Prima Pars
Lecture 50: Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God

Transcript
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To some extent, this is followed in science. Schrodinger, you know, the guy who affected way mechanics and so on, Schrodinger says that the first indispensable thing we demand in an experiment is that it can be repeated with the same results. So if some scientist, you know, performs an experiment and announces to the world his result, and nobody else can repeat the experiment with the same results, he says, we don't consider that as worthy of scientific consideration. So an experiment has to be able to be common, right? And when several, you know, competent scientists have repeated the experiments with the same results, then they take that as a sign that it's able to be common, right? But all this goes back to something that's common, right? But that's, in a sense, analogous to the natural law. You go back to something that is naturally known by men, right? Like the whole is more than the part, and so on. And that's really something partaking of the divine. So, but as I say, Heraclitus, in a way, is seeing that, right? He says that the law of the city is fed by the, what? The divine law, which is more than sufficient. The divine law says you shouldn't take innocent life, let us say, right? Okay. Well, that's really feeding the law that you drive on the right side of the street. Not that it's necessary to drive on the right side rather than the left side, but you ought to decide on one or the other and do this, right? And that's why there's laws about shooting your gun off on the city and so on. And they invent a car, they invent an airplane. There's all kinds of laws about these, right? But they're all being fed by the one law to preserve innocent life. But the natural law, or the natural understanding that underlies the whole philosophy and so on, is a partaking of the divine. Okay. Now, the fourth objection was taken from the fact of God being in the soul and therefore being known by the understanding, understandable vision. Well, you've got to realize that to be young is said in many ways, right? So the fourth, it should be said that the intellectual vision of those things which are in the soul and through its essence are things that are understandable in the understanding. Thus, God is in the soul of the blessed, right? But he's not in our soul in that way. But he's in those three ways we talked about in the earlier treatment of the infinity of God, right? So God is, in our soul, is supporting it in existence, right? Conserving it in existence and so on. Moving us to do things and so on. But he's not in it as, what? The understandable in the, what? Mind, eh? Okay? God is not joined to our mind yet as that bike which we know him. Okay? We know him darkly, right? Through the mirror. So you're all convinced now we're not going to see God as he is in this life, huh? Now, in the next article, Thomas is going to, there's a real break here now, right? Because these first 11 articles are all taken up with seeing God as he is face to face, right? And how this is possible and how it takes place and when it takes place and so on, right? And now in article 12, he goes to something else, whether there is by natural reason, a certain knowledge of God, right? Okay? And as you may perhaps know, it's very clear in the first Vatican consul, it's now an article of faith that God can be known by natural reason. The existence of God, things of this sort, huh? But Thomas is taking up this question formally. So he says to the 12th, one proceeds thus, it seems that by natural reason, God is not able to be known in this life. For the great Boethius says in the book on the Consolation of Philosophy, that reason cannot grasp a, what, simple form. But God is most of all a simple, what, form, as has been shown above, right? We said a whole question on the simplicity of God, right? Remember the eight articles? God is act, he's form. Therefore, natural reason cannot arrive at his knowledge, huh? So that's in the authority of Boethius, huh? And sometimes I'm inclined to say Boethius is the greatest mind around between Augustine and, what, Thomas, right? And Boethius learns of Augustine, right? But Thomas learns from Boethius as well as from, what, Augustine. And, of course, that book, The Consolation of Philosophy, was a treasure house to all through the Middle Ages. And that's where the definition of eternity comes from, that we saw in the treatise earlier. And that's where the definition of divine providence comes from, things of this sort. Of course, you have the famous thing there about, Boethius says, you know, people argue, you know, if God exists, why is there evil in the world, right? And Boethius says, you should argue the reverse way. If there's evil in the world, there must be a God. Because there wouldn't be evil in the world unless there was a transgression from the goodness in the world. And the goodness in the world wouldn't be there without God. So, he says, you're reaching the wrong way. It's kind of beautiful, though, huh? You know, in the fourth and fifth books of The Consolation of Philosophy, he develops a thing about eternity and so on. But the first three books, you know, are dealing more with what human happiness is. And you want to talk about true happiness and false happiness, huh? And Boethius says, well, you have to talk about false happiness before true happiness. Because it's more known to us. And so he goes through false happiness. So that's what it is. And then he goes through true happiness, huh? And he kind of beautiful, beautiful work. And, of course, it became, you know, it kind of alternates with a kind of a poem and then a text and so on. And a lot of people were attracted to this, you know. And Chaucer, for example, in English, you know, he wrote a, he made a translation of it, right? Even Queen Elizabeth I would make a translation of Boethius, right? And, you know, in the sketchbook there, Washington Irving, you know, speaks with great respect of the Consolation of Philosophy. So it had a, but he has many other works. There was a work on the Trinity and so on. Thomas has a beautiful commentary on that, very important. And the other works of Boethius. Great, great, great mind. He was trying to make the whole of Aristotle known to the Latin world, but he just got, I think, the logical works translated into Latin. But the kind of classical translations, you know. Very accurate, very accurate, very profound. Would Dionysus fit in the little grouping of people there, or is he a little yard? Well, it's a little different, you know. Boethius is more a philosopher in a sense. Okay. Yeah. Now, the second objection here. Moreover, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without an image, you know. Okay. We never think without imagining. Okay. And you could say that the, our reason's own object is that what it is is something you can sense or imagine. But God, since he is bodiless, there can't be any image of him in us. Therefore, he cannot be known by us by natural reason or by natural knowledge. So we never think without imagining. You can't imagine God. Therefore, you can't think about God, right? It's a good objection, right? Okay. Moreover, the knowledge which is through natural reason is common to the good and the bad. Just as nature is common to both the good and the bad, right? But the knowledge of God belongs only to the good. For Augustine says, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you, God bless you. the first book of the Trinity, that the sharpness of the human mind in so excellent a light is not fixed unless it be cleansed through the justice of what? Faith, right? So until you're sanctified, you might say, until you're purged of your sins and so on, you can't really know God, right? Well, there's some truth to that, I would say. So this objection is saying, that wouldn't be true if we could know God naturally, because then even the bad, who have nature, could know him. Therefore, God, through natural reason, is not able to be known. But against this is what is said in Romans, listen to the Romans, chapter 1, verse 19 and 20, actually. What is known of God is made manifest to them. Talking about the philosophers, huh? Now, if you go back to Vatican 1, that's the text, the official text is from, excuse me, chapter 1, verse 20, you know, we talked about how God is known through creatures, huh? And as I mentioned before, that's now an article of faith, right? You're an anathema of sin. You think it cannot be known. It doesn't mean it's easy to know it through creatures, right? But it means it's anathema to say it cannot be known through creatures. Okay. Now, Thomas answers. I answer, it should be said that our natural knowledge has its beginning in the, what, sensism. That's what Aristotle talks about there in the premium to wisdom, right? What comes first in our knowledge is sensing, huh? Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, right? Then from that comes memory, right? From memory, experience. And after experience, you start to understand something. Hence, so far, our natural understanding is able to go or extend itself, as it can be, what, led by the hand through, what, sensible things, huh? So you're saying, oh, our knowledge begins with our senses, and the reason has to be led by the hand. Very kind of way of speaking. Led by the hand through sensible things. Now, from sensible things, our intellect is not able to go so far as to, what, see the very divine nature, huh? Why? Because we better know God as a cause from his effects, right? And these effects are not equal to the, what, power of God, right? Because sensible creatures are effects not equal to, or not equaling the, what, power of the cause, which is God, huh? Okay? Hence, from a knowledge of sensible things, the whole power of God is not able to be, what, known, right? And consequently, neither is his very, what, nature or substance. But because they are effects, huh, depending upon this cause, nevertheless, huh? From them we are able to be led, that we might know about God, honest, whether he is, right? I'll give you know what he said. And we might know about him, those things which are necessarily belong to him, according as he is the, what, first cause of all things, huh? Excelling all the things these caused, right? Once we know about him, his relation to, what, creatures, that he is, to wit, the cause of all things, right? And the difference of creatures from him, that he himself is not any of those things which are caused by him, right? So you negate, you know, he's, those things, him. And further, that these are not removed from him on account of his defect, right? But because he excels them, right? Okay. So you can know God from creatures, as the existence of the cause is known from its effect, some, and you can know him by kind of a, what, remote likeness, right? But like the Fourth Lateran Consul says, you can never see or note a likeness of the creature to God without a greater, what, unlikeness, right? So that the knowledge we have of God through the likeness that creatures to him has to be completed by negating the, what, imperfection of his likeness, huh? And that he has his perfections in a, what, higher way, right, than that we understand, huh? Okay. Now in reply to the first objection taken from Boethius, that reason does not grasp a simple form, huh? He says to the first it should be said that reason does not arrive at a simple form, that it know about it, what it is, right? But is able to know about it, that it is, what? Wither. Wither it is, yeah. Onsit. Now the second objection, I'm going to answer it in one way here, but there's other things you could say too. You see, we never understand, right, without an image, right? So what we're understanding is something, what? Imagined, right, huh? Okay. Well, how can we know God if you can't imagine God, right? But you can imagine or sense something that is an effect of God, and that's one way you could come to know God through the sensible or the imaginable, right? Not as what God is, but as an effect of God through which you could know God, right? And so anyways, Thomas answered the objection, though, another way to say, yeah, when we think about God, we imagine, not God, but we imagine something that we negate. So when I think about God, I might imagine a body, right? Now, am I imagining God? No, God's not a body, right? So when I imagine a body, and I understand what a body is, now how do I know God from this? Well, I don't know what he is, I know him negatively, that he's not a body, right? Okay? Yeah. Okay? Or I know that these sensible and even imaginative things are composed of matter and form, right? So I understand, to some extent, what is to be composed of matter and form. Well, that's not what God is, he's not composed of matter and form. But we can, what? Know that he's not composed of matter and form, right? Okay? So you know more of what he is, is what? Not what he is, right? Okay? But then we say that the knowledge of the soul, and especially the knowledge of our own understanding and will, is the gateway to knowing the angels and knowing God, right? So there's something like this, that God and the angels, right, understand as well as us, right? But they understand in a much better way than we do. And so we have to kind of negate the imperfection, right? I have to think about something before I understand it. Does God have to think about something before he understands it? No. No. So I have to negate the imperfection of my way of what? Understanding, yeah. Or I can't understand two things at the same time, unless I relate to them in some way, right? Then God can understand all things at once, right? So, you know, if I know God by the likeness that the creature has to God, I have to, what, negate the imperfection of that likeness, huh? Now, in the third objection, Thomas says, well, you have to distinguish between the knowledge of God that is purely natural and the knowledge of God that is, what, gotten by faith and so on. It says, the knowledge of God through his essence, since it is through grace, cannot belong except to the good. Like, grace is eternal life, as we say, huh? And St. Paul says. But the knowledge of it, which is through natural reason, can belong both to the good and to the, what, bad. Yeah. Once Augustine says in his book of retractions, I always say, your professor should be required to write a book of retractions, you know, because it went through all his works, right? He said, I didn't say this so well here, or, you know, some days, you know, you would crack and stuff, right? Once Augustine in the book of retractions, I do not approve of what I said in the, what? Prayer, yeah. And this is a reference to the siloquase, that God does not wish to be, cannot truly be known except by the, what? The clean, right? High response is he is able, right? Even many who are not clean to know many true things about God, right? To wit, to what? Natural reason, right? Who's that famous philosopher, Mortimer Adler, you know? And he got to like Aristotle and Thomas very much, right? And he, you know, I guess he didn't convert until the end of his life, right? I guess that's when he became a Catholic. But, you know, it's kind of interesting to see these exchanges between Mortimer Adler sometimes and Catholic priests at the thing, you know, where Mortimer Adler would say, you know, really the only guys I learned from is Aristotle and Thomas, you know? Well, you can't mean that, you know? Well, here's a non-Catholic telling, you know, the Catholic that, huh? And, but I guess what delayed Mortimer Adler's conversion, you know, was the fact that he had some disorder in his moral life, huh? And it had to be cleared up before he could make the move, so to speak, you know? So, but he might understand more about God naturally than many so-called Catholics and people might, you know, or even the pious woman in the church, you know? But, so you have to make that distinction, you know? I know myself sometimes, you know, I mean, if I talk about God or I have some understanding of God, people think, well, gee, you're holy because you do that. Well, I wish that were so, but that isn't so, right? You know? In other words, I might think about God and want to talk about God, not because I'm holy, but because he's very interesting to talk about. I'm much more interested to talk about anything else, right? So, you know? And I like to have a good time, and I have a good time thinking about him and talking about him, you know? But maybe I have other things I have a good time, too, which is sinful, right? And so I'm not a holy man there talking about God. But this is the point. But in Augustus, in a sense, correcting himself and saying, yeah, yeah, it's possible for an unclean person, right? A sinful person, by natural reason, maybe, to know God more than someone who's more, what? Pious, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Okay. So this 11th, or 12th, rather, article should be distinguished against the previous, what, 11th, which we're all dealing with this vision of God face-to-face, seeing him as he is, huh? Um, okay. Should we take a little break now, or what? Okay. Yes. Okay, and then we'll turn to article 13, huh? Lucky number. Okay. My in-laws, you know, they bought their house. You know, when someone told me that when he was young, he'd go a couple days without sleep, you know, and just thinking, you know, yeah, yeah, yeah, but, you know, me on the second day, I'd probably be, I think, what, the first day without sleep, I'd probably be no good on the second day, you know, but there's kind of, you know, it's funny, these anecdotal stories, you know, you don't leave them necessarily, but, you know, there's still a story about Aristotle sitting there, you know, with a metal basin and a metal ball, you know, like this, you know, thinking, you know, and he falls, starts to fall asleep, you know, okay, now back to sleep, he's thinking again, you know, well, he wouldn't do something as stupid as that, you know, but such a story should begin, you know, is because, you know, these people are known for, for, uh, taking a long time, right, and, so ready to begin again? Yeah, it didn't work, too, we're all recording now. Article 13th here. To 13th, one proceeds thus. It seems that through grace, there is not had a higher knowledge of God than that which is had through natural reason, huh? For Dionysius says in the book on mystical theology, that the one, um, who is better united to God in this life, is united to him as to something entirely, what, unknown, huh? Which was also said about Moses, huh? Who nevertheless had a most excellent, what, knowledge, um, who obtained a, an excellence in the knowledge of grace. But to be joined to God, beginning of what he is, also happens through what? Natural reason, right? Therefore, through grace, one, God is not more fully known by us than by natural reason, huh? So Dionysius says, you know, that the highest thing in our knowledge of God in this life, and this is, you know, through grace, it seems, and faith, um, is to know that he's above anything we know. Right? So that he is really unknown to us, huh? But doesn't the philosopher know this, too? You see? So that's an interesting objection, right? Okay. You know, Aristotle says that as the eyes of the bat are to the light of day, so is there a reason to knowing, what, God, right? Okay? Because Aristotle thought the bat flew at nighttime because the brightness of this day was too much for his eyes, huh? Okay? Moreover, through natural reason, we are not able to arrive at the knowledge of divine things except through, what, images, right? Okay? We don't think without imagining, huh? But Dionysius says the same thing in the first chapter of the Celestial Harky. The very famous thing, as he was quoted all over the place. It is impossible for us, in the other way, for the ray, the divine ray to shine, unless it be, what, veiled around with the, what, variety of sacred veils, huh? That is referring to all these, what, sensible things, right? Between you, huh? And the divine, huh? Just like in the Eucharist, right? Quesugis Figuris, very, latitas, right? It's hidden under these sensible things, huh? Okay? Therefore, through grace, we do not know God more fully than by, what, natural reason, huh? Okay? It's interesting that Thomas has put this article last, huh? Because he's referring here to a, what, knowledge that is between the natural knowledge of God, right? And the knowledge of God as he is, face to face, right? Okay? And so, kind of, you know, often in our thinking, we take the, what, extremes, right? And then we come to what is in the, what, middle, right, huh? I was laying in bed the other day thinking about the plays of Shakespeare, right? And we say, well, at one end you got the tragedies, right? At the other end you got the, what, comedies, right? You talk about those two groups first, right? There's ten tragedies and five comedies. And then you have in between something, right? Okay? And then I talk about the in between type of plays. Well, it's time to do the same thing here, right? On the one hand you have the natural knowledge of God, huh? Through his effects and so on. And then you have the knowledge of God, and then be a big vision, eternal life, seeing God as he is, face to face. And now he's talking about something, what, in between, right? And in these first two objections, he doesn't, the objection, right? He's saying, well, you know, how does this differ, really, from what? The natural knowledge, right? Because in the natural knowledge of God, we know more what God is not than what he is, right? Okay, it has to be perfected by the, by negations. And Dionysius, you know, who's a great authority in these things, says that, well, it's the highest thing in our knowledge of God. We know that we don't know. Okay? And then the second objection is saying that, well, in our natural knowledge, we know God only through sensible things, right? And now Dionysius is saying, well, the divine light can only be, what, come to us when it's veiled around these sensible things, huh? Okay. Moreover, now, the third objection is a little different. Our understanding, by the grace of faith, adheres to God. But faith does not seem to be, what? Or faith or belief does not seem to be knowledge, huh? For Gregory the Great says in the homily that those things which are seen do not have belief, or those things which are not seen have belief and not, what, knowledge, huh? Therefore, through grace is not added to us some more excellent knowledge of God, huh? Okay. But against all of this is what the Apostle says in the first epistle of the Corinthians, that God revealed to us through the Holy Spirit those things which none of the princes of this age knew. And notice the philosophers, as Agass explains there, that's referring to the philosophers, were the princes of this world. Of this age, right, huh? Now, Thomas says, I answer, it should be said, that through grace, a more perfect knowledge of God is had by us than by natural reason, which can be made clear in this way. The knowledge which we have by natural reason requires two things. Namely, the images taken from sensible things and the, what, natural understandable light, the natural light of reason. By the power of which, understandable conceptions or thoughts are taken from these images. So, I, what, imagine a square, right? And through the light of my mind, I separate out what a square is, huh? Okay. And in regard to both of these things, human knowledge is aided by the revelation of grace. For the natural light of the understanding is strengthened by the, what, pouring in of a gratuitous light, huh? Okay, not a natural light. Well, just like in our little prayer there, before we begin our study, we say, we ask for the angels, right, to strengthen the light of our mind. Well, by the light of faith, the, what, light of our mind is, what, strengthened, right? Okay, so there's more understandable light there, huh? It's interesting what he says there, right? That the natural light of the understanding is confortatory, it's strengthened, right? By the pouring in of a gratuitous light. Light, huh? You're adding light to that, huh? It's a little bit like you've got a candle there and you can't see too clearly and I bring in a big torch or something, you know? And you have more light now, huh? More light upon the matter. And that's what's most essential. But sometimes, into doom I guess, huh? Sometimes images are formed in divine way, or divinely, in the imagination of man, right? Sometimes God will, what, form images in us, right? Images more expressing divine things than are those images which are naturally taken from sensible things. That's very interesting, huh? And this appears most of all in the, what, prophetic visions, huh? Okay? So we have images that are more suitable to knowing God from sensible things than the images taken from our senses sometimes. But this is kind of more of an exception, huh? That's what he speaks of in visionibus, prophetalibus, right? And also sometimes some sensible things are formed divinely, or also some voices to, what, expressing something divine, huh? Just as in the baptism of Christ is seen in the Holy Spirit in the form of a, what, dove, right, huh? And the voice of the Father is heard, this is my beloved, what, son, right, huh? So he says in both things our natural knowledge arises from, right? It arises partly from our senses and from the images we get through our senses, right? And more perfectly from the, what, natural light of reason, right? It separates out what's common. I mean, Aristotle speaks of this more fully there in the Premium to Wisdom, where he says that what comes first is sensing, touching and smelling and tasting and seeing and hearing, right? And then from this comes to be, what, memory, memory of these things, right? And then from many memories of the thing, there comes to be, what, an experience of this, right? And then when you have many memories of the same sort of thing, then the natural light of reason is able to, what, separate out what's common to them. And that's the beginning of our thoughts, right? See? And so, when you're a little boy, one day there's a dog in the yard, and your mummy says, there's a dog, you know? And maybe another day there's a dog on the street. Do you see the dog, you know? And then finally one day, the little child sees a dog, and he says, what? A dog, right? Well, he's now separated out what's common to the dogs he's sensed and remembers to some extent, right? And has some experience with dogs. And then he separates out what a, what? Dog is, right, huh? You got the baby in the high chair, you say you want a cookie, and you get a cookie, and he eats it. Another day, you want a cookie? You know, after the main meal. Mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm, sensible things play a role in both natural knowledge and in the, what, supernatural knowledge. The second, therefore,