Prima Pars
Lecture 43: Analogy, Proportion, and the Beatific Vision

Transcript
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The relation of one thing to another can be called a, what, ratio. And thus, in this way, there can be a ratio of the creature to God insofar as it has itself to him as an effect to a cause and as ability to, what, act. And according to this, the creative intellect has a ratio. Actually, we don't have a good word to say in English. There's a proportion we have to use for that to knowing God, right? There's a proportion there. And if you go back to what we learned in the first book of natural hearing, Aristotle was talking about matter towards the end of the book, and he says it's knowable by a proportion. And he's saying that the first matter is to, let's say, man and dog, like clay, is to sphere and cube. It's not as exact as four is to six is two is to three, right? But there is a, what, a likeness of the way one is to the other, right? Okay. So that's the kind of thing you have to understand in this broader sense, huh? Now, I think that example there is, I mean, that kind of equivocation is the equivocation where a word is carried over by having part of its meaning dropped. We had an example of that, like with the word undergoing. Undergoing first means to be acted upon in a way that is contrary to yourself and destructive of yourself, right? I'm under the weather. I've undergone this, okay? And then you can say what the senses undergo, but this is not really contrary to the senses, but it perfects them, right? It's still kind of a bodily change going on. And that's why if you, you know, look at the light or the bright too long, your eyes are going to be kind of effective. Your sounds too much, you can go deaf, right? And then finally we speak of understanding as a kind of undergoing, right? We're kind of generalizing the idea, right? That's why you carry the word over. Or when you carry the names of the emotions, say, over to the acts of the will, you keep the formal aspect of the emotion, but you drop out the bodily transformation that takes place when you undergo these, right? So, if the terrorist comes in and I'd be afraid, you know, I'd be bodily, you know, thump, thump, thump here, right? Okay? Now, as a philosopher, I'm afraid of making mistakes, right? But it's not the same kind of fear. It's more in my will, right? I realize how easily the mind is deceived. But the word fear is not purely equivocal there, right? Okay? When I say I love the candy or I love the woman or something, that's an emotional thing, right? When I say I love wisdom, or I love the syllogism, I don't have any emotion about these things, you know? But is the word love purely equivocal? No. But as I carry the word love over from the emotion to the, what? Act of the will, I'm dropping the bodily aspect out, right? That's one way that a word becomes equivocal by reason, huh? I'd say that's a very important example, right? You know, when Thomas is talking about the theological virtue of hope, well, hope first names an emotion, an emotion whereby a man screws up the courage to, you know, to overcome the difficulties to get something good, right? But that involves something bodily, too, huh? And you drop that out when you speak about the theological virtue of hope. But you keep the idea of something good that's difficult to attain and that you have to, you know, rise up to and so on, right? So there's a whole number of words like that, right? Perfect. God isn't perfect because what's perfect is something that's completely made. Yeah, yeah. That's an nature, isn't it? Yeah, yeah. But you keep something, that what has been made has been actualized, right? So there is, in the idea of the made, that some potency has been actualized, right? So you drop out the idea that the potency has been actualized, etc., right? But you keep the idea of that, and that's tied up with it, so. So there's an important group of words that become equivocal by reason in that way, huh? But the great Greek philosophers spoke of a road in our knowledge, right? And I always, you know, quote my son Paul when he was a little boy, you know, and I said to Paul on his kitchen table, I said, what do you think of the basic road in human knowledge? And he said, because I've been talking about it all day long in class, and he said, well, there are cars and trucks on him, he says. So he's stuck in the first meeting of road, right? He said, when you carry the word road over from the road we walk or drive upon to the road in our knowledge, right, do you keep something of the idea of that road? Yeah. Because, what is it that you keep? Yeah, yeah. Because when I take the road from here to Boston, let's say, one part of the road is before another part of the road, huh? And so that before and after, I keep that idea, but I drop out the asphalt or whatever material is there, right? And just keep the idea that there's a, a what, before and after in my knowledge, and I call that a road in my knowledge. In Aristotle I usually call philosophy a what? A method that's, huh? And it's what logically that's, say, over a road, right? You say that philosophy is knowledge that's over a road, that follows a road, right? There's a before and afterness in this knowledge, right? So that's another example of what you're doing, right? But the material thing is more sensible, and therefore it's named first, right? When I would teach the love and friendship course, you know, I'd say I was coming into the class the first day, and I'd say, what is love? And then I'd say, what's an emotion? And, you know, well, that's what they think of at first, right? I remember as a little child being in church and hearing the priest in the pulpit talking about the love of God, and I'm kind of thinking of, you know, my love of girls or something. But I think of this warm, fuzzy thing that involves some kind of bodily disturbance, to say the least. And I say, what does this mean, the love of God, right? The love of God is really an act of the will. And so you carry the word love over, but you drop out this bodily aspect of it, right? But you keep the formal aspect that comes from the soul rather than the body. And it's something like that, the word proportionate, right? Probably the first place that I want to talk about a ratio is only proportionate, I go back to numbers, right? And even, you know, when I illustrate Shakespeare's argument by proportionate, you know, it says, what is a man if his chief good in the market of his time he but to sleep and feed a beast no more? And I say, well, the proportion he's got there is that the chief good of man is to man as the chief good of the beast sleeping and feeding is to a beast. And then I say, well, just like in mathematics you can update that portion. You know? I mean, six is to four as three is to two and update six is to three as four is to two. So as the chief good of man is the chief good of the beast, so is man to the, what? Beast. So if the chief good of man is no more than the chief good of the beast, then man is no more than the beast and everybody knows that's false, right? I say to state Shakespeare's argument in numbers he's saying, you know, what is the three if it be half of four? A two no more, right? So half of six is to three is half of four is to what? Two, right? So if a two is half of four, I mean if a three is half of four it's only a two. I go back to something more known and we kind of see it first. We have a more definite, what? A ratio, right? We use with charita, right? But in other words they use sometimes to make us determinata sometimes to see that when this thing comes up, right? Okay? Now, I remember seeing in the disputed questions on the very topic, right? And there Thomas seems to speak in one place as if the creature has no ratio to God, right? Okay? And therefore we use a likeness of ratios and talking about God, huh? And what we do a likeness of and we use and we use and we use and we use Thomas is trying to make the point is that you can have a likeness of ratio between things that are very far apart. You could say not only that three is to six is, say, one is to two, right? But you could say five thousand is to ten thousand is one is to two, right? Or five million is to ten million. You could take things that are further and further apart, right? And still have the same, what? Yeah, a like ratio, right? And so he sees, you know, the likeness of ratios, to use Euclid's way of speaking, as more appropriate talking about God, right? Because you don't, you can kind of go things that are very, very far apart, right? The Lord is my shepherd, right? The Lord is my rock, and so on, right? In metaphor, you take things that are very far apart, that kind of likeness of ratios. So, when Thomas gives the two meanings of proportion here, he starts on the first meaning, and then he goes to the second meaning, right? Which, you kind of try something else, right? So a whole series of words where you do that. Okay? And you'll find, you know, with Thomas in the objections, you know, he'll say, you know, is hope a theological virtue? And some would say, well, hope is an emotion, you know? No emotion, you know? But you won't hesitate to give a kind of objection, right? To make you stop and think, well, no. That's the first meaning of hope. Well, it's not the last meaning. Hope, huh? You don't see that, you're hopeless. You can take a little break now. See you. Um, whether, okay, to the second one proceeds thus, it seems that the essence, the nature, the substance of God, um, is seen by the created understanding through some what? Like this, right? For it is said in the first epistle of John, the third chapter, second verse, that same one that we had, which you'll see him as he has, we know that when he appears, we will be like him, right? Right? And we will see him as he is, right? So we must become like God to see him as he is. So therefore, we see him through likeness? Um, more of Augustine says in the ninth book of the Trinity, that when we know God, there comes to be some likeness of God in us, huh? Moreover, the understanding and act is the understandable and act, as we learn in the third book about the soul, second book. Just as a sense and act is a sensible and act, right? We learn in the second book about the soul. I know the shape of that picture over there because that shape has been received in my eye in some way, right? So the eye in a way has become shaped, huh? But this is not except insofar as the sense is informed by the likeness of the sensible thing and the understanding by the likeness of the thing, what? Understood. Of course, in the case of imagination, we use the word image, which means a little like likeness, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And sometimes the first act of reason, which is understanding of the thing is, is called a, what? Imaginatio peri-intellectum, right? Okay? If therefore God is seen by the created understanding and act, it's necessary that through some likeness he be, what? Seen, huh? But again, this is what Augustine says in the 15th book of the Trinity, that when the Apostle says, we see now through a, what, mirror, right? And in a, what, enigma, obscurity, right? Obscurity, darkly. By mirror and enigma, by the name of enigma, whatever likenesses, right, by him or from him are signified to be understood, which are accommodated to, what, understanding God, right? But to see God through his nature, or essence, is not a, what, obscure vision, eh, enigma, or in a mirror, but it's divided against seeing him that way. Mm-hmm. But the divine essence is not seen, therefore the divine essence is not seen through some likeness, huh? So Thomas says, I answer, it should be said that for vision, both the sensible vision as well as the intellectual vision, two things are required, right? To wit, the power of seeing, right, the visual power, the ability, right, to use Shakespeare's word, and the union of the things seen with the knowing power, with the sight. Because vision does not take place in act, except through this, that the thing seen in some way is in the one seeing, right? That goes back, all the way back to Empedicutes, right? By earth we know earth, and by water, water, and by air, air, and so on, right? And we raise the question there, do we agree with Empedicutes, at least in general, that we know something because the thing known is, what, in us, right? When I know people and recognize my friends and so on, or my students and so on, if the, what, shape and the color of that person was not in some way in me, right? Hmm? Okay? And so we agree with Empedicutes that the thing known must be in the knower in order to be, what, known, right, huh? Okay? But we disagree with Empedicutes that it's in there in a material way, huh? Otherwise this picture here would know what water is, because it has water in it, right? And the chair would know what wood is, because it has wood in it, right? And, who was it that David shot the stone in, huh? The slave of Goliath? Goliath, yeah. Was that helping him to know what a stone is? Well, stone is not in you in that way. Maybe Paul David was a disciple of Empedicutes. Could be, could be. Yeah, yeah, yeah, drive home maybe. Drive home a point, right? But he wasn't driving home to him, what a stone is, right? Okay. So he says, there's not come to be seeing an act, right? Except through this, that the thing seen, kodamodu in some way, right? Is in the one seeing, right? And in bodily things, right? It appears that the thing seen is not able to be in the one seeing through its very, what? Essence or nature. But only through its, what? Likeness, huh? As the likeness of the stone is in the eye, through which there comes to be sight and act. But the very substance of the stone is not in it. That's what happened to Goliath, eh? If, however, it was one and the same thing that was the beginning or the source of the, what? Seeing power. And which was the thing seen, right? It would be necessary, huh? That the one seeing from that thing had both the power of seeing, right? And the form through which it would, what? See, right, huh? Now it is manifest that God is both the author, right? The efficient cause, the maker, right? Of the power of understanding, right? And he is able to be seen by the, what? Understanding that power. And since the understanding power of the creature is not the nature of God, right? It remains that there be some, what? Likeness, huh? Partaken, right? Of him who is the first, what? Understanding, right? Whence the power of the intellectual creature is said to be a certain understandable, what? Light, huh? It's a word derived from the first light, right? That St. Thomas in the communion prayer calls God their luks vera, okay? Whether this be understood about the natural power, right? Or through some perfection added above this of grace or of, what? Glory, right, huh? There is required, therefore, for seeing God, some likeness of God on the side of the, what? Knowing power, right, huh? By which the understanding is, what? Efficacious for seeing God, right, huh? But on the side of the thing seen, right? Which is necessary in some way to be united to the one seeing, Through no likeness, huh? That is created. Is the nature and substance of God able to be, what? Seen, right? Because what he's going to say is that no created likeness would be adequate to expressing God as he really is. And so we can't see God by that kind of a likeness of God created and put into the mind, right? And so we can't see God by that kind of a likeness of God. And so we can't see God by that kind of a likeness of God. And so we can't see God by that kind of a likeness of God. But rather he's going to say that God himself must be in the mind, right? Okay. So if you're a preacher, God would have to create another God. Yeah, yeah, yeah. First, because, as Danisha says in the first chapter about the divine names, to likenesses of a lower order of things, right, in no way can higher things be known, right? For through the form, say, of a body, one's not able to know the nature of a bodiless thing, right? Much, even less than, right? Through a created form of any sort, can the very essence or nature of God be seen, right? Okay. Secondly, and this is the second I'm going to give, because the nature of God, the essence of God, is his very being, right? And this could not belong to any created form. Okay. So in every created form and every creature, the existence of it and the thing itself are distinct, right? Okay. Therefore, it's not possible that any created form be a likeness representing to the one seeing the very nature of God, huh? Okay. It would have to be its own being. It would have to be what it is. But they can't be the other created thing. Okay. And the third reason is that the divine nature is something infinite, uncircumscred, huh? Okay. Containing in itself in a more, what? Superior, eminent way, right? Whatever can be signified or understood by the great intellect, right? And this in no way is able to be represented by some created, what? Species, huh? It's going to be limited to some species or genus of things, huh? Because every created form is determined according to some notion of wisdom or virtue or being or something else, huh? Whence to say that God is seen to a likeness is to say that the divine nature is not seen, which is harmonious. So he gives three reasons, huh? Three is enough, as we say, huh? I know it's Thomas a lot in the disputed questions. He'll give three reasons and he'll stop, right? Other than summa kind of gentile, some music is, you know, twelve reasons or something, you know? I try to remember these, you know? Okay. It should be said, therefore, that to seeing the divine nature, there is required some likeness on the side of the, what? Knowing power, right? To wit, the light of glory, right? To make our, what? Power of understanding more like the divine power of understanding, right? Okay. Strengthening the understanding to seeing God, right, huh? About which it is said in Psalm 35, verse 10. We have that Thomas commentary in Psalm 35, right? In your light we shall, what? See light, huh? Okay. But not through some, what? Created likeness is the, what? Nature of God able to be seen, right, huh? Which represents, what? The divine essence as it is in itself. So the divine essence has to be joined to the mind as the, what? Understandable form by which we see God as he is. Because only that would be adequate to representing God, huh? Okay? Because that and what it is, and that it is, are the same, right? And that is not limited to what it represents. And the first argument there, it's not inferior to what it represents. Okay, those three reasons, huh? Okay? But I still don't understand, he talks about this light of divine glory. He seems to be saying that that's the image. No, no, no. That is disposing our mind to receiving the divine substance as the form by which we see him as he is. Okay? In other words, the divine, when you take up, we'll take up, you know, when we get into the 14th, 15th, you know, questions, we'll see that God understands himself, who himself, right? So God is spoken of as being the form by which he understands himself as he is, right? And so for us to see God as he is, the divine substance has to become the form, right, by which we see God as he is, huh? And therefore that form has to be received in our mind, but our mind has to be disposed to receive it as his form by the light of glory, because this is above the natural form of our mind. This is the form of understanding which is natural for God, his understanding. And so before it can become in some way the form by which we understand God as he is, our mind has to be raised up by the light of glory, right? The light of glory, as Thomas would explain, you know, in other places more fully, is not fully to make the divine substance understandable. The divine substance is pure act, right? And therefore fully understandable, right? But it's not proportioned to our mind as a natural form of our mind, huh? So our mind has to be given a supernatural disposition, right, whereby it's raised up to be a subject that can receive the divine substance as a form which is going to see God as he is. So there's a likeness there, right? But not a likeness of the divine substance, because that would be something created, right? But a likeness to the divine understanding or ability to understand, right? Whereby our mind is raised up, so it's going to understand in a way a bit like God understands, huh? And God understands, what, primarily himself, through himself, right? And so we've got to, in a sense, partake of that, right? And therefore our mind has to be raised above its very nature, okay? So it's like a disposition of the size of our mind to receive the divine substance as a form by which you understand God himself as he is. That's an amazing thing, right, huh? That's a perfect gift coming down from the Father of Lights, right? It's a third, you know, three is enough, as they say. It's the third light. But it's different from the other two lights, huh? As Thomas would explain, because the other two lights are to make something understandable that is not yet understandable to us, right? The natural light of reason and the light of faith, right? But this is not to make something understandable, but to raise up our power of understanding, to dispose it to receive the divine form. Okay, so it's a little different meaning of the word light, huh? Like St. Paul says about the same passage, he quotes there, then I shall know even as I know. Yeah, that's an amazing thing, right? That's what he's talking about. Yeah, yeah. We'll see God in the way God sees himself. Because that's what he says. He says, now we know in part. Yeah. But then I shall know even as I know. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, that's an amazing thing, right? Mm-hmm. John is saying that in the epistle, right, the quote there, that we know we must be in some way like God because we're going to see God in the way God sees himself. And how can you see God in the way God sees himself unless you become in some way like God? And this human glory is doing that, right? Okay? But we're being raised up to be able to receive God as the form by which we see God as he is. That's the form in which God sees himself. But he comprehends that form. We don't. See? But we're going to see him as he is because this is the form in which we see him. If we saw him by created likeness, we wouldn't be seeing him as he is. Now, you see, the angels, in their natural knowledge, the angelic substance is more like God than our soul is, actually speaking. And therefore, they see God more perfectly in their natural knowledge than we do, right? They still don't see him as he is because their very substance, in these three ways that he explains in the body article, falls short, right? It's still infuriated to the divine substance, right? Mm-hmm. And it's... It's the... The difference between the existence and the substance, right, of this form, right? Okay, and it's limited. Okay, okay. So through the likeness which is own substances of God, you can't see God as he is. Never gets to be raised up too, right? That's the morning knowledge, as Augustine says, of the angels, right? The evening knowledge is the knowledge they have in their own natural knowledge, right? But then those who said, hey, thank you, then they received this higher knowledge, right? They'll just say, no, thank you. They lost out. The demons are still smarter than their servants. I mean, the demons are smarter than bad men. Yeah, yeah. They're smarter than the humans, by nature. But if someone doesn't have the help, the light of grace and other things. Well, you know, the last petition of the Our Father, we usually say, is deliver us from evil, right? But, you know, maybe the Greek is more like deliver us from evil, right? And I know it's like in some of the famous traditional prayers of the church, you know, like the prayer where you associate with communion there. I am my Christi, you know, and so on. And then it kind of follows the order, roughly, of the Our Father, right? Except for give us this day I did a bread, because you're receiving it. But then it says, you know, I'll put you in there from the evil one, right? Okay. So it takes it that way. Maybe more, of course, the Greek, you know. He's someone to be avoided, right? We didn't say, too, you said, well, you know, the devil. Tempting these saints, you know. God doesn't usually let them tempt us, lesser ones, as I just said directly, but, yeah. Okay, so the reply to the first objection, which is taken from John there, right, huh? And the authority speaks of the likeness, which is what? Through the partaking of the light and glory, right, huh? But as I say, you know, Thomas, in other places we've talked about the light of glory, he says, the light of glory is not like the light that makes the colors, what, visible, right? It makes you visible, right? Or like the light of the agent's light, which makes the phantasm actually, what, understandable, see? That what's in the images is only, what, understandable in ability. And it's made actually understandable by the natural light of reason, huh? Okay? And by the light of faith, something is made understandable to us that would not be understandable otherwise, right? We might think within the light of glory it's making God understandable. No, no, no, no. God is completely understandable, right? He's pure act, right, huh? So it's a light in a somewhat different sense, right? But it does contribute to our understanding, right? Because it disposes our reason to receive God God as the form by which you're going to see God as he is, okay? But not a light that makes God understandable, okay? God is understandable to himself, right? But he has to become the form of our mind before we see him as he is. But that's not the natural form of our mind. And therefore our mind has to be raised up to something more supernatural, okay? In a sense, sometimes I think you speak of the light of glory as gratia consummata, consummated grace, right? You know, when Thomas speaks of grace and the theological virtues, he says that grace is in the soul, right? And it's giving the soul a kind of, what, a new being, right? A kind of spiritual being that's more than, what, an actual being, right? And just as the reason and the will and so on, the powers of the soul flow from the nature of the soul, right? So the soul is raised up, right? To a kind of spiritual life, right? That you didn't have before. There are flows from the soul into the reason and the will. The, what? Virtues, right? And first of all, the theological virtues. And so, in a way, you're being raised above your nature, huh? So in a way, the light of glory, or glory itself, is what? Kind of the consummation, the completion, right? Of grace, huh? And what our Lord uses the thing there of, speaking of grace as like a fountain, you know? It's like the fountain's going up higher, you know? But, doesn't he speak of it as going up into, what, eternal life, right? Okay, so it's kind of the completion of grace, huh? But that completion gets rid of faith and hope because then you have the end, right? But charity remains and is more perfect, huh? Okay, the second thing here. When we know God, there comes to be a certain likeness of God in us, as Augustine says in the ninth book of the Trinity. Well, Augustine, he says, there it speaks of the knowledge of God, which we have on the road. In via, right? Okay? That's a word that they use in Latin to translate the Greek word for road, odas. If you look at St. John there, he says, I am the, we should translate, I am the way, the truth, and the life. But the word way there is translated in Latin by via, right? Way in English. But the Greek word is what, odas. It's much more sensible, you know? It's original meaning, huh? I am the road, you know? My way is a little more abstract, you know? I mean, that, it could be used for the road, right? But, and this is the way to Boston, this road, right? But, way is sometimes used a little more immaterial way, right? Yeah, yeah. And the third objection, right? They're saying that the sense in act is a sensible in act, and this is brought out in the second book about the soul. And the understandable in act is the understandable in act, huh? And, of course, both of those take place, right? As we learn in the Dhyanima, by having a likeness of the thing in us, right? So, it wouldn't be the same thing when we see God. He said, now, he says, to fear it should be said that the divine essence, the divine nature, the divine substance, right? Got a little bit of Charles Deconic's prejudice against the word essence here, right? Essence, he didn't like that word essence, which apparently in French means gasoline and so on. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But, speak more of the divine nature, the divine substance, right? The divine essence, the divine substance, the divine nature is, what? Existence itself, to be itself. Whence, just as other understandable forms, which are not their own, what? Being, right? Are united to the understanding, huh? According to the being, of which they inform the understanding itself, right? And make it understood, right? And make it to be in act, right? So, the divine essence, the divine nature, the divine substance, is united to the, what? Created understanding, so that it might be understood in act, right? Through itself, making it understood in act, huh? Okay? So, there you can be explicit, like I was saying earlier, right? The divine substance itself is united to, what? Our mind, or maybe better to say, our mind is united to the divine substance. And how can the form which is proper to one thing become the form of our soul, right? See? Our mind has to be raised up by this disposition called the light of glory, which is something necessary, therefore, supernatural, right? So, it's disposed, we see it. The divine substance has the form which it's going to understand. That's not the natural form which I understand. That's a lot better than the form which I usually understand, right? And there are many forms which I understand, right? I have one form whereby I understand what a triangle is, and one whereby I understand what a dog is, and another one whereby I understand what courage is. I've got all these forms up in my head, right? You know? Aristotle says in the Dehima, the soul is a place of forms, right? Okay? Kind of, you know, disagreeing with Plato, because Plato has all these universals existing in the world by themselves, right? But, no, they're all in the, what? Understanding, right? The forms of which it can understand. And since our mind is so weak, we need a different form for everything to understand, really. Therefore, we can't understand very much at once. You know? We barely understand at all, at once. And so we have to go from one thing to another, right? Okay. Hopefully. Hopefully. Yeah. Hopefully. Yeah. We just have to do that even in geometry, right? To go from one thing to another, right? Those who are marking, you know how the, you know, what delight I was having here in the 14 theorem, the last theorem of the second book of Euclid. And it's broadening what I'm saying, but what's kind of new in there is Euclid shows you how to find the side of a square equal to a given rectangle or oblong, right? That's a very simple thing in a way. But if you ask the person, how the person do that, they don't know how to do it. And the way he does it is through an earlier theorem in book 14, number five, which is that theorem I love so much. The theorem that shows, which, when I say it's a little tragedy, right? The theorem that shows that for the same perimeter, right, a square would have more area than a, what, rectangle or oblong with the same perimeter, right? But the way Euclid actually states it for the theorem is that if a straight line would be cut into equal and equal segments, the square on the half will be greater than the, what, or greater than the one contained by the equal ones by, what, the square between the points of section. You're going to use that later on. You're going to use also the tagline theorem, right? So one thing adds to the other thing, you know? But all these things, you've got to consider them one by one, you know? And it's kind of marvelous when you do it, but you realize at the same time, you know, the natural limitations of this mind, you know? You see one thing, then you see something else, and so on. And paulatum, you know, step by step, bit by bit, you know? You get a little understanding. It's kind of marvelous to see that, but this would be much more satisfying. Not marvelous. See? Yeah. And as we go on, we'll see that in seeing God as He is, you'll see everything else you naturally want to know. You see the whole universe, huh? You see? You'll see at least the divine mind, the divine substance clearly enough to see everything you naturally want to know. So I know all you, clearly, you know? But all at once, all at once, you know, huh? You see? Okay? But I know the whole natural world, huh? You know? The boy sitting there out in the Bible, I won't go out anymore. I have everything, you know? I've been listening to Palestrina the last few Sundays, you know, when I come back for Mass, I think that was Palestrina, you know, here, nice Mass, and really pretty good at Palestrina, right there, very good. Thomas says there will be a vocal praise here in Heaven, so we'll have to see what Palestine is up to when you get there. I know.