the meaning of the word. And there's sometimes, and many times, connection between the two, but you can't simply say that they're necessarily the same. Berkwist, huh? Comes from Berg, actually it's Berkwist originally named, Berg meaning mountain, quist, branch, mountain, branch. That's the etymology of my name, but, yeah, but when you say Berkwist, I'm not really mountain, branch. Except metaphoric, you know, these mountains here and I'm a little twig out that, you know. So that's an important distinction between the etymology and the meaning of the word. But, now if you're going to use the etymology to, which you can do many times as a manudectio to lead somebody to the meaning of the word, right? You've got to know the meaning of the word and the etymology and to what extent it's useful, right? And sometimes it can be a bit misleading of the etymology and lead away from what the meaning is, right? So that may be involved in this first objection, right? that you're looking at the etymology of perfecto, right? And it doesn't fit the God who's not made, huh? It doesn't fit the word of God who's gentle but not made. Whoever God is the first beginning of things, huh? but the beginning Beginnings of things seem to be, what? Imperfect, huh? For the seed is the beginning of, what? Animals and plants, but the seed is not an acorn, not really a tree yet, huh? There's something imperfect in that line. Therefore God is, what? Imperfect, huh? We think there are some senses only of beginnings, where the beginning is something, what? Imperfect, right? And so as we were saying before, there's kind of a contrast between those attributes of God that could be said of every beginning, but not the same meaning, right? And one like perfect, which doesn't seem to be said of every beginning. It goes back to what we put in the ninth book of wisdom, right? How with the truth all things harmonize, right? That God is both the first cause and the best thing. But those who think matters the first cause, the first cause is not the best thing, okay? You could say here that God is both the first beginning and the most perfect thing. Further, it has been shown above that the essence, the very nature, you might say, of God is being, not to be. But ipsumessi, to be, seems to be most, what? Imperfect, since it is most, what? Common. And receiving additions of all things, huh? Therefore, God is imperfect. Of course, if you compare genus and difference, genus seems to be taken from what? The matter, right? And difference from the form. And so, just as matter can be formed in various ways, so the genus can be determined, actualized, as it were, by different, various differences, yeah. And so, the genus is more common, right, huh? Okay? And so, if God is being itself, that's most common, right? Most indistinct, huh? And I told you that kind of a fun exchange between my friend and this guy at a, I think it was the American Catholic Philosophical Association, and my friend was talking about the distinction between nature and art, and he said, well, the philosophy doesn't make that distinction. Why not? He says, well, he says, the philosopher talks about being, see? And on the level of being, there's no distinction. My friend said, that's the being that Hegel says passes over into non-being, right? You know? You know, if you ask me, what is this? They say, well, it's something, or it's a being. I seem to have said practically nothing about it, right? Okay? Well, they're kind of confusing that being that is said of all things with the being that is God, that old mistake, in a sense. And then this would be the most, what? Imperfect, the most indistinct, the least formed, you might say, thing you could say. Okay. But against this is what is said in the end of the Sermon on the Mount, right? Matthew 5. I think it's said it more than once in that sermon, actually, a couple times at least. Be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect, right? I guess that's pretty good authority there, huh? Now, I answer, it should be said, that as the philosopher, and that's by Antonio Masia, Aristotle writes a great compliment that he pays to Aristotle. This is Aristotle, refers to Homer sometimes by Homer and sometimes as the poet. Okay? For as the philosopher narrates in the Twelfth Book of Wisdom, the Twelfth Book of Metaphysics, some ancient philosophers, like the Pythagoreans and Spisippus, that ne'er-do-well nephew of Plato, you know, rough with him. That's Aristotle, that's the school, right? I guess he couldn't become head of the school because it was the Athenian law to go to a relative or something. He couldn't have this property going to an outsider. Later on Aristotle came back to Athens and set up the Lyceum. So some ancient philosophers, as with the Pythagoreans and Spis, do not attribute the, what, optimum, the best and most perfect to the first beginning, right? And it seems to me you could say it's even more about the more materialists, huh? Those who think matters are the beginning of all things, would not attribute best and most perfect to the first beginning. And he says the reason for this is because the ancient philosophers considered only the, what, material principles at the beginning. Okay? But the first material principle is most imperfect. That's why it was most stupidly taught by David Adinant that God is the first matter. Because the first matter is, what, pure ability, yeah, pure potency. For since matter as such is an ability, it is necessary that the first material beginning be most of all an ability, and thus most of all, what, imperfect. Okay? But God over is laid down to be the first beginning, not in the sense of the first matter, right? But in the other kind of cause, in the genus of efficient cause, the mover, the maker. And this necessarily is what? Most perfect. Most perfect, huh? Okay. Now he's going to manifest the reason why that is so, right? And I'm going to go back to the fact that one is an agent through what? Through what? Through act, yeah, yeah. I can't give you ability, through your ability, in the passive sense, that you receive something from me, right? Okay? But act is something to give you because I'm actually something. Okay? So, when you make the Christmas cookies there, the cookie press there has already got the shape, right? And it gives the dough that it actually has itself, huh? Okay? For just as matter as such is an ability, and in the passive sense of ability, so the agent as such is in what? Act, huh? Okay? Now you can understand that, Alan, that the one who receives as such is an ability, right? And the one who gives as such is an act, huh? And then what is given to something, like I give, you know, shape to the wood or the metal, wherever it is, right? Or Michelangelo gives a shape to the marble. What you give to something is as act, right? And so it's insofar as you are an act that you are able to give somebody or something something, right? So insofar as you are an ability that you are able to, what? Receive. Receive, yeah. Yeah. So if God is the first beginning, not in the sense of matter, but in the sense of the mover and the maker, then he's going to be most inact, huh? Whence the first active beginning, right? And the active room there is opposed now to the sense which matters are beginning, right? That would be the premium principium possigum, right? It cannot be the first active things. Whence the first active beginning is necessarily most of all an act, huh? Because that goes back to what Aristotle taught us in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, that act is simply speaking before ability. But although the thing that goes from ability to act is an ability before it's an act, it goes from ability to act because it's something already an act. So simply speaking, act is before ability. And therefore the first cause is most an act. And act is more perfect than what? Ability, right? Ability. And so consequently it's most of all what? Perfect, right? Now notice how God in a way being most of all an act, or God being pure act if you want to say that, is kind of the middle term for saying he's what? Perfect, right? Yeah, yeah. For according to this something is said to be perfect according as is an act. For that is said to be perfect to which nothing is lacking according to its what? The way of its perfection, huh? Now we go to the objections. The first one was from, hey, perfect means made, right? Okay. To first therefore it should be said. That is Gregory says, huh? That's Gregory the Great, huh? He's both a pope and a what? Yeah, one of the chief talked to is the Western Church, huh? Gregory, where they say Gregory, Jerome, Vestin, Ambrose is the four ones of the Western Church. So he says, Now, how would you translate that, huh? Yeah, babbling, or maybe even, what, stuttering, huh? Okay? When we speak about God, we stutter. Well, that's beautifully said, right, huh? Because you're not talking about stuttering with the physical words, right? But the mental word, you're like stuttering, huh? So if, just like we take the word word, apply it first of all to the spoken word, right? And then the written word, and then the thought that they signify, huh? So just as if I stutter when I speak, I can't quite say clearly with the spoken word, so my mind stutters, I can't quite say, what, clearly what I'm trying to say, huh? Can't quite do this. So by stuttering, in a sense, we resonate the high things in God, huh? Okay? And he says, what is not made properly cannot be said to be perfect. If you look at the original word, huh? But because in those things which come to be, then something is said to be perfect, right? To be made when it has been, what? Led out from ability into, what, act, huh? Then the, what, name perfect is trans-sumiter, huh? Sumiter means what? Taken, yeah, and then trans-across, huh? Carried over in a sense, right, huh? To signifying everything to which is not lacking to be an act, right? Whether it has this by way of being made or not, right, huh? In the case of God, without, huh? Okay? So, we name things as we, what, know them, right? And the things we know, at first, anyway, are the material things, right? And especially the artificial things, right? And they're perfect after they've been, what, made. Yeah, so that's where we get the word. But then we drop the idea of made and just keep the aspect of it being actual, right? And then we have this broader sense, huh? This trans-sumptio, huh? Okay? So, it doesn't bring in explicitly, but it could at this point. They're distinguishing the etymology of the word, right, huh? And the meaning of the word, right? I think, I'm trying to think now. I think the Greek word would be for teleos, for perfect, huh? And it's more related to the word for end, huh? And I believe that's one used in the New Testament, too, when you say, be ye perfect as your heavenly thought is perfect. I mean, the Latin text would have perfectus, but the Greek would have, I think, teleos, huh? The idea that something is perfect that's reached its end, huh? Of course, God doesn't have to reach his end, but he is the end of all things. So, he's in a little different sense, perfect. Okay? Now, the second one, huh, is arguing that the beginning of things is what? Yeah. So, second, it should be said that the material beginning, which is with us, is found to be imperfect, right? But it's not simply first, right? But it's preceded by another, what? Perfect, huh? Okay, now that's the kind of thing with the word perfect and imperfect, the distinction that we were talking about earlier between ability and act, right? That simply act is before ability, although the thing that goes from ability to act, that thing is an ability before it's inact, huh? So, the thing that is gradually perfected, it's imperfect before it's perfect, but it goes from imperfect to perfect by reason of something already perfect or inact. For the seed, although it is the beginning of the animal generated from seed, nevertheless, it has before itself an animal or plant, whence it is, what, cut off from, huh? For it's necessary that before that which is an ability, there be something inact. For being in ability is not reduced to act, except through some being already inact. That's what Aristotle taught us in the ninth book of wisdom, huh? So, which came first, the chicken or the egg? I said, that it settles it, saying it's not all go to Thomas, you know? Well, no, you go to the ninth book of wisdom, see? The ninth book of wisdom. Because there you realize that in some way, the egg is before the chicken. But simply, the chicken is before the egg. And you could add, want to, simply the chicken or something even more perfect to the chicken is before the egg, right? So, that's the answer to that question is deep wisdom, right? The ninth book. But so you got to go back to Aristotle, huh? You see? I told you about the dinner in honor of Charles DeConnick and Jacques de Molion. Yeah. Huh? Remember that? So these two guys had taught at Laval for, I don't know, 23 years or whatever the years were. So they had this dinner kind of honoring the two of them because they had come at the same time and so on. And Jacques de Molion and DeConnick, after all these praises and so on, they were asked, you know, to say a few words. So de Molion spoke first and he says, he thanked everybody very collectively and so on for all the nice things he said about them. But he said, you should not have been praising me, you should have been praising Thomas. And then DeConnick had his chance and he said, well, you should not have been praising Thomas, you should have been praising Aristotle. You know, you're quite right, see? And so one of the forms of pride is to say that you, what, have something that, an excellence that you don't have. But another form of pride is, well, you might have a certain excellence, but to say you had it from yourself when you actually had it from somebody else, right? And so did it come from Thomas, actually? Or did he get it from Aristotle? But like Cajetan says, St. Thomas so reverenced the fathers of the church that he seemed to have inherited the mind of all of them. You see something like that about Aristotle, he so reverenced the minds of Plato and those before him that he seems to have inherited all their understanding, but not all their ears. But his own mind was developed by rejecting some of their, refuting some of their mistakes. Now, the third one, objection is a little different, saying that God is being itself, but being is most general, and what's most general is most indistinct, yeah, least formed, and so on. Now, Thomas says, to the third it should be said that ipsumessia, to be itself, is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all other things as act. For nothing has actuality except insofar as it is, right? Whence to be itself is the actuality of all things, and also even of forms themselves. Whence it is not compared to others as the one receiving to the received, but more as the received is to the one receiving, and therefore his act is to ability, like you were saying before. For when I say the to be of man, or of the horse, or of anything else, the existence of man, or of the horse, or anything else, the to be itself, the existence, is considered as what? Formal, right? And received. Not over as that to which it belongs to what? To be, right? So to be is the most actual of all things, huh? So God being, I am who I am, right? He's the most actual of all things. It could be more actual than that. Okay? It's a subtle thing, right? Okay? So it's not like a genus then, is it? Actually, when you contract, as we say, being, you know, it's not as if you're contracting a genus by differences, as if you have different kinds of being, but different natures partake of being in a different way, huh? According to their own nature, huh? They're going to partake of being more or less fully, huh? Okay? It's the being which is most actual, and the other things are receiving that. Second question, to the second one, proceeds thus. It seems that in God there are not the perfections of all things. The scripture of God says to, I think, as Moses and Abraham, both of them, I think, I will show you every good. And Thomas says, that is myself. It seems that in God there are not the perfections of all things. For God is simple, as has been shown, right? But the perfections of things are many and diverse and other, right? Therefore, in God there are not all the perfections of things. That's a good objection, right? Moreover, opposites are not able to be in the same thing. But the perfections of things are opposites. For each species, each particular kind of thing is perfected by its own species-making difference. But the differences by which a genus is divided and the species are constituted are opposed. Since they are for opposed things, not able to be at the same time in the same thing, it seems that not all perfections of things can be in God. How can you have the perfection of a man and the perfection of a woman? St. Francis de Sales is correct. And Paul VI quoted him with approval when he made St. Therese of Avila a doctor of the church, right? But he said that the woman has more capacity to love than the man does. That's kind of interesting, huh? And so you read St. Francis de Sales and even St. Alphonsus and so on, they talk about love. Then we're at the take an example from a female saint in trying to talk about love. But then the greatest theologians in terms of faith seeking understanding and faith acquiring understanding are people like Augustine and Thomas and so on. There's no woman like that. So it seems that the man has more capacity to understand than the woman does. But the woman has more capacity to love, right? So how can God have both of those perfections, right? Being a simple thing. There seems to be a little opposition between the way love and knowing go, right? And there's a little contrariety, so to speak, between love and knowing. Because knowing you're trying to get, what, something into your head, right? And then loving you're trying to get your heart into the thing that you love. So they seem to work almost in a contrary way, you see. So how can you put these opposite perfections in God, huh? Because they seem to one exclude the other, right? And thus it does. Moreover, living is more perfect than being. I remember one time, you know how it became kind of popular in philosophical conferences, talk about being, talk about being, you know. The iconic I read, Charles de Cahang, saying, he's got in my law essay, The Boredom of Being. You know, for creation, all this talk about being, you know. Just being doesn't seem to interest you, right? So being alive is more perfect than just being, okay? And being wise is even better than just being alive, huh? Therefore, to live is more perfect than to be, and to be wise than to live. But the essence of God is to be itself, right? Therefore, it does not have in itself the perfection of life and wisdom, huh? And all these other, what, perfections, huh? That's a nice interjection, right? Okay. But against all this is what Dionysius says in the fifth chapter about the divine names. That God, right, in something one, right, has all existing things. He prayed of it. He has beforehand, right? Okay. So everything that's going to be in all these existing things, every perfection, is had before by God, huh? Okay. Now, answer. It should be said that in God are the perfections of all things, huh? That's what things are about God during the Pity Vision. He'll be omni and omnibus. He'll be all things and all, right? It's kind of interesting to me to think about that in terms of this here. Here, whence he is said to be, what, universally perfect, okay? Because there is not lacking to him any nobility, right, any perfection, which is found in any genus or kind of thing. Now, we saw before in the simplicity that God is not in any genus, right? Everything else is in one kind of thing. And it has maybe the perfection of that kind of thing, but that's the element of his perfection, right? But God's perfection is not tied to any one kind of thing, huh? He's universally perfected. It's every perfection. And notice, huh? As says the commentator on the fifth book of Aristotle. Now, you'll find that same thing. The commentator refers to what? The veroes, right? The veroes is common in almost everything Aristotle wrote, right? So he was known in the Middle Ages as the commentator, although I think Thomas has a greater title to that. He is the commentator, in my opinion. But one guy could, you know, because he understands Aristotle better than the commentator does. The veroes, huh? And if you ever read Thomas' Ununity of the Intellect against the veroes, right? You know, he goes through and refutes all their arguments and shows the truth and so on. And then he says, but because they rest also in the authority of Aristotle, he goes through and shows, you know, that doesn't fit the text of Aristotle, right? And the Latin says, and Thomas has a little bit of wonder at the end there, quam limitere erron, huh? How lightly and loosely they err, huh? They make a mistake, huh? You know? So, but yet, you know, the commentator sees this in the chapter on perfection there, huh? Where Aristotle distinguishes the kind of perfection that the creature can have against perfection in the sense which God is perfect. And he sees that God is perfect in a quite different way. And it's the idea of universally perfect, huh? So it's interesting that veroes sees that in the text of Aristotle and correct it to. And Thomas will point it out when he comments on the fifth book, huh? But you have to admire Aristotle for seeing that, right? Mm-hmm. And again, what kind of distinction is that really between the way in which God is perfect and the way in which everything else that can be called perfect is perfect? What kind of distinction is that? Oh, I mean, sir. What? I mean, sir. Well. I don't know if it's simply in a certain way. Yeah, yeah. And it strikes me often that comes up, that kind of distinction, and people don't see it, right? Because it came up when we were talking about act and ability just a minute ago, right? And that's kind of the crucial thing to see in the third part of the ninth book of wisdom, right? Where Aristotle is comparing act and ability, which is before, right? And when it comes to definition and so on, and ability, act is clearly before ability. When it comes to goodness, you know, and perfection, act is before ability. But then he says in time, in one way, ability is before act, but simply act is before ability. Because the thing that goes from ability to act is an ability before it's an act, but it goes from ability to act, as we said, because it's something already an act, so simply. So, that's really the basis for understanding the mistake about the first cause, huh? The mistake about the first cause, the most common mistake, is that the first cause is... is the first matter, right? That's the first cause, you know? And what kind of mistake is that? Well, it's a mistake of simply and not simply, right? But that's also the kind of mistake we make in the beginning, huh? You talk about the natural road, huh? That what is more known to us is not more known. Okay? And when you read the Mino, well, the fundamental mistake that would make logic impossible is the same kind of mistake, the Mino makes there. And when you get down to the private roads, it's the same kind of mistake because they want to proceed everywhere geometrically because that's the best way of proceeding. But it's not the best way for other sciences. Okay? So the best way of proceeding, the most rigorous way of proceeding and so on, is not the best way of proceeding natural philosophy. So that's, again, that same kind of distinction. And it's like the distinction Aristotle makes in politics, right? Where he says, the best government is not always the best government for this people. Okay? So it's best simply, but not for this people. Okay? Okay? And what about perfect here, right? You see? Um, you could say God is perfect. No confirmation. What about Mozart? Well, he's a perfect musician. You know? Not perfect simply. He's lacking in nothing, Mozart. No, that's not true. See? He's lacking in nothing that a human musician should have. Or Homer is the perfect poet. Or Aristotle is the perfect philosopher, right? Okay? But he's not perfect, period. Not perfect simply without qualification. That's the way God is, right? You know? So that kind of distinction comes up a lot. And to some extent, maybe that's why, you know, when they speak to Christ there, you know, and they call him good, you know, and he says, don't call me good. God alone is good, right? Well, on the way, maybe he means what? Without qualification. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Because being good would follow upon being perfect. So God alone is simply perfect. Without qualification, he's perfect. And therefore, he alone is good, right? Okay? It's kind of interesting the way Aristotle touches upon that distinction there in the description of wisdom and the wise man. The first attribute of wisdom or the wise man is that he knows all things. Okay? Aristotle says, the wise man knows all things in some way. Because he knows that which is said of all things, right? Okay? And if you know the difference between something and nothing, in a way, you know everything. Because everything is something, right? Does that have to know everything simply and without qualification? No. No. No. I don't think so. See? And so later on, when he gets to the kind of knowledge wisdom is, right, the culmination there is that it's the knowledge of God, right? Meaning that it's the knowledge which is about God and the knowledge which God, most of all, would have, right? Only God would fully have. So God is the only one who knows all things, simply and without qualification. No man, not even a wise man, knows all things except in a very qualified way. Because he knows that which is said of all things, right? Being and one and so on. But that's to know in a very imperfect way, qualified way, right? It's the way in which you know every man in the world and you know what a man is. But I don't know every man in the world, do I? I don't think so. I mean, I do want to qualify that a lot, right? You know? You know? I know everything that's knowable, right? Some way. Because it's knowable, right? To be knowable instead of everything that's knowable, right? So everything that's knowable is knowable. And I know what knowable means, so. Sometimes I know everything, you know. You always get some wise kid in class, you know, and you try to explain this to them. Oh, that's wonderful. I'm told by dad I know everything, you know. He's that crazy professor up there. That's all he's doing. But now you know everything. Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha It's really proposal one. What he proposes to prove, right? Okay. It's not potassies, which is a great proposition, but pothesies. Okay. Or it's a proposition in the sense in which a man said a proposition to a woman, right? Okay. It's not a proposition in the sense of a statement, huh? Okay. So propose it to prove now, right? Then he goes through and proves it. Okay. I know it's going to be two different ways of showing this, right? First, through the fact that whatever a perfection is found in the effect, right? It necessarily is found in the, what? Efficient cause, the making cause, huh? Either according to the same, what? Ratio. If it be an equivocal agent, right? Like when dogs generate a dog, right? Or cats generate a cat, or men generate a man, and so on. Or it's got to be found in a more, what? Eminently, right? If it be an equivocal agent, right? And taking the old example. As in the sun is a likeness of all things which are generated through the power of the, what? Sun. Sun. Okay. Okay. Is manifest, for it's manifest that the effect pre-exists in the, what? Virtue, in the power, right? In the agent cause, huh? Okay. But to pre-exist in the power of the agent cause is not to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, like it would be to exist in matter, right? But in a more perfect way, huh? Although to pre-exist in the ability of the material cause is to pre-exist in a, what? Yeah. Yeah. In that matter, as such, is imperfect, huh? The agent, however, as such, is, what? Perfect. Since, therefore, God is the first efficient cause, making cause of things, is necessary that the perfections of all things pre-exist in God in a more, what? Eminent way, right? And this reason is touched upon by Dionysius, huh? In the fifth chapter of the Divine Names, saying that, right, God is not, what? Not that. But he's all things, right? In what sense? And not that he's composed of all things, right? But as the simple cause of all things, huh? Okay? That's one way that he shows that God is universally perfect, right? That in the efficient cause has to exist, right? In a perfect way, everything that's going to be found later on in the effect, right? Very perfection. So God is the first cause of all things, so he must have within himself, in a more perfect and eminent way, the perfections of all things, huh? Mm-hmm. The second argument is going to be taken from him being Ipsomessi, right?