Prima Pars
Lecture 52: Naming God: Divine Names and Their Signification

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In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, stream from the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. And help us to understand all of you. Who but Thomas would have 10 or 11 or 12 articles on the names of God, right? Yeah. I'm always struck by the fact that, as Augustine says, another office on the Our Father, the order of petitions is the order which you're supposed to desire things, right? And so before all the other petitions is put, hallowed be thy name, huh? So, however you understand that, you can't get around the fact that his name is in that first petition, huh? Okay, to the first one proceeds thus, it seems that no name belongs to God or is suitable to God, huh? For Dionysius says in the first chapter about the divine names. What's he writing a book about divine names? That there's neither a name of him, right? Nor is there opinion about him, huh? And Proverbs, book of Proverbs, chapter 30, verse 4. What is his name? And what is the name of his son, if you know it, huh? Now, the second objection, which is more an objection from reason, the first one from authority, right? Moreover, every name is either said in abstract or in the concrete, huh? Now, why is that? Okay? It goes back to the fact that reason's own object is what it is, but something you can sense or imagine. And these things are composed of matter and form. And the concrete existing thing has the form, right? But the form is that by which it is such and such, right? So we have these two names running through our language. If you don't stop and think about that, right? Why do we have the word healthy and the word health, right? Well, healthy signifies that which has health, right? And health signifies that by which the healthy is healthy, right? Okay? So that's going to be found in all our names. And there's going to be a problem in giving either name to God. Because if you use a concrete name, you seem to be saying that God is composed, but as we learned in the third question, he's altogether simple. And if you use the abstract name, right? Like you say, God is goodness rather than good, because as we say, God is whatever he has. We're not whatever we have. I'm not geometry. I'm not logic. Whatever you may think of me. I'm not those things. I thought we have some of them. So if we say God is goodness, you seem to be saying he's that by which things are good, but not good himself, right? Healthy. Health is not healthy. And so it seems that goodness itself is not good, right? So either name, there is a defect, right? And maybe in this sense, we have no name for God, right? If we call him good, we seem to be saying he's composed. If we say he's goodness, that he's simple, but he's not good, but that by which things are good. And so we have to use both names, huh? Goodness to bring out his simplicity. Good because he is good. But both names have a certain, what, defect, right? We can never, in that sense, transcend that defect, huh? But names signifying the concrete do not belong to God since he is, what? Simple, huh? Nor names signifying the abstract, because they do not signify something perfect that subsists, huh? Of that perfection. Therefore, no name is able to be said of God. And Thomas will say a certain amount of truth in this objection, right? No name is, every name has some defect that's going to fall short, huh? Moreover, nouns. Now, nomina here, I think, is taking the sense of noun. As I often point out to students, you know, in Greek and in Latin, the word for name and the word for noun is the same. So, onoma in Greek. And nomen in Latin, huh? While in English, we can, you know, use the word name and then speak of noun and verb, huh? We have a separate name for that, huh? And I always contrast that with the word homo and anthropos, right? So, I mean, homo in Latin is common to vir and femina. So, homo means to human being. And we have a separate name then for the male human being, vir in Latin, rather, and femina for the female, the same way in Greek. But in English, we don't have that, huh? So, you have the same word man for human being and man as opposed to woman, right? Okay? And you shouldn't really try to change your language. That's the deal with it, right? But you read Ammonius Hermaeus, the great commentator on the peri-hermeneus that Thomas himself follows a lot. And he's always explaining when Aristavo is using the word onoma as opposed to rhema, noun as opposed to verb, and he's using the word onoma as it's common to both onoma and rhema. And you have to explain it, right? The same when you use the word man in English, you know, sometimes, nowadays in this PC world, you have to, you know, in a sense you're using the word man, see? But you really try to change English when you try to substitute humankind for mankind. It's a very, very clumsy thing, but anyway. So, the third objection. Names signify substance with quality, you know? This is what the grammarians say. Verbs, however, and parsables signify, what? With time. Pronouns with some, what? Pointing out or relation, right? But none of this belongs to God because he's without quality, without every accident. And he's without time, right? And he's not able to be sensed so he could be pointed out, huh? Oh, God, there's something here. Okay, nor to be signified relatively since relatives are some, are we referring back to our recording, you might say, some things are we said, either names or parsables or pronouns. Therefore, God in no way can be named by us. And that same thing would be said about, how can you make a statement about God? Because a statement has to have a verb, verb, and if verb signifies with time, God is not in time, so. And so Christ says, you know, before Abraham was, I am. There seems to be grammatical difficulty there. But, okay. But against all this is what is said in Exodus chapter 15, verse 3. The Lord is as a wary fighter, right, huh? And omnipotent is his name, huh? So he does have a name. Omnipotent, huh? So Thomas says, I am, sir, that it should be said, according to the philosopher, huh? And the philosopher has got a capital P that refers to what? Aristotle, yeah. And that's the figure of speech called what? Yeah, yeah. I think I mentioned before how the Bible uses Antoine Messiah very often. The word Bible itself is, what? Naming the Bible by Antoine Messiah. Because Bible means simply what? Book. So when you call this the Bible, you're saying it is the book. And gospel means, what? Good news. But this is the good news, right? So it's by Antoine Messiah that it's called the gospel. And Christ is called the anointed one. So it's called the Bible, right? So it's called the Bible, right? So it's called the Bible, right? So it's called the Bible, right? So it's called the Bible, right? So it's called the Bible, right? So it's a very common figure of speech, huh? So Thomas often refers to Aristotle as the philosopher, as Aristotle referred to Homer as what? Poet, yeah. And Averroes got the name of the commentator with a capital C, as he commented almost all of Aristotle's works. And St. Paul is often referred to by Thomas as what? The apostle. John Paul II used to call Paul and Peter the princes of the apostles, huh? That's part of the reason why they can be called the apostles, huh? By Antonio Messia. Plato speaks of this in the, what? This way of speaking in the symposium. He's explaining the word poet and the word lover, right? And they're both named by Antonio Messia. If you say he's a lover, you don't think he's a philosopher. Although a philosopher is a lover of wisdom, right? But for some reason the romantic lover stands out by his odd behavior and so on. So he's called the lover, right? And the poet, the Greek word for poet just comes from the word poien, to make. So to say that you're a poet is to say you're a maker. So, but somehow the Greeks regarded what Homer had made as being greater than anything else that has been made by man. And therefore he calls him the maker, right? And they thought the poets must be inspired by the gods. Well, they write so well. And philosophers say that Homer either inspired by the gods or writing with a divine gift, right? Either the poets have received a divine gift or they're actually inspired here and now by the gods. That's why the poets had an authority, huh? Because they seem to be speaking, in a sense, divinely, huh? Okay? So I answer, it should be said that according to the philosopher, voces or vocal sounds, we'd say in English, are signs of what? Things understood, huh? And the understanding or the thoughts are likenesses of things, huh? This is something Aristotle points out in the, what? Perihermeneus and elsewhere, huh? And thus it is clear that vocal sounds, in words you might say more precisely, refer to things signified through the medium, you might say, right? Of the conceptions of the understanding, right? But according as something is known by, what? Or is able to be known by our understanding, so it is able to be, what? Named by us, right? Okay? That's something a very general, you should know, right? Okay? And that's going to be applied to all kinds of things, like when you talk about the categories, huh? Now the Greek commentators think that Aristotle's book called The Categories is about names, huh? Signifying things through thoughts. That's the way they put it. This is exactly the idea that Aristotle has taught them, right? Okay? But now he's going to apply it to the special problem of, what about God, right, huh? Okay? Because if this thing called God is named, it's going to be named through a, what, thought that we have about this thing, right? Okay? Now it has been shown above, in the previous question, that God in this life is not able to be known by us through his very, what, essence or nature, but he is known by us from creatures. He mentions here, this is kind of a important division there, three ways that he's known from creatures, huh? He's known by the relation of beginning or cause, huh? Like Aristotle, Thomas often uses the word beginning, you know, almost synonymous with cause. And by way of excellence, he excels them, right? And remotionis, by way of negation, huh? So we say God is incorporeal, not a body, right, huh? And even if we use a word that grammatically is not negative, like incorporeal is, like simple, right, we mean he's, what, not composed, huh? But if we say God is the first cause, the Alpha and the Omega, right, beginning and the end of things, then we're talking about him secundum habitudinem, which he calls it there, the relation of beginning. Or if we say that God is, what, the sumum bonum, the highest good, huh? Per modem excellentiae, huh? He excels us, huh? My thoughts are not your thoughts, huh? They're above them, okay? Thus, therefore, in this way you might say, therefore, he is able to be named by us from creatures, huh? But that's going to involve a perfect way of naming him. Not, however, that the name signifying him expresses the divine essence as it is, right? Because you don't know him as he is, huh? That's the famous phrase of John's first epistle, right? Chapter 3, verse 2, huh? Where he talks about, you know, us eventually seeing God as he is, right? Yeah. You know, there's kind of three ways that the New Testament speaks about this knowledge of God. And some ways are more proportioned to us and more sensible. Other ways are getting more accurate, right? The most sensible one is the one in what? The Gospel of St. Luke. Where you'll sit at my table, he says, and eat and drink the same thing I eat and drink. Well, that's kind of metaphorical for the Petite Vision, right? But we do sometimes speak of something as food for thought. All my life I've heard of the expression, it's food for thought. Something to think about, right? So, to eat the same thing that God has at his table is a beautiful way, but kind of metaphorical way of saying that we see God as he is. And this is the kind of life that brings out that idea. And then you have the way that St. Paul speaks, and sometimes it's in the Psalms, too, to see God face to face, right? And it's a little more precise, but still a little more, you know, not a big thing. Pretty understandable, right? And then there's one of St. John, where he says it's to what? See him as he is. We know that when he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. That's the most exact thing. So he says, Thus, therefore, he is able to be named by us from creatures, not however such that the name signifying him expresses the divine nature, the divine essence, as it is, right? Just as this name, Homo, right, signifies or expresses by its signification or meaning, the essence or nature of man, right? As it is. For it signifies his definition, declaring his essence. For the thought that the name signifies is the definition, as Aristotle says. Okay? So what is Thomas answering in the body of the article, then? We can't name, he's going to say, in one sense, we can't name God, right? But more, what is that way? We can't name God as he is. Because we don't know him as he is. Okay? If in heaven we name him, if we have a name for him, we'll be naming him as he is. But we can't in this life, huh? Because we don't know him in this life as he is, as we learned in the previous one, huh? That previous thing about how we know God or don't know God is presupposed to how we can or cannot name him, right? But how do we know God in this life, huh? Well, in three ways, but all three of them are from creatures, right? Okay? And if we know God is the unmoved mover, right? Or the first cause, the last end, and so on. But it's kind of a relation to his creatures, right? A relation which, by the way, is not really in God. Let's read it. us. And secondly, by way of excellence, and third, by way of what? Negation, right? But in general, we know him from creatures, and this is actually an article of faith, we can know him from creatures, but very imperfectly, of course, not as he is. And so in that way we can, what? Name him, yeah. Now the first objection was taken from Dionysius and also from the book of Proverbs, right? And of course here's a way in which God has no name. And Thomas has made that. To the first therefore it should be said that for this reason God is said not to have a name, or to be above being named, huh? Because his essence, his nature, his substance, right, is above that which we understand about God, right, and signify by some vocal sound, huh? Is that clear? Yeah. Okay. Now the second objection, drawn from reason, was drawn from this distinction of the concrete and the abstract names that runs all the way through our language. Why do we think that? Okay? You know, I hate this way we have a speaking, you know, in English. People speak of, I hear it all the time in the sermon, if you're in a relationship. Well, this is an abstraction of an abstraction, right? When Aristotle talks about the so-called category of relations, you might call it sometimes, right? In Greek he says what? Prosti, which in Albert and so on is translated, Thomas, as ad aliquid, toward something, right? And relation is a more abstract way of talking about being towards another, right? And relationship is an abstraction of abstraction. Shows you how fouled how fouled up our language is, huh? You know? I shouldn't talk about a relationship with my wife or my friend or whatever it is, right? Or my mother or father, you know? But what my mother is towards me, and what I am towards her, right? That's what I should be talking about. When you use the word relation, or relationship, which is even worse, you think a relation is something that's in the air here between you and me. It's a relation between us. It's you and it's being in between us. It's this relation. No. What it really is, is I'm something towards you, like a teacher maybe, right? And you are towards me something, like a student or something, right? And I think I mentioned, you know, that, I mean, I don't know other people, I haven't seen other people pointing it out, but I assume someone somewhere has done that, that the beginning of John's gospel, right? The actual Greek is, at the beginning was the word, and the word was, what? Towards God, pros. It's the same word there as Taliesis, huh? It's not really translated that good, and we say with, you know, we can understand that in a good way, but, but, you know, even in Latin it's not translated exactly, you know? They say apod, apod, you know? I think in English you say the beginning was the word, and the word was what? Yeah, yeah, yeah, but, okay, enough of that. To second, therefore, it should be said that we come from creatures to a knowledge of God, right? And from them we name them, right? Okay? And therefore the names that we attribute to God signify in this way, according as they belong to what? Material creatures, right? Okay? The knowledge of which is connatural to us, as has been said above, huh? So I, I summarize, you know, Aristotle's teaching there in the third book on the soul, that reason's own object as to what it is of something you can sense and imagine, or imagine either one, huh? Like what a dog is, or what a triangle is, huh? And because in creatures of this sort, those things which are perfect and subsistent are, what? Composed, huh? And the form in them is not something complete subsisting, but it's more that by which something is, huh? Hence it is that all names, now notice this is universal, right? Hence it is that all names imposed by us, placed upon things by us. To signifying something complete subsisting, they all signify in concretion, concretely, insofar as this is befitting composed things, huh? But those which are imposed, placed upon things, to signifying simple forms, signify something not as subsisting, but as that by which something is. As whiteness signifies not what is white, but that by which something is what? White, okay? Because therefore God both is simple, right? And subsisting, and perfect you could say, right? And this is in a sense, you can kind of see the order before, right? He took up the substance of God in question three, starting in question three. He took up first the simplicity of God in question three, and then in question four, the what? Perfection of God, right? And he made the point why he's taking those two together, right? Because God is both simple and perfect, while in material things, the simple things are imperfect, and the perfect things are more composed. So an animal is more composite than a plant, and a plant more so than a stone. But a plant is a more perfect thing than a stone. I mean, the stones are there for the flowers, not the flowers for the stones in the garden, right? And the animal is even more perfect, huh? But in God, simplicity and perfection go together, huh? So once in a while you have a little hint at that in human things, huh? So in Aristotle in the book on the poetic art, huh? We've lost part of the book on the poetic art, the part of comedy, but the first part is about tragedy and epic, right? And they're very similar, tragedy and epic. But in Aristotle comparison, which is greater, tragedy or epic, huh? And as a literary form, he says tragedy. And the reason he gives is that tragedy produces the same thing in us that epic does, but with fewer words, more contracted. So there the simpler, you might say, the two forms is what? Also more perfect. That's a kind of, what, hinting, right? Yeah. Or sometimes you get a little hint like that theorem I like in the book, fun of it, you know? But the square can contain more area, but with less, what, perimeter. Sometimes you have a little hint, you know, something like the divine, and it's kind of amazing, huh? Now, I was going through that Shakespeare's exhortation to use reason and how much he puts into there in 49 words. But as they often say, you know, he says more in 49 words than most people say in the book. So sometimes you see a little hint of what, you know, God's going to be, huh? You know? Because therefore God is, what, both simple and subsistent, we attribute to him both abstract names to signify his simplicity, right? And concrete names to signify his subsistence and his, what, perfection. Of the both, what? Yeah, falls short? Yeah. Insofar as our understanding does not know him as he is in this, what, life, huh? Thomas sometimes quotes one of the prophets there who says that in that day there'll be one name for God, right? There won't be a concrete and abstract name, huh? It's just one name, huh? Now, Thomas, you know, sometimes when he's talking about these two names and he says, now, what perfection would a man have through his wisdom, for example, unless through his wisdom he was wise? He says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now, he says, now What could it be for me to have wisdom if I wasn't made wise by having wisdom? Now, when we show that God is wise, as I suppose we will, actually, we have these two names, right? Is God wise or is he wisdom itself? Well, if we consider simplicity, we'd have to say he's wisdom itself, right? But if we didn't say he's wise, we'd seem to be denied his perfection that we have through our wisdom, which is that we're wise through it, huh? So, we have to use both names, and we have a reason for using both names and a true reason why we say God is wise and why we say he's wisdom, right? But at the same time, we have to take into account that both names are, what? Inadequate to expressing God as he is, huh? Okay? We can't get around that in this life, huh? Because that's a very important objection there, right? Okay? And so, like in the Summa, and like in the Summa Congentiles, we have one chapter to show that God is good, and then another chapter to show that he's goodness itself. You know? You made a separate, separate thing. Now, to the third, which is taken now more from, what? Grammatical things like noun and verb and so on. So, Thomas has a number of things to reply to. To the third, it should be said that to signify substance with quality is to signify the suppositum, that's the something, with the nature or the determined form in which it subsists. Whence, just as some things are said of God concretely to signify his subsistence and perfection, So, some things are, what? Said of God, namely names signifying his substance with, what? Quality, huh? See, he compares that to, what? The concrete names, huh? Now, verbs and participles which signify with them time, this is something Aristotle brings out in the, what? Peri Hermeneus, he's talking about a statement, and the statement is composed of noun and verb, and both noun and verb are names in the sense that they are vocal sounds and signify, but no part of them signifies by itself, huh? But what's the difference between the noun and the verb, right? Well, the verb signifies with time and the noun without time, right? Okay. And they kind of misunderstand these things a bit, you know, in grade school when they tell you that, what, they say a noun is the name of a person, place, or thing? And then what's the verb, see? Can I say like an action word or something? Yeah, yeah. But say a word like action signifies action, obviously, but is it a noun or a verb? Yeah. So it's not, you know, or if I say walking is good exercise, right? Is walking there functioning as a noun or a verb? Or, yeah, yeah. So the distinction is not between whether it's signifying an action or a thing, so to speak, right? Whether it signifies with time or without time, right? I guess I think that's too subtle for the grade school kid, but they end up giving kind of a false definition, you know, what it verb really is. So, as Aristotle says in the book on the sense and the sensible, we understand nothing without the continuous in time. Because we always are imagining, right? Same time we're thinking. And we're understanding something about what we imagine, right? And you never imagine without the continuous in time. And so you always have time here in your statements. So, he says, verbs and particles con-signifying time, signifying with time, right? Are said of him from the fact that in some way eternity includes all what? Time, right? For just as simple subsisting things, we're not able to grasp and to signify, except in the way in which we name and signify, compose things, right? So, simple eternity, we're not able to understand or express by a vocal sound, except in the manner of, what? Temporal things. And this is an account of the, what? Being con-natural, right? Of our understanding to things composed in, what? Temporal. Now, demonstrative pronouns are said of God according as they make a demonstration to that which is understood, not to that which is sensed, huh? So, according to something that is understood by us, according to this, it comes under demonstration that is being pointed out. So, when you name a dog or a cat, you can point them out, right? Or you name a cup and you point it out, right? Cookie, you know, to the kid, you say, cookie, yeah. Point it out, right? But you want to talk about God, how do you point him out? You can't point him out to the mind, right? You can't point him out to the senses, huh? That's why we talk about Jesus and his human nature first, huh, with the child, before we do the divine nature, huh? One of my sons said, he was a little boy, he thought that Father Manjeluso was Jesus Christ. He had that. So, can't quite point out Christ in this way. One of the friars, one of the Franciscans that comes here, was once someplace down in New York, and she was having a big, long beard, and he's a great, big man, but he's the spiritist, Brother Bernard. He was at the zoo, and this little girl, some school kids were there, and she walks up and she's just staring at him, and she looked at him and she says, Are you Jesus? And he said, No, but I work for him. Do you know how the Eucharist kind of bridges this golf, right? Okay. Because he's there, huh? And thus, according to that way in which names and parciples and pronouns are said, the matthew of God are said, according to this, pronouns, huh? Relative pronouns are able to, what, signify, huh? Okay. Now, the, you've got the thought here, the first article, right? This one guy who had studied under the Dominicans, you know, said, the professor said, Never affirm, seldom deny, always distinguish. It's kind of a real thumb this guy had, he picked up from this, this, the teacher. But there's something about this, right? If someone says, you know, can we name God, right? Or just, you know, does God have a name? And you say, well, we should distinguish, right? Okay. We can name God not as he is, because we don't know him as he is, right? But we can name God from what? The way we do know him, which is from creatures, right? And there are three ways to know him from creatures. You can go on to the details of it, right? But you have to make that fundamental distinction, right? Okay. And Thomas didn't say it here in the Pied of the Second Objection, but sometimes another point he makes about that is that the same name can be said of God and denied of God, right? Said of him for the reason that we do say it of him, either because of his simplicity or because of his perfection, but denied of him, the names that signify his perfection because of their way of signifying in a composed way that's suitable to compose things, right? And even the name said of him by reason of his simplicity can be denied of him because of their not signifying his perfection or his subsistence, right? Okay. But again, that's not an impossible thing to do, right? That you can affirm and deny something for different reasons, right? I can say that not only is God good, but he's goodness itself, right? And for a true reason, because he's of the simplicity of which he's good, right? Okay. But I could also say he's not, what? Just that by which things are good, but he's good himself, right? So I might affirm and deny the same name, but for a different reason, huh? Now then, the second article is maybe kind of puzzling you. First, see it. Why is he talking about this? To the second one proceeds thus, it seems that no name is said of God substantially. Now, what does that mean? It might seem, you know, that a name that is said of God substantially means a name that signifies his substance, right? And doesn't that involve knowing him as he is, huh? Well, let's see what Thomas means by this, right? But that's the first thing that comes to your mind, right, huh? It hasn't already been decided by the first thing, right? If we can't name God as we know him, how can we have a name that is said of him substantially? What does that mean? And, of course, the first objection brings this out, huh? It's necessary, right, for each of those things which are said about God to not signify what he is by his substance, right? Secundum substantium, but to show what he is not, huh? Or some, what, relation, huh? Habitudo has often got the sense of relation, Thomas. Or something of those things which follow upon the nature of the operation, right? But not the nature itself, right? Not the very substance of God. Moreover, Dionysius says, huh? In the first chapter about the divine names, huh? That, what? You will find every, what? Hymn. Every hymn of the divine, of the holy, what? Theologians. To the, what? Processions, right? Of the hierarchy to be manifesting this and praising, right? The names of God, dividing them. And the sense is that the names which in divine praise the holy doctors take up are distinguished according to the, what? Processions of God. But what signifies the proceeding of something signifies nothing pertaining to its, what? Essence, yeah. Therefore, the names said of God are not said of him substantially. The third objection is the clearest for us, right? Moreover, according to this, something is named by us according as it's understood by us. But God is not understood in this life according to his substance. Therefore, neither is any name imposed by us said of God according to his substance, right? Okay, you're all convinced now, huh? But now, ooh, does he bring in on the said contract? Huh? The other greatest mind there of the church, huh? But against this is what Augustine says in the sixth book about the Trinity. For God, this is to be. To be strong or to be wise. And if you say anything about his simplicity, right? By which his substance is what? Signified, right? Therefore, all names of this sort signify the divine substance. And sometimes you call that treatise that we had in questions three through what? Yeah. The simplicity of God, the goodness of God, the perfection of God, the goodness of God, infinity of God, right? The immobility of God, right? The unity of God. God, as the treatise on the substance of God, right? Which will be followed later on here, right? The treatise on the operations of God, right? So we've been talking about the substance of God, right? So, some distinction here is necessary. I answer it should be said that of the names which are said of God negatively, right? Or which signify, what? But the relation of him to creatures is manifest that they signify in no way is, what? Substance, right? But the remotion, the removal, right? Negation of something from him, right? Or the relation of him to another thing. Or rather, a sling to him. Okay? But, there's a question about these other names. But about the names which absolute, now absolute means is opposed to what? Relative, right? Don't get too abstract the meaning of absolute, right? But of the names which absolutely, not relatively, and affirmatively are said of God is that he is good, he's wise, and things of this sort. Men have thought different things about these things. Multi-pigitere. Some have thought. Okay? For some say, that all of these names, right? Although affirmatively they are said of God, nevertheless, they are more found to removing something from God than to positing something in him. Once they say that when we say God is living, we signify that God is not in this way as inanimate things are. And similarly, when I take another thing. And this is what Rabbi Moses says. I'm not the Moses of the Old Testament album. Moses of the Maimonides. Maimonides, huh? Okay? And in my text, I give the reference to the Doctor of Perplexorum. You've probably seen that book, huh? I used to have a copy of it. Okay. Others say that these names are placed upon God to signifying the relation of him to create things, right? As when you say that God is good, the sentence says God is the cause of goodness in things. And the same reason is in other things, huh? So you say God is wise means God causes us to be wise, huh? That he himself is wise. But that seems, you know, there's a thing wrong with those explanations, right? You see? You know, when I say God is wise do I mean simply he's not stupid like me. It's really a negation, right? He's not stupid like us. Like the voters. He's not stupid like us. He's not stupid like us. He's not stupid like us. He's not stupid like us. He's not stupid like us. or that he's the cause of whatever wisdom we might have in us, right? Is that what we mean? See? Isn't that, see? Okay. But both of these opinions, right, seem to be unsuitable, right? On account of three things, huh? First, because according to neither of these positions, is one able to assign a reason why some names are said more of God than others. For he is the cause of bodies, just as he's the cause of good things. Hence, if nothing other is signified and has said that God is good, except that God is the cause of good things, likewise, one could say that God is a body, because he's the cause of bodies, right? Likewise, through this that he has said that he's a body, one removes from him that he's not a being in potency only as the first matter. Okay, you learned that in actual philosophy, if you recall that. The first matter is what? What's, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's an ability only, right? It's an ability for substance. And you may recall that the first matter is known through the fact of substantial change, which the best example is a man going out of existence or coming into existence. So something is to man and dog, right? Like clay is to sphere and cube. But what does that likeness consist? Because the clay is an actual substance, right? And sphere and cube are two accidents. But man and dog are not accidents, two substances. And so the first matter is not to them as substances as to accidents. But it is to it as ability is to act. So just as the clay is able to be a sphere and a cube, but not at the same time, so the first matter is able to be a man or a dog or some other material substance, but not at the same time, right? And when it's one, it's able to be the other, but if it becomes the other, it ceases to be the other. So that's why Thomas said that, you know, David did not most stupidly talk that God is the first matter. He said most stupidly because God is a pure act, and the first matter, considered by itself, would be pure ability, right? So he couldn't have anything further away than that. It didn't make more sense that he's a rock. Okay. So why won't we say then that God is a body, right? Meaning he's the cause of bodies. Why would we say more that God is good or God is wise? That's a good objection, right? Do you follow that? If all you mean by saying God is good or God is wise, right, he's a cause of the goodness of creatures, he's a cause of the wisdom of creatures, then since likewise he's a cause of the existence of bodies, he could be called the same reason, a body. But nobody calls him a body. You know? And then Rabbi Moses doesn't call him a body, see? Or if we just say that we call him wise because he's not stupid like we are, well, then you could call him a body because he's not, what? Purely potential like Chris Madden. But nobody's going to be calling him that example. You know, David did not. Second, because it would follow that all names said of God were said afterwards of him, right? Just as healthy is said afterwards of medicine, and it signifies this only, that is a cause of health in the animal, which is said before to be what? Healthy, right? So in a sense, the first health is first said of the animal, right? Or the body of the animal, right? It's in good condition. And then it's said of the medicine or the exercise because they cause it or preserve it or something, right? So everything would be said of God afterwards, right? So is goodness found first in creatures and then, you know? What was our Lord saying, you know? Why are you calling me good? Yeah, yeah. Which seems to be, not said posteriorly of God, but first. Third, because this is against the intention of those speaking about God, huh? For they intend something other when they say God is living than simply that he's the cause of our life, right? Or that he differs from what? Ham and bodies, right? And therefore, one ought to say otherwise. That names of this sort signify the divine substance, right? And are said of God substantially, but they fail from what? An representation of this, huh? Which can be made clear in this way. For names thus signifying God, according as our understanding knows him, right? Our understanding, however, since it knows God from creatures, in this way knows him according as creatures in some way, what? Represent him, right? He has been shown, however, above, that God in himself has beforehand, right? All the perfections of creatures, because he is, what? Simply and universally, what? Perfect, huh? And I think I mentioned there in the chapter, I don't know, but I think I'm perfect in the fifth book of Wisdom, right? And Aristotle, you know, he begins by distinguishing three senses of perfect, which are found in creatures. And the first sentence was that perfect or complete is what has all its parts. So you've got both your arms and both your legs and your nose and ears and so on, you're a complete man, okay? Then the second sentence of perfect was what has all the power of its kind, right? So we might say that Homer is the perfect poet, huh? Because he taught all the other Greeks how to make a good, what, plot? And as Hegel says, his characters are so superior to the French tragic characters, right? And as Hegel and Aristotle point out, his language is so alive, right, and excellent. So he has the whole perfection of a, what, poet, huh? The plot, the characters, the words, right? So he's a complete or perfect poet, huh? Or Mozart is a complete or perfect musician, right? And the third sense of perfect is what has reached its end or its purpose, right? Okay? But then Aristotle has a second distinction later on, right, huh? And this is the distinction between the perfection of the creature and the way in which God is perfect. And the creature is perfect in its kind. But God, so it's not lacking anything of its kind. It's lacking many things, but nothing of its kind. But God, this other thing, is perfect in the sense of in no way lacking, right? And that's what we speak of as being simply and universally perfect, huh? Okay? I say simplicity here because you can't say Homer is perfect. He's lacking in nothing. You can say he's a perfect poet. You've got to qualify, right? Mozart's perfect? No. But he's a perfect musician. Okay? But God is perfect, period. He's lacking in nothing, right? And the other way of saying it is that he's universally perfect, right? So the perfection of every genius is found in God in a higher and simpler way. So it's been shown above that God has beforehand in himself all the perfections, right? As being simply without qualification and universally what? Perfect. That's what kind of makes sense in the Summa there, to take up the infinity of God right after his perfection and goodness. Hence, every creature to that extent represents him and is like him. right, insofar as it has some perfection. Be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect. I think he says it more than once in the Sermon on the Mount. This kind of sums up his teaching, right? Not, however, that it thus represents God as something of the same, what, species or genus, right, but as a principle that is altogether excelling, right, from whose form the effects fall short, but of whom, nevertheless, right, they achieve some kind of likeness, okay, just as the forms of lower bodies represent the power of the sun in some way, huh, and this has been expounded above when one treated of the perfection, the divine perfection. Thus, therefore, the four said names signify the divine substance, huh, but imperfectly, just as creatures, what, imperfectly represent them, right? So this goes back to the great truth that every maker makes something like itself, right? Now, if it's acting by nature, then we notice the dogs produce a dog and cats produce a cat and so on. If it's acting by mind or reason, right, the carpenter makes a chair like the chair he already thought out in his mind, right? So every agent makes what is like itself, right? So, but the effect doesn't have to equal the agent, huh? So these ways which the creature is like God are ways of naming his very substance, right? Although they name it in a way that doesn't do justice to it, huh? Doesn't adequately represent it, huh? So, when therefore God, therefore it is said that God is good, the sense is not that God is the cause of goodness, right? Which is what Rabbi Moses is saying, right? Or that God is not bad, but the sense is that what we call goodness in creatures pre-exists in God, huh? And this in a higher way, right? Whence, from this it does not follow that God, that it belongs to God to be good, insofar as he causes goodness, right? But rather it's the reverse, because he is good, right? He pours out his goodness upon things. According to that saying of Augustine in the Doctrina Christiana, insofar as he is good, we are, huh? Okay? So God is not wise because he makes us wise in some way, right? But he makes us wise through his words in some way because he is wise. Okay? Does the teacher know something because he teaches you to know something? Or is he able to teach you to know something, bring you to know something, because he does know something himself already, right? Right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But if you specify something about that perfection that's private to God, right, if I say there's a sumum bonum, the highest good, right, or not just that God is perfect, but he's universally perfect, right, then that can be said only a God and not a creatures, right? If you say you hit upon some perfection, that is, involves what's private to the creature, right, so Aristotle is the philosopher, right, okay, well, this guy would be said of God, except maybe metaphorically, like we say, he's a lion or something of this sort, right, but can't be said if improper, right, so it's interesting you have those three names, right, the name that signifies perfection without specifying, you know, what's private to the creature or to God, right, and the name that signifies it with the mode that belongs to God, right, you can say, for example, cause of creature too as well as God, right, but if you say, you know, the first cause, then it can be said only of God, right, okay, you can say active creatures as well as God, you can say active, you know, so some relation, like sumum or first or something of that sort, or some negation like pure there, when you add that, then it can be said only of God, okay, so theology would be kind of unsatisfactory, I think, to me, if all good meant, all you learned was that God is the cause of what we call goodness of creatures, right, without realizing that the goodness of creatures is a imperfect sharing of the divine goodness, right, and that goodness really is something found much more fully in God, right, and only in a partial way in the creature, okay, so that's what you mean by signifying the substance of God, right, as opposed to signifying, what, those other two ways, negation and what, and relation, right, take a little break now, and then we'll go on to the third articulation of the question. Thank you.