Prima Pars
Lecture 28: Mode, Species, Order, and the Division of Good

Transcript
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Species in order. Sometimes we say, you know, you're doing that in the wrong order. I'm not how you're speaking when you say that, huh? Because you're really being, it's really disorder you're talking about, right? If disorder is called the wrong order, then the bad seems to have order, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Moreover, most species in order are caused from weight, number, and measure, as is clear from the authority induced from Augustine. But not all goods have, what, weight, number, and measure. For Ambrose says in the work on the six days, huh, the six days of creation, right? That the nature of light is not in number, not in weight, and not in measure. It's not created in these things, right? Or it's created not in number, not in weight, not in what? Measure, right? So we've got to deal now with the authority of Ambrose, right? And therefore the ratio of good does not consist in mood, species, and order. So this is unusual to have five objections, right? He's really getting carried away. But again, this is what Augustine says in the book on the nature of the good, huh? These three things, mode, species, and order, are general goods, right? And the things made by God. And where these three are great, there's great goodness, huh? Where they're little, you have little good. Where none, there's no good at all. Which would not be unless the ratio of good consisted of these, right? Therefore, the ratio of good consists in mood, species, and order. Now this question, Eric Muff, there hasn't been a guy called Augustine, I wonder? Huh? Who else speaks his way? Except for the text from Ambrose, they're denying it. But it's in scripture, right? About making things in mood. In number, weight, and measuring way. I answer, it should be said, that each thing is said to be good insofar as it is, what? Perfect. For thus it is, what? Yeah, so he goes back to the idea of being desirable, right? But now he brings in, or recalls, the idea that what is desirable is the perfect, right? So again, there's going to be a syllabus in there, the good is desirable, and what is desirable is the perfect, right? That shows a connection to him now. But that is said to be perfect, to which nothing is lacking according to the, what? It's own perfection. The way of its own perfection, yeah. For since each thing is what it is through its form, the form of her presupposes some things, and some things, what? A necessity followed upon it, right? Thus, that something be perfect and good is necessary both that it have a form, right? And also those things which are, what? Presupposed to it. And those things which, what? All over all this. Yeah, yeah. Could there be a middle without something before and after it? Okay. It's easy to see, of course. But he's saying, if good consists essentially in some form, and there's something that we can show that's supposed to form, right? And something that follows upon it, right? Then good is going to consist in these, what? Three things, right? Okay. I've got to show those things. Now, what is presupposed to any, what? Form, huh? To a form, is, he says, the determination or the, what? How do you translate? He says, commensuratio. Commensuratio. Yeah. But measured with, right? Other principles. Either of the material ones or of the, what? Efficient ones. And this is signified by what? Mode. Once it is said that measure fixes ahead a mode, huh? Okay. Now, it's kind of interesting, you know, when you read, I do sometimes, Aristotle in Greek, and then Thomas in Latin, and then in English, right? And sometimes, the word that you use to translate has more or less the same meaning, but a little different etymology, right? And I noticed this was the word modus when it first came up in, in the, in talking about the, the way of proceeding in a science. Aristotle speaks in, what we call in English, the way of going forward, and the Greek word to use is tropas for, well, tropas. Tropas. Yeah. And then he has the word for going forward, prog, again, or something like that. In Latin, I'll translate that the modus procedende, the mode, the way of going forward. And then, in English, we tend to translate the way of going forward, okay? Now, is the etymology of those three words exactly the same, huh? But tropas in Greek, tropas in Greek, has somewhat a sense of turning, okay? And it's kind of a little bit strange to say, right? But one of my favorite authors there, Washington earlier, in Montaui, right? Montaui is a guy with kind of a poetic turn of mind. Okay? And so, Aristotle will be talking about, you have to have a different turn of mind to go into a different science. Okay? You have to turn your mind a little bit in a different direction. That's kind of interesting, the etymology of that, right? You change your point of view. You say it in English, right? But your angle is a little different, huh? Turn a little different, right? In the Republic, Plato has a kind of interesting way of speaking of the soul. It's as if the soul is turned towards material things, towards sensible things, huh? If you're going to know the immaterial things, you've got to turn your soul away from material things, huh? And, of course, Plato also was aware of the mathematical sciences. And the mathematical sciences are sort of in between natural science and wisdom. It's in between a knowledge of material things and a knowledge of, what? Immaterial things. Because in geometry, you're studying things that are found in the material world, but you're defining them without matter, right? So, it's like I'm looking towards material things, and you want to turn me all around to look towards the immaterial things, which it turned me as we were 90 degrees to look at the mathematical things, right? And then finally turn all the way around, and now you see the immaterial things. Wow. You know? I never looked that way before, right? Okay? It's kind of interesting. This is kind of the sensible image there, right? Mm-hmm. We're kind of aware of that sort of thing in Christian teaching sometimes, right? We have to turn people away from material things a bit, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And I suppose part of Lent is to turn you away. Okay. Okay. somewhat from material things, right? And turn you towards the material world a bit, huh? Now, in English, we use the word way, right? Way doesn't have a sense of turn, does it? No. I suppose way is almost closer to what? To road, huh? The way, the path. Yeah. I notice how we translate the words of our Lord. We say, I am, usually quoted, I am the way, the truth, and the life. Okay? But the Greek word is hodas. I am the road. It is very concrete, right? In Latin, they'll say what? Not modus, but via, which is the Latin word for road, huh? And they'll translate hodas in Greek a lot, like in Aristotle, but translated by via. Like in the beginning of the physics, Aristotle speaks of the hodas, the inborn road. And they use the word via in Latin, huh? Okay? So way can be, it's not quite as concrete as road, but you can have that sense, right? To put it into that. And what does modus have, huh? What does the word modus have? Well, I guess the idea of modus is almost that of size. Okay? So you talk about getting the way of proceeding that fits. The subject matter, right? It's like getting a pair of shoes that fits your foot, huh? This pair of shoes doesn't fit my foot. I'm going to get a pinched foot, right? You get the wrong way of proceeding, you're going to get a pinched view of the subject, right? Or a lucy of the subject or something, right? So, you may have seen Thomas back in the beginning of the country, in the Psalms, was it, where he uses the word modai, huh? Modai. Different modai in scripture, right? Okay? So that in the historical books of scripture, you might use the modus narrativos, you know? And, but there's a lot of difference in them, right? So, modus keeps that connection with the word measure, huh? You're kind of measured by the subject, huh? By way, he suggests more about the road to this subject and not the road to that subject, right? Taking a different road when you go in this science and go on that road, right? But the Greek word has a sense of kind of turning the mind, right? In a certain direction, huh? So what is presupposed to the four? The determination or the, what? Commensuration, right? Of the principles. Either material ones or efficient ones. And this is signified by mode. Once it is said that measure fixes ahead of time mode. But the form is signified by, what? Species, huh? Now, in Greek, that word would be aidas, huh? Any other form. Because through its form, each thing is constituted in species. And in account of this, it is said that number gives, what? Species. Yeah. Because definitions signifying the species are as numbers, according to the philosopher, that's Aristotle, in the eighth book of the, what? Metaphysics. For just, and this is, well, I like this as Aristotle sees. For just as a unit, added or subtracted, changes the species of number. So, likewise in definition. A difference added or subtracted, right? Okay. So, it's like, it's like almost to say that the stone is one, and the, what? Plant is two, because it's body plus life, right? And the animal, the beast, I'd say, is three, a body plus life plus sensation, and the man is four. Right? And if you take away from man reason, you have anything but a beast, you take away from a beast sensation, anything but a plant, anything but life, you've got just a body, right? Okay? So, there are numbers, right? And what like this Aristotle sees is that, you know, you add or subtract the one, you add or subtract the difference, you seem to have a different thing, huh? Okay? Another like this he sees is that they're not divisible forever, right? Okay? Another like this he sees that, they're not more or less, you know? You see? So, this four is not more or less four than the other four, you know? Okay? So, you may like to say Aristotle sees, but to form or upon form, there follows inclination to the end, right? It is some action or to something of this sort, because each thing, insofar as it is an act, acts, right? And tends in that which is, what? Suitable to it according to its form. And to this pertains, what? Weight in the text of the scripture, right? Or order in Augustine's text, right? Whence the ratio of good, according as it consists in perfection, consists in mode, species, and what? Whatever. Order, right? Okay? Now, the first objection said, huh? That these three things do not follow upon being, except insofar as it is, what? Perfect, right? And according to this, it is, what? Good, right? Okay? The first objection was saying that, hey, God made all things in, what? number, order, and measure, right? And Thomas says, okay, that's true, but it's followed upon being, insofar as it's perfect, and insofar as it's perfect, it's good, right? Okay? But you have to remember that being is in the idea of the good, huh? Okay? Now, the second objection is saying, you're going to go on forever. Yeah. Okay? The second should be said that mode, species, and order in that way are called good as they are called beings, right? Not because they themselves are subsisting, right? But they are said to be because by them other things are beings and good. Whence is not necessary that they have some other things by which they are good. For they are not thus said to be good, as if they are good formally by other things, but because by them formally, other things are good. Just as whiteness, huh? Is not said to be being, because by it something is, but because by it something is in some way, namely what? White. White, huh? And you see a little bit of the idea there, right? I mean, suppose I said, take a super example here, you see, the body is healthy. Now, the body is healthy by what? Health. Yeah. So, by health, the body is healthy. Now, would you say that the, what? That health itself is healthy? No. Because if you said that health itself is healthy, then you have to have another health, by which health itself is healthy, right? Mm-hmm. And then we ask the same question about that health, is it healthy? And if there's just much reason to say it's healthy, too. And then it's healthy by other health, right? You know? Okay? Now, good is not exactly like that, because there's a way that you can say that the goodness of a thing, right, is good, right? Mm-hmm. because the universe ...the idea of good, but it's not good in the way that the good is said to be good, right? Goodness is good because by something is good, not because it itself is good, but because by something is good, right? Okay? So I might be just by my virtue of justice, right? If I have that virtue, right? But is my virtue of justice just? No. No. Is my virtue of justice good? Yeah. Am I good by it? Yeah. But notice, justice is that by which I am good, right? But justice is not good in that sense, that it's good by some goodness itself. But it's what? That by which something else is good. Okay? So it's good in a different sense. And so the man who wants to have mode, species, and order be good in the same way as that which is good by them, is misunderstanding the way in which they would be said to be good. Is that clear as mud? Well, they're good because something else is good than I am. Yeah. They're said to be good there from a different way, right? Okay. So it would be like, you know, if you say that the creature is not his own existence, right? Okay? Okay? So the creature is what is, and the existence of the creature is that by which he is. Now, some might say, but does his existence exist? Right? And want to reduce, you know, that it exists by another existence, right? Well, does the existence of the creature exist in the way the creature does? No. Because the creature is what exists, and the existence of the creature is not what exists, but that by which what exists does exist, right? And so you're trying to, in a sense, make the existence of the creature a subsisting existing thing, just like the creature is. And then you've got this infinite regress, right? Okay? So, that might catch a lot, but you ain't going to catch St. Thomas. Okay. So the second, it should be said that mode, species, and order, in that way are called good, just as they are called beings, right? Not because they themselves are, as it were, subsisting, right? But because by them other things are, both good and beings, right? Whence it is not necessary that they have some other things by which they are good. For they are not vested to be good, as if, what? They were good formally by something else, right? But because by them, formally, other things are good. Just as whiteness is not said to be being because it is by something, but because something else is by it, in some way, huh? Namely, the, what? The white, huh? Okay? Now, the third objection, huh? Moreover, the bad is a lack of mode and species and order. But the bad does not entirely take away the good. Therefore, the notion of good does not consist in mode, species, and, what? Order, right, huh? He says, to the third, it should be said that every existence, every being, is according to some, what? For, whence, according to every being or thing, there follows upon it mode, species, and order, right? Just as man has species, mode, and order, insofar as he's a man. But likewise, insofar as he's white. He has likewise a mode, a species, and an order, right? And insofar as he's all the things which are, what? Said of him, right? But the bad deprives us of a certain being, right? As blindness deprives us of the being of sight. Once it does not take away every mode, species, and order, but only the mode, species, and order, which follow upon, what? The being of sight. Okay? So I'm said to be good in some way by my, in my substance, right? I'm said to be good simply by reason of certain accidents added to me, right? But both in my substance and in my accidents, each of them have their own, what? Mode, species, and order. So just as the evil takes away one good, but leaves another good, so it takes away one mode, species, and order, but leaves another one, and the other good that it leaves behind, right? Okay? Even the devils there, the nature of the devils is good, huh? And has mode, species, and order, but they're lacking some other mode, species, and order, right? On the fourth one, that in which consists the notion of good cannot be called bad, but there is said to be a bad mode, a bad species, a bad what? Order, right? Okay? To the fourth, it should be said, that as Augustine says in the book on the nature of the good, every mode, insofar as it is a mode, is good, and the same is able to be said as species, and order. But a bad mode, or a bad species, or a bad order, they are said because they are less than they ought to be, right? Or because they are not accommodated or suitable to the things to which they are accommodated, right? And thus, they are called bad because they are alien and in, what? Congruous, huh? Not fitting, huh? Now, the last objection was the one from Ambrose, right? About the nature of light. It gave the modern physicists a lot of problems, too, the nature of light, ways of particles. The nature of light is said to be without number, and weight, and measure, not simply, but in comparison to the, what? The bodily things, right? Okay. Now, it's interesting, even, you know, the famous book by Louis de Broglie, the collection of his papers, the father of wave mechanics, the name of the book is Matter and Light, by Montierre and La Lumière. So, you kind of contrast light with matter, even though light, in the understand business, is still some kind of material, right? Photons and particles. But it's not as gross as most matter, right? So, you make a contrast between matter and light. And until the 20th century, they were very much distinct, because light seemed to be traveling in waves, and matter and full particles, right? Then it got more complicated, because they discovered a hyper aspect of light and a wave aspect of matter, but... Because the power of light extends to all, what? Bodily things. And so, as far as it is the active quality of the first body that alters other bodies, namely the, what? Heaven, right? That's kind of a relative comparison. Take a little break here now? Sure. If I do the other, last article in this one, next, after a little break, okay? Now this second division here is going to be more a, what, division of universal into less universal, right? More so, but not terribly. To six one proceeds thus, it seems that the good is not suitably divided into the anestum. Now it's hard to know how to exactly translate the anestum. Kind of translated as the honorable, right, or the noble or something. They do both of those translations, but the useful and the, what, pleasant. For the good, as the philosopher says in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, is divided by the ten, what, predicaments, the ten categories, huh? But the anestum, the honorable, the noble, the useful, and the pleasant, are able to be found in one category. Therefore they are not, what, suitably divided to these, huh? Moreover, every division is by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposed. For the honorable are delightful, and nothing dishonorable is useful. Which would nevertheless be so if the division were, what, two opposites, huh? So that the honest and the, or the honorable and the useful were opposed. As Tullius, or Cicero, right, says in his book about duties, huh? Therefore the force of division is not suitable. Moreover, where one is an account of another, there there is one only. But the useful is not good except an account of the pleasant or the honorable. Therefore it ought not to be divided against the, what, pleasant and the honorable. But against this is Ambrose, in the book about, what, duties, right? Uses this division of the good, huh? So he's influenced here by Augustine and now by this guy, what, Ambrose, right? Who are the great doctors of the Western Church? Ambrose, Gosselin, Gregory III, Gregory III. And Jerome. Oh, okay. Right? I think so. Yeah, so it says he had Leo, so does he have Leo, but, okay, but, so Ambrose is somebody, huh? Yeah, sure. I answer it should be said that this division properly seems to be a division of human good, right? Okay. But maybe it can be understood more broadly, too. He's going to go on to say. Oh, yeah. If, however, we consider in a higher way, in a more general way, the notion of good, this division properly belongs to the good as it is, what? Good, right? Okay. For the good is something insofar as it is, what? Desirable, right? And insofar as it is the end or the term, the limit of the motion of, what? Appetite. Desire. Which termination of motion can be considered from the consideration of the, what? Natural motion of a body or the motion of a natural body, let's put it that way. For the motion of a natural body is, what? What? Terminated or ended simply to the last, huh? In some way, however, to the, what? Middle. Middle. To which one goes to the last, huh? Which terminates the motion. And it's said to be the, what? Limit or the end of the motion, right? Insofar as it terminates or ends some part of the motion. But that which is the ultimate term of the motion can be taken in, what? Two ways. Either the thing itself to which one tends, as for example the place or the form, or the rest in that thing, right? Thus, therefore, in the motion of desire, that which is desirable as limiting the motion of desire in some way, as the middle to which one tends to another, is called the, what? Useful. But that which is desired as last, terminating the whole motion of the desire, as a thing towards which desire as such tends, is called the, what? Anestum. Anestum, right? Yeah. The end, yeah. Because the utility is more like a means, right? Amen. Because the good is said, what is desired to itself or by itself, right? But the utility is desired for the sake of getting to the end, right? Yeah. Okay. So my goal is to get into this, to be here in this room, right? But to some extent my goal was, what? To come through the door. Mm-hmm. But I came through the door in order to be fully within here eventually, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? And then I just sit here and rest and do nothing. Mm-hmm. Okay? Okay. But that which limits or ends the motion of the appetite as rest in the thing desired is called, what? The elatatio. Pleasure, yeah. It's a kind of rest of the heart, huh? Yeah. So desire is like, what? Motion. And pleasure is like, more like, what? Rest, huh? It reminds me a little bit of Thomas' explanation of the metaphor there in the commentary on the Psalms. Have you seen that? Sweet. Yeah, yeah. And he says sweet can mean what? There's three likenesses there. It's pleasant, right? And then it's what? Restful, right? And then it's what? Refreshing, right? Okay. So restful is what's being hit upon here, right? It's being characteristic, a little bit of pleasure, right? Mm-hmm. Or you speak, you know, of a girl, a sight for sore eyes, right? Something refreshing about the beautiful, right? When I was in college, I used to go to this little reading room there, which is, I guess, we didn't manage into the library, but it's kind of separate from it. But he has a kind of interesting, you know, famous painting there on the wall, right? So you could sit reading your lots of texture, you know, and then you look up and you kind of look at that painting. It's kind of, what? Refreshing to look at, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. So, but you know, when the kid's all upset there and they can't find the parents and they give the kid an ice cream cone, they quiet him down, right? So the pleasant thing. It's the work. Puts you to rest, yeah. Yeah. And I just got it, you know, going across country to get a few little kids in the back seat there and they're driving me crazy once in a while. So what I did was I, before we took off, I got like three candies, right, you know? Mm-hmm. And I put them in a little bag and still zipped it up. And then I put it in a bigger bag and I ate several of those, right? So when you couldn't stand the noise in the back seat anymore, times where daddy treats, you pull out one of these things and you pass it back and each get one of these things and they share it and so on. They talk and they're very content, you know, for half an hour, an hour and, you know, and then you go on until the next break down. Hope you're getting to the motel and you pull in the pool, you know, and you get there. Yeah. Okay. Now, the first one's about this strange distinction Aristotle makes of good according to the, what, categories, right? Okay. So you can speak of good in all ten categories. He says, To the first, therefore, it should be said that the good insofar as it is the same and subject with being is divided by the ten, what, categories, right? But according to its own definition, right, this division fits it, right? And that's something, I think, that's not too hard to see, right? The division of one is much closer to the division of categories, huh? Because Aristotle, you know, in one place, when he divides particular meanings of one, like same, equal, like. Well, same one in substance, equal one in quantity. Like, one, and what? Quality, right? But one is very close to being, right? And that's why in the fourth book of wisdom, Aristotle says the subject of wisdom is being and the one. And that's the way the books on the subject are divided, right? Books seven and eight to nine are on being, and book ten on the one. And consideration of good and true and so on follows from that, but the fundamental consideration is being and the one. And their divisions are much more similar. When you first divide the meanings of one, it's being per se, being pratchi-dense, being per se, being pratchi-dense, and then I go on from there. But the good, if you take the definition of the good as desirable, right, being, then this division fits the division of the desirable, right? It's either desirable as an end, or as the means to an end, right? Or as what? The rest in the end. The rest in the end. Resting in the end, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Can you think that would same like and what is it? The third interior and same? Same, equal, and like, yeah. Same, equal, and like. Yeah, yeah. And it's related to... Substance, quantity, and quality, yeah. Substance. Yeah. That's the distinction of meanings of one and corresponds more really to the distinctions of being in the categories. But substance, quantity, and quality are different meanings of good as such, huh? Don't seem to be a division or distinction of the desirable as such, right? See? What is primarily desirable is the end, right? Mm-hmm. But then to rest in the end, right, is desirable, right? Mm-hmm. And in essence, the desirable is what it means to the end. So, you know, sometimes, you know, I see Augustine, this great Augustine, he'll say the end, he says, the vision is the whole reward. Mm-hmm. Okay? And there he's talking about the end, the anastom, right? Mm-hmm. Other times he'll say, the attitude is gaudium de veritate. Mm-hmm. But then he's talking more of the, what? The pleasure, the delitace, the resting in it, you see? Um, you know, Thomas' pediatric union, you know, it looks ver. Then he says, sati etas paina gaudium sepi ternum, secunditas consummata, et felicitas perfecta. So he's talking about the anastom and the directabile, right? Okay? Or it says, you know, enter into the joy of your master, right? Okay? So those two kind of pertain to the end and the useful more to the, what? The means, right? Okay? Um, but, you know, if I'm studying, let's say, geometry, right, you know, um, what's my goal? To know the Pythagorean theorem or to enjoy the Pythagorean theorem? Knowledge of it? Yeah. But they both, in a way, pertain to the end, right? Because if I know and understand, that is to say, the Pythagorean theorem, I have this, I'm like, I'll say my brother Mark, says it is, it's just like, so, so, so delectable, you know? So he says, here you are, you get to know them, huh? And, you know, that theorem I like so much, you know, where it says that, you know, in the second book, theorem five, right? And theorem five says that if a straight line be divided into, what? Equal and unequal segments, right? A rectangle contained by the, what? Unequal segments. Plus the square on the line between the points, the sections, right? would be equal to the square on the half, okay? So, when I was kind of, you know, speaking with this sort of tragedy, as Aristotle says, about Zeno, I said, well, from this theorem, you can realize that a square will always have more area than a rectangle for the same, what? For a perimeter, right? That's interesting in itself, right? Because a square is the simplest of these things. But then, what is the difference in area, right? Well, that's equal to a square of the difference. The square of the difference between the side of the square and either one of these. So, if the square, just to exemplify, if it's five by five, and this is, say, four by six, and this is, let's say, three by seven, well, the area, I mean, the perimeter is the same in every case, right? Namely, 20, right? But the difference in area, there's even five and six or five and four, either one you can take, is one, and one squared is one, and that's exactly the difference in area. Between three or seven, either one and five, the difference is two, and two squared is four, and that's exactly the difference, right? Mm-hmm. That's really, really delightful to see that, right? Okay. So, that delight in reaching the end pertains to the end, too, but it's more something like following upon the end, right? Aristotle says in the 10th book of the Ethics, that pleasure perfects operation, right? Like beauty perfects youth. Is that the definition of youth, right? Mm-hmm. But something, you know, expected that the youth would be more beautiful, right, than the old. Mm-hmm. And so, the perfection of operation is followed by pleasure, Okay? But my aim is more to know this than to delight in knowing it, but to delight in knowing it is not a means, right? It's a kind of resting and tented in what I discovered, right? You know how Thomas says there in the reading prayer, dulce supera, right? sweetly to savor Christ in the Eucharist, right? But then other things are merely what? Meaning, huh? They're useful to get to the end, huh? Well, it's kind of interesting that division, huh? They say this is a division of the good as good, of the desirable, in a sense, as desirable, Okay? but pleasure and the anesthesia there seem to be both on the side of the end in a way, right? But the anesthesia is more the end essentially, and the pleasure more the resting in it, right? But then there's also the useful, the means, that leads to the end, huh? I think that's very interesting, that first objection, you know? Because it's possible to divide the same thing maybe in more than one way, but there's one way that's really dividing it as such, right? More proper to that, huh? And this is what you're doing now. The second objection, every division is by opposites, huh? And he says, this division is not by opposite things, but by opposite definitions, huh? For those things are said to be properly delightful, which have no other, what? Reason for being desired, except pleasure, right? Said sometimes they are, what? noxious, right? And dishonorable, Okay? Like adulterous and that's all, right? Okay, or fornication, huh? Useful things are said which do not have in themselves once they should be desired, but are desired only as leading to what? Something further. Yeah. As the taking of a what? Medicine. Bitter medicine, yeah. Well, if the medicine was delicious, then it would have more and more reason to take, right? And I was like, boy, I had some medicine for something, and it was kind of coated, looked like one of these red cinnamon things, you know, you used to get, you know, those cinnamon things? Candy or something? Yeah, yeah, yeah. And it actually tasted good. I remember holding it in my mouth and kind of, like a piece of candy, and all of a sudden I got through this. Oh, no. You weren't supposed to, you know, enjoy the pleasure of sucking that thing like a piece of candy. as though it was a bitter medicine in itself, wasn't it? Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's what he says, a bitter medicine, right? You know? But, you know, you used to be worried about these things, you know, because a little charge would consume these things, you know. But Anesta are, I said, the things which have in themselves, whence they are, what? Desired, right? So there you're taking pleasure as something other than Anesta, right? I know. Rather than the one falling upon it. So there's a lot of subtlety there. You can see why in Aristotle, when he gets to the 10th book of the Nicomarckian Ethics, he takes up pleasure before he takes up his final consideration of happiness. And, of course, if you read the utilitarians, right, which are mainly the English empiricists and so on, and, you know, going back to Hobbes and Locke and so on, up to John Stuart Mill, they identify the good with what? Pleasure. Pleasure, basically, right? That's the only criterion of the good. Pleasure, right? Because that's where you get all this confusion about animal rights and so on, right? Because they feel pain and pleasure too, right? So what right do we have to inflict all this pain upon the animals, right? Well, if your only standard of good and bad is pleasure and pain, right? Why should, you know, 10,000 chickens die to feed one man or something, right? Well, if your only criteria is pleasure and pain, they can't really see their way out of this, right? Okay? A lot of pain I'm causing there, you see, to get my steak dinner and chicken dinner and pork dinner and so on, right? I see, what's the argument they use sometimes here? You know, some people want to maintain, you see, that all pleasure as such was good, right? Okay? Well, now, some people would try to say, you know, well, suppose I get pleasure from torturing people, right? Is that pleasure good? And some people would try to maintain, well, as pleasure is good, right? You see, is that true? You see? And they try to say, well, you shouldn't want to torture people. But if you enjoy torturing people, that enjoying torturing people is good. What would you think about that? Yeah. Separated from the animals. Yeah, yeah. You see, if it's wrong or if it's bad to want to torture people, right? That's because the object of your wanting there is something bad, okay? Which joins you more to torturing people, wanting to torture them or enjoying torturing them? Yeah. Because you can want to torture people without having them in your power to torture them, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But if you enjoy torturing people, then it's the torturing itself that you're enjoying, right? So you're more enjoying to the bad, right, than you are by enjoying it, than you are by wanting to do it. So if the wanting is bad, then you afford to enjoy it, and enjoying it is bad. So, but, you know, people have a hard time, you know, rising above this, huh? And of course, you know, they attack John Stuart Mill saying, well, your philosophy is a philosophy for beasts, right? Because the beast just lives by pleasure and pain, right? Mm-hmm. And, well, John Stuart Mill tries to make as good a defense against an objection as he can, right? He says, you're the beast, he says. Because you assume that man has only the pleasures that the beast has, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And then he says, well, but man has some pleasures in common with the beast, like eating or something, right? Sleeping and so on. And other pleasures that are, the beast doesn't share in at all, right? Okay? Now, are these pleasures that the beast doesn't share in, are they better than the pleasures that the beast does share in, huh? I see. They could well be worse. Well, you see, Mill, given his philosophy, cannot give any reason for saying that they are better, right? But as an empiricist philosopher, right? He says, those who have tasted both pleasures, right? Okay? Say that the pleasures of the mind and so on, right, are greater than those pleasures of the body that we share with the beast, right? See? So you can only apply, I mean, only try to answer the question, right, by an appeal, right, to the experience of those who have tasted both pleasures. Okay? Now, empirically, I think you could say that makes some sense, right, by itself. I don't say that, this is a thing. Because if someone says to you, you know, which pain is greater, right, huh? You know, pain of a broken leg or pain of an ulcer, you know? Well, the only person who's experienced these two pains can say which is worse, right? And so, you know, in your own life, I'm sure you've compared some pains you've had, right, and you've considered some pains worse, but it's simply on the basis of experience, right? Mm-hmm, okay? So, there's only criterion for saying that the pleasures of the soul or the pleasures of the mind are greater than the pleasures of the body is that those people like Aristotle or Plato who tasted both, right, say that these pleasures of the philosopher has are much greater than these other ones, right? You know, but it's kind of a narrow view, right, huh? You can see, you can see, you can't see anything beyond pleasure as a criterion, right, and the experience you have of pleasure, huh? You can see why Aristotle, you know, does devote a consideration in the 10th book to pleasure, right? That men can, you know, confuse that with the, what, the end itself, right? Okay? Because basically, our goal is to see God as he is, huh? Okay? I'm sure we see God as he is, but I enjoy that. Mm-hmm. But, but is the end, you know, substantially to enjoy seeing God, or is it the seeing of God itself? It's just the end. Seeing God itself. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But, but, but, but, but we'll be able to understand that, right? You know? We'll have to wait and see if that pleasure is greater. And then we'll know that's the greatest good, right? Right? But, but, you know, it's, the direct tabulae is much closer to the, what, anestum, right? Mm-hmm. The utile, right? I'm able to be confused with it, huh? Okay. Just like in the division of the predicaments, huh? Which is the closest to substance? Quantity or quality? Quantity. Yeah, yeah. And you, you go to Descartes, and Descartes confuses, what, the, uh, extension, the quantity of material things with their, what, substance, yeah. You heard my little joke about Descartes, huh? He never grew up. Because your quantity was your substance, right? Then you'd be a different substance when you grew up. So you never grew up, you know? See? So if you actually grew up, then you, the individual man, are not the same as your size, right? Mm-hmm. But you've actually had different sizes in your life. You were knee-high to a grasshopper, and now you're somewhat taller, right? So just as, as, uh, Descartes, and, and, uh, to some extent, the Pythagoreans, you know, and even the Platonists confuse quantity with the substance of things, huh? But not quality with the substance of things, huh? Uh, they may not consume, you know, shape or color or something like that with substance, right? But extension? Yeah. Yeah. And in fact, you have, of course, the two words, body, and body is used as, what, the name of one kind of substance, material substance, and body is used as a species of, what, continuous quantity, right? But it doesn't mean exactly the same thing. But people confuse the two, right? So there's a proximity. Well, they confuse, then, pleasure with the, what, honestum, the honorable, the noble. Well, they, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what itself. But they don't confuse so much the useful. It's a little more different. Now the theory thing was where one is an account of another, there there's one only. But the useful is not good except an account of the what? Either the pleasurable or the what? Unless to an third objection. Therefore one ought not to divide the useful against the pleasurable and the honorable. To the third it should be said that the good is not divided into these three as something, what? Univocal. Having exactly the same meaning. Equally said of them, right? That's often said when you speak of the univocal, right, in the strict sense, that it's said equally of these. So even by talking about the oblong and the square, it is the square more equadrilateral than the oblong? No. No. They're equally what? Quadrilateral. Yeah, yeah. And that's very difficult then, right? Mm-hmm. You know? When something is said ex equo, they'll say, hey, Latin, right? Equally of the many, right? Then it's very much being said univocal. Clearly, huh? But is good being said ex equo, equally, of the anestrum, the delectabulae, and the utile? Clearly not, huh? Okay? But this shouldn't surprise us, right? Is being said ex equo of substance and quantity and quality? No. No. Is being said ex equo of act and ability? No. But it's said secundum prius et what? Posterius, right? Mm-hmm. And so a lot of times they call this analogum, huh? They'll call it equivocal, right? By reason, right? But reason is characterized by order, as we were saying earlier today, right? And prius and posterius is what meant by order, right? So it's equivocal by reason, right? There's some order among the meanings. And per prius, it's said of what? The anestrum, the honorable one. And secondarily, of the delightful. And third, about the what? The useful. Yeah. So now you understand the good a little bit. But Thomas has given us a kind of a lesson in these six articles of really what? The consideration of the good that you might make and even what? Wisdom, right? Mm-hmm. But he's kind of for the goodness of the teaching now, so we can speak more clearly about the goodness of what? Of God, right? Ah-ha! Prodigal son has returned. And we're, I think we should stop here now, because we're just beginning to the sixth, yeah, yeah. We just finished the fifth question, and we're going to, you know, start the sixth question and just, you know, take a bite out of the sandwich. And then we think.