Prima Pars
Lecture 42: Whether Created Intellects Can See God's Essence

Transcript
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14th question and so on, we'll say God knows all things by one act, right? As you go down from God, all the way down to our mind, which is the lowest mind there could possibly be, we have more and more thoughts as you go down, but they know less and less perfectly. So, you've heard my little poem I always use at times. Yeah, God the Father said it all in one word. Only when that word became a man, he spoke in words so few and said so much, he was the brevity and soul of it. You see, the truth of this idea of Shakespeare, the brevity is the soul of it, right? Our style speaks of that too in the 14 books of wisdom, right? In fact, in the Latin translation, they'll say this is a brevity, something small in size but great in its what power. Now, the question is, in the state of this life, is someone able to see the nature of God? And in general, we'd say no, right? But there's a kind of unusual position of St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas following him and agreeing with him, that two guys, Moses and St. Paul, saw God as he is in a transitory way, right? And that's kind of, I think there's some controversy about that, you know? I don't know if the churches are officially proclaimed about that, but both Augustine and Thomas say that. That's because the eminence of these men is prophetic as teachers, you know? Now, what's the difference between all these articles up to this point and the last two articles? The 12th article says, whether we are able to know God in this life by our natural reason. As you remember, we looked at the, perhaps it was fundamental document of the Church on these matters, which is the constitution there in the first Vatican Council. That makes it very explicit that it is possible, right? And it goes back to, you know, taking the text in Epistle to the Romans, chapter 1, verse 20. But you know them very imperfectly, right? In the way you can know a cause through effects that don't do justice to that. When Thomas talks about, you know, why God made so many different things, right? And he compares it to an artist, right? Who, when he sees it, has not fully said all he can say, right? He makes some more things, right? And I noticed myself, and I, you know, I've been reading through the plays of Shakespeare this year. And, you know, if we just had, you know, a few Shakespeare's plays, you wouldn't realize the, what? Right. Yeah, yeah. And so, he multiplies these things, right? Okay. And the same way, if you just do, you know, a few Mozart's pieces, you know? Maybe the piano synopsis and like that, you know, the symphonies, you know, the operas or something, right? You wouldn't have a very adequate idea, right? But even when God's got too big in the whole universe, he still hasn't done something adequate to himself. I was looking at the Lombard, you know, he's talking about God's love and how he loves one thing more than another. And he says, he loves even the human nature of Christ more than the whole universe. And of course, when you say God loves one thing more than another, what does that mean? It doesn't mean that his love is more intense for one than the other. Because there's only one act of love in God, so it couldn't be more intense for one than the other. But it's because he wills a greater good to one than another, right? So he loves the Blessed Virgin more than he loves us. And he loves even the Apostles more than he loves us. Not in the sense that his love of the Apostles or Mary is more intense than his love for us. But because he wills to them a, what? Greater good, right? So he loves Mary more than the Apostles because he wills to her a greater good. But he loves the Apostles more than us because he wills a greater good to them, right? But he wills to the human nature of Christ if he joined in his very, what? Person, yeah. Person. And so he wills a greater good to that than the whole universe. So obviously he loves the human nature of Christ more than the whole universe together. Christ's objection is saying, well, he's just one man. Well, at times he is an individual man. That's true. Or he tries to argue that the whole is greater than the part, right? You know? But you see, he's like a universal cause, right? It contains everything in a simple way. I guess so. Now, what's the 13th article, right? Whether above the natural knowledge of reason, or the knowledge of natural reason, there is some knowledge of God in the present life through grace. Maybe that would refer to things like what? St. Paul. Yeah. Or knowledge of it by faith, right? Yeah. Okay? So, looking at this kind of briefly here, the first 11 articles seem to be all dealing with what? The seeing God as he is, face to face, right? All the different questions are involved, right? And the 12th one is dealing with what? Yeah. Which even, you know, kind of like Aristotle has, right? And then the 13th one with the, in between the two, right? And I did extremes first. And then, okay? Although the one back there, you know, article, what? Four, you know, is important in distinguishing, right? That the knowledge we've been talking about in those first articles is something different than this one we can get by the natural powers of our reason, right? Okay? So, he's obviously most of all interested in one of these three knowledges, right? Okay? So, let's look at the first article. But it's kind of interesting the order that he has there, huh? Okay? It's kind of theological, right? And in the Summa Congentilis, when he's showing that a knowledge of God is the end of man, the final end, and then he'll ask the question as well, is that kind of a confused knowledge that we all have of God? Is that the end that we're aiming at? That's very imperfect, right? And then, he goes on and says, well, how about that knowledge that the philosophers had, right? And that's a little more advanced, huh? But then he'll show that that can't be the last end, right? And then what about this knowledge of God by faith, right? And then he shows the imperfection of that. That can't be the final end, right? And then finally, he'll say, well, there must be a knowledge where you see God as he is. Then you go into the question of how that's possible and so on. They kind of ascend, right? But here, it's almost the, you know, reverse thing now. Okay, to the first, one proceeds thus. It seems that no created understanding is able to see God through his very, what? Essence, through what he is, huh? And now he's quoting Christmastime. We used to have this feast there, at least in the I-Rite we did yesterday. And what was it? Thomas was coming across the city of Paris, right? And laying out there, you know, spread out, you know, in the valley. And someone said, what would you do for this whole city, you know? Thomas said, I'd rather have Christmastime's commentary. I don't see it on Matthew or John, one of the two. He'd take God and face the whole city of Paris. He must have had a hard time getting a copy of the book or something, you know? So he had a great respect for Christmastime. What is it? What is it? I think it's a commentary on John where Thomas seems to almost exclusively give the opinion of, what, Augustine and the opinion of Christmastime, you know? As he goes along through the commentary, like he's kind of taking them as his masters to some extent, right? And seeing what those two guys in particular would say, you know? There's a stem upon John, on the Gospel of John, expounding that which is said in John 1, verse 18. For God no one has ever, what? Seen, right? He says, that which is God, not only the prophets, but not even the angels or the archangels see, right? For what is of a created, a creatable nature, how is it able to see what is what? What? Uncreated, huh? I think there's uncreated, not incredible, I don't know. Okay. And then this guy who Thomas thought was the, what, Dionysius Converted, had the Areopagus in Athens. And Dionysius, in the first chapter of the Divine Name, speaking about God, says, Neither is there a sense of him, right? Nor is there an image of him, nor opinion, nor reason, nor science. Nor is there a sense of knowledge of him, huh? So these are a couple of arguments from authorities where they seem to be saying we don't know him, huh? The second article, or second objection. Moreover, everything infinite as such is unknown, right? But God is infinite as has been shown above. Therefore, by himself, he's unknown, right? And I've got to be careful, because the word infinite has got many meanings, right? And if you think of infinite in the way in which Aristotle is understanding it in the Eight Books of Natural Hearing, then the infinite is something that you can't really know, right? But it's tied up with something that's lacking its, what, form, huh? Something that's very, that's very nature incomplete, huh? Or it's tied up with the infinite that's tied up with quantity, huh? Well, we're trying to know step by step all the numbers are, and that's, you can't do, right? But that's not the way in which God is infinite, huh? Moreover, the creative understanding is not knowing except the things that exist. For what first falls in the grasp of the understanding is being, huh? But God is not existing, but above existing things, as Danisius says. Therefore, he's not understandable, but he's above every, what, understanding, huh? Now, in a sense, what he's saying here is that the proper object of reason is what is, right? And what is, there is, what, a distinction between what it is and its being, right? Well, God is above that. I am who I am, right? So he's above what can be understood, right? Interesting. And then the fourth one. Of the one knowing to the known, there must be some, what, proportion or ratio, since the known is the perfection of the one knowing. But there's no ratio of the creative understanding to God, because they differ instantly, right? Therefore, the creative understanding is not able to see the nature of God. I think I mentioned that when we talked about the goodness of God, right? And Thomas will sometimes raise the question, is God and creatures better than God alone? The creatures, in other words, add something to the goodness of God. And the answer is no. Well, and when Thomas is trying to lead us by the hand to understand that a bit, right? He has two ways of doing that, right? And one way is to say that, well, the goodness of the creature is only partaking of the good of God, right? So just as Dwayne Berkwist and the arm of Dwayne Berkwist is no more than Dwayne Berkwist alone, right? So, in a sense, God, what partakes of the goodness of God, is no more than what? God alone, right? But the other way he does, which is closer to what's going on here, is to say that there's an infinite distance between the divine goodness and the goodness of the creature. And therefore, the goodness of the creature is the divine goodness, not like a shorter line is to a longer line, but like a point is to the line. Now, if you add a point to a line, how much longer is the line? Not at all. Because the point is no length at all, right? So, if there's no proportion, how can, you know, we know God, huh? A ratio. Well, like in the second objection especially, you've got to be careful about the word proportion, right? Because sometimes Thomas will deny that there's a, what, ratio of the creature to God, right? Other times we'll say there is, right? If you take ratio in the strict sense, where you have a definite ratio, right? One half of, or one tenth of, or one hundredth, or one millionth, or one billionth, right? But there is no ratio between the two, right? Okay? But if you take ratio in a kind of broad sense, where one has a relation to the other, right? Then there is, huh? And so I've seen Thomas sometimes deny that there is, and sometimes say that there is, right? I can make that distinction here. But against this is what is said in the first epistle of St. John, in the third chapter, the second verse. I can usually remember that one, three, two, so I'm kind of easy to remember that one. But, um, we shall see him as he is, right? So it seems to be two ways the scripture has of seeing God what he is. One is this passage here, and the other one is the phrase of St. Paul there, seeing God face to face, right? You have that in the Psalms too, you know, this is the race that seeks the face of God and Jacob. So, but perhaps this is said more properly and face to face a little more, um, proportion to us, but more metaphorical almost down face to face. I answer, he says, it should be said that each thing is knowable according as it is an act. Now, what part of philosophy is that beginning here taken from? And from the ninth book of wisdom, right? The book on act and what? Ability, right? And there you see that ability is not knowable by itself, right? It's knowable only through act, huh? So something is knowable through act, huh? So it's brought out there in the third part of the ninth book of wisdom. We looked at that book a little bit, you know, but, um, okay. But God, who is pure act, right? Without any mixture of potency in the passive sense, huh? Now, where did we learn that God is pure act? Yeah, yeah. Because in the ninth book, Aristotle shows that although in the thing that goes from ability to act, that thing is an ability before it's an act, it goes from ability to act because it's something already in act, huh? So, simply speaking, act is before what? Ability. And therefore, the first being, the first cause, must be, what? Pure act, right? If it was a mixture of ability and act, it would be something before it, right? It would not be first. So sometimes, like in the Summa Kahn and Gentiles, Thomas would give that kind of like an argument by itself for God, existence of God, as pure act, huh? Other times, though, you'll see it kind of coming out in the more concrete form of the argument for the unmoved mover. Okay? So, God was pure act. Now, if you might remember in the Summa Theologiae, where is that brought out? That's right. It brought out actually when he talked about the simplicity of God at the beginning of that, right? So if you look back here for a second, question three. If you look at article one of question three, the second article there, right? Okay? That's in the context where the God is a body, right? This is question three, article one. But the second article says, secondly, because it is necessary that that which is the first being, the being before all the rest, right? Because primum is defined by before all the rest, right? To be an act and in no way in potency. And then he calls it, Aristotle says in the ninth book, although in one and the same thing that goes forward from ability to act. It is an ability before it is an act in time, right? Simply, though, act is before ability. Because what is in ability is not reduced to act except through a being in act, right? Okay? It's been shown over above that God is the first being. Therefore, it is impossible that in God there be something in ability, right? Now, sometimes Thomas will do this in the Summa Contagentilis, too. He'll recall that he's shown that God is the first being, the first cause. Then he'll argue like he does here, right? But then he'll take it and make it just darn it by itself for God, right? The first thing must be a pure act, right? It must be a pure act that it's the first thing. But I like the way he does in the Summa Contagentilis, in a sense, because he has a chapter just devoted to showing there's no potency in God, right? And that's where he develops these arguments. He's kind of stuck in the middle of the article on that God is a body, right? But anyway, okay, so we see each thing is knowable according to God as an act, but God is a pure act without the admixture of any potency. Therefore, right, as far as in himself is concerned, he is maximae, most knowable, right? Okay? But now he recalls the distinction that Aristotle makes, and we saw it where you first see it as you study Aristotle. Distinction between what is more knowable by nature and what is more knowable to us. Isn't that the first part of the unnatural? That's the area of it. Yeah, yeah, in the very beginning of the first book of the physics, right? The first book of natural here. That's where he brings it out a bit, right? And of course, he comes back to it in the 14 books of wisdom, the second book, and the ninth book, and so on. And that's, you know, one of the hardest things to understand, right? But why is it that what is most knowable is not most knowable to us? But because our mind in the beginning is purely in what? Potency, right? Okay? And so our mind goes from potency to act. It knows those things that are less than act first. So what act is most known to us? Well, in the ninth book of wisdom, Aristotle says that it's motion, right? And I always quote Shakespeare there, and you'll see a speech there in Torias Impressida, right? Things in motion, sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. You get a lot of mileage out of that, right? Yeah. I was talking to the students there on Wednesday night there about Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? And he first tells us that it's an ability for discourse, right? And discourse comes from the Latin word for running. So discourse names an act of reason that is like emotion. It's going from one thing to another. And then I was recalling the statement, things in motion, sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. So it's our reason in motion that catches our attention more, right? And discourse is a kind of emotion, right? But how actual is motion? It's an experience, actually. Yeah, yeah. It's hard to actual, right? So if I walk across the room, always as I walk across the room, part of my motion is in the past and doesn't exist. Part of my future doesn't exist, right? And how much motion is here all at once? No, because I'd be in two places at the same time. So motion barely exists. Just like Aristotle says, you know, about time, right? And he says, well, the past doesn't exist. The future doesn't exist yet. And between the past and the future, is there any time? So how can it exist, you know, when its parts don't exist, right? So this is the least actual of acts, right? But the one that gets our attention, most known to us. When I try to explain the senses of, the order of the senses of before and after there, in the twelfth chapter, the categories, the first sense of before is before in time, right? Then comes the sense of before in being, and then before in the discourse of reason, and then before in goodness or better. But I ask, why does he start with before in time? Well, that's tied up with the before and after in motion. Time is the number in the before and after in motion. So because things in motion catch our attention, most known to us, the first sense of before and after is that found in motion. You've got a lot of mileage out there. So what's most knowable to us is the least actual. And when we reason, as we did in the first argument for the existence of God, when we reason from motion to eventually the unmoved mover, when we find out eventually it's pure act, right? We're reasoning from what is most knowable to us, to what is what? Reasoning to us. Least knowable to us, but most knowable simply, right? But, you know, when we come to see God as he is face to face, that's going to be a reverse in a way. Just like, you know, the way of knowing in geometry is better than in the other parts of philosophy. Because in geometry, you tend to know the cause before the effect. That's a more perfect way of knowing, but it's not very characteristic of our mind. And we don't even do it in this kind of abstract science, you know, where we consider triangles and circles and separation from the sensible world and so on. And then we have a little bit of, you know, knowing the effect from the cause rather than the reverse, right? But that's why God is everything, right? By knowing himself, huh? So we're going to partake of that, huh, when we come to see God face to face. He goes on to point out the difficulty of our mind. But what is most knowable in itself to some understanding is not knowable, right? On account of the exceeding, right, of the understandable above such an understanding, right? And then in Aristotle's comparison, Aristotle thought the bat flew at night time because the light of the day was too, what? Yeah. Just as the sun, which is most visible, right, because most got light, cannot be seen by the bat on account of the excess of the light. Now, if you've read the Republic theory of Plato, right, Socrates says something like that, right? He compares us to those who are born in a cave, right? And somebody escapes. It says, Not in the sunlight, you know, but it's kind of, what, blinding, right? So things are more visible in the sunlight than in the cave, because there's more light out there, but they're less visible to what? To him, right? Because of the weakness of his eyes, right? That's why Aristotle said in the second book of Wisdom, that the chief cause of difficulty in our knowing is the weakness of our mind, because the things that are most known are at least known to us. Okay? Remember my little comparison there, you know, Aristotle, in the second book of Wisdom there, he talks about how the difficulty in knowing can be from the object of knowing or from the, what, the mind, right? And that's a very interesting distinction, right? But as Thomas will explain in the commentary, this can be said of other things besides knowing. So I say, if something's difficult to love, it can be because it's not very lovable. Like it's difficult to love cancer or something like that, right? Not very lovable. I find it difficult to love rock and roll music. It's not very lovable, you know? Not only do you see, it's defect in my heart. It'd be defect in my heart if I love these things. These terrorists love to blow us up, you know? I don't think that's, you know, not a very lovable thing, really. But if I don't love truth, I don't love wisdom, I don't love God, or I find it difficult to love these things that are very lovable, right? Because they're very good. Then, obviously, the defect is in my heart. I've got a weak heart. I don't mean how I mean it's a pumping heart either. I mean, I've got a weak will, right? You know, you know, it's just, yeah, I, you know. I have a place to free your mind. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So you might say, chief difficulty would be the weakness of my will, that I can't love the things that I most love about, right? And, okay. Now, some people paying attention to this lay down that no great intellect, right, is able to see the essence of God. You can see what people might think this, right? But this is, what? Not suitably said, right? For he says, since the, what? Last beatitude of man, right? Consists in his, what? Highest operation, right? His greatest operation. Which is the operation is understanding, right? If the great intellect never saw the, what? Essence, the substance of God, the nature of God, the nature of God, what God is. Either it would never attain beatitude, right? Or in something other, right? Then God, his beatitude would consist, right? And this is alien from the, what? Faith, right? For in him is the ultimate perfection, the rational creature. In him who is the, what? Beginning of being, right? For each thing is, what? Perfect insofar as it attains its, what? Beginning. That's one reason he's giving that, right? Likewise, he says, it is outside of reason. For there is in man a natural desire of knowing the cause. That's where Aristotle begins the 14 books of wisdom. He says, man is by birth, by nature, right? Man wants to understand, right? To know the cause. And you could say also that the reason wants to know not only what is, but what it is. So it naturally wants to know not only that God is, but what he is. So the very nature would seem to be frustrated, huh? So if our reason naturally wants to know not only what is, but what it is, then it eventually wants to know what God is. And this would make the natural inborn desire there invading, right? For there is in man a natural desire of knowing the cause when he sees the effect. And from this, wonder arises in men. If, therefore, the understanding of the rational creature is not able to arrive at the first cause of things, then the desire of nature would remain empty and vain, huh? When simply it ought to be conceded that the blessed see the, what? Blessed. Yeah. What does Christ say about the angels, right? They always see the face of my Father, right? He uses the word face, doesn't he, in that particular passage, huh? Yeah. Yeah, that's the way that St. Paul speaks, right? The psalm also says seek his face forevermore. Yeah, yes. A number of psalms, right? Yeah. There's one which is seek the face of the God of Jacob, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Okay. So, it's kind of difficult sometimes to understand the theological virtues, right? And, why there should be three? And why you have hope? Because, one theological, all the theological virtues have God as their, what? Object, right? Well, how can there be three virtues then? Because God is one, right? Okay? But God is the object of faith and the object of charity for different reasons, right? He's the object of faith insofar as he's the first truth. Okay? And that fits with faith being in reason because the object of reason is the truth. Okay? He's the object of charity, huh? Insofar as he's the sumum bonum, the highest good. Okay? The good of every good. It's like Dustin says. And that fits charity being in the will but it's obviously just good, right? Now, that's left for hope. The theological virtue in between, right? And, I was reading in the place he takes it up in his sentences and he's saying, well, this is the, what? Supreme Arduum, right? That's kind of strange, you know? Because it's something, you know, analogous to the irascible, right? You know, the emotions where the irascible aims at the difficult, the argument, right? So when one animal fights the other animal it's not because it's pleasant or agreeable to the senses but because it's a difficulty to overcome, right? Put the animal down. Like there's a cat where Tabitha would be a strange cat in the backyard and you see Tabitha come around the backyard and she's like a wild woman, you know? And the other cat would see that Tabitha come in and she'd jump and she'd run off around the yard just like that. Or the other cat would just sit and watch her without doing anything, you know? But Tabitha, I mean, you know. When we first got Tabitha I was almost afraid of her myself and I didn't know whether I could trust her or trust her with the children, you know? Because you know, is this a tough cat? But that's the argument. But when Thomas explained it, you know, that this is the argument, he says because of the attitude. And then he quotes what Augustus, I mean, Boethius says that happiness or the attitude is a state made perfect by the communication of all goods. So that's an arduous thing to pursue, right? And, you know, if they're not to pursue without the help of God, the mercy of God and without some merits in your own through the grace of God and so on, but it's the idea of the thing it can be. And of course, in a way, God is every good. You know, like he says to Moses, follow me and I'll show you every good. Thomas says, that is myself. Okay? it might have a reminder of the year because he says something we might say this is so up above us, right? You know, Thomas says here, because what is most knowable is least knowable to us, right? He might say, as he says here, pay attention to this, some pose where I lay down, that no created understanding is able to see the essence of God, right? This is an arduous thing, right? And therefore you need the, what, hope, right? I mean, Thomas would approach it by saying, in order to pursue a good, you have to know it in some way, you know about it, and faith does that, right? You have to want it or love it, and that's what charity does, right? But you've got to see it as possible, too. And that's how hope comes in, right? And so. Promise. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But Thomas says, you know, when he gets through, showing what our real beatitude finally consists in, he says, and therefore they will blush, he says, right? We seek the end of man and something, you know, candy or woman or whatever, you know, whatever people seek, money, power, you know, something, you know. We realize how high the end that we're called to, huh? Okay. Now, how does he reply to the argument from the authority of St. John Chrysostom and the Dionysius, right? The supposed disciples and Paul himself, right? Well, he's saying you misunderstand the text, right? They're talking about what? Comprehension, right? Which is knowing God as much as he is knowable, right? Only God can know that, right? The first effort should be said that both authorities speak of the vision of, what, comprehension, right? Knowing God as much as he is knowable. Whence Dionysius puts forth before, those words proposed, that to all he is universally in comprehensivities, right? Okay. So that kind of confirms Thomas' understanding of what he's saying. And Chrysostom, although after the words, right, adds, this vision, most certain consideration of the Father, and comprehension, right, only as much does the Father has of the Son, right? So there, Thomas is looking before and after, Sage Bacetius, right? He looks at what Dionysius says a little bit before, and he refers to comprehension, right? And then looks at what Chrysostom says after, and he's saying something referring to comprehension, right? I call vision here the most certain consideration of the Father and the comprehension of him, right, huh? Such as the, what? As much as the Father has of the Son, right? Okay. Translation. In the past. Okay. Okay, now, in the applied to the second objection, in the fourth objection, in both cases you'll be distinguishing senses of the word infinite in one case and of the word, what? Proportion or ratio, okay? Thomas tends to use the word proportion for ratio, right? You know, like, it comes customary, a fine-minded physicist using the word proportion, meaning ratio. But, uh, in Euclid, you know, ratio, um, and proportion don't mean the same thing. Proportion is, um, a likeness of ratios, right? So two to three is a ratio. Four is to six, is two is to three, would be a proportion, right? But, then people started calling the ratio a proportion, huh? And that's unfortunate, I think, but, you know, but sometimes, you know, Thomas has to kind of make a word, proportionality he wants to talk about, you know, so, so, I like to follow my master, Euclid, you know, but, anyway, Thomas goes along with the way people are speaking. So the second, it should be said that the infinite, which holds itself from the side of matter, not perfected by form, is unknown, secundum se, right? As such. Because all knowledge is through some form. That's another way of saying it's through act, right? Or commit with it. But the infinite, which has itself on the side of form, not limited or contracted by matter, is in itself most known, right? And in this sense, God is infinite, huh? And not in the first way, as is clear from the things above, going back to the treatise where we showed that God is infinite, and what that means, huh? In the Summa Contra Gentilius, I kind of like the fact that Thomas takes up, in the consideration, the substance of God, the same five things, but he takes up the infinity of God last. And he's already shown that God is not a body, he's not continuous, and they treat us on the simplicity of God. And God is one and not many, right? So there's neither continuous quantity nor discrete quantity in God. And therefore, when he begins to consider the infinity of God, he excludes the infinity that's tied up with, what, quantity, right? Which is usually the infinity that Aristotle has in mind when he's talking about infinity, huh? And knowing that kind of infinity by enumerating the parts of something, you can never do. You can never divide the line completely. And you can never, you know, enumerate all the numbers, right? And that's not the kind of infinity that God has. Let alone the kind of infinity that you apply to matter, you know, and say that the first matter is infinite, considerate by itself, because it's not limited by any form. And, as we learned in the first book of natural hearing, the first matter is not knowable. by itself, right, huh? Okay? So God is not infinite in that way, right? He's most knowable himself, huh? Just that we're not ready for knowing something that knowable, right? Now, the next, um, objection, huh? This is the one about God being, what? This is kind of, this is the way he's speaking. Yeah, yeah. Um, but a little bit like if you were, say, you know, that God's goodness is above the good, because the good means that you have goodness, and therefore, if you have goodness, you're not the same as your goodness, right? Well, God doesn't have goodness, he has goodness itself, so he's above the good. Okay, so, that is, in a way of speaking, kind of emphasize certain things, right? For God is not thus said to be not existing, as if in no way he exists, but because he's above everything existing, which is not the same as his existence, right? For existence, you know, in the way of speaking there, it seems to be saying that you have existence, right? And therefore, you're not your very existence. But insofar as he is his very, to be his very existence, that's something we learned in the, what, question on the simplicity of God. Whence from this it is not foul, that in no way he is able to be known, but that he exceeds, what, all knowledge that we have the creatures, anyway, which is for him not to be, what, he'll be comprehended now. So the, a third in the first objections has something in common, right? Okay? And that's that they bring in, to some extent, the idea of God not being able to be comprehended, right? But the second and the fourth, we looked at the second already, but the second and the fourth have in common that there's a word, infinite in one case, other case, proportion or ratio, that are used in a, what? Yeah. Different sense. Different sense, right? So you have the fallacy, the qualification in those arguments, right? Okay? But the infinite which is not knowable is not the infinite which God is. Okay? And the ratio of the creature is not the original sense of ratio, we have a definite ratio, you know, half or a fourth, something like that. To the fourth, it should be said that proportion or ratio is said in two ways. In one way, as he served in what? Relation of one quantity to another according to double or triple or equal are a species of ratio. That's the one that you're mainly concerned with in mathematics, right? Mm-hmm. So the ratios, and then proportions in Euclid's sense, are much more exact, you might say, right? Another way, more generally, you might say, you might say,