Prima Pars
Lecture 48: Seeing All Things in God and the Beatific Vision

Transcript
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Gregory the Great was one of the major doctors of the Western Church. To the first, therefore, it should be said that Gregory speaks as regards the sufficiency of the, what, object to wit God, huh? That as far as in itself is concerned, it sufficiently contains all things and, what, demonstrates all things, huh? But nevertheless, it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, because he does not perfectly, what, comprehend it, huh? And the second objection was taken from the idea of God being kind of a mirror, right, a likeness of all things. To the second, it should be said that the one seeing the mirror is not necessary that he see all things in the mirror, unless he comprehends, by his vision, the mirror, right? Now, the third objection, which is the most interesting in some ways to me. To the third, it should be said that although it's more to see God than all other things, huh? Nevertheless, it is more to see God such that all things are known in him, right? Then thus him, that not all things are seen in him, right? But fewer or more are known in him, huh? But it's been shown already that the multitude of things known in God follow the way of seeing him, which is either more perfect or what? Less perfect, huh? Now, some days, Thomas, we'll make out the distinction between what? But seeing this thing in itself, by itself, and seeing it in God, right? Okay? And so, although you could know it more easily by itself, then you could know God, right? To know it in God would require you to know God better, right? Okay? And you just know God some way. So the better you know God, the more you see in God, right? Okay? Now, Thomas talks about these things more explicitly in the other Summa, but he's going to break the point here. What about the natural desire to know the whole universe? Well, Thomas says, well, in seeing God, you know all that you naturally desire to know. To the fourth, it should be said, huh? That the natural desire of the rational creature is for knowing all those things which pertain to the perfection of the understanding. And these are the species and general things, and their reasons, huh? Which in God will see whoever is seeing the divine essence, huh? Okay? But to know other singular things, such as the thoughts and doings of others, right? Is not of the perfection of the created understanding, right? Nor does its natural desire tend towards this, huh? So I don't have a natural desire to know what you guys have been doing all day long. Which I've been thinking, right? As Thomas says, it doesn't pertain to the perfection of my mind to know how much you understand. Nor again to know those things which are not, but are able to come to be by God, right? Okay? So what Thomas says more fully in the Summa is that we have a natural desire to know the, what, the existing universe, right? And all the kinds of things that are in it, right? And so on. And all of that we'll see in seeing God, right? So our natural desire will be satisfied, huh? But we'll see all this at once, huh? Okay. I stayed at my house study and I said, gee, this, I'm reading the sentences right now, you know, but I'd like to go back and read to some more Euclid, you know, or go back to the physics. But I can't do all these at one time. It's kind of a circle, you know? And I said, gee, that's a nice piece of Mozart, but that's only one of, you know, my CDs. Mozart. And so I, that kind of circle, I try to go through them, you know? But I can't hear them all at once. You know, and say, well, that's really a beautiful piece. I haven't heard it for a while, you know? Well, that's a beautiful thought, right? You know? And, uh, I mean, this Summa Kahn Chantila, you know, read a couple chapters or something, you know, and say, but, you know, 150 chapters and I can't give them all in one day, you know? So there's kind of a cycle there, right? You see? Go back, you know? Go back and get the commentary on the Psalms again, you know? Or the commentary on John, you know? Commentary on Matthew and John. I can only do these a little bit at a time, you know? When you see God as he is, you'll see all these other things that you naturally want to know in this life. At this, all at once, right? Then it goes on here, huh? There's a famous text of Augustine, right? If, nevertheless, God alone was seen, right? Who is the fountain, right? And the beginning of all being and truth, so would the natural desire of knowing be filled, right? That nothing else would be what? And one would be what? Acid, right? Okay? It doesn't melt anything, right? And I always like this beautiful quote from the great Augustine. Once Augustine says in the fifth book, huh? Of the Confessions. In Felix, huh? Unhappy or miserable, right? The man who knows all those things, namely creatures, right? But who does not know you, huh? Blessed also the one who knows you, even if he knows those, is ignorant of those other things. Who knows you and those things, right? Not an account of that is more blessed, but an account of you only blessed, right? So he's saying, miserable the man who knows all those things, but doesn't know God, right? Blessed the man who knows God, even if he doesn't know anything else. Blessed also the man who knows God and other things, not the more blessed for knowing other things, but for knowing God alone, huh? That's kind of amazing, huh? To see that, huh? He's that interesting. So that when you see God as he is, I don't know if we've got attention to each other much in heaven or not. You know? You know, these famous saints and other people that you read about, and so on, you know, you say, well, I'd like to meet them, you know, and say, hey, did I understand that right, Thomas? You know, this is the way I thought you meant, you know, and if I didn't want to have any desire to pursue those questions, it would only be clear to me anyway, or... You know, you're curious, you know, I mean, you know, to see Christ in the flesh, right? Mary in the flesh, you know, what should we look like? And you're going to have the saints, you know? They like to count them. Those people that are worried if their dog's going to be in heaven or not. You know the proper answer to that, right? It's just the dogs will be outside the saints. The answer, as it gets a little child, is that if your dog or cat is necessary for your happiness in heaven, your dog and cat will be there. They're not saying they're going to be there. They're saying if you would not be happy without your kitty cat or your dog in heaven, your kitty cat or dog will be there. That's true. And you can have an instant statement that it's true, even if the parts are, what, not true. So the other one has an immortal soul in it? No, no. Not necessary for your happiness. It's like if I say, if candy is necessary for your happiness in heaven, there will be candy in heaven. Oh. So that... If why? If you have to change that poker that goes in heaven, there ain't no beer, that's why we have it here. That's why we have it here. You see, it's a characteristic instant statement, though, right? You know, if you say, if Socrates is a mother, then Socrates is a woman. That's true. Even though it's false that Socrates is a mother, Socrates is a woman, right? Okay. What does a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed a beast no more? So you can say that's true. If man's chief good is no more than the chief good of the beast, He's... He's... He's... He's... He's... He's... He's... He's... He's... He... then man is no more than a beast. That's true. Even though both simple statements that it's put together from are what? False, right? You know, you talk about if-then statement, you point out that you can have what? A true if-then statement made out of two false simple statements, and you can have a false if-then statement made out of two true statements. If I am a man, then I am a father. Say, well, I'm a man and I'm a father, but that statement is false. If I'm a man, then I'm a father. If I'm a man, then I'm Dwayne Burkist. Well, that's false, isn't it? I think so. What? I think so. Yeah. It shows you the difference in what the falsity means there, you know? Well, that's why in the if-then argument you use a regular statement, right? Mm-hmm. In order to get back to a regular statement as a conclusion. You say, mind is one of the rest of the if-then, though. But you don't explain all this to the child and say, if candy is necessary for your happiness in heaven, there will be candy in heaven. Right. Keep keeping quiet for now. Yeah. Or sometimes we think we can't be happy without this person, right? Well, if that person is there for your happiness in heaven, they'll be there. They need not be, but I mean, if they're going to save your happiness, they'll be there. So St. Thomas is more explicit about this reply to the fourth objection there in the Summa Contra Gentiles. Okay. Now, Article 9 is what? Talking about those things we do see, though, in God, right? And whether they're seen by some what? Likeness, huh? You know, God is not seen by some likeness, huh? To the ninth it proceeds thus. It seems that those things which are seen in God, by those seeing the divine essence, are seen through some what? Likenesses, right? Of course, that can't be so long. A bunch of likenesses floating around in God, where are you going to? Okay. For all knowledge is by the likening of the knower to the what? Knower, huh? For thus the understanding in act is the understood in act, as Aristotle says. And the sense in act is the sensible in act, insofar as they are informed by what? Their likenesses, right? As the pupil by the likeness of color, right? So when I have the definition of square in my mind, right? I have the nature of square in me. In a way, I become a square, right? If, therefore, the understanding of one seeing God through its essence, through his essence, understands in God some creatures, is necessary that it be informed, huh? By their, what? Likenesses, huh? Moreover, those things which we saw before, we hold in our memory, right? But St. Paul, and this, of course, is the position of both, what? Augustine and Thomas, huh? That St. Paul saw God as he is, in a passing way, right? Yeah. And that Moses did, too. But just those two, huh? Okay? But Paul, seeing in rapture the essence of God, as Augustine says in the 12th book, in Genesis to the letter, after he ceased seeing the essence of God, recorded or recalled, brought back to his heart, you might say, huh? Many of those things that he had seen in that rapture. In the rapture. Whence he himself said that he heard hidden words, right? Hidden thoughts, which is not licit for man to speak, huh? Therefore, it is necessary to say that there are some likenesses of those things which he, what, recalled, huh? And these remained in his intellect, huh? And for the same reason, when they are seen presently, when the vision, when the essence of God is seen presently, of those things which are seen in it, there are some kind of likenesses or species. But against all this, he says, is that through one species, or through one form, is seen the mirror and those things which appear in the mirror. But all things are thus seen in God as in a certain understandable mirror. Therefore, if God is not seen through some likeness, but through his essence, neither are those things which are seen in him seen through some likenesses or species. The answer should be said that those seeing God through his essence see those things, those things which they see in the very essence of God, they do not see through some forms, but they see it through the very, what, essence of God, right, joined to the understanding. In other words, this is the form of the mind, which in this case is a divine substance itself, right, is a form adequate to knowing not only God, but other things, right? And through that one form, one knows God and other things in God at the same time. Thus, for thus, he says, is known each thing according as its likenesses in the knower. But this happens in two ways, huh? For since some things, right, are like to one and the same, they are also, what, like each other, right? The knowing power in two ways can be assimilated to something knowable. In one way, by itself, when it directly is informed by its, what, likeness. And then it is known by itself, right? In another way, according as it is informed by the species or form of something which is, what, like it. And then the thing is not known in itself, but in its, what, what is like it. For other is the knowledge by which a man is known in himself, another by which is known in his, what, in his image. Thus, therefore, to know things through their likenesses existing in the knower is to know them in themselves or in their proper natures. but to know them insofar as their likenesses preexist in God is to see them, what, in God. And these two knowledges differ. Whence, by that knowledge by which things are known by those seeing God through his essence in God himself, they're not seen through some, what, other likenesses, but only through the divine, what, essence which is present through the understanding through which also God himself is, what, seen, huh? So the divine substance is, what, a likeness in some way of everything, right? And this goes back to what Aristotle taught us that every agent makes what is like itself. So since God in some way made all things, right, all things have some likeness to God, right? And they're all contained in the power of God in some way. And therefore God in knowing himself fully, right, knows everything else. And we, the more perfectly we see God, the more we see in him all these other things. But through seeing him, right, not to a likeness adapted to those things in particular. That's kind of an amazing thing that God is, right? But you kind of approach it as you go up, you know, the angels, even on actual knowledge, huh? The higher angels have, what, fewer ideas, but they see things more, what? Yeah, yeah. I think you kind of because you talked about a little bit about our striving to be like the ages a bit, huh? And it seems that we need To know everything distinctly, we need a sort of thought, usually, right? Okay? So to know, let's say, a triangle or a square or something like this, or a polygon, sorry, we need one idea, and to know a circle, we need a what? Another idea, right? We can't know the two by the same idea. Okay? But now, Euclid shows us how to, what, inscribe a square in a circle, right? So we inscribe a square in a circle. And then we can bisect these things, right? Bisect the four things. And then we can bisect the main ones, right? And as we do this, we get a polygon of an increasingly number of sides, but it's approaching the what? Circle. But because it continues to be divisible forever, it's never immediate. So the circle is a limit that it, what? Never reaches. Yeah. But now we have an idea of the polygon, right? That these polygons are approaching the circle as a limit. So we seem to be knowing circle and polygon at the same time. Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? Right? And that's the way the angels do it, right? But one idea, they know two things, or more than two things, distinctly. They vary distinction, right? Mm-hmm. You see? So, that's just the same indication of our trying to be lighter and superior mind. Sometimes when they compare the nature of things to numbers, they said that if ten understood itself, right, fully, would it understand not only ten, but also nine, eight, seven, six, five, four? Yeah? And, you know, when you understand, let's say, what the human soul is, right, do you understand in some way what the animal soul is? Mm-hmm. And even the plant soul? Mm-hmm. So, but like, you know, understanding in ten, nine, eight, seven, six, right? Mm-hmm. There's something, but not the whole, right? Mm-hmm. It's like what they call sometimes a potential whole, right? The soul, right? That's kind of struck. I mentioned, I was reading Thomas there talking about the character and so on, and talking about baptism, and in a baby, baptism removes, what, the original sin from the person. Mm-hmm. But in an adult, what does it do? Yeah. Yeah, both original and actual sin, if the person is, you know, contrite and so on. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Well, one of the objections, again, saying that baptism moves actual sin, right? Mm-hmm. So that it has, in that sense, more power than confession, huh? Mm-hmm. Or confession has part of the power of baptism, huh? Mm-hmm. I never hear him say that elsewhere, maybe he does say it elsewhere, but I'm just happy to see it there, I mean, that part, you know, that fourth part that he's talking about baptism, you know, and amazing things, you know? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. You know? But, in a way, this is what it means to know God, right? It's like knowing ten, and knowing ten fully, you see, nine, eight, seven, six, and all these things, in a way, are contained in ten, huh? But, they can imitate God more or less, right? Nine imitates ten, but not perfectly. Mm-hmm. Eight years and less so. Seven years and less so, right? All the way down. Mm-hmm. So, the more perfectly you know God, the more you know these lesser things, they can be like him, more or less, but never exactly like him, huh? Mm-hmm. I noticed in that speech there, of Benedict there, he quoted the reference to the Fourth Lottery Council. Mm-hmm. I first, you know, happened to think about that text, you know, when Paul VI, back in one of his talks, you know, referred to explicitly, huh? But what the text says is that you can never see a likeness between a creature and God without a greater, what, unlikeness, you know? It's kind of a key text, see? Mm-hmm. So, some of you see, like in the Psalms, it was like the Lord, our God, and so, and so, I told you the little counter, I have it in right, years ago. Yeah. Mm-hmm. Because we were doing the text of Shakespeare, right? Yeah. And he objected to reason being called God-like. Yeah. And so, I was talking to him about it a little bit, and trying to explain, you know, the Christian position, and I was quoting the Fourth Lottery Council, you know, where we say that, right? Mm-hmm. But if you deny there's any likeness of the creature to God, then you're essentially denying God's causality. Mm-hmm. And the idea that the agent makes something like itself, huh? Mm-hmm. Now, what they call univocal cause, when a dog produces a dog, or a cat produces a cat, then the likeness is exactly the same, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. But then you get the higher things, huh? The higher cause contains a lower, like a ten producing nine, or eight, or seven, or something, all the way down the line, huh? There's still some likeness there. Otherwise, you wouldn't be giving somebody what you have. There's no likeness at all, right? Like a dog producing a cat, or something else. Mm-hmm. Okay. See, we've got through the body of the article here now. Mm-hmm. And notice, in the next world there, if we see God as he is face to face, this doesn't exclude, as Thomas would say elsewhere, that we might have some, what, knowledge of other things, right? Mm-hmm. Through their own likenesses, right? Mm-hmm. But that would not be in the vision of God. It wouldn't be any likeness. You'd be seeing all of them through the divine, what? Divine nature, yeah. Mm-hmm. Which only has the likeness of all things. Mm-hmm. That God can say, you know, I'll show you all good. Yes. Myself. Okay. Okay. Now, the first objection was taken from the idea that you have to be assimilated to the thing, right, that you know in some way. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the understanding of the one seeing God is likened, huh, is assimilated to the things which are seen in God insofar as it is united to the, what, divine essence in which the likenesses of all things pre-exist, right? Okay. It's more perfect knowledge even of those things. Yeah, yeah. The more perfect likeness of it than the likeness that would be appropriate to that thing. This goes back again to the central question of philosophy, right? Mm-hmm. That the way of knowing doesn't have to be the same thing as the way of the thing. Mm-hmm. So you're actually knowing the creature better in God than you know the creature in itself, right? This is the problem. Another thing that Father Bernard Loner can base, speaks of the concept, what is conceived in mind is the means by which we know, so it's the likeness of the thing that we know. Well, he says, no, that's what we know. That's the problem, one of his many problems. He supposedly attributes all this to St. Thomas. Oh, yeah. Okay, now, the second objection was taken from St. Paul, right? Now, Chris? What they're confusing here is that when Paul saw God face-to-face, temporarily, then he saw all these things in God, right? But when that vision passed away, there were some effects in it, right? And those could be multiple likenesses, right? Okay. The second should be said that there are some knowing powers, right, which from the species or forms first conceived are able to form other ones, right? And as imagination, right, from the preconceived species of mountain and gold forms the species of a gold mountain, right? I remember in the fairy tale there, a diamond mountain, you know, and you kind of mount up the diamond thing, that guy on the horse or something. But you never seen that, right? But you can form image, right? And the understanding from the preconceived species of genus and, what, difference, right, forms the ratio of the species. You know, that's from porphyria, right? So the genus of, what, square is quadrilateral, right? And the differences are equilateral and right angle, right? So from them you form a ratio, he says, definition of the species, yeah. And likewise, from the likeness of an image, we are able to form in us a likeness of that of which it is an image, yeah? And thus Paul, or anyone else seeing God, right, from the vision of the divine essence, is able to form in himself likenesses of the things which he sees in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even after he ceased seeing the, what, essence of God. But this vision by which things are seen through species thus conceived is other from the vision by which things are seen in God. Okay. Now we come to the idea now, would you see all these things at once? Or is there a, what, discourse from one to another? Well, you're going to be partaking of eternity, huh? Couldn't you be timeless? It's another, you know, in Shakespeare, I think timeless means in Shakespeare, untimely, right? Oh. Untimely means, yeah, it has a different meaning, and timeless means, it's usually taking a good sense, right? You know, but timeless, this timeless death is untimely death. I get there with the notes, you know, my profound scholarship here at the Yale Shakespeare, you know. But it's a pretty good addition, you know. Oh, yeah. Yeah. We were looking last night at the, we were talking about Shakespeare's definition of reason, you know, and I was remarking how Theobald, one of the great editors of Shakespeare, when he comes to the words looking before and after, in Shakespeare's definition there in Hamlet, he says a phrase almost Homeric, right? Uh-huh. And so I was taking out the Homer there in the Iliad, and Homer's phrase is, look before and behind yourself. Uh-huh. And Puli Damus there in the 18th book of the Iliad, he looks before and behind himself, and he says, let's get back in behind the walls before Achilles comes back into the battle. Uh-huh. They've taken away their minds, you know, because they wouldn't listen to the advice of Puli Damus, who was better with words than Homer was, I mean, Hector's better with muscles, huh? But the next day, of course, Achilles mows him down, and the wheat, you know, just, you know. And so that's very much like Shakespeare's phrase, right? Uh-huh. You know, in the death scene of the account of the death of a false death. Uh-huh. And it's a corruption of text, you know, and it said, and table of green fields. What the hell does that mean? You know, these are the dying words again, right? And table of green fields. And, of course, Theobald amended it to, and a babbled of green fields. A babbled of green fields, huh? It's beautiful. And I was taking out one of my editions there, and the note guy talking about the corruption of the text and the imitation of Theobald said, you know, perhaps the, you know, the most, you know, excellent imitation in all fiction, you know. But it's in Shakespeare, you know. So that's improving upon a line that you enjoy fictionally, in the account of false death's last things. And then this other one, in terms of understanding, right? It's just praise for Theobald, you know. We don't always agree with this, imitations, but he's responsible for the happiest imitation. But for seeing the likeness between the two greatest poets, Homer and Shakespeare, that they both see reason as characterized by looking before and behind. But Shakespeare says it's a little more extendable way, when he says it's looking before and after, you can extend those words a little better. But, you know, even in Schoss, you know, the idea of the man of prudence, you know, he's got eyes in front and behind, you know. That's what he's represented, you know, so he can see before and behind himself. Might have been telling, you know, the Pope, you know, to watch his back now. But that's the kind of expression, you can watch your back, right? You know, to look before and behind yourself, that's what the man of foresight does. So, yeah, yeah. But as I was saying to them, we go to the greatest poets there to see what reason, what's most known about reason, huh? You see, because the philosophers are too much into reason, they get kind of lost in all the things they want to say about reason. And they forget what's most known, right? See, but the poet kind of brings out what stands out first. That's very important for the philosopher to see what's more known. So the poet is a help there to a philosopher in thinking about reason to know where to begin. I can't remember what play is Falstaff's death in... In Henry V, Henry V. Yeah, okay. Yeah. See, you don't really, it doesn't really appear there. Right. But we'll hear about his zeal health as being, you know, rejection, the princelgism at the end of the fourth, you know. And then Shakespeare decided, you know, to finish him off. You know, because he did the video role of the play there, you know, in Henry V, you know, the glorious deeds of Henry V. There's a description, though, by the hostess there of his death. He's kind of very funny, but very true to the man, right? Yeah. And they're saying, God, God, some reverence to God, and he notes this, and I didn't think it was time for him to get involved in those things yet, you know. Kind of this lack of comprehension of what death is all about, you know, in the part. It was a very, very interesting scene, very, very interesting. And then he complained about woman, you know, in his deathbed. So there are devils incarnate. And the hostess says, you never could stand incarnation, you know, but it's a barbarous scene, you know, but it's something you play in terms of fiction, you know, in terms of the character of Falstaff. It's interesting, you know, incidentally, you know, the time is two texts together, though. When Falstaff is first introduced to the world, right, Shakespeare's greatest comic character, ending the fourth part of the one, he's asking Prince Hale, what time is it? And he said, what's that got to do with your time, you know, with you, you know? Unless, you know, he goes on, you know, you know, these are the signs of body houses and so on, you know, all this stuff. Why would you ask something so superfluous as time? That's the first sense of before and after, right? That the life of Falstaff is not a life of what? Yeah, it's a life of the tavern and the brothel and the, you know, and all these things, you know? So, it's kind of genius that Shakespeare should hit upon that way. That's really the natural gift, huh? So, they asked me, you know, does Shakespeare really see all these things you see in Shakespeare? I said, let's go. Of course. Now, whether those seeing God through essence see all things which are seen in him, which they see in him, rather. To the tenth one proceeds thus. It seems that those seeing God through his essence do not see at once or together, right, all those things which are what? Which they see in him. Because according to the philosopher and that's Aristotle, it happens, what? To know many things but to understand one thing, right? Aristotle's thinking there about what? Like I possess geometry, so I know many things in the sense of sheer way, but I can only think about one of them at a time. Okay. But those things which are seen in God are understood. But by the understanding, God is seen. Therefore, it does not happen that those seeing God at once see many things in God, right? So it's kind of arguing from what we know in this life, right? Okay. So I can't do the Pythagorean theorem and the other interesting theorems at the same time. I only do one at a time. You know, I'm almost dead, as Deconic would say, in my mind. It's hardly alive, huh? There's a little spark there, and that's about it, huh? Good goes, and a little spark. Yeah, yeah. Well, you know, St. Heli. Moreover, Augustine says in the eighth book, upon Genesis to the letter, that God moves the spiritual creature through time, right? And, of course, Thomas explained that the time of the angels is not time in the sense of the fourth book of natural here. It's discrete time, not continuous time. That is through understanding and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore, those seeing God successfully understand and are affected. But for time, it implies some kind of succession, right? If you're talking about the natural knowledge of the angels, right? He doesn't understand everything by understanding himself, which he always understands. So he has some additional, what, form which he understands, more or less depending upon how high up he is. And there's a certain, what, going from one to the other, right? That's called kind of a, like time, right? Another kind of time. And, but that's maybe not talking about the scientific knowledge of the angel. And this is clear from what Augustine says in the last book of the Trinity, right? For our thoughts, then, will not be, what, in motion, huh? Going from these to those, right? And coming back again. But the knowledge, all our knowledge, we will see with one, what? Sight at once, together. Okay? Simo, usually in English, we translate it together, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But sometimes we translate it at once. Make sure we get it at once together. Well, that's what the word conspect to it there. Yeah. In any case, it's looking with, you see, in all the beginning. Yeah. But the idea is simo, you know? And simo comes up in the categories, right? Aristotle has a chapter on before, or you can say really before and after, because you understand that. And then the next chapter is on simo, right? Well, it's hama in Greek, right? And then simo, matin. In English, we usually translate it what? Same. No. At once. At once or together sometimes, right? Okay. And if two things, if two events are simultaneous, to use the Latin word, right? But if you wanted to use English word, what would you say? These two events took place, what? At the same time, at once. Yeah, we say at the same time, yeah. Or together, right? I answer, it should be said, that those things which are seen in the word, are seen not successively, but at once or together. Now, for the evidence of this, it should be considered that the reason why we are not able to, what, understand many things, meaning in this life, is because we, what, know many things through diverse species, right? So I can't know all the experience in Euclid at the same time, because the syllogism, which I know each of these, is, what, different, right? And one syllogism makes me know this, and another syllogism makes me know that, another syllogism makes me know that, and so I can't know all these things at the same time. That's a trouble, right? I can't know all Mozart at the same time. Because we understand the many, through many, what, species or forms, right? And the understanding is not able by many, what, species, right? To be informed, to understanding through them, at once in act, right? Together. Just, and this is the comparison he always makes, just as neither one body is able to be, what? But, shaped at the same time by diverse figures, huh? So your mind's like a piece of clay, and it's in this shape, and then in this shape, and this shape, but it can't be in two shapes at the same time, right? So your mind, in a sense, can't be formed by two forms of the same kind, right? But Thomas was saying it can be formed at the same time, but two forms not of the same kind, so the clay can be yellow, let's say, and spherical at the same time, right? But it can't be spherical and cubical at the same time, right? That's important to realize later on, that we can have, with the Vedic vision, natural knowledge, because they're not forms of the same kind, huh? Okay? If you have forms of the same kind, the mind can't be formed, actually, completely, by both of them at the same time. So I can't think about all the things I know at the same time. It's just very frustrating. I just can go one to the other, and then another one, another one. It already seems worthwhile. Sometimes. Once it happens, huh, that when many things are able to be understood by one form, right, huh, they understood what? Together, right, huh? Just as diverse parts of some whole, right? If each one of them are understood by their own forms, they are understood what? Successively. Like, I think about the seat of the chair. I think about the back of the chair, right? Okay? But if I think of the chair, I think of them all together in one form. If, however, all are understood by one form of the whole, they understood what? Together, right, huh? But it has been shown, however, that those things which are seen in God are not seen, each one of them through their own likenesses, but all through the one essence of God. Once they are seen together, and not, what, successively. So, if you want to see those things all together, that would be nice, huh? Same more time. But I don't have any time all together, right? That's what Chesterton said, the chief demonstration for the immortality of the soul, because you can't get enough of a good thing. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, I used to speak, you know, of what I call a self-sustaining collection, you know, of CDs and so on, right? That, you know, you can go from one to another, and you never get tired of it, because it's so long before you get around to the one you, you know? If you have a very small collection, you know, you get a little tired, you're playing the same things all the time, right? But usually I play a CD, and I play it twice, at least. And then I go on the next one. It'll be a while before I come back to that. So now we're down to the applied rejections. To the first, therefore, it should be said that thus we understand one thing only insofar as we understand by one species. But when many things are understood by one species, they are understood, what, together, right?