Prima Pars
Lecture 55: Analogy: The Middle Way Between Univocity and Equivocation

Transcript
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are not the same thing. And so whatever knowledge or understanding I have of God and whatever love I have of God are not the, what, same thing, you know. There's a little footnote here, but I noticed, you know, in the treatise on the Eucharist there, you know, that Thomas had given some credence to the idea that the bread in the Eucharist is for the body and the wine and the blood for the, what, soul, right? You heard that said before? And it's kind of, I've heard that before, but you may notice it again in here. And, you know, this famous psalm there about the Eucharist, O God, you are my God whom I seek for you, my flesh pines and my soul thirsts, like the earth, you know, you do not bring the one. But notice I've mentioned the flesh first, right, before the soul. That's kind of strange, because the soul more, you see. But it's the same order of the, you always get the bread before you get the wine, right, in church, right? One always receives the bread before the wine if you receive under both ones, you know. The soul is thirsty. Yeah, yeah. And I don't think it means, you know, you know, if you just receive the body, the bread and not the wine, you know, that you're not getting the whole. But I mean, there's a sin of appropriation there. I'm thinking today, if there wasn't also a way in which you could say that the bread is ordered to faith and the wine to charity. You know how it says in the anima Christi, you know, the inibria out there, the wine, right, is always understood as referring to love, right? Okay. But I know it's like in Thomas' prayer, I don't know if you know his prayer after communion, you know. But he says, sit mehi armatura fide et scutum vone voluntatis, eh? May it be to me the armor of, what, faith and the shield of good will. Notice the order there, because the faith first and then the, what, the will and charity there for second, right? The same order of the, what, bread before the wine, eh? And, you know, if you go to Vatican II, it makes a kind of beautiful comparison on the one in Divine Revelation where it says that the church wants people to have from the mints of the table, right? The bread of the word and the bread of the Eucharist, right? It makes that comparison, right? And of course, you're talking about the bread of the word, you're thinking of faith, first of all, right? And so I say, if it's, if it, if there's truth to what I was seeing in the Eucharist, that in a certain way the bread is for the body and the wine for the soul, why couldn't you also say that in a certain way the bread is to, what, strengthen our faith, we do call this the mystery of faith, the sacrament, right? And the, the blood, your Eucharist, I mean, your, your charity, the love of God, huh? Okay? Because that inebriation, that intoxication, right? What I say in the spiritual, right, this refers to the intoxication of love, right? You say that the man who loves is, is mad, you know? It's a good way, right? Um, so. We have that in the prayer for communion that we have now that you sanctify our bodies with your holy body and purify our souls with your unforgivable blood. Okay, that's in the right, in the liturgy, yeah, that's, that's, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Which doesn't mean if you just receive it under the form of the body that you know, you know? I don't want to say how to explain it, but I mean, this is things, this is, this is, this is, this is a thing. But I remember this thing, other thing being said about the, the faith and, and love and charity, you know? But thinking about Thomas' prayer again, sit me, armature, fide, scutum, the same order, right? Okay. Now to the third it should be said, that this also, right, pertains to the perfect unity of God, that those things which are, what, multiplied and divided in other things are in Him, in a simple way, in a united way. Okay. And from this it happens that, what is one in a thing, and many according to what thought? Because our understanding, in many ways, grasps Him, just as things in many ways represent Him, right? Okay? And this goes back to the great truth that, what, every agent, every maker makes something like itself, right? So God's effects have to be like Him, right? But since they're not one and simple like He is, they have to be like Him in many different ways, right? And since we know God through His effects, right, then corresponding to these many ways in which creatures are like Him, we have many thoughts about God, and they all in some sense correspond to God because this multiplied perfections and creatures, each of them in some way, is like God, right? And so the thought we have from them that we used to come back to God does correspond to something in God, right? So, I mean, that last comparison is the reason in a sense, right? Why we have many thoughts, right? Because the perfection of God is altogether simple and one, and creatures can only be like Him in many different ways that are imperfect. And so when we know God through His effects, we're going to have to know Him through many thoughts, right? And these thoughts will represent Him, each one of them, in some imperfect way, right? In the same way that each of these perfections and the creatures represent in some imperfect way the divine perfection. So it's kind of beautiful to see that, huh? Reminds me a little bit of what Thomas says when he's talking about why, you know, the universe requires intellectual creatures, huh? So that you might have likeness of God not only in an actual order, but in the order of what? Yeah, right, yeah. But not only are they like there, but since one is derived from the other insofar as we know God starting from knowing things, right? So is that clear that they're not synonyms then? Why they're not synonyms? Why they're not synonyms? Why they're not synonyms? Okay. Now, these next two articles here, especially the next one here, this is important now because if we know God from creatures, if we know the perfection of God in a sense of the perfection of creatures, right? Which in some distant way, right? Infinitely distant way. Imitate him, huh? We name these perfections as they're found in creatures first, right? Then we turn to God, what names or what words do we use? See? Do we invent new words or do we carry these words over? Well, we carry these words over, but when we carry them over, do they have the same what? Meaning? No. So Thomas is very concrete, he'll use an expression, even when he's talking in the fifth book of wisdom, that we place a word upon something, right? And we, you know, in Latin we say impositio nominis, but impositio means a placing upon, right? But we speak that way in English, you know, we say put a label upon something, put a name upon something, right? So you put a name upon something, then you pick up the name, and we carry it over, and place it upon something else, but, in the case of an equivocal word, an equivocal by reason especially, it has a new what? Meaning. Meaning, right, huh? And as long as we carry it over again, right? Okay? Mm-hmm. And so, you know, I mentioned the famous text there in the fourth book, Natural Hearing, Physics, where Thomas points out how the word in, or the words to be in, are first placed upon being in this room. And then they're carried over to a part being in a whole, right? And then carried over to the genus being in the species. And then carried over to the species being in the genus! And then carried over to the form being in matter. And then carried over to the whole being in its parts. And then carried over to your being in my power. And finally to, you know, where your treasure is that your heart should be. It's carried over. But each time it's carried over, there's a little different meaning, right? But the mind is led along by the word that's carried over, right? But it's got to understand the difference in meaning when it's carried over each time. In Latin you see sometimes the phrase there, translatio nominisa, but trans is across or over, and latio is carried, right? Carrying over of a name, huh? Monsignor Diana says sometimes about somebody, you can't move the word. You can't pick it up and carry it over, right? But people get into trouble, you know, mixing up these meanings, right? What you'll notice is that in trying to understand or use a word in a later meaning, they fall back upon the earlier meaning. And so, for example, Anaxagoras is trying to see, you can't get something out of nothing, right? And so, if something comes out of matter, it's got to already be in there, right? So he's kind of imagining everything that can be made out of matter as being in there, something like things are in a place. And so he's falling back upon the earlier meaning, you know? Or like a part and a whole or something, you know? Okay. To the fifth one proceeds thus. It seems that those things which are said of God and creatures are said of them, what? Univocally, huh? Univocally means with the same, what? Meaning, right? Exactly the same meaning. Univocally. For everything equivocally is deduced to something univocally. As the many to the one. For this name, what? Dog, right? Is said equivocally of the, what? The latravity. The barking one. And the, what? Sea one, right? I like the word lion sometimes. Speaking of sea lion, you see these little things, you know? Like a little, or horse, like that horse. Is necessary that of some things it be said univocally, right? Example of all those that are barking, right? Okay. Otherwise one would go on forever, right? There are found, however, some univocal agents which come together with their effects and names and definitions. As man generates man, right? And some agents are equivocal. As the sun causes heat, huh? Since, however, it itself is hot. Only in the equivocal sense, huh? It seems, therefore, that the first agent to which all agents are reduced is a univocal agent. And thus, whatever I said of God and creatures are said of them, what? Univocally, right? Okay. Well, in a sense, I suppose what you're thinking here is, you take a word like bat, let's say, right? And bat is said of the thing used in baseball and of the thing that flies out of the church belfry, equivocally, right? Okay. But it's said univocally of the baseball bats, right? And it's said univocally of the ones that fly out of them, right? So, it seems fundamental that there's something univocal underlying the, what? Equivocal, right? Okay. In other words, if bat was not said of baseball bats, it wouldn't be said equivocally of baseball bats and the flying ones, right? Okay. And it could be said of, say, the baseball bats and we had a different word for the thing that flies out of the thing, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. So, that's kind of seeing, trying to make the idea that the univocal is underlying the equivocal and therefore, if God underlies everything, he must be, something like that, the argument is going. Offspring. That's the famous distinction between the univocal and the equivocal cause, huh? Mm-hmm. So, when dogs produce dogs or cats produce cats, that's called univocal causation because the offspring is a, what, cat in the same way that the parents are cats, right? Okay. Okay. But, um, when the sun, huh? It produces something, yeah? Mm-hmm. It's equivocal, huh? It's interesting there, Thomas' use of that when he's talking about whether, I just got through the trees in the resurrection there, 43rd distinction. And he's asking, is the resurrection of Christ a cause of our resurrection? Mm-hmm. Okay. And Thomas says, well, the divinity of Christ, right, is an equivocal cause of our resurrection, right? Mm-hmm. But the human nature of Christ is as a, what, a difficult cause, huh? See? Mm-hmm. Because God in his divine nature can't, what, rise from the dead in the way we are going to rise from the dead, right? But we're going to rise from the dead in the same way that, what, Christ did, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But, of course, he's a univocal cause that is joined to the equivocal cause, right? So, through him, right, huh? We're going to rise, huh? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Interesting. That's a very important distinction. Moreover, according to equivocals, there's not noted any likeness. Now, he's thinking, of course, of what we call, what, equivocal by what? Chance, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But let me come back a little bit to the equivocal of this word here. Remember this way of naming that I talked to you about before? That sometimes a common name, send the two with even the same meaning, is kept by one of them as its own name. Mm-hmm. And the other gets a new name, right? Mm-hmm. Because it has something that stands out right. Mm-hmm. I just got through a reading article by Thomas there in the sentences, whether incest is fornication. Well, in the broad sense, fornication is fornication. Mm-hmm. But because it has a special, nominally, extra reason for being bad, right, huh? It gets a new name, incest, right? And, uh, the, uh, one that just has, you know, keeps the name fornication, right? Okay. And then he gives another meaning of incest there, not Costas. Mm-hmm. And he says, and then he says you're naming it by a total messiah. Oh. Mm-hmm. You know, the fornicator is unchaste, but you could say the man of incest is really! I mean, very much so! Terribly so! Right? I mean... Okay. Um, now, um, when you talk about one name said of many things, sometimes we divide that into, what? Two. Now, if it's said of many things, ah, the same exact meaning in each, then we say it's, what? Univocal, right? If it's said with other meanings, then we say it's, what? Equivocal, right? Okay. But, some divides, right? Univocal, right? And we say, well, sometimes it merely happens that the same word, the same vocal sound signifies two, right? Univocal, right, then? And then we say it's by, what? Chance. Like, in class, you might have two students named Michael or two girls named Mary, right? And some look at these two and they say, oh, they need the same name because they've got the same shape of the nose or something. No. So, it's just happened. It just happened. two persons who are, what, have the same name, right, huh? Okay? But sometimes there's a reason why the same name is given to two, right? And then we say it's equivocal by reason, right? Okay? Now, in that case, there's a connection among the meanings, an order among the meanings, right? In this case over here, there's no connection among the meanings and it means no order among the meanings. Does bat, first of all, mean the piece of wood used in baseball or does it first of all mean the, what? Yeah, well, neither one, then there's no order there, right? You see? Well, in the case of the word to be in, right, it first means to be in place, right? And then you can go through the meanings, right? So this adds something noteworthy, right? This adds nothing beyond the idea of, what, many meanings. It just has many meanings, period. But this has not only many meanings, but many meanings in a certain order, right? There's a reason for it, right? Now, sometimes then the equivocal by reason gets a new name because it adds something significant. And then that word that people have used is an ellipse, right? Again, to clarify that word because it comes in the word for proportion and not every name equivocal by reason takes place to reason or proportion or proportions. But anyway, they give it a new name. And this keeps sometimes the, what, common name, right? Okay. Now, sometimes Thomas, when he divides one name said of many things, you know, found the rule of two or three, since you have here two, sometimes, you know, he'll divide into three right away. And he'll say either it's said of many things with entirely the same meaning in each case, which is this here, right? Or with entirely different meanings, and that's this down here. Or else you have this middle case where it's not entirely the same, but it's not entirely different. There's a connection among them, right? Okay? So it's similarity meanings. And then you speak of univocal, and again, you might use the equivocal for the other extreme, and the analog is for that middle one, right? He often divides it into three instead of into two, right? Okay? And neither way is the correct way. You can use either way. Okay? So I mentioned this as being of general use to see how we use the words, but also because of this objection, right? Because this objection is taking the equivocal as meaning what? There's no likeness among the meanings, no connection among the meanings. They sometimes call this purely equivocal, right? Okay? It's not a way to say finally speaking of it sometimes, huh? But sometimes they simply call it equivocal. You see? You see? As I say, you can use the word equivocal also for the equivocal by reason, right? Okay? So this objection is saying, according to equivocal words, there's not to be attended or noted any likeness, right? But since therefore there's some likeness of creature to God, according to that of Genesis 1.26, let us make man to our image of likeness, right? It seems that something is said uniquely of God and creatures, huh? Now the third objection. Further, the measure is homogenous to the measure. It's not the same kind as the thing measured, as it said in the 10th book of the metaphysics. So, of course, you can see this most clearly in mathematics, huh? You might measure a line by inches, right? But the inch is really a, what? A length, just as a line is a length. You might measure a surface by square inches. See? You wouldn't measure a surface by inches, would you? How many inches is a surface? You know, it's got to be a surface, a square inch of surface. And you measure a volume by, say, a cubic inch or something of that sort, right? But a cubic inch is a, what, body or a three-dimensional thing just as the thing you're measuring, right? So this is the idea that a measure has to be homogenous, which God says the virtuous man is a measure of all other men. But God, or Mozart, is a measure of all musicians, huh? Or Homer, or all poets. But God is the first measure of all things, as has been said, right? Now, it's interesting, you know, how Thomas, and I think I mentioned this in our study of the attributes of God, to some of the attributes he attaches some other attribute. So to perfect he attaches good, huh? to infinite, that he's everywhere, right? And to unchangeable, that he's eternal, right? But he could, and he often does, following Aristotle, say that it's appropriate to the one to be a measure, right? And so you could attach to consideration of unity of God that he's the measure of all things. And the great teacher there of Aristotle, Plato there in his last work, the laws, you know, he says, well, Protagoras is mistaken when he says that man is a measure of all things. If God is a measure of all things, right? Okay? And so, so if God is the first measure of all things, he's got to be homogeneous, and there something must be said, what? Eudivically, right? Okay? But again, this may be using the word measure in a broader sense when you say God is the measure of all things. And therefore, something is significant of God in creatures. But against this, whatever is said of some things according to the same name and not according to the same meaning is predicated them equivocally. But no name belongs to God according to that reason, according as it is said of the creature. For example, wisdom in the creature is a quality, right? One of the kinds of accidents. But it's not an accident in God. For the genus, varied changes the notion, right? Why? Because the genus is the first part of the definition, as Porphyry tells you. And the same reason other things. Therefore, whatever is said of God in creatures is said equivocally. That seems pretty good to me. Moreover, God is more distant from the creatures than creatures from each other. But on account of the distance of some creatures, it happens that nothing can be said of them what, univocally? Just as of those things which do not come together in the same genus, huh? So there are ten categories, right? So if you say thing of what? Of a man and the shape of the man doesn't have exactly the same meaning, does it? Right? And a man and a dog are two things in a different way than a man and his shape are two things. You know? If you went down and asked a man in the ministry, you'd kind of see that. You'd say, a man and a dog would do the same thing. They're two things, right? Yeah. How about a man and his shape? Are they two things? You know? Well, it seems to be different than the man and the dog. Because the man and the dog can exist by themselves, right? But the shape of the man seems to be something of the man, right? And that really is something, a thing really distinct from him. So if some creatures are so far apart that you can't say anything with the same meaning of them, right? You can't say thing of the shape of the man, the man in the same sense, then even much less, right? Of God and creatures, right? Okay. So my being a man and my being in this room, is that being said of my being a man and my being in this room in the same meaning? And that's why when I was generated, I came to be, right? But when I came into this room today, did I come to be? Came to be in this room. I got to qualify, right? So it's not exactly the same meaning, right? You know? And when I leave this room, I'll cease to be. Yeah, yeah. I got to qualify, you see? So being is not said of the same meaning. So if my being and my being in this room are that far apart, you can't say something with the same meaning of it. Being can't be said at least with the same meaning. How much more so the one who says, I am who I am, right? So you can say to St. Catherine of Siena, you know, remember two things? I am who I am, and you are she who is not. But that's to be far apart, right? More so than my being in this room, right? I wouldn't say that my being in my room is my not being, but it's, you know, it's not being a man. Okay. My answer, it should be said that it is impossible for something to be said of God and creatures, what? Univocally, right? Because every effect not equaling the power of the agent cause, the mover, the maker, receives the likeness of the mover or maker, the agent, not according to the same, what? Definition, but in a, what? Deficient way, right? Thus, that what is in a divided and multiplied way, in effects, is in the cause simply and in the same way. Just as the sun, according to one power, produces many and various forms in these inferior things. In the same way, as has been said above, all the perfections of creatures, all of them, which are in created things in a divided and multiplied way, exist, pre-exist in God, in a, what? United way, right? Thus, therefore, when some name pertaining to perfection is said of the creature, it signifies that perfection as distinct, right? By reason of its definition of the mother's things, as when this name wise is said of man, it signifies some perfection that is really distinct from the nature of man, and from his power, and from his being, and from all of these things. So for me, to be is not to be wise, which it were, but it ain't. But when this name we say of God, we do not intend to signify something distinct from his, what? Him, or his being, right? So for God to be, and for God to be wise, are two different things. And thus, when this name wise is said of man, in a certain way, it, what, draws a line around, and comprehends the thing signified. But not when it is said of God, but it leaves the thing signified as not comprehended, and is exceeding the signification of the, what, name, like, the, Danish will speak of supersapiens, you know, and then, okay? Whence it is clear that not according to the same reason, or same thought, or definition, this name is said of God and of man, right? And the same reason about others. Whence no name is said indivacally of God and, what, creatures, huh? But neither is something said purely equivocally, like I was mentioning, that's another way they speak of this sometimes, huh? Okay. Equivocal by chance, or purely equivocal, right? Okay. As some say. Because, according to this, from creatures, nothing could be known about God, right? There are nothing demonstrated. But there would always happen the fallacy of, what? Equivocation. And this is both against the philosophers, who prove many things to monstity of God, and also against the apostles, saying in Romans, verse 1, or chapter 1, rather, verse 20, the invisible things of God are understood the things that are made, right? That's the famous text that the Church uses in the First Vatican Council, right? And it's saying, ex copita, that man can know God from, what? Creatures. It should be said, yeah. It should be said, therefore, that these names are said of God and creatures by, what? Analogy, right? That's the Greek word, analogia. That is proportion, right? So you look at the English translation there of Euclid, the Greek word would be amogia, and it would be translated proportion, right? Okay. And then he distinguishes two ways in which this happens, right? Either because many things, and the Thomas often uses the word proportion, not in the way Euclid does for a likeness of ratios, but for a ratio itself, right? Okay. So the word proportion becomes, what? Equivocal, right? It can mean a ratio or a likeness of ratios, huh? But either because many things have a ratio to one thing, right? As, for example, healthy is said of medicine and urine, right? Insofar as both of these have some order, right? And ratio to the health of the animal, of which the one is a sign, right? The urine, and the other a cause, the medicine, right? Okay. Or if I said your complexion is healthy, right? Okay. Or if I said your exercise is healthy, right? Well, does healthy mean the same thing said of your complexion, your looks, instead of your exercise, say it? No. Instead of your exercise, because it's productive or conserving of health, instead of your complexion, not because it does that, but because it's a sign that you're in good condition. So sometimes it's said of two things and by other ratios to the same thing. Or it's said of two things by the ratio of what? One to the other, right? As healthy is said of medicine and of the animal, insofar as medicine is the cause of the health which is in the what? Animal, right? So I'd like to say the first meaning of healthy is to have your body in a good condition, right? Other things are said to be healthy, not because they have their body in a good condition, but because they are productive of that or because they're signaling that or something of that sort, right? And in this way, some things are said of God and creatures on a logiche, right? And not purely equivocally, nor univocally. There he has the three that he distinguishes sometimes, huh? For we are not able to name God except from creatures, right? So we have to carry over names from creatures to God, right? This will be a primary address or explicitly the order there in the next lexum. And thus, whatever is said of God and creatures is said according as there is some order of the creature to God, right? As to a beginning and cause in which pre-exists, in a more excellent way, all the perfections of things, right? And this way of community is a middle, right? Between pure equivocation and what is simply unification, huh? Okay. So there you, Thomas is touching upon that division where you suddenly divide them into what? Three. Three. Yeah, yeah. You know, you have the two extremes and something in the middle, right? Oh, yeah. Okay? Nor in those things which are said analogously is there one definition as in univocal things. Nor the wholly diverse as in equivocals. Now he's using equivocals just to mean what? Purely equivocal. Or equivocal by what? Chance, right? But here he just calls it in equivocis, right? And that's an example of what? It's keeping the common name, right? As its own, right? Okay? So the equivocal by chance is a more precise way of stating it, maybe, right? Purely equivocal, right? But the equivocal by chance or purely equivocal sometimes just keeps the name equivocal as its own. Okay? So I say to the students, if the biology teacher says you're an animal, he may not be insulting you. He may be the way they understand it now. But if your girlfriend says you're an animal, it's an insult. But in one case, you're using animal as common to man and the beast, right? Other case, you're keeping the name animal for the beast. Okay? So sometimes we divide man against the, what? Animals, right? Other times you say man is an animal without being, yeah. Nor are they totally diverse. Other times you say man is an animal without being, yeah. Other times you say man is an animal without being, yeah. Other times you say man is an animal without being, yeah. But the name is thus said many ways, it signifies diverse, what, ratios to something one, right? As healthy said of urine signifies a sign of a healthy animal, of medicine it signifies a cause of insanity. That's the old example of Aristides in the fourth book of Wisdom, right? He's talking about how the word being is said critically, right? He compares it to the way medical is said or the word healthy is said. He used those two examples, but okay, take a little break here before I do the advice and objection here.