Prima Pars
Lecture 24: God's Perfection and the Likeness of Creatures to God

Transcript
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And that second reason, you could say, then depends upon what was shown in the question on the simplicity of God. The first argument is taken from things that were shown in the question on the existence of God, right? That he's the first deficient cause, right? But the second one depends upon simplicity. So I notice in both Summas and in the Summa, in the compendium of theology, he takes up the simplicity of God before the perfection, right? So there's some, you know, first shall be last, shall be first, there's some, you know, things that are before in one and after in others, right? But in all three of them, the simplicity of God is considered before the, what, perfection of God, right? And one reason why that makes sense is because you're going to argue from God being, what, ipsa mesi, right? From there being no distinction between the substance of God and to be, right? Okay? I think that's what he's been arguing. I've seen him arguing that way before. Okay. Secondly, from what has been shown above, and that's referring back to the, what, previous, right, question, the fourth article, okay? That God is, what, to be itself, right? Subsisting by itself, through itself, right? Okay. From which it is necessary that he contains in himself the whole perfection of, what? Being, yeah. Yeah. For it's manifest that if something hot does not have the whole perfection of hot, this is because heat is not partaken according to its perfect notion, huh? But if heat would subsist by itself, huh? There could not be lacking to it anything of the power of, what? Heat, huh? Okay. So heat is that by which the hot is hot, right? Mm-hmm. So if something was heat itself, it'd be lacking in nothing whereby the hot is hot, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Well, that's the way God is not with regard to heat but with regard to to be, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So nothing that something has through in some way partaking of being is going to be lacking to God because he's to be itself. Mm-hmm. So you're going to have perfection that anything else has by its partial way of being, its contracted way of being. So God is being, being all that being could possibly be. Yeah. Okay. Whence, since God is, what? To be itself subsisting, right? Nothing of the perfection of being is able to be, what? Lacking to him. But perfections of all things pertain to the perfection of being. For by this, some things are perfect that in some way they have, what? To be. Okay? So as Thomas will say, you know, you would not be perfect through wisdom, right? Unless through wisdom you could be said to be wise. Mm-hmm. Okay? So you can't even be perfect except through, what? Partaking of to be in some way. But God is to be itself, right? Mm-hmm. So he contains in a simple way the perfections of all things that they have through being in some particular way. Whence it follows that the perfection of no thing is lacking to God. and this reason is touched upon by Dionysius. He's a pretty important guy who's Dionysius, isn't he? Thomas says there in his thing on the, you know, that he falls short of Dionysius, right? And it's kind of interesting because I guess Thomas was like the Middle Evils thought that Dionysius was what? Dionysius the Arphagite who was converted by St. Paul, right? So you've got things from Dionysius you're getting from the horse's mouth, right? You know, this guy's close to St. Paul, right? And it was Gregory the Great who brought Dionysius' works back, I think, from Constantinople to the medieval world. Yeah, yeah. So, but he may not be the Dionysius that St. Paul converted, right? So, but they had great deal of respect for him. And this reason is touched upon by Dionysius in the fifth chapter about the divine names. That God is not, what? In some way existing, right? But some future, right? That's that word that we talked about, huh? The Greek word would be haplos, right? Haplos. And in circumscripte, right? He's not encircled in any way, right? Between the genius. The whole, he takes in himself uniformly, right? He pre-accepts, right? He, okay. And afterwards he subjoins that he is to be to all subsisting things. Okay? So those are the two ways that you, what? See that God is universally perfect, huh? He's the first efficient cause, right? An efficient cause has to contain in an equal or more perfect way, right? Perfections is found in its effects, huh? So since God is the universal cause of all things, he must have their perfections already in himself, right? But in a simple way, huh? And then because God is to be itself, right? Whatever else is perfect by being in some qualified way, right? In some limited way, he must have in a simple way by being being itself. Okay? So, it's quite a perfection in the yes, huh? Now, let's go back to the objections here. The first objection, huh? That God is simple, right? But the affections of all things are many and diverse. Okay? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the Son, as Dionysius says in the fifth chapter about the divine names, it being one, loose existing, right? And uniformly shining, right? In itself, uniformly, right? Takes beforehand, right? The many and different qualities and substances of sensible things, huh? It contains them all. So, much more in the cause of all things, meaning God, I guess, is necessary that there pre-exist all things according to a natural union. And thus, the things which are other and opposed in themselves pre-exist as one in God without any, what? detriment to the simplicity, huh? Okay? Okay. So, that's hard for us to understand, right? And Aristotle's talking there about the, about friendship, right? He distinguishes the three kinds of friendship. And one, friendship is the friendship of utility, right? You're useful to me, I'm useful to you, right? You know, we trade information and so on. Okay? And, but our friendship would stop if you ceased to be useful to me, right? Okay? And they compared the friendships among nations to that, right? So, in the wars with Germany there, France is useful to England, right? But in the war with Napoleon, Germany is useful to England, right? Okay? They change, huh? And then you have the friendship of what? Pleasure, right? I enjoy your company and so on. But then you have the highest kind of friendship which is a friendship based upon what? Virtue, right? Okay? So we're friends because we're both wise and courageous and temperate and so on. And, but, if you're wise and courageous aren't you really more useful to me than the man who's not? Yeah. You know? In time of war, you know, courageous man next to you is useful. And you're trying to learn something, a wise man is useful to you, huh? But, and won't such a person be more pleasant to be with, huh? You see? As Aristotle points out, two bad persons might enjoy each other's company because they're alike in their badness, right? But they're alike in something that is not naturally, what? Pleasing, right? You know? So two cowards, let us say, right? let us say, let us say, let us say, let us say, let us say, uh they're both uh escaping the battle and and fighting and so on but cowardliness is not a quality that is intrinsically pleasing to to possess you see well if you and i are two courageous men right we're alike in something that is naturally pleasing and praiseworthy and so on so we should be more pleasing right well if you and i are a pair of fools right we might enjoy each other's foolishness right you know and screwing up and all this sort of stuff but um folly and foolishness is not intrinsically a pleasing thing in a person huh but two people are wise are wise in qualities that are intrinsically pleasing so they have a reason to enjoy each other's company not only because they like each other but because they like each other in something that is naturally what pleasing rather than like each other in something that is naturally disgusting or or uh displeasing right um so that the the uh true friendship is is uh sister would call it contains that the lower ones though but in a what simpler fuller way right it's kind of a little hint there what they're talking about right okay or we said simple example there you know of the square containing more area right for less perimeter okay that's just kind of a hint you know okay but that's why we want to see god as he is right so we can see uh much better that he's at the same time what completely simple and universally what perfect right okay we're proving here the reason why he must be universally perfect right and before that he's altogether simple but uh we're understanding this more negatively right than understanding it as he is right okay you see so that that tension that difficulty our mind has and and uh combining these two in the same thing right and seeing that the same thing must be both completely simple and what universally perfect huh that's why thomas maybe puts these two together here yeah unlike what he does maybe in some of the other consumers but uh that works but uh because he wants you to to transcend your experience in the material world right where these two don't go together in fact they seem to be almost opposites right yeah what more perfect is but as i said there's that that hint you know little things like i was mentioning how aristotle gives reasons in the book in the poetic art where tragedy is more perfect than what epic epic oh yeah uh but it's simpler than epic too right so you began to see the idea that something could be simpler and yet more what perfect perfect yeah and beautiful words there are saying trees of avala where she says god is altogether simple and the closer one gets to god the simpler one gets huh and you kind of see that in the the same something really very simple people and uh uh i had a girl student this year she's from albania and she's come over about four years ago i guess they were in salem first came up here so i just happened talking to her you know i said well you know that's where mother teresa comes from albania i thought you know about mother teresa but mother teresa is very simple you know when you get to know the woman you know um you know you're kind of looking sometimes you're pretty more complicated than they are right well you know you go to macchiavelli now and advice to the prince and so on right then you realize that bad people are kind of complicated and and just the opposite of the saints right but you see in the in the in the sight there the simplicity and perfection going together right and there's a connection between the fact that as priest of avala says you know god's all together the simpler the closer you get to god the simpler you are but also the more what perfect you are right and uh you know most of us are um kind of distracted by many things and being pulled in many directions and we're kind of complicated all these these needs have to be met like martha there you know you know concerned about many things right and and and uh mary has chosen the better part right and the much simpler thing that she's doing right um my father has still you know business you know maybe a hundred employees and so on you know and uh says we're down on a sunday or something like that and walking through the the company there and all these details and in fact it is a foreign child and we're jolly you know my mother my mother's how do you ever my mother you know my father how do you keep all this in mind you know huh you know and uh of course my father job with three philosophers right three sons but uh he says you're gonna have a better life he says but it's really simpler than life he was needing right you know you see you know and uh you know people kind of may say oh all the things you do you know huh and and uh and uh but that doesn't necessarily bring happiness though you know um so you can see the certain uh perfection and simplicity you know you know i i have in my mind that i read somewhere that thomas is supposed to have said but never gonna find it again that the way to become wise is to be a man of one book and uh obviously thomas read many books but but there's a way in which there are some books that are so important you really have to what nourish yourself on them and uh i guess when charles deconic was a was a student uh someone told him you know some dominican i guess you know the way to become wise is to memorize the sum and there's a little truth to that right you know that uh there's so much in here right now um and you ever see those letters of uh of john paul ii when he was a student at angelicum there's a famous letter there where he's writing to one of his friends and uh he's kind of uh it's in awe there that thomas could write so simply yet be so profound now coming from poland and all these crazy uh things that he'd been introduced to you know before where wisdom goes with complication or is presumed to go with complication and here a man could be much wiser than and the people he's met before but uh yet be very simple in his way he expresses himself you know uh well you see a little bit of of that little likeness to god there right huh in some ways thomas is is much simpler than than hago or or um kant or these guys right but but but much more wise and much more what profound you see and uh i kind of used to say sometimes i'm getting back to the simple understanding of aristotle and thomas huh all this complication of layers of of uh complication that some writers on them pour forth that doesn't really illuminate the text at all so get little flashes of the idea there might be some way of confiding you know the simpler with the perfect huh after um pope benedict the sixteenth went to the cologne yeah there was a little blurb from one of the german papers finally a scholar we can understand yeah yeah yeah especially yeah getting for german for german i think i told you i read the swiss's biography of chairman mao you know and uh i guess uh tried pushing me to get too you know laura bush gave him a copy of it so he's reading so but i mean you know um complicated man this guy you know huh you see and uh you know crafty you know and so on you know but but uh really kind of crazy when you get me down to it and uh what's what you find that the evil men there they have a complication that that uh somebody a saint doesn't have okay and no wiser than i've already known as you know i mean deconic and diana so much simpler really than most people i've met in the economic world but so you know simplicity of profundity right And if you reach Shakespeare's science there, he speaks, you know, even in the science there, he's complaining about various things. One thing he complains about is simple truth is called simplicity. Something to think about. Okay. So, that was the reply to the first objection, I guess. And to that is clearly the reply to the second objection, he says. Okay, which is about how opposites can be combined, huh? It's sort of interesting, you know, talking about the different religious orders. In a way, Dominicans are supposed to imitate St. Dominic, huh? And Franciscans are supposed to imitate St. Francis, huh? And I suppose that's something like that's true for every order, right? Somebody's supposed to imitate. But you're all supposed to imitate, what? Christ, right? You know? But does Dominic and Francis, et cetera, et cetera, they all imitate Christ in exactly the same way, you know? But they have something of him, right? And that's why, you know, but like St. Paul says, you know, be imitators of me as I am of Christ, right? So we imitate Dominic or St. Francis insofar as we imitate Christ. But none of them imitate him fully or completely, you know? So he combines the perfection of Dominic with the perfection of Francis, with the perfection of St. Teresa of Avila and the rest of them. But he's one man. So you see a little bit of that, you know, that same idea, right? That he's a perfect model of Christ, you know? More perfect than Dominic would be or Francis or any of the other founders, right? Now, the third objection is a little bit like the last objection in the previous article, right? Dealing with Esse, right? Esse is not as perfect. To the third should be said, that just as in the same chapter, Dionysius says, that although Ipsum Esse, right, is what? More perfect than life, huh? And life itself than what? Wisdom. If they are considered according as they're distinguished by reason, right? Nevertheless, what is living is more perfect than what is being only, right? Because living also is being, right? And being wise is also being and living, right? Thus, although being does not include in itself living and wise, because it's not necessary that that which partakes of being partakes of it according to its whole, what? Way of being, right? Nevertheless, to be of God includes in itself life and wisdom, because none of the perfections of being are able to be lacking to the one who is, what? To be itself subsisting, right? So one would not have any perfection through life unless through life one was living. And one would have no perfection by wisdom, as I was saying, unless to be wise belonged to me through my wisdom, okay? And to be living belongs to me through my life, huh? So it's only through to be in some way, right? That I am perfect by these things, right? And so if God is to be itself subsisting, then he's going to have the perfections that we all have through being wise or being alive or being courageous or whatever it may be, huh? Okay, so we'll take a little break here before we go on to the third article. Let's see if I can first. Okay, whether any creature, or some creature, is able to be like God, to the third one proceeds thus, it seems that no creature is able to be like God, for it's said in Psalm 85, there's no one like you among the gods, right, Lord, but among creatures, the more excellent ones are called gods by participation, shall be gods, much more, therefore, less would other creatures be able to be said to be like God, moreover, likeness is a certain comparison, but there's no comparison of those things which are a diverse genre, there is any likeness, for you not say that sweetness is like, what, whiteness, but no creature is of the same genus with God, since God is not any genus, as has been shown above, in the simplicity of God, right, this is another reason why these articles come after the simplicity of God, right, okay, therefore, no creature is like God, right, moreover, similar or like are said things that come together in form, but nothing comes together with God in form, for the nature of no thing is to be itself, except in the case of God, therefore, no creature is able to be like God, moreover, in like things, there is a mutual likeness, the like is like what is like it, if therefore some creatures like God, also God will be like some creature, but against this is said in the book of Isaiah, whom do you make what, yeah, or whom do you make God like too, because he's arguing the other way around, yeah, okay, but against this it is said in Genesis 126, let us make man to our image and our, what, likeness, and St. John says in the, that's the famous text there, we see him as he is, right, and when he appears, we will be, what, like him, he goes on to say, for we'll see him as he is, okay, I answer, it should be said, that since likeness is noted according to a coming together or communication form, there is a multiple kinds of likeness, huh, according as there are many ways of coming together or communicating in a form, for some are said to be like which come together in the same form according to the same, what, ratio, huh, according to the same mode, and these are not only said to be like, but to be equal in their likeness, huh, as two things equally white are said to be like and whiteness, and this is the most perfect, what, likeness, huh, okay, in another way things are said to be like, which come together in the form according to the same, ratio, but not according to the same way, but according to more and less, as something less white is said to be like something more white, and this is an imperfect likeness, huh, in a third way, some things are said to be like, which come together in the same form, but not according to the same, ratio, ratio, as is clear in agents that are not univocal, for since every agent makes what is like itself insofar as it is an agent, huh, because it's giving it, what, the act that it already has in some way, um, for each thing acts according to its own form, it is necessary that in the effect there be some likeness of the agent cause, huh, it's not saying to my Mohammedan friend there, right, God made us there must be, because he made us some kind of likeness there, right, if therefore the agent is not contained in the same species with its effect, there will be a likeness between the maker and the maid in form, oh, excuse me, if he is contained, yeah, in the same species with its effect, there will be a likeness between the maker and the maid in form, according to the same, uh, definition of the species, as a man generates a man, if however the agent is not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the same, what, the species, yeah, as those things are generated from the power of the sun, but they will, what, approach to some likeness to the sun, huh, not that they receive the form of the sun, according to the likeness of the species, but according to the likeness of the, what, genus, huh, if therefore there is some agent that is not in the genus, its effects even more, right, will exceed in a remote way to a likeness of the form of the agent, not, however, that they partake a likeness of the form of the agent according to the same notion of the species or the genus, right, but according to some, what, yeah, just as to be itself is common to, what, all things, huh, but not in the same way, and thus, in this way, all things which are from God are assimilated to him insofar as they are beings, huh, assimilated to him as to the first and universal beginning of the whole of, what, being, huh, okay, that's why Thomas there, kind of a passage he has in the De Veritate, where he's talking about the likeness of ratios and talking about the likeness of the creature to God, well, he says, take this here, right, let's say, 1 to 2, okay, now, which is more like a 2, let's say, 4 or 100, 4, 4 is much closer to 2, right, okay, but now if you take the ratios, and you say, 2 to 4, and let's say, 50 to 100, right, is 2 to 4 more like 1 to 2, and 50 is to 100? Not really, no, no, see, so this is kind of a way of bridging the gap, right, by reason of a likeness of, like in the movies there, you know, I think it would stay up. Even Dickens says that, you know, where Joe comes to visit him, you know, Joe's, you know, country bumpkin, right, and he tries to put his hat, you know, on the thing, and it falls off, and then he picks it up again, and it falls off. So this is kind of a way of making things more alike, right, that are further away, right, then? Okay, so he wants to make use of that likeness of, well, it's kind of an analogy, right, analogy as the Greek word for proportion, proportion, you know, proportion got used for a ratio sometimes, but you could use it as the word proportion, or onogeia, in Greek, for a likeness of ratios, and you can kind of compare things that are very far apart, right, like 2 to 100 there, huh? So, the likeness between us and God, huh, forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us, right? So, you know, the servant, you know, who got forgiven, went out and throttled the other servant, right? But, in a sense, what you're saying here is that God will be to you as you are to your neighbor, let's say, right, huh? So you're making a proportion there, right? There's a certain likeness there, right? Some way you're like God, right? When you forgive your neighbor, right, huh? Okay? You know the distance between you and God. God is infinite, huh? There's some likeness there. Now, in Psalm 85 here, who's like God, right? To first, therefore, it should be said, as Dionysius says in the ninth chapter about the divine names, that when sacred scripture says that something is not like God, right, this is not contrary to its having an assimilation of likeness to them, huh? Well, how can this be, huh? Well, the same things are, what? Like God and unlike God, right? Like Him insofar as they imitate Him in some way, right? Insofar as it is possible to imitate Him who is not perfectly, what? Yeah, imitatable, okay? Dissimilar according as they, what? Fall short of the equivocal cause, you could say, right? Okay? Not only according to intensity and emission, like the less white falls short of the more white, huh? But because they are not, what? Coming together, either in the same species, nor even according to the same, what? Genus, right? Okay? So, another man can be like me because he's in the same species, man, right? And the dog or the cat can be like me in some way, right? But in a more remote way, right? But we're being like God is more remote than the dog or the cat being like me. Because at least the dog or the cat is in the same genus as I am, right? But God is not in the same genus as us, right? So, there's a great distance there, huh? And only by analogies, he says. But you can't deny there's some likeness there, right? And Scripture says that we are made to the image and likeness of God, right? But maybe it says to the image and likeness of God to indicate there's a great distance there, huh? But the text from the, I think it's the Fourth Lateran Council, the 1215 one, did not know the likeness between God and the creature without a greater, what? Unlikeness, yeah. That's kind of a key text, you know? Okay. And the second objection was about, what? You can only compare things to the same genus, right? Well, it's not altogether true. But God does not have himself to creatures as things of, what? Diverse genera, okay? Because in a sense, the objection is taking something from this genus and this genus and saying you can't compare them, right? But God is not, what? Yeah, yeah. So, it's not like he's in one genus and we're in another genus, right? He's one kind of thing or another kind of thing, right? But he's like the, what? Origin of every kind of thing. He's going to have a connection with every kind of thing, right? Well, one kind of thing may be more chopped off than another kind of thing, right? And not so comparable, right? But every kind of thing can be compared to the beginning of every kind of thing. And there's a certain ratio there, because God is the beginning of every kind of thing. But it's not any one kind of thing himself. It's not any one in genus, huh? Sometimes I use the word kind instead of genus in English, right? Like I was saying, sui generis, huh? Well, we say one of a kind, huh? Okay. So, God is not in any kind of thing. Like animal or substance or something like that, right? But he's the beginning of every kind of thing, huh? There's no source of every kind of thing. So, he has a connection with every kind of thing. That one kind of thing might not have another kind of thing. See that? Because one kind of thing might not be anywhere source of another kind of thing, right? But God is the source of every kind of thing. So, he has a origin. Go, right? But like the point in the center of the circle, right? You know, in a sense, if you think of all the lines that's going from it to the circumference, it's the origin of all those other points, right? But they're maybe disconnected, right? One from another. So, God does not have himself to creatures as things of other genus, right? Because, but he is as that which is outside every genus, right? And the beginning of every genus, okay? But to speak English, he's the beginning of every kind of thing, okay? But it's that which is the beginning of every kind of thing, no kind of thing? Or, put it this way. Is that which is the beginning of every kind of thing, confined to no kind of thing? He's not confined to any kind of thing, is he? No. Okay. So, would you say God is some kind of thing? So, not kind, as the philosopher understands the genus, right? No, no, no, no. No. He's something. He's something, yeah. Kind. That might limit him, right? To one kind of thing. Included in the room. You see, I'm just one kind of thing, you know? So, is God just one kind of thing? Huh? You know. Now, Thomas would take up the infinity of God after perfection of God, and it seems to me there's some connection between those two. Is God being universally perfect and is it being infinite, huh? It's not being limited in any way. Okay. Now, the third objection. Those things are said to be like which come together in form, but nothing comes together with God in form. For the essence, the nature of no thing is to be itself, except in the case of what? God, God, God alone. Okay. Well, it says, to the third it should be said that there is not said to be a likeness of the creature to God on account of a coming together in form according to the same, what? A notion of a genus or a species, but according to what? Analogy only, right? In so far as God is being through what? Essentially, right? And the others by what? Partaking. Partaking, yeah. Yeah. So, it's not a likeness of one kind of thing, right? Whether by kind you mean genus or species, right? Sometimes in English we'll speak of a genus as being a general kind of thing, right? And then species as a particular kind of thing under that, right? Okay. But God is not in any genus or species, so we don't have that kind of likeness to him, huh? But according to analogy only, huh? The heat itself and the hot. Okay. Okay, the fourth objection. In things that are like, there's a mutual likeness and so on. Well, no, Thomas, there's a distinction here. To the fourth it should be said that though in some way it be conceivable, that the creature is like God, right? In some ways like God, very distantly. Nevertheless, in no way should it be conceivable that God is like the creature. Because, as Dionysius says in the ninth chapter about the divine names, in those things which are one order, there's received a mutual likeness, huh? Not, however, in the cause and the cause. For we say that the image is like the man and not, what? A conversal. Okay, so if you do a painting or a portrait of me, and I... Say, well, that's like Perkos, you know. Would you say Perkos is like that? Because that's being made like it, right? And of course, sometimes Thomas will say, you know, and even less so can you say that God is assimilated to something, right? Okay. But the creature, you could say, is assimilated. The creature is made like God, right? Okay. And likewise, it is able to be said in some way that the creature is like God, not only that God is like the, what, creature. Okay. Of course, you come back and think about that a bit, huh? You know, and something is said metaphorically of God, right? It's primarily in the creature, right? You said the Lord is a rock, right? Well, rock is said properly of this thing that you stuck your foot on out here. But it's said metaphorically of God, right? It's kind of curious, huh, in terms of this likeness, huh? It shows you how distant the likeness that is, huh? In the case of the metaphor. So you're going to say God is like a rock? Because the rock is like God in some way. Most distantly, rock has something of God's solidity. He's unbreakable. Just like that, I guess, with this history of the image and in a certain way a son is the image of the father, I mean the trinity, I mean the natural generation, you wouldn't say of my father, gee, you look like your son. You'd always say it the other way, right? Yeah. Yeah. And so, if it's your word with God, right? That way of speaking him. Let's see. And so, we now know that God is perfect, right? And each university is perfect, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. And now to this he attaches a consideration of the divine goodness, huh? But for the goodness of the teaching, he has a little treatise about the good first, right? Then one seeks, or it's one question about the good, and first about the good in community, right? Secondly, about the goodness of what? God, okay? Now that first consideration is really a consideration that is proper to what? First philosophy, right? And since he's giving a little summary of some of that teaching, right? So, he finds a need to do that, right? Okay. Now, let's just talk a little bit about, the most common things, huh? The most universal things. The distinction of the most universals. Now, to my knowledge, there's a man who succeeded in understanding the distinction of the most universals, huh? And everybody else who's understood anything of it has been influenced by Aristotle, okay? But Aristotle doesn't bring it all together, right? To some extent, Avicenna does. I don't know if I misunderstands the part of it. But Thomas, in the first question, the first article, the first question of the Iveritate, the disputed questions about truth and goodness, he follows, but... Avicenna says, huh? His work, huh? But this is a way to go back to Aristotle, but a few misunderstandings, he'll find out that Avicenna has, huh? Now, I speak of the distinction of the most universals. There's really three distinctions you have to understand, right? One is the distinction of the most universals from each other, okay? Now, at first sight, it might seem a little bit strange that there could be more than one most universal. How can there be more than one most universal? How's that possible, you know? I mean, before you get into it, it seems to be a problem, right? Because notice, as you go up from the less universal to the more universal, you get more and more, what, unity, right? Okay? And they used to call this the tree of porphyry, because he wrote these things, right? Okay? And as you descend from the more universal to the less universal, you get more multiplicity, right? So you start with substance, and that's one. And you say, well, there's material substances and immaterial substances. Okay, now you get two, right? Material substances, you have the living and the, what? Non-living, right? And then you have animals and plants, and then, you know. So you keep on going down, so they call it the tree of porphyry, right? It's like a Christmas tree, right? One time at Laval, there's a Christmas party, you know, they had a little Christmas party with professors and students here at Christmas time, and they gave the life professor a little tree, you know. Call it the tree of porphyry, I don't have a joke, you know. But vice versa, as you're growing up, you're getting more unity, right? So you can't go up any more than the most universal. You expect there to be just one most universal, right? So how can there be more than one most universal? That's kind of strange, right? And when Thomas following Avicenna distinguishes the most universals from each other, he distinguishes six of them, right? Now I can only count to five, you know, because of my hand. And so, sometimes I notice they put two of them together, but, you know. But five or six, you know, that's rather puzzling, isn't it? You think there'd be the maxima unitas there at the top, right? Okay? As I say, the only man I know who knows how to distinguish the most universals from each other is Aristotle, and those people like Avicenna and Thomas who got it from Aristotle, right? And the only guy who got it completely from Aristotle to my knowledge is Thomas. That's one distinction of the most universals, huh? That is the second distinction of the most universals, and that is the distinction of the most universals from the opposites. Okay? Now that's extremely puzzling, too. How can the most universal have an opposite? We do. Yeah, but then if you're dividing them, there's got to be something above them that's more universal than the two of them, right? That are poems, right? You've got virtue and vice, right? and you've got above them habit, right? Okay? And if the most universals have an opposite, well, the one is not set of the other, right? So how do you have a most universal anymore? How can a most universal have an opposite? Because one opposite is not the other opposite, right? Now the third distinction of the most universals is into and the other one is into the other one the other one the other one and the other one and the other one what is immediately below them, right, in the sense of, what, something less universal, right, okay, the distinction of most universals into what they are first divided into, you might say, right, okay, the less universal things, huh, okay, now all of those things, I mean, extremely difficult. Now, let's just look at the first one a little bit, right, okay, distinction of most universals from each other. The most universal that Avicenna and Thomas began from, I guess maybe Aristotle too, is the universal being, right, okay, what could be more universal than that? Everything that could be said to be in any way whatsoever would come under being, right, okay, Now, being here in English might seem, you know, to mean to be or existence, but we're using it more in the sense of what is, right? So if I be, you mean what is, in any way whatsoever, it would seem to be most, what, universal, right, no? But it seems to be tied up with to be in some, right, with existence, right, okay? Now, is there anything in a thing besides its existence, huh? Well, you start with the things that are most known to us. Is the existence of a cat and what a cat is the same thing? And I found out that God, the existence of God and what God is are the same, right? But we know God only through creatures, right? And is that true, that the existence of a dog and what a dog is are the same? And there seem to be different questions, you know, for the logician. Does the cat exist? And what is a cat? Right? That seems to imply that the existence of the cat and what he is is not the same thing, right? Okay. But can there be a cat or anything else that is not what it is? So, the second most universal is thing or something, right? Okay. And thing is getting its distinction from being because it's tied up with what a thing is, right? Or what it is. Here you're thinking of that it is, right? And now what it is, right? Okay. That's why we tend to use the word thing when we talk about what a definition is. The definition we say is speech signifying what a thing is, right? Remember to say what a thing is and what a being is, right? Because, you know, the word thing seems to have a connection with what a thing is, huh? Okay. Now, anything else besides the existence of a thing is what it is? Now, you see, Plato got thinking about numbers, huh? About how numbers are made up of many ones, right? And is everything something one? Okay? Now, there's a little problem here, whether the one that is the beginning of number is the one that everything is, right? Heraclitus says it is wise, and listening not to me, but to reason, to read that all things are one. One way that could be false. You think a dog is a cat, right? But is there a sense in which all things are one? But now, to say that something is a being, or to say that something is a thing, does that mean the same thing as to say it's a one? Or does one have a meaning that is a little different from being and thing? What is the basis of the distinction between one and being and thing? Is it being and thing considered in what actually exists? Let's say, like it's composition, as it exists in reality? Yeah. Maybe you'll see that around when Thomas is showing that every being is one, right? You'll use an either-or argument, right? And he'll say every being, or everything you could say, is either simple or composed, right? Now, a composed thing doesn't exist unless it's put together, right? And that's a kind of unity, right? Okay, unless the parts are unified, huh? So you don't really have a chair if you pull the parts apart. And so if the composed is one, a fortiori, the simple is one, right? So everything that is, is one, right? But notice, one is saying that something is undivided, right? Okay? And so one is adding, or the idea of being or a thing, in negation. Is it adding something real? No. Because this negation is really a being of reason. Okay? And adding something, it's not like you're saying, you know, a white man, or a white is adding something to what a man is, right? Okay? Say, I'm a man. I'm one man. Okay? So, sometimes they say the meaning of one is undivided being, huh? Okay? And so you get to the, a question on the unity of God, God being one, I mean the fifth attribute of God, he's one. You've got to say that he's a being, as well as that he's undivided, right? Right, huh? Okay? Of course, he's indivisive, what he would say, right? Now, in the text, in the beginning of the day, the day you're attacking, he says, these three things are said of a, of everything in itself, right? Right, huh? Okay? Now, the next three are said in comparison to something else. Okay? And the next one is, is again negation, but you're distinct from all the things. Okay? Now, sometimes he runs his two together to say one means both. To say that I'm one man, I think, could mean, not only that my body and soul are together and my other parts, but I'm distinct from all the rest of you guys. You see? Okay? But again, that's involving negation. I'm not you, I'm not you, I'm not this, I'm not that, right? Okay? I'm not anything else. Okay? And of course, in my time, I should take the word, alliquid, and make it, I mean, alluiquid, okay? But let's just say, distinct from, all other things. Thank you. Thank you.