Prima Pars
Lecture 32: Infinite Multitude and God's Presence in All Things

Transcript
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Okay, whether there be an infinite in things according to multitude, the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems possible for there to be an infinite multitude in act. For it is not impossible that what is in ability be reduced to act. But number is multipliable forever. Therefore it is not impossible for there to be an infinite multitude in act. For Aristotle in the ninth book of wisdom there says that some abilities are what? It's a nature never to be fully actualized. Moreover, of any species it is possible for there to be some individual in act. But the species of figure are infinite. Hexagon, seven figure, eight figure, nine figure. Therefore it is possible for there to be infinite figures in act. Moreover, those things which are not opposed to each other do not impede each other. But having posited some multitude of things, there is able to come about another multitude, right, which is not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible, again, for another one to be together with them and so on forever. Therefore, it is possible for there to be an infinite. Now, nice sickanta, huh? But again, this is what is said in the book of wisdom, 11 verse 21. All things in weight, number, and measure you have disposed. Oh, God. I answer it should be said that about this there was a two-fold opinion. For some, as Avicenna and El-Gazelle, said it was impossible for there to be an infinite multitude in act per se, right? But an infinite multitude for accidents was not impossible. Now, that is said to be an infinite multitude per se, when it is required that for something to be, that there be an infinite multitude, huh? And this is impossible to be, because thus it is necessary that something would depend upon infinity of things. Once its generation would never be completed, since you can't go through an infinite number of things, multitude of things. Per accident, however, a multitude is said to be infinite, when it is not required for something an infinite multitude, but it happens thus to be. And this can be manifested thus in the work of the metalworker, I guess. To whom a certain multitude is required per se, to wit that there be an art and a soul and a moving hand and a hammer. But if these are multiplied forever, never would the work of the fabricator be completed, because we depend upon infinity of causes. But the multitude of hammers, which happens from this, that one is broken and another is taken, is a multitude of cracks he does. For it happens that he operates by many hammers. And it doesn't differ at all whether by one or by two or by many, or by infinity of them, if you operate it in an infinite time. So in this way, they laid down that it's possible for there to be an act, an infinite multitude, per accident. But this is impossible, he says Thomas, because every multitude necessarily is in some, what, species of multitude. This sounds like the argument to be used in the previous article, doesn't it? But the species of multitude are according to the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite, eh? Because each number is a multitude measured by one, eh? I remember reading the text of the Oxford translation of Aristotle, right? In class, and the English text says, an infinite number. And my teacher could say, no, Aristotle wouldn't talk about infinite number. That's like a kind of diction in terms, right? Dwayne, look it up in the Greek. Sure enough, the word number was not in there, right? Okay. So it was infinite multitude that Aristotle used? Well, yeah, yeah, but not infinite number, you see. Yeah. Okay. Whence it is impossible for there to be an infinite multitude in act, either per se or per accidents, right? Because it could be some, what, particular kind of multitude, particular kinds of multitude being distinguished by numbers, eh? Moreover, the multitude existing in verum natura, right, in reality, in the real world, is created. And everything created is comprehended or included under some certain intention of the creator. For he does not, what, do something in vain, eh? Whence it is necessary that under a certain number all created things are comprehended. It is impossible, therefore, for there to be a multitude that's infinite in act, even per accidents, eh? So God's not going to, what, aim at an infinite multitude of, of blessed, right? There's some number, and the number is completed, that's it. And the ball game's over. That way it's not. But for there to be an infinite multitude in potency, in ability, right, is possible, right? Why? Because the increase of multitude follows the division of magnitude, eh? The more something is divided, the more, what, according to number, results, eh? Of course, you kind of saw that in Anxagris, right? He said there's no smallest of the small, which is only true of mathematical quantity. And then he goes on to say there's no larger of the large, right? He said, what's the connection between saying there's no smaller than the small, and therefore no largest of the large? What's always getting larger as you divide the line and subdivide and subdivide? Well, sometimes you get a student who will say the number of lines is always getting larger, right? So if you can always divide a line and divide forever, then the number of lines can always increase without any limit, eh? So there's no largest number, just like there's no shortest, what? Line. Line, yeah. Quence, since the infinite is found in potency in the division of the continuous, because it proceeds to matter, the same reason the infinite is found only in potency in the addition of the multitude, eh? So Aristotle talks about, or defines even, the line of the continuous as that which is able to be divided forever. Or is that an ability that can never be, what, fully actualized? No. No. And in a way my ability to walk home is a little bit like that too, right? Because when is my ability to walk home completely? When you finally get home. Yeah, when I have walked home, but then I'm not walking home. So as long as I'm walking home, it's the very nature of walking home to not have walked home. And to have walked home is not to be walking home. So it's a little bit like the division of the continuous, right? Kind of a strange ability. Not like the ability to be a chair, see? The wood has where that can be fully realized that ability to be a chair. And when you try to show the infinity of the mind, that's kind of interesting. Because one way we show the way the mind is infinite in a way is by it's non-universal. That's kind of the common way. But if you realize that you can know one thing through knowing another thing, then the more you know, there's always something more you can know through what you just learned, right? And then if you know something more as well as that, then you can know something else through that, and so on. Kind of another way, right? But it's never completely actualized, huh? When you study geometry, you realize that you're going to be no end to this discovery of simple numerical relations among these things. So, let's go back now to the first objection. It says, it is not impossible that what is in potency be reduced to act, but number is multipliable forever, right? Therefore. To the first, therefore, it should be said that each thing that is in potency is reduced to act according to the way of its own being. For a day is not reduced to act, that it be totesimo, all at once, but successively. And likewise, the infinite multitude is not reduced in act, that it be all together at once, but successively. Because after each multitude, one is able to take another multitude, and so on forever. Now, the second objection is taken from, can't you have one of each kind? And this is an infinity of kinds, right? It says, to the second it should be said that the species of figures have infinity from the infinity of number. For the species of figures are trilateral, quadrilateral, and thus. As soon as you say the word trilateral instead of, what, triangle. It's kind of funny, I don't know. We tend to call triangle from three angles rather than three sides. It would probably make more sense to call it, what, trilateral, right? Whence, just as the infinite multitude numberable is not reduced in act, that it be all at once, so also neither is the multitude of, what, figures, huh? But I heard Thomas say elsewhere, you know, that when we see God as he is, we'll know all figures. That's kind of strange, right? Because there's no limit to that, right? It's kind of hard to understand how in understanding one thing we can understand many things, huh? It kind of gives a famous thing on the ideal limits, right? Where you're trying to know distinctly at the same time the circle, let's say, and the, what? The polygon, right? Where you're knowing the circle as the limit of these polygons as you divide the sides all the time, you know? So it's like you're trying to know two things distinctly at once. Trying to be like an angel. Well, not quite getting there, perhaps, but, you know, you're the limit, huh? And the third objection. You can always add something. To the third should be said that although some things being laid down, to lay down other things is not opposed to them. Nevertheless, to lay down infinite multitudes is opposed to each, what, species of multitude, huh? Hence, it is not possible for there to be some, what, multitude and act infinite, huh? Okay. Now, a little time left, I guess. Now, question eight is the one attached to God being infinite, right? And this is God's being, what? God's sitting all around us. Yeah, God's infinite is everywhere, right? Okay. Because to the infinite, it seems to belong that it be everywhere, right? But as you suspect, it's not going to be everywhere in the way that a body is everywhere, right? So in a sense, he's excluded that. He's excluded the infinite body in the third article, right? Then God is not everywhere in the way that a body is that fills everything, huh? Now, whatever Newton meant by the sensor in the day, right? He's not there in the way that space was thought to be everywhere, you know? Going on and on and on forever, right? Did I ever tell you about Heisenberg's student there, Weitzacher, you know, who's a physicist? But in his book, The World View of Physics, he has an interesting thing about the Internet. Well, he was working with Heisenberg in the modern physics. And what characterizes modern physics, that is to say the physics of the 20th century, as opposed to Newtonian physics of the 17th, 18th, and 19th century, is the discovery of limits, okay? Now, the beginning of the physics of the 20th century, modern physics, as they call it, was the quantum hypothesis in December of 1900, proposed by Max Planck. And this says there's a limit as to the smallest amount of energy you can give or receive. But there's an amount of energy below which you cannot give or receive. And you give either this amount or some multiple of this amount, huh? And Planck came to this, you know, in his study of black body radiation. And so he proposed in December of 1900, and then five years later, Einstein showed you he can't understand light without this quantum. And then 13 years later, Niels Bohr showed you he can't understand the end without this, right? So nothing in the physical world, matter or light, is without the quantum, right? But this is a limit now, right? And sometimes, you know, popularly I compare it to the monetary system, right? There's the smallest amount of money you can give or receive, which is a penny, right? You either give or receive a penny or some multiple of a penny, but nothing less than a penny, and nothing between one penny and two pennies. You see, they had just so-called quantum jumps in the atom, right? And that's why it was introduced by the great Niels Bohr. But then in 1905, Einstein proposed the what? Special theory of relativity. And that's that there's a limit as to how fast the body can go, you see? Which is the speed of light, right? So this is a limit now in the direction of the large. Now, neither of these limits existed in Newtonian physics. And you could always give less and less energy. You could go faster and faster in principle, right? So these are the foundations of modern physics, huh? Well, then, ten years later, Einstein proposed the general theory of relativity, huh? And, well, then tested until after this first one of the work that kind of broke up. But the general theory of relativity gave a great impetus to cosmology, the study of the universe as a whole. And so they started to think about the universe in the light of the general theory of relativity. And it seemed to make sense that the world is finite. And ever since the Renaissance, they had been maintaining that the universe was infinite, huh? You know? Everybody talks about that famous work of Kauré, you know? From the closed universe to the infinite universe, right? This is the modern thing, right? So from the Renaissance until, you know, the general theory of relativity, they just assumed that the universe was infinite, right? In opposition to, you know, what Aristotle thought the universe was finite. But now it seemed that the universe was finite. And I guess Einstein was a little bit surprised at coming out of his own theory. And he thought the guy's mathematics, you know, the guy's mathematics was wrong. And Einstein actually was making some miscalculations himself. And finally had to admit that he had, oh. And then with the Big Bang and so on, right, huh? There seemed to be some reason to say that the universe might be not only limited or finite in space, but even in, what, time, okay? It's a great shock, right? Well, then the quantum physicists, they went in the opposite direction. They started to go down to the study of the elementary particles, huh? And at least two of the Nobel laureates in quantum physics who went into study elementary particles, they were working with the idea that there's going to be a minimum length, a smallest length, which is something like 10 to the minus 13 centimeters, huh? Below which there is nothing, right? You see? And it's a great job. A minimum length. It's a contrasting to what you have in math, right? It's a minimum. But in the natural world, there's a limit, right? So anyway, that's kind of background. But Weitzacher was giving a, what, a lecture, right, on the new physics, you know, and kind of emphasizing the fact that what characterized it is limits, limits, limits, limits, right? And there was an older physicist there, you know, who got very indignant about this whole thing, right? And angry and really upset about this, you know? So Weitzacher being a young physicist decided to go see this older physicist and see what his objections really worked to the new theories, right? And, you know, see them privately where he can, you know, talk a little more calmly about things. And it seemed that the old physicist, he didn't see any objections to new theories, I mean, any defects in the thinking, but just couldn't stand the idea that we had a finite universe, right? And even though the evidence was pointing that way, right? And so Weitzacher began to think, you know, well, why was he so upset about this, right? And then he went back to thinking about... And then he went back to thinking about... And then he went back to thinking about... when they started to think the universe was infinite. And it wasn't maybe a coincidence that they had turned away, they said, from the study of God, who is infinite, of course, to the study of the material world, and the universe was now becoming a substitute for the study of God, but a finite thing can't satisfy our mind. So they had to, what? Make the universe infinite to make it a substitute for thinking about God. When it turns out to be finite, what do you do? You know, it's dead end, you know. The universe is a dead end. It's not a dead end, it puts you back to God. My wife and I have a joke, you know, between us, you know, and we say it to the tip, you know, that we consider marriage to be a dead end. And people kind of, you know, what's wrong with that? And the joke, the reason why I call it dead end, there's no way out of what you're in. I was going to say, it's just like Sars, no exit. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, that's what I meant, you know. I mean, it's horrible, it's kind of nice. But it's a dead end, you know. So the universe ought to be a dead end, you know, need to be limited, right? But that's kind of, I think, significant, though, right? It's an interesting point he's making, huh? I don't think he's a believer, right? But he sees that an infinite God that you were thinking about is something very satisfying to the mind, right? And when you give up that, like they did, you know, the Reformation and so on and their Renaissance, and then devour yourself to the natural world, the natural world has to become now a substitute for what? For God. And therefore, if it's not infinite, it can't be a substitute for God. But then, with modern science itself, you know, using its own methods, runs into the conclusion that everything's limited out there, it seems to be. Well, then what do you do? You see? I think it's interesting, huh? It reminds me, you know, of what you see in the modern philosophers, too. Myself, I'm both a philosopher and a theologian, right? And incidentally, in your latest little newsletter, right? You said, in our philosophical class, Oh, yeah, I love that, too. Yeah, you've got to be careful about that, right? Because as a philosopher, I don't know that there's a trinity. I don't know that God became man, right? I don't know that as a philosopher, right? So, although some of these things, you know, could be understood by the philosopher, the order is really imitating God's, because we're partaking in God's knowledge. It's not really a philosophy class. That's a little mistake there, right? What? I think, Dr. Berquist, I think you should sue them. But the point is... Do you think a taxi man goes in? It's a long walk out of town. Knowing both some philosophy and theology, you see, what happened in modern philosophy was they gave up theology, right? But they're living in a society where there's still remnants of Christianity around and so on, right? So they're not back in the position of the Greeks, huh? The Greeks are philosophizing without theology, right? But they're never exposed to it, right? But the modern philosophers have given up theology, having been exposed to it to some extent, right? And so they seek in philosophy a substitute for theology. And so they seek in philosophy things the Greeks didn't seek in philosophy or try to get in philosophy, right? Because they weren't trying to get a substitute for theology. So, I mean, I always say Hegel's philosophy of history, you know, is more like the city of God of Augustine, the secularized version of it, huh? And Hegel's system is like the Trinity, you know? I mean, a perverse imitation of the Trinity and then at the end there, you know, the thought becomes flesh, you know? So it's a perverse imitation of the Trinity and the incarnation and so on. And it doesn't make sense really philosophically. But you can see that guy's trying to get a substitute for theology, right? But it's something like that, right? In a sense, the natural world is becoming a substitute for God and it can't be unless it's in some way, what? Infinite, right? And, you know, communism appealed to some people too, you know? Marxism, you know? This is kind of a salvation, you know? You know, like Whitaker Chambers, I don't know if you've read his book, Witness and so on. But he graduated from Columbia University, right? He had two alternatives. He was either to become a communist or commit suicide. There's no salvation, you know? And I guess his brother committed suicide and he became a communist, right? But this is like, you know, look at your salvation, you know? And it's kind of funny you read, you know, about L.J. Hiss and these other people, you know, who, you know, how could they have done this, you know? But it was like a kind of a... It's interesting how communism really... It's an imitation of Christianity in many ways but it's peculiar because many of them, like Lennon and many of them, they actually would take a new name when they became communists and so forth. It was kind of peculiar, you know, how... Preserving the body, you know, there. Yeah, it's really bizarre. It was interesting that reaction of one of that older physicist was because just reading this morning when, as you know from St. Thomas' commentary on Job, he said they proceed by disputation. Yeah. And one of the comments he makes at the end of chapter 6 is he's commenting on Job is trying to refute the arguments of his first aliphaz. Yeah, his dear friend. And he gives four reasons at the end that put an end to all kind of disputation. And one of them is when somebody doesn't have a reason against your argument but he just doesn't want to hear it. Yeah. So that was an end to disputation. Yeah, yeah. Because they don't have a reason to dispute anything. Yeah, yeah. And that's kind of this reaction, this kind of visceral reaction. Yeah, yeah. But again, see, in seeking the natural world as a substitute for God, right, and therefore having to make the natural world in some way infinite, right, it doesn't mean that you attribute to the natural world in this substitute the kind of infinity that God has, right? Mm-hmm. But I mean, the average mind doesn't see that, right? You see? And as I say, looking at it from the other point of view, from the point of view of the Greeks, they were thinking of the beginning of all things as being infinite in a kind of quantitative sense. And Thomas says, they were encouraged by the truth to think that the beginning of things is infinite, but they had misunderstood the kind of infinity it had. And so Thomas has to kind of contrast that infinity with the infinity that God does have, huh? And the consequence of that is that this God being ubiqui and some, what does that mean? But not understanding that in a quantitative being everywhere, you know, spread out like space, or like the Manichaeans say, God is like a light extended through space. Because truly to the infinite it seems to belong that it'd be everywhere and be in all things, right? Okay? It should be considered whether this belongs to God, huh? Okay? And of course, when Melissa or somebody like that said that the being is infinite and he thought of it infinite in this quantitative sense, he thought it was everywhere, right? You can see how close this is to the way the mind works there, right? You think of something as being infinite, you think of it as being everywhere in some sense, right? And as you understand the infinity, you understand you're everywhere. So about this, four things are sought. First, will there God be in all things, huh? Secondly, will there God is, what? Everywhere. So Thomas doesn't understand exactly the same thing by saying God is in omnibus rebus in all things and he's ubiquae, right? Doesn't say exactly the same thing, huh? So when he says that up above there in the premium, because to the infinite it seems to belong as being everywhere in all things, there's a little distinction between those two, at least there's a separate article for each, right? And then the third article is kind of a breakdown of the second, right? Where the God is everywhere through essence and power and presence, huh? It's always kind of a funny way of saying it, but we'll see what it means, huh? And then, whether to be everywhere is proper to God, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? He's got nowhere to go, huh? So, the first one proceeds thus, it seems that God is not in all things, huh? Now, of course, to be in is said in many ways, as you know. I should talk a little bit somewhere earlier. For what is above all things is not in all things, right? But God is above all things, according to that of Psalm 120. The Lord is raised above all, what, nations, right? Of the heavens is the Lord above nature, huh? Therefore, God is not in all things, huh? Moreover, what is in something is contained by it, huh? That's only the first sense of being in, huh? We're contained by the four walls of this room, right? We're in this room, right? But God is not contained by things. But more, he contains them, right? Okay, we're in God's hand. God's on us. Therefore, God is not in things, but more things are in him. Whence Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions, that in him more are all things than he himself, what? Some more. Okay? Three, more. As an agent is more powerful, right? So, it's action proceeds more to what is distant. But God is the most powerful of agents. Therefore, his action is able to, what? Reach those things which are distant from him. Therefore, he doesn't have to be in all things. Moreover, the demons, the devils, huh? Are some things, right? But God is not in the demons, for there is no coming together of light with darkness. As is said in the second epistle of the Corinthians, chapter 6, verse 14. Therefore, God is not in all things, huh? But against this, wherever something operates or acts, there it is. But God acts in all things, according to that of Isaiah 26, chapter 12, verse. All our doings you do in us. Glory, huh? Pretty interesting thing, huh? You don't do anything except in what? Well, in the power of God, huh? Therefore, God is in all things, huh? It always comes up in discussions, you know. I mean, does he cooperate with the sinner? Well, the defect doesn't come from what God does, right? Whatever there is of goodness in what the sinner does is due to God. Defect is due to the sinner. I answer you, it should be said, huh? And that God is in all things, not as a part of, what? Their nature, right? Or as an accident, right? But as an agent is present to that in which it, what? Acts. For it is necessary that every agent be joined to that in which it immediately acts, right? And that by its power, it, what? Touches it, right? Okay. Once in the seventh book of the physics is proved that motion and the moved, I should say, and the mover are necessarily, what? Together, right? Since, therefore, God is to be itself, who is very nature, right, is necessary that created existence be his proper effect, huh? Just as to be ignited, to be fired up, is the proper effect of fire. But this effect God causes in things, not only when at first they begin to be, but so long as they are conserved in being, huh? Now, like this here, just as light is caused in the air by the sun, so long as this air remains, what, illuminated, right? So long, therefore, as things have existence, or being, so is necessary that God be present to them, right, in the way in which they have being. But to be is that which is most intimate to each thing, huh? And what, more profoundly, is inside of all things, huh? Since it is formally, huh, it's formal with respect to all things which are in the thing, huh? It's the actuality of everything, as is clear from what has been said above. Once it is necessary that God be in all things and being, what? Intimative. So sometimes the saints say, he's closer to you than you are to yourself. I'm kind of spread out again, I've got arms and legs and so on. And, you know, when, who is it, St. Tzadal, you know, talks about the interior castles, not the expression of Jesus, you know? It's like going in to God, right, who's more within you than you are within yourself, right? But why is that, huh? Because he's the cause of being, not only when the thing first begins to be, but always, right? And he can't make something to be without him. That would be a contradiction, right? Doesn't have being except to what is essentially being, namely God. So God is in all things in the sense in which the, what, agent is present to all things, right? It's not the most obvious sense of being in, right? And we tend to fall back upon the interior senses to be in, right? And therefore, misunderstand the sense in which God is in all things, huh? So the first objection was that God is above all things, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that God is above all things by the excellence of his own nature. And nevertheless, he is in all things as causing the being of all things, huh? Okay? So he's not, what, above all things in the same way that he is in all things, right? So that's the distinction that he's making at. You know, the second one is going back to the first meaning of being in, that Thomas does in the order, is the senses of being in, in the fourth book, to be in the room, being contained. The first sense of to be in is to be in place, right? To be in the room here. The second one is to be in something as a part in a whole, right? When Thomas is showing how that's the second sense, he says that if you loosen the part from the rest of the whole, then it's in there like in a place, right? So if you knock my tooth out, and I can take it down and put it back in again, like there's a false tooth. False teeth are really in the mouth, and the mouth is in a, what, place. They're not really a part of your mouth. You know, I guess they hassle me to hold them in there, I guess. I kind of got to that. But, but, but, so, in part is, is, is, is not destroyed to the left thing. You can see how close the meanings are, right? Then the third meaning is what? The genus and the species. So he says, the second, it should be said, that although bodily things are said to be in something as in, what? What is containing them. Nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are. Just as the soul contains the body, right? And so the soul leaves the body, the body falls apart, right? So the whole is what, the soul is what holds it together. And so if it holds it together, it's, it's, it's containing the body more than the body containing it. There might be another sentence you could say that maybe the body contains the soul, right? The form is the matter. Whence God is in things as containing things, huh? Nevertheless, through a certain likeness of body things, all things are said to be in God. insofar as they are contained by him, huh? And that can be said, you know, also in the sense of what? When you get to the seventh sense of in there in the physics, I've got you in my power, right? See? That means you're what? I control you, right? And we see sometimes, you know, when something's not in our power, it's out of my hands, right? Okay? I have no control over it, huh? It's out of my hands. Okay, now the idea about acting at a distance. To the third, it should be said that if no agent, no matter how powerful it is, does an action proceed to something distant except insofar as it acts through the, what, intermediaries, huh? But this pertains to the maximum, huh? The maximum power of God that he immediately acts in all things. So, whence nothing is distant from him, right? As if God, what? Didn't have a deal of self. Yeah. Things near us are said to be distant from God through the, what, unlikeness of nature, right? Or through the unlikeness of grace. Just as he is above all things, the extents of his nature. Going back to the distinction he made in the first, reply to the first objection, right? Now, what about the demons? To the fourth, it should be said that in the demons is understood both the nature which is from God and the deformity of fault or guilt, right? Which is not from him. And therefore, it ought not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, right? Insofar as there are demons, right? But with this addition, insofar as there are certain things, they're very, so their staying in existence depends upon God, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. But in things which name a nature that is not deformed, absolutely one might say that God is, God is, yeah? Shouldn't I, right? Yeah, I would say, Hail Mary, full of grace, the Lord is with thee. I can't say with thee, I guess you can say in you. We'll see where to go. So, should we stop or time to be done? No, no, no.