Prima Pars
Lecture 34: God's Omnipresence: Essence, Power, and Presence

Transcript
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Now, in both ways, in some way, God is in every place, which is to be everywhere. First, because he is in all things, is giving them what? Existence, right? And power, right? And what? Operation. For thus he is in every place, as giving to it its existence and its power to what? Locate things, to place them. Also, things placed are in place insofar as they fill the place, and God fills every place. But not as a body does, for a body is said to fill a place insofar as it does not, what? Suffer, another body to be there, right? But through this fact that God is in some place, one does not exclude, but that other things can be there. Because through this he fills all places, that he gives existence to all things that are located or placed in place, right? Which fill all places, huh? So everything that's in place is held in existence by God, right? So God is present to every place, right? Now, first objection here. Corporeal things like God are not in place, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that bodiless things are not in place through the contact of what? Demensive quantity, right? Thomas uses that sometimes as a synonym for continuous quantity, right? So, you could say the water is contained inside this cup here, as in a place, right? And the outer surface of the water is in contact with the inner surface of the cup, right? That's what he calls contact of quantitatis dimensidae, huh? Okay? Now we speak of dimensions, right, huh? So it's tied up with continuous quantity as opposed to discrete quantity. So you have the line which is one dimension and the surface has two dimensions, right? And the body three. So there's a contact of part to part there, right? So the outer surface of the water here and the inner surface of the containing are together, right? But that's not the way God is in contact with all things. But through the contact of what? Yeah, contact of power, right, huh? Okay. So what do you mean when you say to somebody, keep in touch? Yeah, yeah, yeah. See? We're using that word touch to talk about what? Power, right, huh? Yeah. Now, second thing, talking about the indivisible there, and it can't be, what, everywhere. To the second it should be said that indivisible is twofold. One, which is the, what, limit of the continuous as the point in permanent things and the momentum in successive things, huh? And this kind of indivisible in permanent things, because it has a determined site or location, is not able to be in many parts of the place or in many places. And likewise, the indivisible of, what, action or motion, because it has a determined order in the motion or the action. It cannot be in many parts of time. Okay? But in general, that's the, what, indivisible that is a limit of the continuous, right? Okay? And therefore, it has a definite position or place, you might say, in the continuous, right? And therefore, it can't be in two places at the same time, right? Okay? Now, the other indivisible, which is, what, outside the whole genus of the continuous. And in this way, the bodiless substances, the incorporeal, that means bodiless in English, as God, the angel, and also the soul, are said to be, what, indivisible, right? Such an indivisible is not applied to continuous as something of it. That would be the point, right? It's just in the line of which it is the, what, limit, right? But insofar as they touch it by their, what, power, right? Or by its power. Hence, according as its power can extend to one thing or to many, or to the small or to the large, then, according to that, it is in one or many places, or in a large place, or a, what, great one, right? But God's power being infinite, right? It's going to be in every place, huh? Okay? But, sometimes they speak of the angels as being in place when they're acting upon something, right? Here, or there, right? And they can't act everywhere at once, right? So, they can be one place and not another place in the sense that their power is being exerted here and not somewhere else, right? But God is not limited, given his infinite power, to be acting here and not there, right? They can act at once everywhere. Okay? This power has no limit. Okay, now the third one is talking about whole. And how can the whole of God be in one place, and then some of them being somewhere else? To the third, it should be said that whole is said with respect to the parts. But there is a two-fold part, huh? To it, the part of the essence or nature, as form and matter, are said to be parts of the composite, composed. And also, genus and difference are parts of the, what, species, huh? And that's why he puts the, there's two different senses of whole and part there. Genus and difference are parts of the species and form and matter that are composite. But he puts those two together as having something in common, right? That they're parts of the, what, the nature, right, huh? Okay? And you kind of see the reason for this, huh? What are my parts? Well, I'm a creature composed of body and soul, right? That's my nature, being composed of body and soul. And that's form and matter, right? You could also say, I'm a rational animal. And that's what I am, too. That's my nature, okay? Being expressed by a rational animal. But animal is the genus, and rational is the difference, huh? So he puts those two different ones, the two different ones, and the two different senses are a style of distinguishes in the fifth book of wisdom. But they're put together as both giving you parts of the nature, right? But the one is more the parts as they are in the reason, genus and difference, right? And the other is the parts as they are in the thing apart from reason, right? Okay? So the we is a distinction in me, the walking, talking man here, between my soul and my body, right, huh? And someday they're going to part, I guess. But genus and difference are more parts in reason's understanding, right, of my nature. An animal might be taken more from my bodily aspect, right? And rational more from my, what, soul, right, huh? But nevertheless, you can't say that animal is the body and rational is the soul, right? Okay? But there's something proportional about those, huh? And, uh... But then the other kind of whole would be the quantity of whole, right? That's another sense that Aristotle distinguishes there. The first one, in fact, in the fifth book. Um, and also the part of quantity, right, in which is, to wit, divided some quantity, huh? When I was reading Thomas in English, they always translationally said, to wit, to wit. Yeah. That's a translation, so I never got to calm that myself. Now, what, therefore, as a whole is in some, what, place? by the whole of its quantity, is not able to be outside that place, right? Because the quantity of the placed is measured together with the quantity of the place. Just like I was saying, the surface of the water, right, corresponds to the inner surface of the cup, right? They're equal, right, huh? Because the quantity of the placed is measured with the quantity of the place. Whence there is not the totality of the quantity if it not be the totality of the place. But now the totality of the nature, the essence, is not measured with the totality of the place. Whence is not necessary that that which is a whole, by the wholeness of nature in something, in no way be, what, outside of it. Just as it appears in accidental forms. Because when they have, accidentally, quantity, huh? For whiteness, for example, is a whole in each, as a whole, in each part of the surface, right? If one takes the, what, wholeness of its nature, right? If you have this white tape with you, right? You know, this is fully white here, the nature of white, and this is fully the nature of white here, and white here, and so on, right? Okay? So whiteness is a whole in each part of the surface. If one takes the whole of what? The nature, right, huh? The whole nature of white is found in each part. Because according to this perfect, the perfect definition of the species, it is found in each part of the surface. If however you take the totality according to quantity, which it has by accident, thus, the whole is not in each part of the surface, huh? But it's spread out on the whole surface, huh? In bodiless substances, there is no totality, neither pericene or pericetence, except according to the perfect definition of nature. And thus, just as the soul as a whole is in each part of the body, so God as a whole is in all things in each one of them, right? Now remember that article we had on the soul, right? That the whole soul is in each part of the body, right? It's a little bit like, on the whole, what whiteness is is in each part of the what? Surface here, right? Okay? Even though the extent of it, you know, over the surface is not everywhere, right? You get the quantitative aspect. So, what are the two senses in which God is everywhere, then? In this article, yeah. But he's everywhere because he's, what? Giving existence to everything that's in place, right? The agents. Yeah. But he's also giving existence to, what? The place itself, right? Oh. He says, first, as he is in all things, going back to the body article. Yeah. As giving them existence and power and operation. Thus, for thus he is in every place, as giving to it being, right? Right? And his power of, what? Locating things. Also, things placed are in place, insofar as they fill the place. And God fills every place. Not as a body, right? Okay? But it's giving, what? He says, eventually, existence to all things placed, which fill all places, right? So God is in every place because he's in everything that's in place, right? But he's also in place itself. He's giving place, that's what? Existence, right? It's kind of interesting when Aristotle, you know, begins the consideration of place, and he quotes the early Greeks, that whatever it is must be somewhere. If it is somewhere, it doesn't exist. Existence, and then he quotes Hesia and so on, that you first of all have to have a place for things, right? So you can have things. So place seems to be the first of all things, he says, right? Place can be without the things that are in place, but the things that are in place can't be without being somewhere, so you've got to have a place before you can have anything else. But then people come along and they say, you know, yeah, what about place? If whatever it is must be somewhere, where's the place? You have to have a place to place place, right? Right? And that seems to be a little difficult, right? Because then you have the same question about that place, right? Yeah. Where's that? Sure, sure. But if you say that place doesn't have to be anywhere, but yet it is, then you're saying something is without, what? Having to be in place, huh? Okay. Now the third article. Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence, and what? Power. And this now is a more, what? Particular knowledge, right? God's being everywhere. To the third one proceeds thus. Thus, it seems that badly are assigned the ways of being, or God being in things. When it is said that God is in all things through essence, power, and presence. For that, through essence, is in something that is essentially in it. But God is not essentially in things, for he is not of the essence of some thing, right? I said that before, right? God is not in things as part of their nature, right? He's not the soul of things or the body and so on. Therefore, it should not be said that God is in things through essence, presence, and power. So that's an objection to his being in all things, per essentium, right? Okay? Because that seems to imply the essence of a thing, the nature of a thing, right? And God, therefore, you seem to be saying, it would be in the very nature of things, right? He's the soul of the world or something like that, right? Moreover, that is present to some things, that is not what? Lacking. Yeah, or absent from it, yeah. But this, is it for God to be by essence in things, that is not what? Lacking to them or absent from them. Therefore, it is the same thing for God to be in all things by essence and by presence. Therefore, it is superfluous to say that God is in things through essence, presence, and what? Power, right, huh? So what is the difference there between God being in all things through essence and presence, huh? Moreover, God, just as God is the beginning of all things through his power, so also through his knowledge and his will. But God is not said to be in things through knowledge and will, therefore, neither through, what? Power. Moreover, as grace is a certain perfection added over and above to the substance of the thing, so there are many other perfections added over and above. If, therefore, God is said to be in a special way in some things to grace, grace, it seems that according to any perfection, we're not to give or take or get a special way of God being in things, huh? Now, that gets stuck in there and all, huh? Grace. But against this is what Gregory says, and I assume this is Gregory the Great, right? What else do you mean? In his commentary upon the song of what? Songs. Catechal of catacles, right? That God, in a common way, is in all things by presence, power, and what? Substance. No, no, substancia there is like the word essentia in the other text, right? Okay, so those three ways, and then, nevertheless, in a familiar way, he says, said to be in some things, right? Through grace, right? Maybe that's the reason why that fourth, what, objection came up, right? Because of this text of Gregory the Great. Now, I answer, it should be said that God is said to be in some things in two ways. That's a kind of interesting distinction now. In one way, through the manner of an agent cause. And thus he is in all things created by him. Because the agent is what? Together, right? With the thing that's acting. How can you act upon something without taking contact with it? Being there. In another way, as the object of operation is in the one, what? Operating. Which is what? Operator or prior? Prior, yes, huh? It's just in the operations of the soul, right? According as the known is in the knower, right? And the desired in the one desiring. So, in this, therefore, in this second way, God especially is in the rational creature, right? That is to say, in the rational creature which knows and loves him, right? Either actually or habitually, right? And because the rational creature has this through grace, as we'll be clear below, he is said to be in this way in the saints through what? Grace, huh? So, you're the temple of the Holy Spirit. That means the Holy Spirit is in you, right? But he's in you, what? Through grace, right? Right, huh? Okay. And he says, In things and other things created by him, in what way he is, should be considered from those things which are said to be in human things. For the king is said to be... Now, here you start to go to the other three, right? That gave their... They were singled out in the statement of the tension of the article, right? Where the God is in all things through essence, power, and what? Presence, right? Okay. And he's going to lead us by the hand here from human things, huh? So, in other things created by him, in what way he is, should be considered from those things which are said to be in human affairs. For the king is said to be in his whole kingdom through his, what? Power. Even though he is not everywhere, what? Present, right? The king's power extends everywhere. Through his presence, however, he is said to be in all things which are in, what? His prospect, in his sight, right? Just as all those things which are in some house are said to be present to someone, huh? Who nevertheless is not according to his very substance in each part of the house. But according to substance or essence. Now, see there he's taking, what? The words of Gregory, right? That we had, substantia, right? And the words in this, what? Article. Where he said, it's got, what? Everywhere. Through essence. Through, what? Yeah. Yeah. They say, in the text from Gregory, you had substantia. Okay. And, well, yeah, but leave you the left side now. Yeah, presentia, potentia, substantia. But in the original text of the article, you had presentia, potentia, and essentia, right? But essentia and substantia mean somewhat the same thing, huh? Okay. But substantia is a different word than essentia, obviously, huh? Okay. Now, according to substance or essence. I'm saying this kind of being the same. Something is said to be in place in which it's, what? Substance is had, right? For there was some, to wit, the Manichaeans, who said that to the divine power are subject spiritual and incorporeal things, right? But that the visible things and the bodily things are subject to the, what? Power of a contrary principle, right? Because matter is evil, right? For the Manichaeans, huh? So God's power doesn't extend down here. This sublunar world, with all its misery, right? So against these heretics, these Manichaeans, therefore, it's necessary to say that God is in all things through his, what? Power, right? Okay. There were some who, although they believed all things to be subject to the divine power, nevertheless, they did not extend divine providence all the way down to these, what? Lower bodies, yeah. From the person of whom is said, Job 22, he, what, walks around the cardinal points of the heavens, right? Nor does he consider our things down here, right? He doesn't bother about us down here. And against these is necessary to say that he is in all things through his, what? Presence. Presence, huh? There were also those who, although they said that all things pertain to divine providence, nevertheless, they laid down that all things were not immediately created by God, right? But that he immediately created the first creatures, and these created others, right? And against these is necessary to say that he is in all things through his, what? Yeah. It's a little fun use of words there, but. Thus, therefore, he is in all things through his power, insofar as all things are, what? Subject to his power, right? He is by presence in all things, and this refers now, I guess, to his knowing, insofar as all things are naked and open to his eyes, right? Nothing, no closed doors to God, right? Now, he is in all things through essence, insofar as he is in all things as the cause of their, what? Being, right, huh? Now, it seems to be a little overlap there between, what? Potentium and essentium, right, huh? Okay? But essentium is referring very much so to his, what? Being everywhere as giving existence to these things, right? Now, deconic, you know, the teacher didn't like the word essence, right? I guess in French, you know, because he's teaching in French, essence, you know, meaning gasoline, I guess. Oh. So he's always, you know, bringing up that meaning of essence and then apparently turned him off the word somewhat, right? Mm-hmm. But if you look at the word essentia, it's obviously related to the word esse, isn't it? Yeah. You see? And so, he said to be in all things through his essence, insofar as he is, what? To all things as the cause of their ascendancy, to the cause of their being, right, huh? But all these things that he's the cause of being, his power is there, able to act upon all of them, right, or transform them or to do something, right? Okay? So, but, you know, in some context you might say it's through the power of God that things are created, right, and held in existence, right? So he seems to be almost, what, using the word essence there for the giving of these things their existence, right? And then subsequent to that, they're subject to his power, right, to move them, to do something or not, and to change them in any way he wants to and so on, right? But then the presence is something quite different. That's, is, is knowledge, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So, you know, those words I don't think are really Thomas' choice, but they're the word ...that were famous, right? And he's kind of explaining how to understand them. A lot of times Thomas will use the words that are common at the time, you know. I know when I teach the love and friendship there, and you have the distinction between the, in Latin, the amor concupiscentiae, and the amor amicitiae, and perhaps you could translate them more accurately, I mean the meaning, by saying the love of wanting and the love of wishing well, right? Because friendship implies, you know, not only that you wish well to somebody, but that there's a mutual wishing well, right? So when you say the love of friendship, is that the best way to name this? Then you see later on, you get to the treatise on friendship, the highest kind of friendship that Aristotle talks about there, is the friendship where the friends wish well to each other, right? But the lesser kinds of friendship, the friendship of pleasure, right? And the useful friendship, there we don't really wish well to each other, right? But I want something from you, pleasure, or some useful way that you're useful to me, right? And you want something pleasant or useful from me. Not really wishing me well, right? You want me because I tell a lot of good jokes or something, right? Or I cook a real good meal or something, right? You know? So you have the love of wanting from me, right? Or I'm useful to you in your dealings and so on, right? And of course, but if you're talking to two kinds of love involved, in the highest kind of friendship and in the lower kinds, well, you don't want to call one of them the love of friendship, and the other the love of concubiscence, right? Or the love of wanting. It'd make better to say the love of wanting than the love of wishing well, right? But likewise, you can have the love of wishing well for someone who doesn't wish you well. But that's not friendship, because friendship involves mutual wishing well. We'll break right now. We'll break right now. We'll break right now. We'll break right now. To the first, therefore, it should be said that God is said to be in all things through essence, not because he is, what, of things as being of their very essence, but because through his essence, right, his substance is present to all things as a cause of their being, right? So the way of speaking that is a little bit, it seems to be awkward, you know, to say that in all things through, what, essence, right, huh? It has some ambiguity to it, right? So it needs to be explained how it's to be understood, right? But it seems to have something to do with the fact that the word essence is related to the word essay, huh? And so God is, through his essence, present to all things as giving them, what, their being, right, huh? Because God's essence is his being, right? So God is being essentially, so all the things are partaking of the divine being. So there's some appropriateness to it, but still, it could be easily misunderstood. Now the second objection, huh? That what is present to things is not, what, lacking to them, right? Not absent from them, and so on. And it's a privilege, therefore, to say that he's in all things both through essence and presence. To a second it should be said that something is able to be said to be present to something insofar as it is subject to its, what, sight, right? Okay. Which nevertheless is distant from it according to its substance, as has been said. And therefore it's necessary that there to be two ways laid down, namely through essence and through presence. So God is, what, everywhere, in a way, through his, what, knowledge, right, huh? And he's everywhere through giving, what, existence to things, right? Okay. Those are two different ways of being everywhere, huh? Now the third one says, why do you say power and not through science and will? He says, to the third it should be said that it's of the notion of science and the will that the thing known be in the knower, right? And the thing willed in the one willing. Whence, according to knowledge and will, things are more in God than God in things. But it's of the notion of power that it be a beginning of acting in another. Whence, according to power, the agent is compared and applied to an exterior thing. And thus, through power, the agent can be said to be in, what, another, right? Okay. Now sometimes Thomas will point out, you know, if you use the word power with respect to knowing and willing in God, you can't really say there's a real distinction between the two, right? Because there's no, what, difference in act and ability in God, huh? But if you take power in comparison to exterior things, then those exterior things in God's power are really, what, distinct, right? And that's why I use the word power more than the word will or reason. Now the fourth objection. And this goes now to the other way of God being in things as their, what, object, right, huh? To the fourth it should be said that no other perfection added to substance makes God to be in something as the object known and loved except grace. Grace, and therefore grace alone makes a singular way for being of God in things. There's, however, another singular mode of being for God and man through union, at least referring to the, what, incarnation, I think, right? Yeah. Okay. Think about which in its place will be treated, huh? Okay. Think about which in its place will be treated, huh? Think about which in its place will be treated, right? Think about which in its place will be treated, right? Think about which in its place will be treated, right? Think about which in its place will be treated, right? Think about which in its place will be treated, right? That's a special one that you don't take up here, right? It takes up the Incarnation in the third part, right? I assume, right? Just not so appropriate here. It's called Emmanuel in the Gospel of Matthew, right? And in Isaiah, I think it is, that's the only place where he's called Emmanuel. It means God be with us, right? But it's referring, in a way, to the Incarnation, huh? That's a special way that he wants to take up in the third book. Let me just, hints briefly. Okay, now the fourth article. Whether to be everywhere is proper to God, huh? It seems that to be everywhere is not private to God, I'm going to say, huh? For the universal, according to the philosopher, is everywhere and always. And the first matter, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, huh? Unless he gave it to none. Therefore, to be everywhere is not, what? Private to God, right? Moreover, number is in the numbered, huh? But the whole universe is constituted in a number, as is clear in Wisdom chapter 11. Therefore, there is some number which is in the whole universe, and thus is everywhere. I don't even tell you to think of all these objections, you wonder, huh? Moreover, the whole universe is a certain, what? Whole body that is perfect, as is said in the first book of the Heaven and Earth, huh? First of all this book on the universe. But the whole universe is everywhere, because outside of it there is no place. Therefore, not only, not God alone is, what? Everywhere, right? Moreover, if some body were infinite, no place would be outside of it. Therefore, it would be everywhere. And thus, to be everywhere would not seem to be, what? Private to God, right? Moreover, the soul, as Augustine says in the sixth book of the Trinity, is a whole in the whole body and a whole in each part, right? And Thomas will often take off from Augustine there when he takes up that article, right? Mm-hmm. You see that in the Zoom and other places. Because Aristotle doesn't talk too explicitly about it. If, therefore, there was not in the world except one animal alone, its soul would be, what? Everywhere, right? And thus, to be everywhere is not private to God. Moreover, as Augustine says in the epistle to Volusianum, the soul is where it sees. The soul, where it sees, there it senses. And where it senses, there it lives. And where it lives, there it is. But the soul sees, as it were, everywhere. Because successfully it sees the whole heavens. Therefore, the soul is everywhere, right? Jerry, get your soul in the heavenly things, right? But again, this is what Ambrose says in the book about the Holy Spirit. Who would dare to say that the Holy Spirit is a creature? The Holy Spirit who is in all things, huh? And everywhere, and always, huh? Which surely is, what? Private to the divinity, right? I answer it should be said that to be everywhere, first and through itself, is private to God. For that is, I say that is everywhere first, that by itself as a whole, is everywhere. If something were everywhere by diverse parts in diverse places, right? It would not first be everywhere, but through those parts, huh? Because what belongs to something by reason of its parts, does not belong to it first. Just as if man is white by his teeth, whiteness does not belong to man first, but to the teeth first, right? But to be everywhere per se, I call that to which it does not belong to be everywhere by happening, on account of some supposition being made. For thus, a grain of what? That's some size there. Would be everywhere if one supposes that no other body were, right? So an apple would be everywhere, right? Whatever the fruit is, if it's the only body. But through itself, it belongs to something to be everywhere, when it is such that whatever position being granted, it follows that it would be everywhere. And this properly belongs, or privately belongs to God, because whatever places there are laid down to be, even if one were laid down infinity of places, right? Besides the ones which are, huh? It would be necessary that in all of these is God. Why? Because nothing is able to be except through Him, right? Thus, therefore, to be everywhere, first and through itself, belongs to God, and is what? It's property, if I say, right, huh? It's private to Him. Because no matter how many places are laid down, it would be necessary, it's necessary, that each of them be God, not by some part of God, but by Himself, huh? Okay? So through Himself, He's everywhere, right? Now, to the first objection, that the universe and the first matter are everywhere. He says, well, the first, therefore, it should be said that the universal and first matter are everywhere, but not according to the same, what? Being, huh? Not according to the same existence, huh? Because matter is under different forms, and therefore has, what? A different existence, right? Under each of these forms, huh? And the universal exists in the mind apart from the singulars, but man out here exists in you and me and the next guy by a different, what? Existence, right? So the existence of Socrates and the existence of Plato is not the same. Both of them are the existence of the universal in some way. So the universal is a set of many, each one of which has its own distinct, what? Existence, huh? So it's not through itself first everywhere, is it? But through the existence of each of the singulars of which it is said, right? To the second, the one about number. To the second it should be said that number, since it is an accident, is not through itself, but through action or through happening in place. Nor is the whole in each one of those numbered, but according to part, huh? So it's four in all of us. It's four in me and four in you and four in you, okay? And thus it does not follow that it be first in through itself, what? Everywhere, huh? The same thing for the universe, huh? To the third it should be said that the whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not first, because the whole is not in each place, right? But one part of it is here and one part of it is there, right? So it's not first in through itself everywhere, but it's everywhere through its parts, one of which is here and one of which is there, okay? Nor again is it everywhere through itself, because if one were to lay down there to be other places, it would not be, what? In them, right, huh? But God would still be in these other places, because they couldn't be without Him, right? To the fourth it should be said about the infinite body, that if there were an infinite body, it would be everywhere, but by its, what? Parts, right? One part here, one part there. So the infinite body, first in through itself, couldn't be everywhere, could it? But it's hidden everywhere because this part is here and that part is there, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.