Prima Pars
Lecture 45: Divine Vision and the Knowledge of God's Essence

Transcript
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Thomas says, well, he doesn't mean that. He means, what does God know primarily, right? See? And it's only by knowing himself he knows anything else, right? I see. And, of course, Aristotle, you know, in other places, you know, there's two or three places, for example, where he criticized Empedocles because in the position of Empedocles, we'd know something that God didn't know. That's ridiculous, Aristotle didn't know. So, I mean, you know, so great a philosophy and so great a question should be, but, you know, kind of Dickie himself, you know, Thomas does even occur in the Aristotle, he's so stupid, right? You know? And especially when he himself is so clear about the fact that there's something wrong with the position of Empedocles about how knowledge takes place if the consequence of his position is that we know something God doesn't know. We know hate, and God doesn't know hate. Okay? And so, I see Thomas, not in that particular text, but in some other place, you know. So great a philosophy and so great a matter should mean this. It doesn't make any sense, right? And the same thing, you know, it has partly that attitude towards what? You know, Guston, right? And so great a theologian could mean this. Well, he does read Guston very carefully, like he reads Aristotle very carefully. Okay, but the third objection is taken from the text in Isaiah. So I think Isaiah says, I saw God, right? You know, on the throne, right? There's something to that effect. Now, it should be said that in an imaginary vision, the very substance of God, the essence of God, is not seen. But some form is what formed in imagination, representing God according to some way of likeness, right? As in divine scriptures in the Bible, divine things are described metaphorically through sensible things, right? So we say the Lord is a rock, right? Well, I thought the rock is taking on new meaning right now. But the meaning of the speaker is not that God is a rock, but that he's something like a rock insofar as he gives support or firmness to things, right? One thing you notice about metaphors, the same metaphor can be used for something good or something bad, right? So if someone says, you've got a stony heart, that's not a compliment, huh? You say the Lord is a rock, right? Or what's it, was it Stonewall Jackson? It's like a stone wall or something, you know? That was a compliment, right, huh? So, to be like a stone, it can be taken in a good way, like a bad way, right? The devil is a, what, lion going around, seeking whom he may devour, right? And you have Aslan, right? And you have the lion of the tribe of Judah, right? And so, the lion's cruelty, right? Maybe the likeness there in the case of the devil, right? But the lion's strength and courage, whatever it is, is more like the lion of the tribe of Judah, the one of Congress. He's the king of the beasts, right? You know, it's not like a chance that the English have, you know, the lion is a symbol of this, huh? You walk around Venice, you see all these lions there. St. Mark, yeah. But there's also a symbol, isn't there, the authority, kind of a more authority there. It's interesting how the different senses, nevertheless, are kind of metaphorically carried over, right? Taste and see how sweet is the Lord, and so on. And in the songs, there, you know, running in the ointments of God, and so on, right? The smell, or all these things, instead of just virgin, you know? It's not by chance, you know, setting up in the grave of the saints, and you get the flowering, instead of the stench, there's a couple of long bodies, and you get this, you know, that kind of a sign of the good odor of these people, right? And, of course, the ear and the eye are used a lot, of course, in Scripture. Hear God speaking. Not so much this way, right, unless you're, you know, what's his name? David there, who's that, the guy? The prophet? Nathan, was it? Nathan, before David. Was it Saul? Saul? Samuel? Yeah, Samuel, yeah. Who heard it, right? Oh, yeah. That's what his master was, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's coming usually here. But he's actually here in his ears, right? It's not just, you know, it's not just imaginary. Okay, now the fourth article. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that some created understanding, and I'd like to say this for the power, right, is able, through its natural powers, to see the divine, what, substance, right? If Thomas is going to take the other side, right? Contrary guy, right? But Dionysius says in the fourth chapter, the divine names, that the angel is a pure, what? Pure. Yeah. Most, what, clear, right? Receiving the whole, if one could say so, beauty of God, right, huh? That's quite a creature, right? I think tomorrow, I think they have the Rayfield, Gabriel, whatever here. Your calendar. Not, not yours, right? Yeah, St. Michael in November. Yeah. By himself? Yeah, by himself. We don't have Rayfield on our calendar, I think we should correct that. Yeah, there wasn't a feast there, three of them. We call them saints there, he's in the switchbook. Yeah. But each thing is seen when it's, what, mirror is seen, right, huh? It's image. Since, therefore, the angel, through his natural powers, understands himself, it seems that also through his, what, natural powers, he understands the divine essence. He sees God naturally much more clearly than we do, because he sees himself and he's a much more clear mirror of God, right, huh? But still, he's going to be limited, huh? Moreover, that which is most visible becomes less visible to us on account of the defect of our sight, either of our bodily sight or of our celestial sight. So that's going back to what Aristotle said, right, that what's more knowable is less knowable to us, right? That's why we know things in a confused way before we know distinctly, as he says in the beginning of the first book of the actual hearing. And Aristotle says it's the eyes of the bat, right, to the light of day, right? So is our reason, right, to the things which are most knowable. But the understanding of the angel does not undergo such defect, right? Since, therefore, God by himself is most knowable, right, it seems that he is most knowable by the angel. If, therefore, other things that are understandable through their, what? If, therefore, he's able to understand other understandable things through his own natural powers, much more can he understand God, right? So this is the difference between us and the angels, is that the object of our understanding is something that's understandable, only in ability. And we have to make it actually understandable. That's the act of understanding that does that. But the object of the angelic understanding is something that is, what? Understandable in act. Therefore, it seems that he'd know most of all what is most understandable in act. And that's God. Moreover, bodily sense is not able to be raised up to understanding a bodiless substance, because it is above its nature. If, therefore, to see God, by his essence, was above the nature of any created understanding, it seems that no created understanding is able to be raised up to the nature of the nature of ...to arrive at what? Seeing the essence of God, which is erroneous, as has been said above. It seems, therefore, that it is natural to the great understanding to see the divine essence. But against this is what is said in Romans, this is the Romans, chapter 6, verse 23, by the grace of God, eternal life. But eternal life consists in the vision of the divine essence, according to that of the 17th chapter of John, where Christ says, this is eternal life, that they know thee, the only true God. So it's by grace that you have eternal life. It's by grace, then, that you have the value of God, and therefore it's not by nature. Therefore it's see, or nature alone. Therefore to see the nature of God, belongs to the great understanding by grace, and not by nature. That's a nice soldier's in there, right? I saw the phrase there in Thomas today, where he speaks of, he's talking about the commandments, right? And when you have a commandment saying, like, thou shalt not commit adultery, right? Is it included under that commandment, thou shalt not commit fornication, right? Or, thou shalt not kill. Does that include I shalt not chop off your arm, or something? Which is lesser than kill you. You say, well, yes, it is, right? But how is it included in there, right? And Thomas says, was not included via syllogistica. In other words, you can't reason from the greater evil being prohibited to the lesser one, right? You can't say that if adultery is bad, then fornication is bad. You can argue, if fornication is bad, then adultery is bad, right? Or if it's bad for me to cut off your arm, even more so is it bad for me to kill you. But you can't do the verse, huh? And say, if it's bad for me to kill you, then it must be bad for me to do something lesser. And then he goes on to explain, you know, it's more like a seed, right? But he makes a nice comparison. Just as the reason goes from what is more known to us to what is less known to us, and more difficult to be known, right? So, in the moral life, we go from avoiding what is easier to avoid, or easier to do, to what is more difficult to do, or more difficult to avoid, right? So there's a certain likeness there, right? But it's not via syllogistica. It's not by a syllogistic road. Because via is kind of the Latin word for road. The roads are going. Via is kind of the common Latin translation of the Greek word hodas, right? The crisis and the hodas, huh? And they translate it in Latin and the via. And in English, by way, but way is a little, not quite as, it can mean the road, the way, but it's not quite as concrete as via and hodas. So, no syllogistic road there. But here's a syllogism right here in the synchronicity, right? By the grace of God is eternal life. Eternal life is to know God, right? Therefore, it's by grace that we know God, and not by, what? Nature, by nature alone, right? And it gives, there's evidence there that the use of vision is referring to the understanding, not the understanding of the body. Yeah. Yeah. The answer, it should be said, that it's impossible that some created understanding, by its natural powers, right? See the, what? Power. The nature of God. The essence of God. For knowledge happens, takes place, according as the knower is in the knower. I remember we first met that with the great, what? Empedocles, right? In the beautiful fragment of Empedocles, by water we know water, by air we know air, by fire we know fire, by love we know love, and by hate we know hate, and so on. It's by having these things in us that we, what? Know them, right? And then since he thought of God, and correctly, it's kind of immortal, right? By hate is what destroys things, pulls them apart, right? Then he said there's no hate in God, right? Which is good. Sorry, what? But then, if by hate we know hate, and there's no hate in God, then God doesn't know hate. And therefore we know something God doesn't know. That knows the difficulty that Aristotle got him into, right? But, going back to what he said, was it correct that the known is in the knower before it's known? It's got to be in the knower in some way, anyway. Would I know any of you guys, I bet you're on the street there in Worcester or something, would I recognize you? If I didn't have your shape and so on, your color, in my, what, memory, right? Could I recognize, you know, my five of my grandchildren this time? Actually, I saw the other six of their ones, too. If I couldn't, if I didn't have their shape, their thing in me, right? But how is it in the knower, that's the question, right? Because if it was in there in a material way, then this chair would know what wood is. It's got wood in it, huh? And, right? Nobody thinks that, huh? Or, what's his name when know what a stone is, when he gets a stone in his head. So, Aristotle said, well, in Pentecost, it's correct that the thing known must be in the knower, right? Before it can be known. But maybe he misunderstood the way in which it is in the knower. It's not in the knower material way, but in a, what? Immaterial way, right? People take sometimes, you know, the example, even in the senses, which are not as immaterial as reason, but, you know, when you go into the shower or something like that, your body gets adjusted to the water, and then it doesn't feel as warm as it did, right? Then people sometimes turn on the hot for a little bit more, right? And it's because your body is not taking on the, what, heat as its own, right? Just receiving it in a kind of material way. The brick receives heat, huh? But we have to receive the form of another as other in order to know it. That's a kind of immaterial way of receiving. And as you go from the outward senses to the imagination and on, and find the reason, you get something which is, what? More and more immaterial. So the imagination is more immaterial than the eye. When I see you now, it's not as immaterial as when I picture you in my imagination. I go home and I can still see you with my imagination. But that's not as immaterial as when I understand what you are, a man. And so, Thomas is in columns, right? Knowledge contingent, huh? It happens, huh? It takes place. According as the cognitum, the known, is in the, what, cognoscente, the one knowing. But the known is in the knower, according to the way of the, what, knower. It goes back to the more general statement that whatever is received is received, according to a receiver. That's a good thing to remember when you're a teacher, right? You know, that the students always see what you say in a somewhat different way, depending upon their preparation and so on, right? That's a terrible thing, you know, in colleges now when you have all this freedom of choice, huh? And so some students have had this course and some students have had that course and some have had neither of those courses. And what can you presuppose when you start to teach, huh? You see? And, uh, which I have, you know, everybody has a different background. background coming in, and you can't kind of build, you know. You've got to take away freedom to build, right? At TAC, right, everybody takes the same thing. One thing builds upon another, and you get further that way, even if you have freedom. If you're free to take solid geometry, not having had plain geometry, and he's had plain geometry, he's going to learn more solid geometry with his background, but you should have been, you know, required to take plain geometry before solid geometry. Well, they might have hit that map, but they can't see it, and other things aren't as easy to understand, huh? When Aristotle begins to investigate, say, the definition of the soul, remember that in the second book of the soul? And he approaches the definition of the soul with six divisions, right? Three on the part of the soul and three on the part of the body, right? And the first division he gives goes back to the categories, the first book of logic. And the second division into matter and form, the genius, the substance, and so on, that goes back to the first book of the actual hearing. So if someone is reading the second book about the soul, and he's going to approach the definition of the soul, he doesn't know the categories, he doesn't know the first book of theology, right? The first book of the actual hearing, what do you do? What do you do? Thank you very much. It's like my senior Dion trying to teach theology, you know, and telling them what a sacrament is, and a sacrament is a sign, right? I can't explain what a sign is. They haven't had, you know, the philosophical background of what this thing is, so he ends up teaching philosophy rather than theology. So he says the known, however, is in the knower according to the way of the knower, right? That's more particular, right? He began by saying that knowledge takes place according as the known is in the knower, right? And now he's saying that the knower is not in the known, the known rather, is not in the knower in the same way, right? Quite a different tangent. Quence, he says, the knowledge of each one knowing is according to the way of its own, what? Nature. If, therefore, the way of being of something known exceeds the way of the nature of the knower, is necessary that the knowledge of that thing be above the nature of that one, what? Knowing. Your way of knowing can't, in a way, excel your way of being. That's part of the reason why we, so long as our soul is a soul in a body, right? Its way of being is in the body, right? And that's why its natural way of understanding is something that can be sensed or imagined. I sometimes kind of paraphrase what Aristotle says in the third book on the soul, that our reason's own object is what it is of something that can be sensed or imagined. And what cannot be sensed or imagined, it can't know what it is, except perhaps by some kind of, what, roundabout way, right? And a way that would involve something in negation of what can be sensed or imagined. Okay? Now the way of being of the angels is different because he's not in matter, right? And so he naturally understands himself and to some extent the other angels because they are actually, what, understandable. His way of being is not the way of being of the one who said, I am who am I? That's that Thomas going on. There is over a multiple or manifold many ways of the being of things, right? For there are some whose nature does not have being except in this individual matter, this flesh and blood and bones of this individual, right? Flesh right here, right? Individual. And this sort are all bodily things, huh? Some things are our whose natures are, what, subsisting by themselves, not in any manner, right? That's the angels, which nevertheless are not their own, what, to be their own being, their own existence. But they are having existence, huh? So they have and they have, and that's the same. And these are the bodiless substances, right? What they often call separated substances, but meaning separated from matter, which we call the angels, right? But that's more of a theological term, because you're being sent all the time. But only if God is proper the way of being, that he would be his own, what, subsisting existence, huh? What God is, is to be. Okay? It's not what an angel is, but he has to be. Those things, therefore, which do not have being except in individual matter, is connatural for us to know, right? In that our soul, by which we know, is the form of some matter, huh? So you remember the definition of the soul in the second book about the soul? So it's the, what, first act of a natural body, right? Composed of tools. The substantial form, right? Of a body composed of tools, huh? That's organic means, huh? Greek word organon means tool, right? Which soul, nevertheless, has two kinds of knowing powers. One, which is the act of some bodily organ. That's the senses. That's true of the inward senses, as well as the outward senses. And to this, it is connatural to know things according as they are in individual matter. Whence the sense does not know except, what? Singularism. Okay? So I never see man in general. I see this man, right? I never see chair in general. It's always this individual chair, right? I never feel chair. I feel this chair. I can't feel chair. I feel this, okay? Because our knowledge starts with our senses, that's why our knowledge starts with what? Singularism, right? So Aristotle gives me the premium to wisdom, if you recall, the order of our knowing. It says it begins with sensing, right? Then you have memory of what you sensed. Then you have experience from many memories, right? But all of that is in knowledge of singulars, right? And only after much experience do you begin to separate out, by your act of understanding, what's common to these many singulars, when you begin to understand the universal, right? So that's why induction comes before syllogism. Because induction is originally from singulars and going towards universal. But syllogism begins with something universal. And that's why, you know, the dialogues, when they try to define something, Meno, Sadie in that dialogue, or Yuthi Froh in that dialogue, or Theotavis in that dialogue named after him. They give examples, right? Because that's closer to the senses. Original examples are sensible. And then, you know, if you ask a little child, you know, what is a square or a rectangle, you point maybe to those outlets you've got around here, right? Or something else is a rectangle. What's a circle? You point to the clock there, or something that's circular, or the picture of the butterflies, or the thermostat there, or something. You look about with the universal definition, right? And I find that's true about students, and especially a child. But now, there's another power in us. There's another knowing power of man, which is the understanding, which is not the act or form of some bodily organ. Now, that's something that Aristotle first proves in the third book about the soul, right? How do you prove that the understanding is not a body? Let's Aristotle prove it. It's a very concrete way he has to show it in the third book of the soul because he's gone through the senses first, right? And it seems that the senses, in order to know something, have to be lacking that object to begin with, right? So if my tongue is going to be able to taste the sweet and the bitter and the sharp and the oily and so on, then, can my tongue have any taste? I mean, if my tongue was a sugary thing, would I be able to taste other things? And if my ears, you know, had Mozart in Vilt, because I'm hearing Mozart all the time, would I be able to hear all these different other sounds? Or if my eyes, you know, had the scent of there, if they had, you know, green fluid, would I be able to see all colors? So it seems that the senses, in order to receive all colors, the eye has to lack any color in the center there. And the tongue, in order to receive all tastes, has to lack any taste in them. So reason is open to knowing what? All bodily things. Therefore, it must lack any what? Bodily nature. Now, another way that the kind of prisoner of style there is that reason knows the, what, universal, right? Now, if you know something about singularity, why is it possible to have, let's say, many chairs that are of exactly the same kind, right? You've got a number of chairs in there, right? Around this table, they all seem to be more or less the same kind. You've got many hooks up there on the wall, right? They're all the same, right? Well, the simplest answer is, in one case, you've got enough wood. In the other case, you have enough, I don't know, metal, whatever it is. So what enables you to have many individuals of the same kind is that you have matter subject to quantity, right? And so the woman rolls out the dough, right? And she's got enough dough, and she can make all these different cookies at Christmas time, right? She stamps them a lot, right? Because one's here, one's there, one's there. So, you see, matter, as subject to quantity, is the cause of what? The individuation of these different cookies, or these individual chairs, right? Or even, you're in mine, right? Because my flesh is not your flesh, right? Flesh is divided up among us, okay? So, what is received in a body is received as what? Here or there. It's received as what? Singuish of it, right? See? But when I understand what a man is, or what a chair is, or what one of those hooks is, right? I'm understanding something what? Universal. So, chair is received in my reason as something what? Universal. But if my reason was a body, subject to quantity, what is received in the understanding would be received as what? Actually, it's received in the senses. As singular. So, that's another way that they show, right? That reason is immaterial. That things are received in it, and they what? But it's universal rather than what? It's singular, yeah. Now, you can see the imagination, again, it's received as what's singular, right? Remember the difficulty of the English philosopher there, Locke, you know, he's trying to understand the general idea of triangle, and he's trying to, he's mixing up the image of triangle with the, what? Idea of triangle. And therefore, it's got to fit isosceles and scathe in the negrilateral. It's got to be all, none of these, right? And he can't quite grasp the universal. But can you see or imagine the universal? No. Any chair you see will be individual, but even any triangle that I imagine is singular, and I can't imagine triangle here and triangle on this side and one above and so on. But chair and triangle are received in the reason as universals. So they're received in a, what? None bodily way. Or take that other thing here. You know what the continuous is, right? Continuous is a quantity whose parts made it a common boundary, right? Like the parts of a line made it a point, or the parts of a circle in a line, right? Parts of a body, a surface. Well, is the definition of triangle or the definition of a circle, is that something continuous? I define a square as a equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. Now, are equilateral and right-angled beating quadrilateral? Like the parts of a line made it a point, or the line, is that this? No. So a definition of square is not continuous, is it? And yet I'm understanding a continuous thing. So what does that tell me? I'm understanding a continuous thing, in an uncontinuous way. Is that because of what is being understood? No, I'm understanding something continuous. Therefore, it must be that the one understanding, that by which I understand, is responsible for my understanding the continuous in an uncontinuous way. I understand bodies in a body's way. That's a sign, again, an argument to show the immateriality of the understanding. And most people don't know that, right? But because you're understanding that what it is is something sensed or imagined, your reason, as long as it's in your soul's in the body, it naturally turns towards images, right? So when I think about what a triangle is, I imagine a triangle, right? But I understand what this is. I understand something universal. So I would say it depends upon the imagination there. But some would like the dependence I have upon you being there for my seeing you. But my seeing you is not in you at all, is it? It's in me, right? And people get confused about that, right? Because a blow on the brain interferes with thinking. Your elbow going to the brain interferes with thinking, etc., etc. See? But your leaving the room would interfere with my seeing, right? Knocking out the light there would interfere with my seeing, right? But it's on the side of the object, not on the side of the sense itself. So, a little review there of some things there from the third book about the soul. So, there's another knowing part he says in us, which is the understanding. Which is not the act of some bodily organ, right? Because it knows bodies in abideless ways, right? And it's open to knowing all bodies. And so on. Whence the understanding is connatural, it's of our very nature, to know natures which do not have being except in matter that is individual, but nevertheless not according as they are in matter that is individual, but according as they are abstracted or separated from matter by the consideration of the understanding. Whence, by the understanding, we are able to know things of this sort in general, universally, which is above the ability of the senses. But to the angelic nature, or understanding, it is connatural to know natures that are not existing in matter, which is above the natural ability of the human understanding according to the status of the present life, right? In which it is united to a, what? Body, right? It remains, therefore, that to know ipsum esse subsistence. all right, is connatural to only the divine, what, understanding, and that it be above the ability, the natural ability of any created understanding, because no creature is its own, what, yeah, its own being, its own existence, its own to be, right, but it has being that it is partaken of. Therefore, the created intellect is not able to see God, whose essence, or in his essence, except insofar as God, by, what, his grace, right, is joined to the created understanding as something understandable by, right? In your light we shall see light, as it says, huh? Let's take a break here at 3.30. Let's try to look at the fifth article if we can.