Prima Pars
Lecture 30: Divine Goodness and God's Infinity

Transcript
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So let's look at the fourth article here, where that all things are good by the divine goodness. Now you might think he's going to say yes, but he's going to say no. Sounds pious to say that all things are... To the fourth, thus one proceeds, it seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says in the Eighth Book of the Trinity, you see this good and that good? Take away this and that and see good itself, if you're able. Thus you will see God, who is not by another good, good, but he's the good of what? Every good, huh? And so I mentioned that, you know, in the Summa Congentitas, the first capitulum is God is good, and the second one, I think, is God is goodness itself. Third one is that there's kind of anything bad in God, to call Faulkner and be good as itself. And the fourth one is that he's the good of every good. And then the fifth one is that he's the Summa Bona, huh? But each thing is good by its good. Therefore, each thing is good by that good itself, which is what? God, huh? Again, Augustine, you know, sometimes needs to be read with care. And Thomas, in some sense, is a more proportionate student who can easily misunderstand some of these texts of Augustine. Moreover, as Boethius says in the Book of the Hebdomaribus, All things are said to be good insofar as they order to God, and this by reason of the divine goodness. Therefore, all things are good by the divine goodness, huh? That sounds pretty good. But against this is that all things are good insofar as they are, which Augustine said in another passage, remember? But all things are not said to be being through, what, divine being, but through their own being, huh? Remember that passage you used to have from Dionysius, you know, he says that God is the essae omnium? And Thomas said, well, he doesn't mean the formal being, by which each thing is, but the essae effective or something, of all things, huh? And I got an email from somebody the other day and said, do I exist by the divine essae? Something like that. Right away, I used to say, I don't know, I had to be singing right away, but right away I sat back and I took the chapter from the Summa Conectilis, you know, and started saying, God is not the essae for a Mali Omnia, you know, right away. I can't wait a second with this guy. Why do you even ask the question? But it kind of gets in a kind of pantheism, right? You know, if you say that the existence by which I am is God, right? Then he's all, you know, down in us things here. I answer it should be said that nothing prevents in those things which imply relation for something to be, what, denominated from something extrinsic, just as something is denominated, placed from place and measured from, what, a measure, huh? But about those things which are said absolutely, again, absolutely there as opposed to, what, relative, right? There's a diverse opinion. For Plato laid down that the, what, species separated of all things on the world of, what, forms, right? And that from these individuals denominated, as were partaking of these separated species. As, for example, that Socrates is said to be a man according to the separated form of man, huh? Don't translate that idea. And just as he laid down a separated form of man and horse and dog and so on, okay, which he called, what, man himself to himself, right? And horse itself to itself, right? I think I mentioned how two ways that Plato maybe came to this idea. One was that he thought the way we know must be the way things are if we know truly. And so corresponding to the truly knowing through definitions, as Socrates showed that we couldn't know the definitions, had to be these universals existing by themselves, right? Because in a definition you know the universal in separation from the, what, singularness. But maybe the other thing was that he realized in some way that in material things, like man and horse, what a thing is, is not identical to the thing. And so it seems in some way that Socrates is not a man through being Socrates. And therefore he's only a man by partaking. And therefore there must be before him something that is man itself to itself, okay? But the problem that man himself to himself would just be form and in no way matter. And then you don't have any of the nature of man. So likewise, as he posited man himself and horse himself through himself, so likewise he laid down a, what, form of being and a form of one separated, which he called being per se and one per se, huh? And by his partaking each thing is said to be being or one, right? And this that is per se being and per se one he laid down to be the, what, highest good, right? And because good is convertible with being, just as one is, this good itself he said to be God, right? From which all things are said to be, what, good by way of participation. And although this opinion seems to be unreasonable in this regard, that it laid down that the species of natural things are separated, existing by themselves, right? As Aristotle proves in many ways, it's not reasonable. Nevertheless, this absolutely is true, that there is something first, which through its very, what, essence or nature or substance is both being and good, right? Which we call God, as is clear from what is said before. And to this position, Aristotle is in agreement, huh? From the first, therefore, through its own, what, essence or nature, something being and being good to its own nature, right? Each thing is said to be good in being insofar as it partakes of it by way of a certain, what, assimilation, huh? A certain likening. Although remotely and efficiently, right? Who is like God, right? Thus, each thing is said to be good by the divine goodness as by a first exemplar, again. Now, exemplar is a, what, exterior form, right? Remember that when Aristotle explained the four causes? I guess the second kind of cause, it says the form and exemplar. But form means intrinsic more and exemplar, extrinsic, right? Okay, okay? So, each thing is said to be good by the divine goodness as by a first beginning that is an exemplar, right? And is also, what, efficient cause, maker, and also an end or purpose of all goodness, right? Nevertheless, each thing is said to be good by a, what, likeness of the divine goodness inhering in it. That's, that's, that's true. Which is, as it were, formally, but, yeah, denominating it, right? And thus, there is both one goodness of all things and also, what, many goods. You're talking about the goodness by which I've intrinsically formally said to be good. That's something in me, right? And the same with each other, each other thing has its own goodness, right? But they're all a certain likeness of the divine goodness, which is therefore the exemplar of all the goodness in these things and the efficient cause of all that and the end of all this, right? But, but not the, the form, right? You've heard me say it before, how many? When I get to the four kinds of causes, matter, form, move, and end, and I try to show that this is a universal distinction of what kinds of causes there are. And you can, you know, any science or art you get into, you can say which of these causes we should use, right? And so you say, God is a cause, I say, how many of these senses has God a cause? And I always answer, what, two and a half senses. He's in no way a cause in the sense of matter. He's very much a cause in the sense of a mover, a maker, an end, when he says, I'm the alpha and the omega, the beginning, the end. He's also a cause in the sense of exompar. Let us make man to our image and likeness, right? That's what you mean when you speak of exompar cause. But the intrinsic form is not the intrinsic form of things. So that's why I say the cause of two and a half senses, right? You see what I mean? But in a sense, Thomas is saying it, right? He's the first, beginning, exemplar, effective, and final of all goodness. But he's not the intrinsic goodness by which a thing is denominated good. But that intrinsic goodness is like his goodness, right? And is an effect of his goodness and is ordered to his goodness, right? As an end, huh? It's still something different. And you say something like that about the divine, you know, our existence, right? God is existence itself, and he's not the existence of which I exist, formally. But the existence of which I exist is like his existence in some remote way, right? And is an effect of his efficient causality, right? And it's ordered to God as an end, too. And so Thomas says, from this it's clearly implied to the objections, right? Because Boethius there is talking about that the word to God is an end, right? But also, we have other ways of doing it. This is a little more ambiguous there, please, right, son? So now we've considered two attributes of the divine substance, huh? And question three, that he's altogether simple, not composed in any way, right? And for good measure that he's not entering into composition of anything else, right? Which he wouldn't in this case if he was, what? A formal being, yeah. And now he's going to take up, what, the infinity of God next, huh? To which will be attached his being everywhere. I can't confine this infinite being. He's going to be infinite and everywhere in a different way than a body would be infinite, you know? In extent and everywhere in place, huh? I had some students at my house there last night there, and we're doing the natural fragrance there, and we come to the Naxamandu. He says, the infinite is the beginning of all things, right? I don't think he makes this comparison, so I might share it, but he does in the Summa Cantu Gentiles, that he says, quoting Aristotle, when he talks about the infinite, that almost all the Greek philosophers had in mind that the beginning of all things is infinite. But they're thinking of infinite in kind of a quantitative sense, huh? Either infinite multitude of things, or infinite extension, right? But then when they began to see that there couldn't be such a thing, then they realized it had to be infinite in some other way. But he speaks, he uses the famous phrase at Arstavo, where he's talking, in another context, but he's talking about how they're all saying something without giving a reason for it, as if coerced by the truth. And so our mind is naturally moving towards a beginning that is infinite, huh? Even without, or even before, it has a reason to say that the beginning is what? Infinite, huh? And so I was talking about how four of the things that Thales and Maximander say about the first matter, right, are the same in name, not necessarily in meaning, but the same in name as four of the five attributes of the divine substance. That's worth noting, right? And as I say, Thomas, in particular, in regard to infinite there, he takes some time to show the comparison. It's not purely unrelated to those two, even though there are different senses of infinite, huh? And that really kind of impresses you when you first see that, huh? You know? But you realize that the mind is moving in that direction, even before it has the reasons why it must be so, right? And that's part of the mind being convinced, huh? That's not something, you know, unheard of, you know? Or, you know, I was talking about how in mathematical physics, they're always looking for something, one equation will explain everything. And they say, you know, if you ask them, and I think you ever get that, they say, oh, probably not. But when you're working, you know, we're always looking for something one, right? And something simple, right? And Max Planck says, you know, the more universal a theory is, the simpler it should be. And there's something infinite about the equation, huh? Force equals mass times acceleration. You can deduce an infinity of masses or accelerations there. Forces, they're plugging in numbers, right? So there's something kind of infinite about it. And something kind of changing about it, too. You know, Heisenberg and Rothner, the physicists say, the conservation law is the most basic laws. Conservation of energy and momentum and angular momentum. So the mind seems to be moving to something one simple, unchanging, infinite, right? You know, perfect doesn't come up because they're making more material terms, but four of the five, right? So you see, hey, even before I see all the reasons or understand all the reasons, I can see that the mind's working that way, huh? It's not like this is coming out of nowhere, you know? We're naturally inclined in that way. So we just have to begin here a little bit. Okay, so after the consideration of divine perfection, we're not to consider about His infinity, right? And about His existence in things, right? Okay. And also Thomas refers to, what, four, five, and six is about the divine perfection. Because the goodness was attached, you might say, to the consideration of divine perfection. And now, to the infinity of God would be attached His existence in all things, everywhere. Right? Okay? And just like later on, to His unchangeableness would be attached to the consideration of His eternity. Okay? So we say there's five attributes. Yeah. But we have certain things attached or followed upon one or another attribute, right? I don't know why when he talks about God being one, he doesn't bring in that He's the measure of all things. You know, that's what I'd add in there, right? It's for the revised creation. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But when Thomas comments in Aristotle, in metaphysics, when Aristotle talks about the one, huh? He says it's a property of the one to be the beginning of things and to be the measure. Yeah. Yeah. And you first see that with the one that's the beginning of number, you know, but then it's carried over. So he ties mitanis to every genre, that something one is a measure of all. And so we find out, as we will, in the 11th phase of this question, right, that God is altogether one. That could have been another question there, that God is a measure of all things. It's, you know, but these lacuna, you know, and these great minds. He only had so much time. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. He didn't finish the book as it was, so. Yeah. Makes a direction, though, huh? So after the consideration of divine perfection, we're not to consider about his infinity and about his existence and things. For there is attributed to God that he be ubiquae, huh? Everywhere, huh? It's kind of interesting, ubiquae, huh? Yeah. Because ubiquae by itself means what? Everywhere. Yeah. We say everywhere. But I don't know, quae doesn't say anything. It doesn't have the sense of everything. But I guess that's the way he turns it, huh? It's kind of Latin. And in all things, of those two kind of going together. In so far as he is in circumscriptibus, you cannot draw a line around God, huh? It's a beautiful way of speaking. And he's, what, infinitus, huh? I think he's taking those almost as synonymously there, in circumscriptibus, right? You can't draw a line around God. And so I'll use that phrase in Greek sometimes, you know, perigraphia, to draw a line around. When he first defines happiness in Book 1, He calls it perigraphia, right? And then he's going to go into all the virtues in detail, and then he's going to come back and fill in more of it, exactly, human happiness is. But a very concrete way of speaking, it's perigraphia. God. But just as infinitus seems to be opposed to his being, what, defined, which makes him infinitus. And so, likewise, you couldn't draw a line around him without a paragraph of him either. So about the first four things are sought. First, whether God is, what, infinite, huh? You notice the other articles are not really about God so much as the fact that this is unique to God, right? Secondly, whether anything besides him is infinite in its very, what? Substance. Substance, yeah. Second, whether anything is able to be infinite in magnitude, right? And third, whether anything is able to be, what, infinite in things according to what? Whether the infinite can be in things according to multitude, right? Now, especially three and four go back to the first meaning of finite, infinite, which is set in quantity, right? In discrete quantity and continuous quantity. To the first one proceeds thus, it seems that God is not infinite, for everything infinite is imperfect, because it has the notion of a part in matter. That's the kind of infinity that Aristotle is talking about in the third book of the natural hearing. But God is most perfect, therefore he is not, what, infinite, huh? It's kind of interesting, that word infinite, huh? Originally, it has a sense of something, what, unformed, huh? Moreover, according to the philosopher in the first book of the physics, finite infinite belong to quantity, right? That's what he's arguing against, but this is in Parmenides, who say that everything is one. There's no multiplicity at all in the world. But one guy says that the, what, the one thing is infinite, the other guy says it's finite. And Aristotle says, well, infinite and finite refer to quantity. So you've got substance and quantity, you've got some multiplicity. That's one of the arguments against that, right? So that's how he points out these things. But in God, there is no quantity, since he is not a, what? A body, huh? Therefore, there's not belonging to him to be infinite, huh? That's why I always puzzle about my separated soul, you know? I can't, I want to imagine it, I can't imagine it. But the soul separated from the body, does it have length and width and depth? No, no. And it seems to be nothing, you know? Because every time we think, we imagine something, right, huh? You know, and so we tend to think that everything has got length and width and depth, but the soul doesn't, huh? So it's very hard to transcend your imagination, as you have to do, when you think about immaterial things, huh? And Socrates can't even transcend, but, you know, his imagination, he's thinking about the universal. He's thinking the universal is a sail that covers things, you know? And he gets into all kinds of troubles, and that will call it the primenities, huh? So, moreover. What is here that is not there is finite according to place. Therefore, what is this that is not that is finite in its substance. But God is this and not that, and not other. For he's not a stone, he's not a piece of wood. Therefore, God is not infinite according to his substance, huh? He's this and not that. So he's limited to being this and not that. That's pretty definitive as far as I can see, huh? You know, when you teach these things, what's nice to do is to give them a page that just has objections on it, you know? And they say, contra, and let them stew on that for a while. And then, you know, you drop in the second part, you know? And let them absorb that, and then finally, you know, say, now reply to the objections. And then, you know, then after a while, drop in the reply to the objections. That's the way you should do this, you know? I know when I get through with the, the, uh, and of course in Love and Friendship, right? So at the end, I go a little bit about charity. And the article in the Sumo where the charity is, what, friendship, right? But I put the objections against this being friendship on a separate piece of paper, right? And give that to them, let them stew at that, huh? And the objections come in a way, way out of between this own friendship, huh? So, um, Aristotle, you know, will say that friendship is, is mutual love, right? And, uh, but you're, most love your enemies. No, love those who hate you. And by, by charity, so. It's obviously not friendship, right? Not mutual love. Or, if it's friendship, it's got to be the highest friendship, right? And the highest friendship is, is between the virtuous, which is supposed to love sinners, huh? So, this is obviously not the highest kind of, you know? So, it's beautiful in objections, you know? And then, and then, uh, it's interesting to see how Thomas will eventually untied those objections, huh? But, uh, you've got to think of the whole article once, you know? You've got to say, you've got to discipline yourself, huh? You read these things on your own, kind of, you know, you get to the objection to kind of stop and think about it, you know? And say, you know, how to handle these things, huh? Maybe you can't handle it, but at least it's good to know that you need someone to handle it. But, uh, okay. But against this is what Damascene says, huh? I don't know, you heard of St. John Damascene, the, the Philia Orthodoxa, that's the reference down there, huh? Okay, that God is, what? Infinite and eternal and in circumscriptivities. That's the way you got that word, in circumscriptivities, huh? Interesting. But, uh, why is he sticking Eternus in there, right? I was quoting Dan for St. John Damascene, because Dan was at this. Yeah, but I mean, I suppose, because you think of Eternus as having a beginning and no end, right? And therefore as being, what? Infinite, huh? Eternal. Yeah. Uh, Guadius' definition, we'll meet later on, is, you know, Totesimo et perfecta possessio, vitae interminabilis, right? It's not like saying unending life, but interminabilis is almost like internet, right? That's what he thinks of that, right? It's in that context, but, um, Thomas would take up Eternus attached to what? Unchangeable, unchangeable, right? He doesn't think of Eternus is attached to infinite, right? He'll take up ubiqui in all things. I answer it should be said. Aha! You're going to say this. That all the ancient philosophers, right? Attributed infinite to the first, what? Beginning. As it's said in the third book of the physics, where Aristotle takes up the infinite. Okay, that's interesting, isn't it, right? And this reasonably, considering that things flow from the first beginning without, what? End. Okay, that's kind of one of the reasons I guess, you know, why should Max a man to think that the beginning of all things is infinite in some way, right? Well, because, one reason would be because things keep on coming to be. Every spring, things spring up, right? They see that from God in. So the origin of things must be infinite in some way, if things come on coming to be from it forever, right? Well, it's kind of coerced by the truth itself, right? To think that in some way, the beginning of things is infinite. But maybe they are mistaken as to exactly in what way it is infinite. But some erred about the nature of the first beginning, right? Consequently, it was that they erred about the infinity of it, huh? Can we mention how the word error comes from the Latin word to wander? It suggests that error is the result of a disordered movement of reason, okay? And when our Lord speaks to the Sadducees, you know, they're trying to give a rough time. The Sadducees didn't believe in the resurrection and so on. And so they had the impossible situation of a woman marrying one man and he died without an heir and the second brother marrying her. The Sadducees didn't believe in the death of a man and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died without an heir and he died So seven brothers, they all had no heirs. So whose wife will she be in the next world? They're like, you know, you've got a false situation. And Christ says, you planace, right, in Greek. And the Greek word plane, right, comes from the Greek word to wander. And it's where you get the word planet, because the planets seem to wander around the sky in comparison to the other ones, as opposed to the fixed stars, as they call it, right? Right? So the word error in Latin, which is a very common word, and plane in Greek there, both come from the word to wander, right? And so it suggests that we wander into errors, right? Like Shakespeare says in the comedy of errors, we wander in illusions. Why the other word for error, which is mistake, right, seems to hit more upon what? Stilling, negative and stilling. Well, mistake is probably closer to what we call being mixed up, right? And so that's not seeing some distinction, or not understanding some distinction, or misunderstanding some distinction, right? And so sometimes I tied up with, you know, Shakespeare's definition of reason as the ability for a large discourse, looking before and after, right, looking for order. But as Thomas points out, before you can see a before and after, you've got to see a distinction. So error is named from what? I mean, both mistake or error is a defect of reason, but mistake or mixed up is more a defect in regard to distinction, and error more from wandering at defective order, right? So it's kind of interesting to see those two words, huh? But somebody said, erd, they wandered, right? I remember one time, you know, I kind of liked the wander, you know, the newspaper, you know, but the liberals were attacking it, and, you know, for being mistaken. So they said, the wanderer wanders, right? And it was kind of a nasty thing, you know, especially to somebody like me, who knows the origin of the word, right? I'm surprised if they do that. Okay. But because some erred about the nature of the first beginning, consequently they erred about its infinity, right? Because they laid down the first beginning to be matter, consequently they attributed to the first beginning a material infinity, which would be the quantitative, right? Saying that some infinite body was the first beginning of things, huh? That's the release of that, mixed up in the very senses of infinite, too. Now, it should be considered that something is said to be infinite from this that it is not, what? Limited, right? Okay? Negative. But in one way, matter is limited by form. And in another way, form is limited by, what? Matter. For matter, through form, insofar as matter, before it receives a form, is in potency or in ability too many forms, huh? So the wood could be a chair or a table or a door. What limits it to one of these or the other? It's the form it receives, the act, right? But when it receives one form, then it's limited to what? That, huh? Form, however, is limited by matter, insofar as form, considered by itself or in itself, is common to many. But through this that is received in matter, it becomes a form in a determinate way of this thing. Matter, however, is perfected by form, through which it is, what? Limited. And therefore, the infinite, according as it is attributed to matter, has the notion of something imperfect. For it is, as it were, matter not having a form. Form, however, is not perfected by matter. But rather, through it, it's, what? Amplitude, huh? It's extent, is, what? Contracted or limited, huh? Whence the infinite, according as it has itself in a part of form, not determined through matter, has the notion of something, what? Perfect, huh? He's asking somebody, what is it like for a man to get married? And he said, this philosopher, it's like form being contracted by matter. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It ties a man down, and it limits him in the... It can be more perfect without that limitation. Okay. Now, that which is most formal of all things, what is most, the act of every act, you might say, huh? Is existence itself, right? As is clear from the things above. Since, therefore, the divine being, the divine existence, is not being received in something, but it is being, subsisting itself, right? It manifests that God himself is both infinite and, what? Perfect. Now, perhaps this is one reason for taking up the infinity of God right after his perfection, right? They seem to be very, what? Yeah, very close, yeah. It almost seems like infinity is saying, you know, speaking about God is infinitely perfect, right? His perfection is not limited to any, what? Genus, right? But the perfections of every genus are found in God in a simple way, huh? It's universally, perfectly, say, sometimes, right? So Thomas often quotes there God saying, do I think? Maybe Abraham and Moses, but one of them, not both. I will show you every good. You know, follow me and I'll show you every good. Thomas says, that is myself. I just love the way he does that. It's sort of, so what a great mind he has. Okay, so that's the reply to the first objection, whereas I was thinking of the infinite that is tied to matter, right? For everything infinite is imperfect because of the notion of part and matter. Okay, but that's not the kind of infinity we're going to attribute to God, huh? Now, the second objection is saying that finite infinite belong to quantity, but in God there's no quantity. To the second, it should be said that the term or limit of quantity is as its what? Form, right? In fact, that's probably where you get the word form first, right? From the limit of quantity. A sign of which is that figure, which consists in the termination of quantity, is a certain form about quantity, like a, what? Triangle or a circle or a square, right? So when you can talk about a square or a circle or a triangle, he's not just talking about the four lines, he's talking about the, what? The surface that is bound by four lines, right? So you speak of the diameter by setting a circle. The circle is all this, it's not just that line itself. Some people, you know, think it's the lines being the circle, right? Okay. Whence the infinite that belongs to quantity is an infinite which has itself from the side of matter, and such an infinite is not attributed to God, as has been said, right? You may recall during Aristotle's distinguishing the categories, right? And he says, some things are said of individual substances by reason of what they are, like man instead of you and me, and more generally animal and all we have to substance. Other things are said of us not by reason of what we are, but something existing in us, right? Either absolutely, he says, or towards another, right? And towards another, the category of, towards another, variation. He said, absolutely, and then he distinguishes quantity and quality, but one is on the side of matter and the other on the side of what? Form, yeah. So, we're more apt to carry words over from quality. to God, like he's wise or he's just, right? Then things from what quantity, huh? Because that falls upon matter, right? And such an infinite is not attributed to God on the side of matter. Now, the third one, what about his being here and not there or being this and not that, right? To the third it should be said from this very fact that the being of God is subsisting by itself not received in another, insofar as it is said to be infinite it is distinguished from what? Other things, right? And other things are removed from it, just as if there was some subsisting whiteness. From this fact that it's not in another it would differ from what? All whiteness existing in a subject, huh? So it's not like God has something in common with other things and by this he's separated from that and those but because he's not, what? Received in any way, right? He's simply, what? Unlimited. It's interesting, when Aristotle talks about the various senses of being in metaphysics, right? And there's accidental being, huh? Like white geometers and so on and then there's being as such, right? And the two main kinds of being as such are act and ability that's one division. The other one is being according to the figures of predication, right? And it's interesting the word he uses there, figures of predication but figure comes up here, right? It's not really the same thing as quantity but it's talking about genus and species and so on, huh? And why does he use the word figure there? I mean, you can talk about that for a while, you see. But God is not under any one of those figures of predication. He's not in any genius, huh? So he's not limited in that sense, right? So he's not like something in one of those genus that has to be distinguished from other things in that genus. But something outside all those genera, right? And not limited to any one of those genera. He's unlimited. And that's why he's distinct from all these other things, right? But if he was in some genus and he was this and not that he would be limited, right? Now, Thomas could be confused a little bit more, right? But I think he's thinking in part, partly of that. Aristotle uses the word figures there, I think. You know, he's talking about the syllogism, too, huh? And, you know, we tend to borrow the Latin words. We speak of the major term, the middle term, the minor term. But the Greek word is limit, right? What term means limit, really? The major limit, the middle limit, the minor limit, right? I suppose it's borrowed from quantity originally, right? But it's a little different meaning. But still, it's unlimited in a way that God would not be limited, right? Then you find the word limit also in the word definition, right? So God strictly speaking cannot be defined, huh? Sometimes, you know, we say, you know, well, can motion be defined? Because that's kind of unlimited, too. But it's a different kind of being unlimited, right? So I thought it was funny when you read that objection, your reaction was, it's very definitive. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But what we're thinking is you think they're in the same kind of thing, right? And then, you know, this is a dog and not a cat, you know? This is wine and not beer or something, you know? But there's some kind of comment, huh? Should we stop right now? It's about 415. Yeah. No, let's see. Oh, let's see.