Prima Pars
Lecture 37: Eternity, Time, and the Divine Nature

Transcript
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Now, first objection. And now, excuse me, there's a nice little text of Bwethius I'm just referring to, right? Nothing made is able to be said of God, but eternity is something made. For Bwethius says, the now flowing makes what? Time. The now that stands makes eternity. Yeah, beautiful. And Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions, God is the what? The author, the source of eternity. Therefore, God is not eternal. Moreover, what is before eternity and after eternity is not measured by eternity. But God is before eternity, as is said in the, what? Book de Cosis, right? Thomas has a commentary on that book on the Libra de Cosis. And at first they thought it was by Aristotle, but then Thomas later undiscovered the author was and where it came from, right? But it's an important book, and it's not altogether correct in everything it says, but, you know, it says in the, it's a very authoritative book, you know, in the latest. But God is before eternity, as is said in the book de Cosis, and after eternity. And it's said in Exodus 15, now this is even more important, that God rules in aeternum and beyond. Therefore, to be eternal does not belong to God. Now, probably we misunderstand these texts, you know, but, you know, you can see how this objection comes up. More of eternity is a certain measure, right? See? But it doesn't belong to God to be measured. Therefore, it does not belong to him to be eternal. We say our life is measured by time, God's life is measured by eternity, though. And be. Moreover, in eternity, there is not a present, a past, and a future, since it is all at once, as has been said. But about God, it's said in scriptures, words of present time, past, and future, right? Therefore, God is not, what? Eternal. But against this is what Dionysius says, and this is, I guess, the Athanasian Creed, the Father Eternal, the Son Eternal, the Holy Spirit Eternal. So, nice set of rejections. It's got the beautiful quote that I was giving, though, at the beginning from the Buethys. You know, the reference there to the Buethys is down in the De Trinitate, chapter 4, right? But the definition of eternity is given in the consolation of philosophy, so the texts are nicely brought together, right? Okay. Answer, it should be said that the ratio or notion of eternity follows upon unchangeableness, right? Just as the ratio of time follows upon motion. That's a very important proportion, right? Again, you kind of, you know, you learn that when you study the physics, right? That motion takes time. And so, what moves is in time. So, you carry it over to God, you negate time, change first, before you negate what? The power. Yeah. So, you consider God as being unchangeable before as being eternal. So, I like about Thomas, he puts order into your thoughts, huh? Mm-hmm. And so, you learn from Thomas how to think about God in an orderly way, right? and kind of complete way, too, if he can be said to, you know, be complete. I don't even like this to read anybody else like Thomas, I don't know, where he puts that. Hence, since God is Maxime, Immutabilis, right? He's all together, huh? So it belongs to him, Maxime, right? To be eternal. And that only is eternal, but he is his own eternity. It's like he's not only good, but he's goodness itself, right? Since no other thing is its own what? Duration, right? Because it's not its own, what? Being, huh? But God is his own, what? Being uniformly. Whence just as is his own essence, so also he's his own, what? Trinity, huh? Okay? Now, to the first, it should be said, this is a text now of Boethius, where he said that the time standing still makes eternity, right? The first effort should be said that the now standing is said to make eternity according to our, what? Apprehension. Our apprehension, our way of grasping, right? For just as there is caused in us the grasping of time in that we grasp the, what? Flow of the now itself, right? So there is cause in us a certain grasping of eternity in so far as we grasp the now as what? Standing still, yeah. What, however, Augustine says that God is the author of eternity is understood about the partaking eternity, right? So we are said to partake of eternal life, right? And Thomas will talk about that, huh? In the Sumatana Gentile there is another place when he talks about seeing God as he is, right? And why would you see God as he is face to face if you partake of eternity, right? There is no before and after in that vision, right? It is all at once. It is always going to be fresh in that vision. And that is what he adds there, right? In that way God communicates his eternity to some things in which also he, what? His unchangeableness, right? So there is no change at all in the vision, right? And therefore as you partake of his unchangeableness in that vision so you partake of his, what? Eternity. So we call that eternal life. Let me even say that in the eternal life, right? In the prayers of the dead and so on. Okay, so that is the answers to the first objections, right? And the second one is taken from the text of the Decauses in Exodus 2. And to this is clear the solution to the second, right? Thomas orders these projections in the way, right? One leads on the other one. For God is said to be before eternity insofar as he is partaken of by the immaterial substances, huh? Whence there also it is said that intelligentsia, meaning the angelic minds, right? are laid out with eternity, right? Or they're made equal to eternity. Whatever is said in Exodus that God reigns in a term in ultra, it should be understood that eternum is taken there for what? Secular, for the age, right? As has another what? Translation, huh? You know he was a scriptural scholar, Thus therefore he said to rule beyond the eternal or eternum because he what? Endures beyond any what? Age, right? That is any duration given. For an age is nothing other than the period of something as is said in the first book about the universe of Aristotle. Or he's said to reign beyond the eternal because there's something what? Else always was as the motion of the heavens is according to some philosophers. Nevertheless God reigns beyond insofar as his reign is what? All at once, huh? It's a mouthful. Now, you know when God says Christ talks about the last judgment there and some people are on one side and some on the other side, right? And they're going into the everlasting fire preparing for the devil and so on. I think you might use the word eternal there too, right? But it's not the full notion of what to call it. Alternately, right? It might be unending, I guess that's part of the meaning of it, right? But is it all at once? No. So using the word eternal there was only part of the full meaning, right? But that shouldn't scandalize you, right? Because we often define something in the fullest sense, right? And then we realize there can be lesser senses, right? Like the first example there is in the beginning of philosophy is in the Isagogia, where Porphyry would define the property as what belongs to only one species, to every member of that species, and always, right? So it's a property of, say, two to be half of four, because only two is half of four, every two is half of four, and two is always half of four, right? But let's say it's a property of two to be, let's say, less than ten. Where every two is less than ten, every two is always less than ten, but not only, right? You see what I mean? So you define the property in the strictest and fullest sense, and then you can have lesser senses by dropping one another, right? Or like, you know, when I define marriage, I say it's the, exemplifying the four causes, I say it's a stable union of a man and woman, right? By mutual choice for the sake of children, right? And you say, well, I know some unstable unions, right? But I'm defining, you know, marriage in the full sense, right? And then, you know, maybe some infringement upon free will there, mutual choice, right? You know, shotgun weddings or whatever it might be. And, well, they're sort of married, right? And then you say, well, and what about old people get married, right, who aren't able to produce children anymore, right? Well, are they married? Well, I guess you have to say they're married, I guess. They're not living in sin, I mean. But that's not really the full meaning of marriage, right? You see, you know, I don't want to slam those people too hard because they're lonely or something. But that's not really the full meaning, you know, I mean, that's that marriage in the full sense, right? And so we tend to define these things in the full sense, right? So eternity in the full sense, it's not only unending, but it's what, all at once, right? But you might take eternity in a lesser sense where you drop out the idea of what? All at once, but keep the idea of what? Of the gain and the win. And I think most people, you know, when they think of eternity, they think of endless time, you know, and they have part of the idea but not the whole, right? So it's not purely equivocal to use the word, but it is equivocal, right? Okay? And so I could deny, you know, that less than ten is a property of two, right? That it's not properly in that full sense, but that's no big deal, you know, to see the equivocation of that, huh? Okay? I mean, sometimes even you find Aristotle will speak of being as a genus, right? And Thomas says, well, he means, you know, something general, set of many things, and so on. But it's not a genus in a strict sense, you know, because he'll deny that it's a genus in a strict sense. But sometimes you use the word in that elusive sense. Now, the third objection is about measure, right? To the third, it should be said that eternity is not other than God himself, right? When God is not said to be eternal, that he's in some way measured, right? But it takes there the ratio of measure according to our, what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So if someone asks us, you know, what measures your life? Well, time measures my life. What measures God's life? Well, eternity measures it, right? That's kind of according to our way of grasping the thing, yeah. Now, the fourth one is talking about how these different times are applied to God, huh? And here Thomas doesn't say explicitly that this metaphorical, although it could be in some cases seem to be that way. But he says the words or verbs of diverse times are attributed to God insofar as his eternity includes all times, right? Not that he is very too, what? Past, past, future. Yeah. Now, you see this other comparison. Thomas, you know, where he sometimes compares with the, what? Invisibility of eternity to the point, right? That's the center of the circle. So, and then the points on the circumference compares to the nows of time, right? And these ones, this one comes after that one, let's say, but before this one, let's say. So, the parts of time are before and after each other, but they're all related to the, what? Center of the circle. Yeah, they're all opposites, you might say, right? Okay, so the past and the future are present to the, what? Now of eternity, but the now of time is not present to the past of time or the future of time. So, God sees them, right? There used to be this program in the old days on radio, you were there, is that before your time or not? And they were in agulants, you know? I mean, I remember one time that they had the trial of Socrates or something like that, you know? And of course, yeah, you know, announcing, you know, and so on. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It started like a news broadcast and so on. So, they kind of, it's kind of a negative in a sense. They take some historical event like that and you were there, right? You were in prison, right? But the story, you know, teaches you to say, you know, when you get to eternity and see God as he is, he'll be there. Because the past and the future and so on, they're all there present to God and to eternity. So, but you see, his now is not in time, right? It's outside of it, huh? But everything can be, in a sense, related to the now as eternity in the same way, right? So, it's kind of a, the way he sees my life, my life is, you know, I'm trying to remember what happened, you know? I said to Rosie, how long did you go to Europe twice or did you go to England twice or something? Yeah, I guess we did, yeah. But it's all present to God, right? You see it all comes back when you die, right? And you see your whole life laid out there, you know? And then the judgment, then you get your judgment, right? And you see the justice of your judgment, right? I don't know, but it's a pretty frightening thing. So, 420, shall we stop? Yeah, I think I'm right here. Okay, now, I mentioned next week I'll be getting the exam in fact of this time. And then enjoying the correcting of it and so on. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. We'll have to pray on this too. Right? So, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us, and help us to understand all that you have written. Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. So, we'll start with Article 3 here, and Question 10. Whether to be eternal is, what, private to God, huh? For it is said in the book of Daniel, Chapter 12, that those who instruct many in justice will be like stars in perpetual eternities. But there would not be many eternities if only God was eternal. Therefore, not only God is eternal. Moreover, it is said in Matthew 25, Go accursed into eternal fire. Therefore, not only God is eternal. Moreover, everything necessary is eternal. This is in the Posterian Olympics. But many things are necessary, like all of the principles or beginnings of demonstrations, and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore, not only God is eternal. Again, this is what Jerome says to Marcellus, that God alone is the one who does have no beginning. But whatever has a beginning is not eternal. Therefore, God is eternal. This isn't the definition of eternity. That's the, what, all at once and perfect possession, right, of unending life that has no beginning, no end. The answer should be said that eternity, properly speaking, is found in God alone, because eternity follows upon immutability or unchangeableness, just like time follows upon what? Motion, right? So the negation of change or motion negates, what, time, right? We saw that in the definition of eternity. But God alone is altogether unchangeable, as has been shown above. Nevertheless, insofar as some things receive unchangeableness from him, by that they retake of his, what, eternity. Now, some things there are that in this respect receive unchangeableness from God, that they will never, what, cease to be. And according to this, it says in Ecclesiastes, about the earth, that it stands in aeternum forever. Some things are said to be eternal in scriptures, on account of the, what, length of their duration, even though they are, what, corruptible, as is said in the Psalms, the eternal, what, mountains. And in Deuteronomy, one speaks also of the, what, fruit. Fruits of the eternal hills, Bacchus Amat Koles, Bacchus Amat Koles. He likes hills, right? That's not even that word there. He heard that particular phrase, Koleum. But some things receive more of the notion of eternity, insofar as they have, what, unchangeability, either according to their being, right, or further, according to their, what, doing, their operation, as the angels and the blessed, who enjoy the word. Because as regards that vision of the word, we're seeing the word face to face, as it is. There are not in the saints changing thoughts, as Augustine says in the 15th book on the Trinity. Whence also those seeing God are said to have eternal life. According to that of John 17, 3, this is eternal life, that they might know you and him who know the sent. So that's like the definition of eternal life. Thomas goes to that definition of eternal life there, when he talks about the division of the articles of faith. Because the faith is kind of a, what, foretaste of the vision. And of course, the way that text says, this is eternal life, they might know you and him whom you have sent. So he divides it according to the divinity and the humanity of Christ. But it's because it's a foretaste of eternal life. So to the first, therefore, it should be said. This is the one that had the objection from Daniel, right? Speaking about the stars, right? And the perpetual eternities. And there are said to be many eternities, according as there are many partaking of eternity, from the very contemplation of God. So there's no before and after when you see God face to face. I was just reading the last chapter of the Summa Contra Gentiles this morning. And Thomas was quoting the apocalypse there. And time will not be anymore. So it's kind of hard to, you know, think of yourself as not living in time and not having your life measured by time. It's quite an adjustment. It will take you a long time to adjust. To second, it should be said that the fire of hell, right, is said to be eternal on account of its what? On end, yeah. But nevertheless, there is in their pains a what? Change, huh? According to that of Job chapter 24, that they would transit from the waters of snows, right, to exceeding what? Heat, huh? So you have both the complaints of winter and of summer. And this, whence in hell there is not true eternity, huh? Because the definition of eternity was what? Totesimo. All at once. There's no before and after, right? Okay. So there's more time there, right, huh? So far as there's this change from the hot to the cold. According to that of Psalm 80, that there will be their time in what? Ages, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Now notice, nothing prevents one from using a word like eternity in more than one sense, right? Yeah. So God's life is essentially eternal, right? Right. And then we have life because we partake of eternity, and we have an activity of seeing God face to face, in which there's no before and after at all, right? Okay. And we will have no end in that. Okay. We have a beginning, but no end in seeing God, right? Mm-hmm. So you're keeping more of the meaning of eternity, right, in the beatific vision than you are in the second section here, referring to hell, right? Because there you have a transmutation, a change from one state to another state. And it has only the idea of not having an end in common with, what? Eternity, right? Okay? So the word becomes equivocal by dropping something of the full meaning of eternity and keeping, what? Yeah, less than less, yeah. And for the souls in purgatory, there's no sense of the word eternity for them, right? Because there'll be an end, there's still... There's a beginning and an end, yeah. Yeah, yeah. So it's kind of, there's something... They're not to be eternal, that... You're punished, right? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Even more time, is it word? More time, yeah, yeah. More time than that. More time. I think in purgatory, there's no body there to distract you, right? And so your desire to see God is really causing the pain, right? Because you realize you're impure and not ready to see Him yet. And you want to have this burn away, right? You know, just like you're getting married to something or not to break off with a rash or something. You want to get married when you're cleared up with all these pimples and gargoyles and everything. But I mean, the separate soul is more aware of its defects, right? Than it is in this life. And you have nothing other bodily to distract you or to console you. So, it must be very intense, you know? What does St. John of the Cross say, you know, says to his friends, pray that I might have my purgatory on earth? Most people aren't willing to pray for that, but they say that purgatory is more painful than having a purgatory on this earth. That's the thing that they like to do a lot in funerals now, too, you know, people, because if, you know, everybody's there, you arrive, you know? And they, I know when my father died, the priest, a very good priest, he had a parish there. But, you know, the thing, you know, never stop praying for him, because we never know how long, you know? Nobody says that anymore, you know? I always remember him saying that to my mother, and everyone had told me that. So she always, you know, pray for him. And if he's got over already, I mean, then these prayers aren't going to be wasted. It's not going to be like, oh, I was praying for somebody who already made it. But if they hadn't made it, and they would be very thankful when you get there, and they'll remember you, too. So, and just like we learned in logic, when you define a property, a property is defined by porphyry, in a strict sense, it's what belongs to only one species, to every member of it, and always. So, it's a property of two, say, to be half a four. Because only two is half a four, two is always half a four, and every two is half a four, right? But then if you say, well, isn't it a property of two to be less than ten? Well, now you've got, every two is less than ten, two is always less than ten, but not only, right? And then you drop one meaning, right? And then maybe you can say, is it a property of man to be a logician? Well, every man is not a logician, and, well, what's this as a property? Well, only maybe man is a logician, right? But not every man is a logician, and not always, right? Even those who are logicians. But you still have something of the idea of property, right? So you have something like this in eternity, which is, you know, you're dropping maybe the idea of before and after, right? The negation of before and after. I think when people think of eternity, they usually think of endless time, right? And so if you call that eternity, I suppose you could say that's one way of using the word eternal, right? But it's falling off from the full sense, huh? Yeah. Okay? And you can drop out one or maybe more than one meaning, right? You drop the idea of not having a beginning, but keep the idea of not having an end, right? Okay? Now the third objection was talking about the necessary being what? Eternal. The third, it should be said that necessary signifies a certain mode or way of truth. But truth, according to the philosopher, in the sixth book of wisdom, the sixth book after the books of natural philosophy, is in the understanding, right? According, therefore, true and necessary things are eternal because they are in a, what? Eternal mind. Which is the divine mind alone, right? Once it does not follow that something outside God is eternal, right? Okay? But in some sense, we would say that, what? It's always true that two is half a four, right? It's true. Is it? So you're convinced now that God alone? So you ought to answer the objections, huh? Okay? Now the fourth article, where the eternity differs from what? Time. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that eternity is not other than time. How is it going to argue this now? It is impossible for two measures of duration to be together unless one is part of the other. For there are not together two days or two, what? Hours, right? But there could be an hour and a day together, right? Because one is a part of the other. But the day and the hour are together because the hour is a part of the day. But eternity and time are together. That's a very important word, that simo, huh? Hours, Daba has a chapter on simo in categories, right? It's a chapter right after the chapter on before and after. The Greek word is hama, simo. In English, how do you translate that, huh? Essentially, same. We could say together or, you know, at once, you know. At once. Okay? But it has more than one meaning, but they kind of correspond to the senses of before and after. It's kind of interesting, huh? It's like you understand simo by negation of before and after. Aristotle hints that way, too, about more and less than equal, that more and less are actually before in our thinking equal. And two lines are equal. One is neither more nor less than the other. See? And I know in the fragment of Anaxagris, when he's talking about things being forever equal, right? But before he says that things are forever equal, he says there are never more, because you can't get something from nothing. And there are never less, because something can't go into nothing. So if they need them more nor less, then all things are forever equal. But it's like he's showing that they need them more nor less, and then concluding that they're not, what, equal, right? But it shows you how, and it's a strange geometry is, huh? Because in geometry, we consider the equal before the, what, unequal. And you'll notice this, when Euclid defines, he'll define the equal before the unequal. He'll define the equilateral triangle before the isosceles triangle, and the isosceles triangle before the scalene triangle. Or when he defines, let's say, the angles, he'll define right angle first. When a straight line meets a straight line, makes equal angles, those angles are right. But then when he comes to define obtuse angle and acute angle, he doesn't say, when a straight line meets a line, makes unequal angles, the greater is called obtuse, the lesser are acute. No, he defines obtuse by right angle. An angle more than a right angle. Acute angle, angle less than a right angle. So, not only does he define the equal before the unequal, but he defines the unequal through the equal. And even when he gives the axioms, he'll give the axioms of equality, like quantities equal to the same, equal to each other, before the axiom of inequality, the whole is always more than the part. And having taken this example, I think it's kind of interesting. Most people have heard the Pythagorean theorem, right? But the first book of Euclid's elements ends up with the Pythagorean theorem, 47 and 48, the Pythagorean theorem and the converse of it, 47 and 48. Well, then it's not until you get to book two, and towards the end of book two, that he gives the corresponding theories for the obtuse angle triangle and the acute angle triangle. And in the case of the two-sangle triangle, the side opposite to the two-sangle, the square on that, is greater than the two squares and the sides containing it. And with the acute angle, it's just three verbs, right? That they're less, right? Than the other two. So he does the theorem of equality before the theorems of inequality. So he does the theorem of equality. So he does the theorem of equality. ...proofs of the inequality theorems, he uses Pythagoras the American. That's kind of interesting, huh? And the same way, you know, take another example there from the first book of Euclid. You know, he shows that in a triangle, if two sides are equal, the angles opposite them will be equal. That's proposition 5. Now, starting to down, I think it's proposition 18, that he shows that if one side is longer than the other, then the angle opposite that one will be greater than the one opposite the lesser side. But if he examines the proof, he uses that theorem about the Sassan's Triangle to prove the one about inequality. So, that's kind of strange, huh? If we really know equality from neither more nor what? Less. It's kind of interesting, because in the dialogue called The Fatal Year, The Last Day of Socrates' Life, Socrates is trying to reason that we got our understanding of equality before we're in this life. And the reason he gives is that when we look at the bodies around us, you might say, for example, that these two chairs are equal, right? But when we examine them more closely, we realize they're not exactly equal. And so, they approach equality, but fall short of it. So, where do you get the idea of equality from something that falls short of it? And, but someone might come back and say, hey, but if you get the idea of equality from more or less, there are clearly some bodies that are larger or smaller than other bodies, right? And then we get the idea of equality by negation. Two bodies, one of which is neither larger nor smaller than the other. But then they're, what? Equal, right? Then you have a way out of that particular argument of Socrates. But in geometry, we seem to go from equality to, what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. You see something like that in modern science, where the basic mathematical expression is a so-called equation, right? So, equation, as it's taken from the word equal, right? And so, you can actually use an equation to know something that's unequal, right? But then you're knowing the unequal through the equal. Kind of contrary to my bricks here. So, but I make a kind of comparison there between knowing equal through more and less and knowing semo through before and after. And that's probably where Astao takes up before and after before he takes up semo, right, together, huh? Okay? But eternity and time are semo, together, huh? So, it's kind of hard to translate semo. Sometimes you have to translate it by together, I think. Other times, by at once, right? Okay? When you speak of two events as being simultaneous, what does that mean? Does it take place at the same moment, can you say? Yeah, yeah. Which both imply a certain measure of duration, right? Time, eternity. Since, therefore, eternity is not a part of time, because eternity exceeds time and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and not other from eternity, huh? That's an interesting thing, huh? Structures your mind a little bit there, right? Moreover, according to the philosopher in the fourth book of the physics, the now of time remains the same in the whole of time, huh? But this seems to constitute the notion of eternity, that be the same indivisibly, having itself in the whole discourse of time. Therefore, eternity is the now of time. We talked about that a little bit in the definition, but Thomas is touching upon this. But the now of time is not other in substance from time. Therefore, eternity is not other according to substance from time. Incidentally, let's go back a little bit to the fourth book of natural hearing there, so-called physics. Aristotle says, It is not the same now throughout time. When was the now corrupted? When is one now corrupted? Well, it can't be corrupted when it is. Therefore, it has to be corrupted in some what? Later now, right? Okay? But if you understand the now of time, it's a little bit like the point of the line. So is there a next point on the line? Because two points cannot touch, right? Without coinciding. So if you have two points, one earlier and one later, there's always some distance between them, and therefore another point in between those, right? Okay? So, when is the now of time corrupted? It can't be corrupted when it is. It's corrupted in some later now. Then in the intermediary now, it continues to be. That's a difficulty he sees, right? So Aristotle says, The now in time, in some senses, remains, right, throughout time, but it's always in a different position, right? And he compares, in a way, time to the motion of a body, right? And the now to the body in motion. So when the stone falls to the ground, right, that motion takes some time, right? And one part of the motion is in one part of the time, another part of the motion, another part of the time, and so on. But it's the same body that you drop in that remains throughout the whole descent to the ground, right? But the falling stone, let's say, the same stone throughout the whole thing, but its position is always, what, different, right? So he compares the now of time to the falling stone, right? To the body in motion, right? That body remains throughout the motion, but it's always a different position. So in that sense, the now of time is never corrupted, right? But he's probably going to bring in what the great Boethius taught us, right? That the now that, what, flows along makes time, but the now that, what, stands still, right? Makes eternity. Right? But it's very interesting. He makes a comparison. This objection makes you stop and think. Moreover, as the measure of the first motion is the measure of all motions. So we take the first and most regular motion, right? And for us, in most of our life, it's been the motion of the sun around the earth, or at least the apparent motion of the sun around the earth. And we use that to measure all other motions, huh? Okay? So he says, just as the measure of the first motion is the measure of all motions, as is said in the fourth book of Natural Hearing of Physics. So it seems that the measure of the first being, right, is the measure of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being, which is the divine being. Therefore, eternity is the measure of every being. Like Plato said, God is the measure of all things, huh? He says, Protagoras is mistaken. It's saying, man is the measure of all things. But God is the measure of all things. That's in Plato's last work, right? But the being of practical things is measured by time. Therefore, time is either eternity or something of eternity, huh? Now, he said contra. But against this is that eternity is tota, what? Simo. And I translate that, what? All at once, huh? All together. But in time, there's a before and after. So you may recall the definition of time. I think we stayed that a little bit. Okay? But it's the number of the before and after emotion, huh? And especially the before and after in the most regular and continuous motion, huh? So before and after is in the very definition of what? Time, right? And therefore, in Aristotle, in the categories, distinguishes the senses of before and after. He gives us the first meaning of before and after, that of time. And you can leave back that, the before and after in the motion itself, and the before and after in the path that the motion takes, huh? But he singles out before and after in time because that's most explicitly got the idea of before and after in it. It's in the very definition of it. It's not in the definition of time, huh? Even though you can maybe figure out to be a fear Before and after, because of what you learn from the definition of time, but the definition of motion, rather. But the definition of motion is the act of what is able to be, insofar as it's able to be. So before and after is not explicitly the definition of motion, but it is explicitly the definition of time. It's kind of interesting, because you learn in the sixth book of natural hearing, the connection there between the before and after in the road, and the before and after in the motion going down the road, and the before and after in the time it takes you to go down the road, and how they're kind of divided together, those three. And so, when Aristotle gives the first meaning, say, of beginning, in the fifth book of wisdom, the first meaning of beginning is the beginning of the table, beginning of the road. As Thomas points out in his commentary, to that first meaning of beginning, you reduce the sense of what? Beginning of the motion. You start at the beginning of the road, and the beginning of the time it takes you to go down the road, if you start at the beginning of the road, right? Okay? So there, but he gives you the first meaning, the one that's tied up with magnitude, with the place. And then the fourth book of natural hearing, when he takes up the senses to be in, right? He gives the first meaning of to be in, to be in place, like our being in this room, right? And after he goes through with the eight senses that Aristotle distinguishes, he raises the question, why doesn't Aristotle talk about to be in time? And he says, well, that's led back to the first meaning, huh? Because place and time are both measures of what they contained, huh? But in the case of before and after, he gives the first meaning not place, but time. And then before and after emotion and in place are reduced to that sense, huh? But it's a real care that Aristotle wrote, right? But in the word beginning and in the word to be in, the first one is in place. And then the one, the time is attached to that, huh? But with before and after, the first being given is time, and then the reverse is so. Before and after emotion or in magnitude is reduced to that sense. Yeah. But there I begin to realize what Aristotle does, huh? He doesn't give you all the meanings of these words, right? But he gives you the central meanings, right? And then that some meanings are attached to the central meanings, but are not as tipping stones as the next meaning. And very slowly he does that. You see, you enter into the details. That's why Aristotle was the first man to really understand the words he uses. And that we all use. We all use these words. But he really understood them, huh? And he could distinguish the central senses and see the order of them. And not anyone else can do that except Thomas, because he doesn't. Aristotle, in the physics there, he doesn't order the eight senses of him. And Thomas says, no, we're going to order them in the way Aristotle teaches us in the fifth book of wisdom. I don't think anybody could have ordered those. So it's absolutely amazing, huh? You've heard my famous propositions, right? If a man understands the words he uses, then he is wise. If a man does not understand the words he uses, then he is not wise. I told you that, those two, haven't I, before? I mean, true or false, those statements. If a man understands the words he uses, then he is wise. True or false? I mean, true? Well, I'd say false. Because wisdom doesn't consist chiefly in knowing the, what? No, it's chiefly in knowing the first cause, in knowing God, right? Okay? If a man understands God, then I'd say he's wise, right? I wouldn't say he's wise because he understands the words he uses. But now the second statement, if he does not understand the words he uses, then he is, then he is, what, not wise. That's, that's true, right, man? Okay? Okay. Just like if I said, you know, if a man understands plain geometry, then he's a master of the science of geometry. I'd say no, because you had to be no solid geometry, right? Mm-hmm. You know? But if a man does not understand plain geometry, then he is not a master of geometry. That's very true, right? And so if you can't understand the words you use, right, you know, you're obviously not wise, huh? And I just happened to, you know, I was clearing out my office, you know, reading a passage there of David Hume, you know, he's talking about the word nature, and he obviously doesn't understand the word at all. It's just so obvious, you know, to a man who's been reduced to all the meanings of nature and the order of those meanings and so on, they just want the words they're using. So it's like, you know, Thomas is talking about those people get mixed up, you know, and talking about incarnation and so on, and they'll say, you know, well, there's only one person, but there's two hypostases, huh? Hypostasis. Well, it's something like saying, you know, you know, that you and I are two animals, but we're one man, right? We're two animals. The only animal we could be would be a man. And so we're two animals, we're two men. So hypostasis is more general than a person. A person is a hypostasis of a rational nature, right? But the only hypostasis you can have of God or a man is a person. So if you admit two hypostasis, you're admitting two persons, and now you're in heresy, right? But he says they don't understand their own lingua, their own language. More than Aristotle, the father of logic, says in the book on social refutations that the most common mistake in thinking is from mixing up the sense of a word. How can a man be wise, right, who mixes up the sense of the words he uses? And they will do so with these words because they all have many meanings, these common words in certain order. So against this is that eternity is all at once, but in time there's a before and after. Therefore, time and eternity are not the same thing. I answer it should be said that it is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. But the reason for this diversity, some assign from the fact that eternity lacks a beginning and an end, right? Time, however, has beginning and end. But this difference, Thomas says, is what? For accedent, that's very strong. And not as such. Because it being given that time always was and always will be in the future, according to the position of those who lay down the motion of the heavens to be eternal, there would still remain a difference between eternity and time. As the great Boethius says in the book on the consolidation of philosophy. I mentioned that book before. That's the last book of Boethius written in prison, right? And, you know, Boethius made the mistake, if I don't say that, of following the advice of Plato until philosophers are kings or kings are philosophers who have bad government. So he went into government service, right? And apparently he was a very just man. And he was stopping some of the shenanigans that go on in government. And so he made, what? Many enemies. And so on trumped-up charges, they had him thrown in prison, right? And eventually he was, what? You might say martyr, right? It was actually, as Rome is now, as a local cult of his martyrdom there. But he wrote this book in prison, The Consolation of Philosophy. And I don't know if you have a chance to read that. He gave a copy of it, an English copy of it. It's a beautiful work. There's little verses and then a prosa, they call it, and a prose text, you know? And the little verses are very thoughtful, as well as the text. But written in the form of a dialogue, right? And Lady Wisdom comes down to console in prison. And what are you moaning for and groaning for? And so on. And she gradually leads him out of his, you know, depression and so on, huh? And the earlier books are dealing mainly with happiness, right? And Porifis takes up false happiness before true happiness on the grounds that's more known to us. And so he refutes what false happiness is, and he shows you how to do it.