Prima Pars
Lecture 39: The Continuous, Becoming, and the Unity of Being

Transcript
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because you divide, let's say, substance into material and immaterial, and then you subdivide material into living and unliving, and it spreads out, so it's like a Christmas tree, right? I told you one time at Laval there at Christmas time, their Christmas party gave the logic professor who taught a tree of warfare, right? It's kind of a joke. But you represent in the more universal above the other, which is less universal, right? You speak of the underlying cause. And sometimes you speak of the cause of being before the fact, but before and after goes back to continuous, the first meaning. We said it's that of time, right? And the before and after in motion and magnitude. But that's the before and after in the continuous, the discourse of reason, the running of reason, right? So the sixth book of the physics, of the natural theory, is the book of the philosophy of the continuous. The whole book is devoted to that, huh? And that's where Aristotle would take up, you know, the magnitude as being continuous, right? The line and the motion down the line and the time it takes, they're all continuous, huh? And he'll show this in many ways, huh? But all the famous propositions about the continuous, that's divisible forever, right? That it's not composed of the indivisible, so? And so on. All these things are brought out in that sixth book, right? That became really a key thing, huh? I think I mentioned this famous article by Charles Deconic called, it's in French, in la voie théologique et philosophique, Paradox de Devenir par la Contradiction. And Aristotle solved the problem, right? But as Deconic points out, Hegel was deceived by this, huh? He didn't understand it. And Deconic talks about the difficulties they had in the Middle Ages about the Eucharist, because he didn't understand this, huh? And it's very subtle, what Aristotle does there, huh? But it's the idea that when you have what is not a circle becoming a circle, let's say, right? Okay? And there's a time when it's not a circle, and there's a time around which it is a circle, right? Okay? And is the last instant in which it is not a circle the first instant in which it is a circle? Well, if you say that, then in that instant, it would both be and not be a circle, which is a contradiction, right? Okay? But if the last instant in which it is not a circle and the first instance in which it is a circle are not the same instant, right? Then between them, there has to be some time. Then you ask the question again. In that time, is it or is it not a circle? See? It's got to be one or the other. So you can't have a time in between that, right? Therefore, it seems that the last instant in which it is not a circle must be the first instant in which it is a circle, in which case you have a contradiction. That's the way Hegel proceeds, right? So becoming is a contradiction. Okay? That's where the Marxists get the idea that all change is a contradiction. But this happened in the theology of Eucalyptus, right? Because there's a time in which under the accidents of bread and wine, there's really bread and wine there. And then there's a time in which there's no longer bread and wine there, but there's the body and blood of our Lord. Okay? And this is the problem. Is the last instant in which it is, of the time in which it is bread and wine, the same as the first instant in which it is the body and blood of our Lord? Well, then you have heresy, right? Okay? But then, if they're not the same instant, then there's some time in which there's neither the bread and wine under there, nor the body and blood of our Lord, in which case the Eucharist would be impossible because you couldn't change none being into the body and blood of our Lord. So, that involves the solution to that problem, right? You can only solve it by going back to the sixth book of Aristotle's physics. Now, what Aristotle does is very subtle, right? But he will show that there's no last instant in which you are, what? Not a circle. That's the last time, not the last instant. But there's a first instant in which you are a circle. You know? That's very subtle, right? Aristotle saw that, right? See? But, you know, that didn't end to the theology, right? And he kind of keeps showing in that article the difficulty the theologians had until Thomas using Aristotle solved the difficulty. But, you find Hegel making the same mistake, right? And therefore saying that contradiction or change involves a contradiction, right? But obviously, he doesn't know it's Aristotle. so I find the moderns, you know, repeating the mistakes that Aristotle has refuted and they don't know the repeating history, right? But you see the importance of this for theology, right? That people couldn't solve it without Aristotle. So that's, so the philosophy of the continuous is extremely important. But as I see in this text of Thomas there in the Potentia, Questionis Disputate in the Potentia, which is kind of my favorite work of all the Questionis Disputate. It's got nice sections on the Trinity and so on. But, Thomas makes his point on how our names seem to come from the, what? Continuous, huh? Because our knowledge starts there with the continuous. Of course, we always fall back upon the continuous and sometimes get into false imagination, huh? Now, Thomas has to point out that God is not indivisible like the point is because the point is something indivisible that has a, a, a vocation in the continuous, right? It's here or there, right? God is indivisible outside the whole genus of the continuous. But you have to either distinguish God from the continuous, huh? What's the first thing we learned about God? The substance of God in it after his existence. Is there a recording? Well, that God is, yeah, God is not a body, right? You see? Even before, it doesn't have matters. You go back to the very first article in Question 3, right? Yeah, that God is a body, right? Okay. There you're learning that God is not, what, continuous. That's right. But anyway. Now, so now I talk about a road in our thinking, right? And the Greeks would all talk about a road in our thinking. But a road in the original meaning of the word is something continuous, huh? But when Aristotle talks about thinking there in the third book about the soul, he points out that thoughts are like numbers, not like, what, something continuous, right? So when you carry over the word road to the mind, you keep the idea of before and after, which you can have with numbers, right? But you drop the idea of what the continuous, okay? So, thoughts are not divisible forever, like the continuous is. And between the premises of the syllogism and the conclusion, there's no thought. If I say, every mother is a woman and Socrates is not a woman, there's a next thought. Yeah, yeah, see? Just like the numbers, right? Three to the next number, four, right? But this line here, is there a next line? Next longer line? No, no. You see? So there's a next thought. But not a next... So there's a second line here. longer line. And thoughts are not divisible forever. Just like numbers are not divisible forever. That's one of these crazy moderns. You think the one is divisible, right? So this is a very important principle here. You know, what does it say about God there in the apocalypse? God, I am the Alpha and the Omega. The Arche in Greek, the Telos. What's the first meaning of Arche? The beginning of this table. That's the first meaning of the beginning. This is the beginning right here. And that's something in the continuous, isn't it? So the first meaning of the beginning is what? In the continuous. And then at the other end, we're saying God is the beginning of all things, right? So you have to go through these different meanings of beginning until you get to God. That's what Aristotle does. That's where he begins in book five. So that's a good example of why he started the continuous. The first meaning of in is to be in place. Place is something continuous, right? It's tied up with the continuous. This is part of understanding our words, right? That's why we tend to use the word sense for the meanings of a word, right? Because we go back to our senses for the first meanings, huh? Come into this world knowing no words at all, right? So the first words have to be learned by connecting a sound with what? Something sensed. Cookie, huh? Want a cookie? That's it. I stabbed that on the tape with my son, Paul. So the first words are all tied up with the sensible. And therefore, the continuous. Now, some say that there is one time of all things temporal. On account of this, that there is one number of all things numbered. Since time is a number, according to the philosopher, right? By Antonio Masia, he calls him the philosopher, right? But this does not suffice. Because time is not a number as abstracted, right? Outside the numbered. It's a numbered number, as we say. Okay? But as existing in the numbered, huh? My teacher, an undergraduate there, because sir, he could write his doctoral thesis on numbers, right? And so on. He's talking about reading John St. Thomas there, the student of Thomas. And John St. Thomas begins, you know. And we pass over the vulgar distinction between numbering number and numbered number, you know. Because they say, well, what is that distinction? You know, you should know it by now, you know what I mean. But here, here, Thomas is making the distinction here. Otherwise, it would not be, what? Continuous, right? Okay? Because it's the number of a continuous thing. That's why time can be divided forever, right? Because the abstract number would be discrete. Yeah. Like datum, what? Only, I forget what that means in Latin, but it's one measure of the bread, right? Have continuity, not from number, but from the, what? Number, right? Okay? What? Cloth. Yeah. I thought it was being a cloth. Oh, okay. Okay, excuse me, I think I'm getting started with panis, two Ns. Oh, yeah. Okay, I think was it an elbow or something like that? That was, that's the cubit. Oh, cubit, okay. Oh, yeah. That's the elbow. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. But it has continuity, not from number, but from the numbered, right? For the number existing in the numbered is not the same of all, but diverse of diverse things. Okay? So there's six or seven of us here, right? It's the number numbered. Whence others assign the cause unity of time from the unity of eternity, which is the beginning of all duration. And thus all durations are one if one considers their beginning, but they are many if one considers the diversity of those things which receive duration from the influx, the inflowing of the first beginning. Others assign the cause unity of time on the side of the first matter, which is the first subject of motion whose measure is time. But neither assigning seems to be sufficient because those things which are one in a beginning or a subject and most of all a remote one are not one simply, but what? Secundum quid. The reason, therefore, for the unity of time is unity of the first motion by which, since it is the most simple, right, all others are measured, as is said in the tenth book of the metaphysics. The tenth book of the metaphysics is about, what, the one and the many. And it's a property of the one to be a measure, right? So Aristotle elaborates on the idea of measure there. Thus, time is compared to that motion, the first motion of the heavenly bodies we fall around us, not only as a measure to the measured, but also as a, what, accident to its subject. And thus, from it it receives unity. But to other motions it's compared only as the measure to the, what, measure. Whence by their multitude is now multiplied because one measure separated is, or by one measure I should say, separated, many things are able to be, what, measured. This being had, now, I think all that in your head now, it should be known about the spiritual substances that there's a two-fold opinion. Some say that all proceed from God in a certain equality, as Origen said, right? First Democrat, right? Or also many of them as some say. Others say that all spiritual substances proceed from God in a certain grade and order. And this, Tanisha seems to think, right? Who says in the tenth chapter of the celestial hierarchy that among these spiritual substances there are first ones, middle ones, and last ones, right? And even in each one order of angels has the beginning, the middle, and the last. According, therefore, to the first opinion is necessary to say that there are many eva, according as there are many ev eternal things, first, that are all equal. But according to the second opinion is necessary to say that there is one eva only, because each thing is measured by what is most simple in its kind, as is said in the tenth book of wisdom. Therefore, since the being of all ev eternal things are, what, measured by the, what, being of the first ev eternal things, which, insofar as it's more simple as before, and because the second opinion is more true, as he will show later on, he takes up the angels, as will be shown later on, we concede for the present that there is one eva only, right? Okay. Now, the first objection was taking eva in a sense of age, right? So that was just equivocation. And he says, the celestial bodies and the spiritual bodies differ in genus of their nature, but nevertheless they come together in that they have unchangeable being, according to the old opinion. We can forget about that. It's the angels do. When Thomas discusses that opinion there in the book on universe, he says, well, maybe the heavenly bodies take a longer time to change than the lives and many men. He's aware of the fact that it might not be altogether necessary Aristotle's argument. Just like Aristotle thought that time, what, was instantaneous. It's kind of amazing how fast light is, isn't it? It's pretty probable that it should take time to get, you know, it seems to take no time for it to go right across the little sky. Well, you got fluorescent lights. It's like you have a trick that come on kind of, you know, so it doesn't shock you by it, you know, right? The third thing about some things getting a later start. The third should be said that neither do all temporal things begin together, right? And nevertheless, of all of them, there is one, what, time. you know, you know, you know, you know, an account of the first that is measured by time. And thus all of eternal things have one avum, an account of the first, even if not all begin at once. And the fourth one, he seems to say you don't have to have the one that measures all the rest be their cause, right? What it has to be is more, what? Simple than the other ones, yeah. It's interesting, though, huh? If you go back to God being the simplest of all, then God would be the, what? In some sense, the measure of all things, as Plato says in the commandments, right? No, excuse me, in the laws. The laws, I think he says it again. I have often taught at the idea, you know, that if you want to add a little bit here to the treatise on the substance of God, right? As you know, the treatise on the substance of God is divided into five parts, right? So you have God being simple, God being perfect, God being infinite, God being unchanging, and God being one, right? But to some of these five things, he attaches something, right? So to God being perfect, he attaches a consideration to the goodness of God. And to God being infinite, he's being everywhere, right? And to God being, what? Unchanging as being eternal. He doesn't attach anything to his being simple, right? Or to his being one, right? I have to think, well, maybe you could attach to one as being the measure of all things. That's the property of the one to be the measure of all things, right? But you'd also say here, it seems to be a property of the simple to be the measure of other things, right? So if you wanted to have a consideration of God as the measure of all things, would you attach it to as being simple or one? There's a reason to attach it to either, right? Now, of course, there's no problem in the compendium of theology because he takes up the unity of God and the consideration of simplicity, so the two go together, right? But you could have a reason for maybe attaching it to either one, right? Property of the one to be the measure. Of course, the first one we think about is the one to be the number, right? It measures the numbers. But you kind of carry it over by analogy to the genre, right? So, Mozart is a measure of all musicians. Shakespeare is a measure of all poets. And Aristotle is a measure of all philosophers. The next time we'll find out about the most universal, see? The first two articles there, right? This will be the evidence. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Very good, you are. Help us to understand what you're written. Father, Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. And this division of the four articles of question 11 reminds me of what I sometimes say, that given the limits of the human mind, the basic choice in human thinking is either you choose to consider all things in general, and the best things in particular, or you consider lesser things in particular. And so, as you study all things in general, you see how that's very important for understanding the best things in particular. And you see it here in the order here of the four articles, because the first two articles are about, what, the one that is convertible with being, the most general one, things. And, of course, the last two articles are about the best thing. So, those two go together. Strange as it may seem. So, after the four of said things, it should be considered about the divine unity. And about this, four things are sought. Whither one adds something over being. Secondly, whither one and many are opposed. Third, whither God is one. And fourth, whither God is most one. So, article one. To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that one adds something over being. For everything that is in some genus, some determined genus, has itself with addition to being, which goes around all genera, covers all ten genera, that Aristotle talks about in the categories. But one is in a determined genus, for it is the beginning of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore, one adds something above being. So, there are ten basic genus, right? And the first one is substance, and the second one is quantity, the third is quality, the fourth is relation, and so on. And number comes under quantity, right? And one is the beginning of number. So, it's not as universal. And therefore, it must be adding something in particular. Further, what divides something common has itself with addition to that. But being is divided by one and many. Therefore, one adds something over what? Being, huh? More, if one does not add something over being, it would be the same thing to say one and being. But it's not, what, just a nugatoria. It's not just a... It's a repetition, right? To say one being. You say, I'm a man. You say, I am one man. Are you adding something or not? Or just saying the same thing. Therefore, it's not a nugatio to say one being, which is false. Therefore, one adds something over being. But against this is what Dionysius says in the last chapter of the Divine Names. There's nothing among existing things that does not partake of the one. It should not be if one added something over being that contracted it. Therefore, one does not have itself in addition to being. Okay. Now, Thomas says, I answer it should be said that one does not add over being some thing, right? But only the negation of what? Division. Now, this negation here is not a real thing, but a being of what? Reason. Beings of reason can be either negations or relations of reason. and we'll find out about the good and the true that they add a relation of reason. But the one adds merely negation. And from this, it is apparent that the one, that one, is convertible with being. Now, convertible in logic means what? Changeable. Well, yeah. But in logic, you say, A and B are convertible if every A is a B and every B is a what? A. Okay? Okay. So, like we say that a thing in its definition must be what? Convertible, right? Every triangle is a plane figure contained by three straight lines. And every plane figure contained by three straight lines is a triangle. Now, Thomas shows this by either or argument, that every being is one. For every being is either simple or what? Composed. Now, what is simple is undivided not only in act, but also in what? Ability. So the point is not divided actually and it's not able to be divided. You can't cut a point in half. But what is composed or put together does not have being so long as its parts are divided. but after they constitute and compose the thing that is composed or put together. So if the parts of the chair are not put together, the chair doesn't exist, right? Hence it is manifest that the being of each thing consists in division. Then he gives a sign of this again in addition to the argument, right? And hence it is that each thing just as it guards or tries to keep its own existence or being, so it guards its own what? Unity. Okay? So the being of the army is going to be destroyed if it's divided, right? Are you all convinced now that being and one are convertible? Parastas shows this in the beginning in the fourth book then, of wisdom, that being and one are convertible. Now, let's go back to the first objection which was drawn from the one that is the beginning of what? Number, right? That objection would be good if the one that is the beginning of number was the same as the one that is convertible with me, but they're not the same one, right? Okay? Now, I think I mentioned before how in wisdom the order of proceeding is you're going towards the immaterial, right? Just the opposite way of what you do in natural philosophy where you go down towards matter. But there's a second difference because in natural philosophy you go from the general to the what? Particular, but in wisdom in a way you go from the particular to less universal up to the more universal. Now, this is most clear and most explicit in the ninth book of wisdom. Remember the book on act and ability? In the first part of the ninth book Aristotle talks only about the act called motion and the different kinds of ability in reference to that act. And then in the second part of the ninth book he ascends to a completely universal consideration of act which gives rise to an understanding of other senses of ability. And this is important eventually for studying even the immaterial things. So in a way you're ascending from the less universal to the what? Pure universal. Now you can say he's doing it also in the study of substance because he begins with material substances. substances. So in a way And from them, he kind of ascends to a general understanding of substance that's valuable, even when you talk about the separated or immaterial substances. Now, most people are stuck on that less universal level. And so Aristotle, in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, Physics, when he takes a place, he quotes the common opinion of the Greek philosophers before him. That whatever is, whatever exists, he says, must be somewhere, in some place. If it isn't somewhere, it doesn't what? Exist. Now, you go out on Main Street here, and in these towns around here, and that would be the common opinion. Whatever exists must be somewhere, and somewhere doesn't exist, right? I remember in grade school, you know, asking the teacher, well, where is God? Well, to be somewhere, to be in a place, is really a property of bodies, right? So you're identifying what is with bodies, and what exists in bodies. And that's where our mind begins. And so, if you look at the division of the opinions of Aristotle's predecessors that he gives in the beginning of the first book of the Physics, after he gives their division of their opinions about the cause of natural things, he says, in the same way for them was the consideration of what is. Because natural bodies are more fundamental than artificial bodies. So if you want to know what is, you've got to understand natural bodies, and that's it. Okay? That's not until Anaxagoras, and then Plato, and Aristotle himself, show that there exists some immaterial things, that our mind begins to what? Separate the idea of what is, and the idea of substance even, from what? Body, right? So it's hard for us to rise to that most universal level. And the same thing that you see in the state of act and ability, and in the study of substance, comes up in the study of the one and the many. Because the one we first have in mind is the one that's tied up with the bodily, with the continuous. And the division that is involved in the negation there of the one is the division of the continuous. But the division that's negated in the more universal one is the division of being and what? Not being. Okay? So it's very hard for our mind to rise from one to the other. And you have this problem, you get to the Trinity, right? But it comes up here in this first ejection, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that some, thinking the same to be the one that is convertible with being, right? And the one that is the beginning of number, they were divided into contrary, what? Positions. For Pythagorysa, and also Plato, seeing that the one that is convertible with being does not add something over being, but signifies the very substance of being, insofar as it's undivided, they thought that thus it has itself about the one, that it is the, what? Beginning of number. And because number is composed to entities, they believed that numbers were the substances of all things. I've got your number. That's an old Pythagorean speaking, right, huh? Okay? I've got your number. So they're confusing the Platonists and Pythagoreans, the one that is the beginning, right, of number with the one that is the, what? Convertible with being. And therefore making the very substance of things to be numbers. Now in a contrary way, Avicenna, right? Considering that the one which is the beginning of number adds something, right, over the substance of being, right? Otherwise, number composed of units would not be a species of quantity, huh? He believed that the one that is convertible with being adds something over the substance of being, just as white adds something over man. So notice, these are very great thinkers, Plato and Avicenna. And they're both, what? Yeah, yeah. Not seeing the distinction there between the one that is the beginning of number and the one that is the, what? Yeah, yeah. So you've got to stop and realize how easy one can be deceived. But this is manifestly false because each thing is one through its very, what? Substance, huh? Not to something added. If it were through something other one, if something was one, right? Through something other, some other thing, since that again would be one, it would be one through something else, and this would go on forever, right? Once we're not a stand in the first. Thus, therefore, it should be said that the one that is convertible with being does not add something above being. It adds many negation, which is a being of reason, right? But nothing in reality. But the one that is the beginning of number adds something over what? Being. Pertaining to the genus of what? Quantity. Right? Which is the use of, when he always refers to the one that is the beginning of number, he always uses the word rest there. He uses it so that you would say that it is something real. That's why I was understanding this. If he refers to the one which is the beginning of number, it says it doesn't add some rest, some real thing. Yeah. Yeah. See, when you contract being into substance, quantity, quality, relation, you're getting something more particular, right? So you're adding something real there, right? But being and the one that's conferred with being doesn't add anything real. It does add indication. Okay, now the second objection, about being divided by the one and the many, right? Therefore it must add something to it, right? Now to the second it should be said that nothing prevents that which is in one way divided to be in another way, what? Undivided. Just as what is divided in number is undivided in species, huh? Like you and I are one in species, right? And you and the dog are one in genus, right? But you're still an individual, right? And thus it happens for something to be in one way, one, and in another way, what? Many. But nevertheless, if it be undivided simply, either because, what? Is undivided according to, what? What pertains to the essence of the thing, although it be divided as regards those things which are outside the nature of the thing, just as what is one in subject is many in accident. Like I'm one in subject, but I'm, what? A geometer, and I'm white, and I'm healthy, I guess. More or less. Okay. Or because it's undivided in act and divided in, what? Potency. You get being like guilty in there and actually, see, actually two instead of one. Just as what is one is a whole, but many in its parts. Things of this sort are one simply and many, what? So you couldn't have quit. There's that distinction again that we meet so often in philosophy. If, however, something, a converso, is undivided in some way, secundum quid, and divided simply, as because it is divided according to its essence and undivided according to, what? Its notion or its thought, yeah? Or according to its beginning or cause. It will be many simply in one, secundum quid, as what are many in number and one in species or one in their origin. Thus, therefore, being is divided by one in many as it were through one simply. So, let's see. And many, what, say quindam quid, huh? For the multitude itself would not be contained under being unless it were contained in some way under, what, one, huh? For Darnitius says in the last chapter of the Divine Names that there is not a multitude not partaking of one. But what are many in parts are one in a whole, and what are many in accidents are one in subject. What are many in number are one in species, and what are many in species are one in genus, and what are many in going forward are one in their, what, source, huh? Okay? As the great Heraclitus says, Why is this thing not to me, but to reason, to agree that all things are one? Okay? But some things are one simply, and some are one in some way, right? So I've got 12 grandchildren, right, huh? Okay? So they're one family, one big family, you know? But we're all one in one source, huh? I told you the guy who saw me at church, and they went to the grandchildren and said, You know, you're responsible for all this. Well, in some way I'm responsible for all these little grandchildren, you see. But, so they're one in some way, right? In me, right? Okay? And we're all one in this country in some way, huh? All the citizens are in some way one. And that's simply, right? But in some way, right? Okay? Nuclear result. Yeah. Yeah. And if the army is, it's got to have some unity, right? And if the army gets dispersed and scattered, just a crowd, you know, fleeing, you know, then it's not been an army anymore, is it? See? Okay? Because lost is unity, right? The unity of that. Yeah? Is this last one referring to the Trinity, or no? No, no, it's just the fact that we're one in their source, like my family, right? Okay. Yeah? Acts of the soul, you know, acts of the will, that's one in their source. Yeah. Yeah. Now, the third objection was saying, what? It's not simply a repetition to say one being, right? He says, the third, therefore, is not just a negatio, when it is said that being is one, because one adds something, secundum rationa. It adds a, what? Negation, right? Okay? It adds the idea of undivided being, you know? Negation is nothing, what? Real, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? That's true even if things like, you know, you say that this man is blind, right? Okay? Is that something added to the man? No. It's really, what? In reality, something away from the man, right? It's a separation. Yeah, yeah. But we say that the man is blind, just as we say the man is healthy, right? But the health is something real added to the man. To be blind is the negation of something, right? But the mind takes it as if it were a kind of being, right? Mm-hmm. Being is true, as Aristotle calls it in the fifth book of wisdom. So one adds something in meaning to being, right? And that is a negation, though. Nothing real. Undivided being, huh? Okay? Now, number arises from what? In particular, it arises from the division of the continuous. And because the continuous, as we've seen before, is divisible forever, then number can go on forever, right? Okay? Now, the next article is on whether the one and the many are opposed, huh? Okay? Now, in understanding these most universal names, you have to see what is the distinction of these names, one from another. We've seen that a bit in this first article. It could be a little more explicit than it is. But you can say one differs in meaning from being because it adds the idea of undivided to being, right? Okay? But you also want to look at the opposite of each of these ones. The opposite of good is bad. The opposite of true is false. The opposite of one is many, right? Mm-hmm. And they're opposed in different ways. Mm-hmm. Okay? So he's going to take that up now. The second one proceeds thus. It seems that one and many are not opposed. For nothing opposed is said of its opposite. But every multitude is in some way one, as is clear from the four said things. Therefore, the one is not opposed to what? To the many, to the multitude. Further, nothing opposed is constituted from its opposite. But the one constitutes multitude. Therefore, it's not opposed to multitude, huh? That sounds like, you know, sickness, making up health or something, right? Or vice versa. How can this be? Moreover, one is opposed to one thing. But to the many is opposed to few. Therefore, it's not opposed. Therefore, one is not opposed to it, huh? Okay? So it's the opposite of black, white, huh? Healthy, sick. Hard? Opposite. Yeah, it seems to be only one opposite, right? So sometimes we oppose the many to the few, right? So if it's opposed to the few, it can't be opposed to the one. Mm-hmm. Moreover, if one is opposed to the multitude, it is opposed to it as the undivided to the divided, huh? And thus it is opposed to it as a privation or lack to the habit of the having. But this seems inconvenient. Because it would follow that one would be, what? Posterior to the multitude, and it would be defined through it, huh? When, nevertheless, multitude is defined by one. It's a collection of ones. Once there would be a circle in the definition, that's not to be allowed in circularity in definitions, which is inconvenient, huh? Not suitable, not fitting. Therefore, one and many are, what? Opposed, huh? Or not opposed. But against this, those things whose reasons or definitions are opposed, they themselves are opposed. But the ratio or definition of one consists in its indivisibility, or in division. But the ratio or notion or definition of multitude contains division. Therefore, the one and the many are opposed, huh? I answer it should be said that one is opposed to the many, but in diverse ways. For the one, which is the beginning of number, right, is opposed to the multitude, which is number, as the measure is to be, what? Measured. For one has the notion of the first measure, right? And number is a multitude measured by the one, as is clear from the 10th book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle. But the one, which is convertible with being, is opposed to multitude by way of privation or lack, as the undivided to the, what? Divided, huh? Okay? So that's a very interesting distinction, right, between the two ones and the many that they're opposed to, huh? So we sometimes define the number as a, what? Multitude measured by one, huh? Okay? And then later on, Aristotle, in the 10th book of Wisdom, will say that we carry over the idea of measure to other kinds of one. But the original meaning there is the one that's the beginning of number. That's the first measure, really, huh? That's what it's saying later on, you know, God is what? 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